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In the aftermath of the U.S. 2003 invasion of Iraq, a number of news media outlets revisited their 
pre-invasion coverage, expressing public regret over perceived coverage gaps, and conducting 
deep internal self-examination over policies and procedures that might have contributed to their 
confessed incomplete reporting. The unprecedented editorial page apology by the New York 
Times, as well as the ongoing narrative of U.S. government and administration officials, resonate 
with some ethical tenets of utilitarianism, though unacknowledged and incomplete. The enduring 
influence of this ethical tradition, and of John Stuart Mill, its main proponent, emerged 
especially in scholarly activity surrounding the 2006 bicentennial of his birth and the 2013 
sesquicentennial of his book, Utilitarianism. A deep reading of this book surfaced a previously 
unexamined emphasis on security as the “most vital” interest for the greater good, and suggested 
a five-part Millian Security Principles model for war coverage. A pilot test of this model on a 
small sample suggested by the Times editors revealed utilitarian gaps in that coverage. Despite 
encountering several limitations from that small sample, the model provided several useful 
points of analysis of that coverage and suggestions for improvement. Further, the model appears 
to offer further applications for enhanced coverage of traditional war, of newly emerging conflict 
types, and of general community well-being, as well as a new framework for normative 
enterprise reporting practice, media ethics practice and research, and journalism education. 
 Keywords: John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism, consequentialism, just war theory, war ethics, 
media ethics, normative ethics, 2003 Iraq invasion, 2003 Iraq war, The New York Times, 
security, justice, journalism, reporting, war correspondence, asymmetrical war, terrorism, free 
press, community journalism, citizen reporting, civilian command, democracy.  
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Introduction: War coverage is often inadequate 
Journalism, the “first draft of history” (i.e. Barth, 1943, p. 667), often drafts a history of 
both individual tragedy and violence – “the oldest kinds of stories” (Coté & Simpson, 2000, p. 3) 
– as well as one of collective deadly conflict. “Come see the violence inherent in the system!” 
cries the satirical medieval Anarcho-Syndicalist – humorous, in part, because we know it to be 
true (Forstater, White, Gilliam, & Jones, 1975). Perennially, war and storytelling remain 
inextricably linked: “Few events ... affect people more than war” (Copeland, 2005, p. xlvii). 
“Because of the far-reaching effects of war, we want to know as much about it as possible.”  
Historically, “all wars have been fought by the latest technology available in any 
culture,” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 375); unsurprisingly, “the history of communications technology is 
often pegged to a succession of wars” (Carruthers, 2011, p. 1). Humankind’s “first written epic” 
chronicled the triumphs of Gilgamesh in what is now Iraq (Sasson, 1972); four millennia later, 
“some 500 reporters” armed with “digital cameras … [and] portable satellite dishes” prepared to 
return to the scene of that earlier epic and provide their own audiences with unprecedented, 
“direct-from-the-front coverage” (Johnson, 2003, para. 9).  
Regardless of continuing advances in media technology, and despite myriad perennial 
challenges of war coverage, ethical journalists still aspire to somehow “seek truth and report it” – 
as well as to “acknowledge mistakes and correct them” (Society, 2014, p. 1) – because “language 
is the primary means of social formation and ... human existence is impossible without an 
overriding commitment to truth” (Christians, 1997, p. 13). Indeed, the very “essence of 
journalism is a discipline of verification” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 12).  
So, when the New York Times noted in its May 26, 2004 lead editorial that “this 
newspaper has shone the bright light of hindsight on decisions that led the United States into 
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Iraq. … It is past time we turned the same light on ourselves” (From, 2004a, para. 1), other 
outlets “pointed to the ... Times as a paragon of journalistic virtue” in “a chorus of appreciation 
for the … decision to admit to its readers that it let them down” (Greenslade, 2004, p. 5).  
Unfortunately, regardless of hindsight’s clarity, “correcting the record in the aftermath of 
war cannot reverse the history propelled by such narratives” (Carruthers, p. 5). However ethical 
journalists are encouraged to “consider the long-term implications ... of publication” and to 
“provide updated and more complete information” (Society, p. 1); indeed, “newspapers should 
… discover why the mistakes were made and ... prevent their repetition” (Monbiot, 2004, p. 19).  
Further, it wasn’t just the Times on the 2003 invasion bandwagon: “I remember almost 
every editorial page in America saying, ‘yeah, we should go to war,’” recalled one U.S. senator 
(Sanders, 2015, para. 18). Indeed: “The mainstream press was not aggressive enough … in 
asking the hard questions about the War on Terror,” said Dean Baquet, Times executive editor, a 
decade later (Hülsen & Stark, 2015, para. 60). In retrospect, then, just what were those “hard 
questions” the press failed to ask? Further, did anyone ever ask them? Finally, how might ethical 
journalists resolve to be sure to ask them the next time war is proposed?  
By accident or design, ongoing debates over waging war – as well as on covering it – 
often include arguments from a consequentialist, or outcomes, perspective. Recently, one scholar 
embraced this dynamic by proposing a Utilitarian War Principle that “invites extremely hard 
questions, such as ... are the goods that this war seeks to secure ... worth the projected loss of 
these many lives and this much material damage?” (Shaw, 2011, p. 289). Echoing the repentant 
Times, “it is precisely tough questions of this sort that one should be asking.”  
Informed by a resurgent interest in utilitarianism – and especially in John Stuart Mill – 
and an increasing focus on war correspondence (cf. Copeland) as well as on media ethics, this 
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dissertation considers several of those questions. First, I propose five Millian Security Principles, 
and 12 associated Security Questions, based on my reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism, informed by 
recent research. Then, I test the utility of this Millian instrument through an ethnographic 
Qualitative Document Analysis of a brief sample of the Times’ Iraq reportage.  
Implicit in the Times editor’s apology are three major assumptions: First, the most 
important assertion, in the very first sentence, is that the “decisions that led the United States into 
Iraq” somehow involved multiple “failings of American and allied intelligence” (From, 2004a, 
para. 1). In other words, the federal government must justify its decision to go to war.  
Second, the Times makes the assumption that U.S. citizens must retain full access to this 
information. “In most cases, what we reported was an accurate reflection of the state of our 
knowledge at the time, much of it painstakingly extracted from intelligence agencies that were 
themselves dependent on sketchy information” (para. 2). In other words, whatever information 
the U.S. government had, the press fully intended to share with its readers.  
And finally, the editors make the assumption that a free press must question its 
government officials, especially on a topic as existential as a decision to go to war. “We consider 
the story of Iraq’s weapons, and of the pattern of misinformation, to be unfinished business,” 
they concluded (para. 14). “And we fully intend to continue aggressive reporting aimed at setting 
the record straight.”  
Each of these assumptions carry implicit, if not explicit, appeals to utilitarianism. And of 
course they would, Mill would argue: the “principle of utility … has had a large share in forming 
the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority” (1863, p. 4). For one 
thing, Mill drank from the same Enlightenment stream as the authors of the U.S. Constitution (cf. 
McCloskey, 1963), whose First Amendment enshrined concepts of press freedom and active 
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citizenship reflected by the Times editors. For another, utilitarianism has been an influential 
philosophical tradition in the West for two centuries (cf. Miller, 2010a). Finally, the tradition 
remains significant in media ethics research (cf. Christians, 2007; Elliott, 2007; Peck, 2006). 
This study extends that research at the intersection of media ethics and military ethics by 
addressing gaps in the literature of both: Neither address Millian security.  
More than 150 years after its publication, John Stuart Mill’s classic tome Utilitarianism, 
as well as many of his other writings, continue to exert a perennial influence in philosophical 
musings on ethics. “Mill was one of the most outstanding British intellectuals of the nineteenth 
century,” notes one scholar (Ahn, 2011, p. 81); today, utilitarianism remains “enormously 
influential” (Christians, 2007, p. 113; Harris, 2002; Kymlicka, 1990; Sandberg, 2013).  
Mill’s arguments in Utilitarianism – such as “[a]ll action is for the sake of some end” (p. 
2), “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness” (p. 8), “security [is] the 
most vital of all interests” (67), “any conduct which threatens the security of the society … is 
threatening to his own” (63), and “justice … grounded on utility [is] the chief part … of all 
morality (p. 73) – continue to be invoked in ethical discussions of war, journalism, and any 
number of issues. The 2006 bicentennial of his birth, and the 2013 sesquicentennial of his 
Utilitarianism, witnessed a renewed scholarly interest in Mill’s longstanding contributions (cf. 
Skorupski, 2006; Su, 2013; Ten, 2008; Varouxakis, & Kelly, 2010; Villa, 2017).  
After asserting that every other moral tradition draws upon utility in some way, Mill 
concluded that “I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the 
chief obstacle which impedes its reception” (p. 6). Believing that “education and opinion” are 
key to public enlightenment (p. 21), he set about adapting Jeremy Bentham’s original conception 
of the philosophy into a more broad and yet more focused ethic.  
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Over the years, both Mill and the tradition have attracted their share of criticisms 
(Eggleston & Miller, 2014; Schultz, 2017; Spiegelberg, 1961) – for being too cold (Kors, 2011), 
too calculating (Taylor, 1995; Woodcock, 2010), too difficult to navigate (Kagan, 1984; West, 
2006), and too easily abused (Baron, 1994; Brandt, 1959; Sachs, 2010). However, key Millian 
contributions such as an enhanced definition of the good (Harsanyi, 1982), an aggregate greater 
good (Shaver, 2004), and his defense of liberty (Gray, 2000) remain influential today.  
The decision to go to war is one of the most important ethical decisions a nation can 
consider, Mill wrote (1859b), as it calls for sacrifice in service of some greater communal good 
(Ellul, 1969; Gustafson, 2013; Mill, 1862a). Unfortunately, war tends to escalate out of bounds 
(Clausewitz, 1873) “if unchecked by political goals” (Hamblet, 2005, p. 39; Tierney, 2018).  
However, despite these very teleological trappings, the utilitarian tradition has dealt very 
briefly with the question of war; instead, war ethicists usually adopt pacifism, realism, or just 
war theory (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016). While pacifism involves mostly virtue and deontological 
ethical impulses, it may be seen as having some utilitarian impetus as well. Realism, which holds 
that war is outside of morality (Carlson, 2008; Shaw, 2011), is sometimes defended by a myopic, 
incomplete appeal to utility (Ahn, 2011; Ballacci, 2018). Just war theory is a mediating 
consequentialist approach that allows for some very restricted warfare, but under tight control in 
three arenas of justice: going to war, fighting in war, and ending a war (Bell, 2009; Dubik, 2016; 
Lazar, 2016; Ramsey, 1961; Walzer, 1977; Whitman, 1993).  
The early utilitarian philosophers judged war as “almost always deleterious” (Shaw, 
2014, p. 303.). Jeremy Bentham (1838–43) and James Mill (1808) had no use for war. Yet John 
Stuart Mill allowed war a very rare window (1862a) – but only when justified by utility (Hayek, 
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1963; Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2106; Williams, 1989) as an aggregate self defense, then later as a 
balance between rights, eventually as a means of justice, and finally as an aggregate justice.  
The 9/11 acts of terrorism and subsequent military responses brought new utilitarian 
scholarship to bear on the question of war (Brandt, 1972; Bykvist, 2010; Nahra, 2013). Most 
recently, Shaw synthesized disparate elements of the ongoing debate into his Utilitarian War 
Principle (2011, 2014, 2016), which “swims against the current of contemporary … approaches 
to war ethics (2016, p. x) and incorporates just war tenets – but not security.  
Interestingly, a nearly opposite dynamic drives media ethics scholarship, where thinkers 
have long encountered a strong current of utilitarianism: “The mainstream press … codes of 
ethics, and media textbooks are dominated by various strains of it” (Christians, 2007, p. 116).  
 In the United States, it would seem that the First Amendment to the Constitution seeks no 
justification for protecting a free press – other than the virtue of free expression. “Few have 
subscribed to this notion wholeheartedly” (Pember & Calvert, 2008, p. 43); instead, the half-
dozen legal theories that have evolved around these first freedoms all appear to justify 
themselves with appeals to consequence, if not to outright utility. Especially the marketplace of 
ideas theory, which “dominates the ... discussion of freedom of speech” (Baker, 1989, p. 7), “can 
be traced back to … Mill” (Pember & Calvert, p. 45), who championed “the ‘liberty of the press’ 
... against corrupt or tyrannical government” (Mill, 1859a, p. 228). Today, utility is seen 
defending press freedom, and defining its duty and scope, but not quite yet directing its focus.  
Along the way, some media ethicists have found fault with it. “Utilitarian ethics has 
major weaknesses,” charged Christians (2007, p. 120), including charges that no one can truly 
reduce the good to a single value, or accurately predict an outcome (Quinn, 2007, p. 175).  
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Media ethicists continue to reconsider Mill’s contributions in light of recent scholarship. 
Writing during Mill’s bicentennial, Lee Anne Peck emphasized that “utility is not an excuse for 
unethical behavior … Ultimately, using Mill's theory correctly means responsibly serving the 
public” (2006, pp. 211-212) in a way that maximizes good in community. Building on this, Deni 
Elliott blamed this “simplistic reasoning” on an inadequate understanding of Mill’s explication 
of justice in Utilitarianism. Instead, “Mill requires calculating what is truly good for the whole 
community” (2007, p. 100). However, neither scholar addresses Millian security.  
The literature gaps in both martial ethics and media ethics converge in the unique U.S. 
civilian command military model, enshrined in the Constitution along with the First Amendment 
freedoms. Here, the citizen is given control over any Congressional ad Bellum decision to go to 
war, control over the civilian president who serves as commander-in-chief, and control over the 
public funding of the military. Further, the citizen staffs the military by serving as a soldier when 
needed (Offley, 2001; Millett & Maslowski, 1994.  
U.S. journalists continue to struggle with the First Amendment’s normative implications 
for their free-press “watchdog” craft in general, and wartime correspondence in particular 
(Aukofer & Lawrence, p. vii; Craig, 1996; McQuail, 1994; Merrill, 1974; Offley, 2001).  
First, the practical demands of war coverage can limit what a correspondent can actually 
report, especially because of the need to focus on the immediate. And this is a perennial problem, 
as the U.S. goes to war about once every two decades (Beschsloss, 2018); over the years, 
American journalists have reported from at least 15 conflicts (Copeland, 2005).  
The nature of the military beat can influence press independence, as patriotic tendencies 
may interfere with objectivity (Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Ganz, 1983; Hallock, 2012). Further, the 
complexity of the modern military beat can overwhelm the inexperienced reporter (Snowden, 
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1916; Hale, 1896; Knightley, 1975), covering a different kind of war (Smith, 2005; Tierney, 
2018) – working with fewer resources (Pew, 2014) to meet heavier demands (Craig, 2011; 
Granatstein, 2008) – all at a significant risk of injury or death (Global safety, 2015; IFJ, 2016).  
In the end, very little of this coverage focuses on security. I propose to address these gaps 
in the literature by extending Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle, Peck’s insights on utilitarian 
community, and Elliott’s utilitarian justice checklist by focusing on a set of Millian Security 
Principles and associated guiding questions to extend the utility of each discipline.  
While increasingly difficult (Fullerton, 2016; Kalb, 2001; King, 2003) comprehensive 
conflict coverage, focused on the crucial ad Bellum planning narrative, remains vital to the 
security and survival of a civilian-command democracy.  
For one thing, Mill’s 155-year-old charge that public “sentiments, both of favour and of 
aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their 
happiness” (1863, p. 4) accurately describes the consequentialist, if not explicitly or 
acknowledged utilitarian, ethical appeal of much of the ad Bellum national conversation.  
For another, Mill’s definition of security as the most vital, indispensable good (p. 66) also 
rings true – and, unfortunately, existential-threat fear sells – not only for the commercial news 
media (Abramson, 2019; Blume, 2019; Brooks, 2016; Wang, 2016), but also for those politicians 
interested in motivating the public (Bamford, 2005; Bush, 2001, 2002, 2003; Saunders, 2004). In 
the long run, however, those motivations are not sustainable (Hadar, 2008; Mill, 1863; Nowicki, 
2013; Wolfers, 1952). Fear, as the song goes, may truly be “the mother of violence” (Gabriel & 
Gabriel, 1978, Track 3); “You know self-defense is all you need.”  
Instead, a focus on a more Millian conception of security could keep ethical journalists 
from pandering to a fickle and fleeting “feeling of security” (Blume, 2019; Braybrooke, 2004; 
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Doyle, 2015; Teleological, 2019), by shifting their focus onto consequential areas of justice and 
community. For Mill, security is inextricably linked to a rights-based justice that is ensured 
through communal consensus and action (1863; Peck, 2006; Elliott, 2007).  
This means an extension of the concept of individual self defense into a larger, utilitarian 
concept of aggregate defense that protects and promotes the greater good in sustainable ways. 
For the Millian correspondent, then, war coverage should consider how a given war might yield 
true, sustainable Security-through-Justice-for-All-involved.  
So, how should a free press cover a representative government in a civilian-command 
democracy – especially when, theoretically, so much power rests in the hands of the citizens?  
Normative press theory describes how media should ideally operate (Baran & Davis, 
2000; Christians et al, 2009; Glasser, 1986; Littlejohn, 1996; McQuail, 1994; Siebert, Peterson & 
Schramm, 1956; Vaca-Baqueiro, 2018; Vold, 1999). My normative prescription for war 
coverage draws on my constant-comparison reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism, which arrived at 
five Millian Security Principles: First, a Millian security would protect against a vital, existential 
threat. Second, a Millian security would preserve both immediate safety and future stability. 
Third, a Millian security would promote mutual justice. Fourth, a Millian security would produce 
mutual community. Fifth, a Millian security would practice considered utility.  
The first principle would address tangible threats and realistic outcomes while filtering 
out fear-based appeals. The second would address specific threats to ongoing security. The third 
principle would address the “justice of self-defence” (Mill, 1863, p. 68) through a rights-based 
approach. The fourth would address a secure community, which includes “our fellow-creatures” 
(p. 67) and a sustainable “general good” (p. 64) for all involved parties. The fifth principle would 
address specific utilitarian calculi in acting as a free, responsible, and useful press.  
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The ensuing conversation should be based on historical contexts, human tendencies of the 
past and present, and expected future issues. Further, it should be empirically based on fact and 
knowledge. Finally, the conversation would need to include an extended version of Shaw’s 
UWP, one that made sure to ask if the proposed course of action is the only one that would result 
in greater “Security-&-Justice-for-All” – otherwise, the proposal fails to prove utility.  
These principles should be useful for all armed conflicts, traditional, asymmetrical, or 
virtual clashes in cyberspace, because they focus the reporter’s attention onto security.  
Triangulating these three sets of utilitarian literature – Shaw’s UWP, incorporating just 
war theory; Elliott’s UDT focused on justice, incorporating Peck’s extension of Millian good and 
community; and my five Millian Security Principles drawn from Utilitarianism – we may begin 
to limn the basic toolkit of a truly Millian war correspondent, for whom we might ask the 
question “What would John Stuart Mill ask?”  
As a Millian citizen, he might ask about “Security-&-Justice-for-All” in terms of the 
general community: What is the nature of our security? On what is it based? To what is it 
vulnerable? And what might protect these vital, existential security elements?  
This begins with a focus on effects (Lyons, 1965), asking what might maximize the good 
(Johnson, 2013) for the general welfare (Urmson, 1953) of all involved (Peck, 2006), securing 
sustainable justice (Elliott, 2007) that will strengthen the community (Mill, 1863).  
As a Millian soldier, in a civilian-command military, he might ask about “Security-&-
Justice-for-All” in terms of proposed actions of defense and attack. What will this defense 
accomplish, whom will it benefit, and whom will it harm? Is this truly our last resort?  
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This begins with careful examination of proposed actions and their likely results (Shaw, 
2016), in light of Millian justice (Elliott, 2007) and community (Peck, 2006), while incorporating 
just war theory tenets as secondary moral principles (Shaw, 2011).  
As a Millian reporter, representing a free press, he might ask about “Security-&-Justice-
for-All” in terms of editorial independence: What, exactly, constitutes this community as “home” 
– and how is that being threatened? What secures our rights-based justice?  
This begins with careful preparation to cover foreign affairs (Hess, 2003) and the military 
beat (Patterson, 2013), a step away from infotainment (Edwards, 2003), and a renewed 
commitment to independence from the agencies to be covered (Allsop, 2019).  
The lack of U.S. press independence from governmental agenda setting became painfully 
evident in the aftermath of 9/11 (Janensch, 2004) – and again during the preparations for the Iraq 
invasion (Iraq, 2007). So, what “Security-&-Justice-for-All” questions would J. S. Mill ask in a 
truly Millian ad Bellum coverage? Beginning, with my five Millian Security Principles, I have 
derived a dozen questions to guide basic coverage from a security stance.  
For MSP 1: Threat: Security protects against a vital, existential threat, I derive three 
guiding questions: What is the specific nature of the perceived security threat? Whose specific 
security is actually being threatened? And, who, specifically, is threatening anyone?  
For MSP 2: Safety & Stability: Security preserves safety and stability, I derive two 
guiding questions: How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s present 
safety? And, how would this preserve anyone’s enduring stability?  
For MSP 3: Justice: Security promotes justice, I derive two guiding questions: How 
would this proposed response specifically promote justice for anyone’s present safety? And, how 
would this specifically promote justice for anyone’s enduring stability?  
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For MSP 4: Community: Security produces community, I derive two guiding questions: 
How would this proposed response specifically promote the present safety of all involved parties 
– and their larger communities? And, how would this specifically promote the enduring stability 
of all involved parties – and their larger communities?  
For MSP 5: Utility: Security practices utility, I derive three guiding questions: How 
would this proposed response specifically deter or “repel” this perceived threat? Further, how 
would this proposed response represent the only action available that would foreseeably promote 
the greatest expected well-being and least expected harm for all involved parties – including 
historical contexts and all possible alternatives? And, finally, how would all involved parties be 
harmed if the proposed response were not undertaken?  
Applying these principles and questions to the Times editors’ sample of its coverage of 
the 2003 Iraq invasion, I arrive at five corresponding Research Questions, which also incorporate 
the associated secondary questions for inquiry:  
RQ 1: How did the Times address security as protection against a vital, existential 
threat? So, just how did the staff cover governmental and public discussion of these issues?  
RQ 2: How did the Times address security as preserving safety and stability? How did 
they report on preserving national security immediately, as well as in the future? 
RQ 3: How did the Times address security as promoting justice? In this coverage, how 
did they address what would promote justice immediately, as well as sustainably in the future?  
RQ 4: How did the Times address security as producing community? How did this 
coverage address the safety of all involved, in both local and international communities?  
RQ 5: How did the Times address security as practicing utility? In other words, how did 
the Times report on administration claims in ways that would reflect a utilitarian calculus? 
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Indeed: “Nonconsequentialist approaches to military ethics have enjoyed supremacy” 
(Jenkins, 2017, p. 963); however, for the utilitarianist, “the proper response ... is not to abandon 
consequentialist thinking ... but rather to examine with as much specificity and meticulousness as 
possible the likely results” (Shaw, 2014, p. 309). Especially because war is unique (Walzer, 
1977), and journalists lack a useful, truly independent coverage paradigm, I will apply these 
initial Millian Security Principles-based research questions to measure just how effectively the 
citizen-journalists at the Times covered the crucial ad Bellum question “when, if ever, are we 
morally justified in waging war and ... how are we permitted to fight?” (Shaw, p. 303).  
Social science research brings together three disparate domains: the “Substantive”, or 
content to be studied; the “Conceptual,” or organizing ideas, and the “Methodological,” or 
examination procedures (McGrath, 1994, p. 152; Baran & Davis, 2000; Shoemaker, & Reese, 
2014). For this exploratory study, the substance of the narrative data, “already bounded by some 
existing public discourse” (Pauly, 1991, pp. 11-12), are the 29 Times stories, related to the Iraq 
invasion, identified by the editors (From, 2004b). The importance of the Times for research has 
long been established (Hallock, 2012; Lule, 2002; Miller, 1998).  
The conceptual organization of this study’s examination of these data is my Millian 
Security Principles research protocol, based on my reading of Utilitarianism, informed by the 
literature review of utilitarianism in military and media ethics. The methodological approach, 
suggested by the narrative nature of these data and the exploratory nature of this initial study, is 
an Ethnographic Content Analysis (Altheide, 1987; Altheide & Schneider, 2013; Carey, 2008; 
Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer, 2007; Lule, 2002; Pauly, 1991). Such an approach provides a 
framework for analysis that encompasses the Times articles as well as Mill’s Utilitarianism.  
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This study applies Altheide’s five-stage, 13-step Qualitative Document Analysis protocol 
(1987, 1996, 2013b; Altheide & Schneider, 2013), which guides inquiry into relevant documents, 
and allows for reflexive modification of the research that this interaction may suggest. In 
addition to its appropriateness for this kind of data, the QDA methodology has guided a number 
of research projects involving mediated appeals to fear-based security (Altheide, 2002, 2004, 
2009b, 2013a, 2017; Altheide et al, 2001; Atkinson & Leon Berg, 2012; Iqbal, 2017; Lumsden & 
Morgan, 2017; Nicole, 2017; Stögner & Bischof, 2018).  
In Altheide’s first QDA stage, Document Identification and Selection, I considered the 
Times initial reporting and subsequent self-critique. The unit of analysis is the single article. In 
Altheide’s second stage, Protocol Development and Data Collection, I turned to a constant 
comparison reading (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967) of Mill’s Utilitarianism, seeking a clearer 
understanding of the security-based arguments made by the U.S. government as reported in the 
Times. This reading suggested five categories – and, later, 12 questions – based on Mill’s 
conception of security as “the most vital of all interests” (1863, p. 66), informed by the extensive 
literature review. These were incorporated into a Coverage Research Protocol instrument for data 
collection. Adapting Altheide’s third stage, Data Coding and Organization, these Principles will 
be used to code the data, organize the resulting observations, identify further issues of 
importance, and suggest adaptations or changes to the instrument.  
In Altheide’s fourth stage, Data Analysis, I will conduct a qualitative content analysis of 
the Times data, taking notes throughout the process and summarizing my findings. Finally, in 
Altheide’s fifth stage, Reporting, I will combine these summaries with examples of each finding, 
include observations of significant examples and deviations, and integrate the findings with my 
original Millian Security Principles, situating them within the larger narrative.  
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Because of the universal nature of war in general, and the importance of the Times in 
covering the decision to go to war with Iraq in particular, I expect that Mill’s definition of 
security as justice through community will identify both strengths and weaknesses in that 
newspapers coverage, independent of the editors’ own valuation of their work. So I expect to 
discover how the Times coverage met, as well as failed to meet, Millian security definitions.  
Finally, in addition to testing and improving the Millian Security Principles model while 
analyzing the Times coverage, I expect this study will suggest some practical improvements for 
applying the model to future conflict correspondence, independent of tactics or venue. Though 
not comprehensive, this exploratory study seeks to refine this initial Millian security theoretical 
foundation to inform future war coverage research – as well as such coverage itself.  
Situating Millian Conflict Coverage in the Utilitarian Ethics Literature   
The framers of that document in 1787 knew that British and other European monarchs  
had abused their absolute authority to make war: if a regime was growing unpopular,  
they sometimes cited or invented a foreign danger in order to launch a war that would  
unite their people and expand their own power and popular esteem. To reduce the risk of  
such offenses by an American President, the Founders created a Constitution that gave  
Congress the sole power to wage war, and divided the responsibility to wage war  
between the executive and legislative branches. (Beschloss, 2018, pp. vii-viii)  
A decision to go to war represents the most consequential action a state can undertake on 
behalf of its citizens, who must bear both the significant costs of waging that war as well as its 
outcomes. Ultimately, it invokes the sanctioned “violent retaliation by members of a tribe or 
group against persons committing hostile acts towards group members” (Scott, 1950, p. 1).  
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In an age of increasing transparency, governments must work harder to “sell” such 
decisions to their publics (Freedman, 2004), while journalists must work harder to fact-check 
government claims of truth (Knightley, 2004); “War is Sell,” punned one media analyst (Miller, 
2002, p. 1). The U.S. government relied heavily on the threat of negative potential outcomes to 
support its decision to invade Iraq in 2003 – and the U.S. press, including the New York Times, 
reported those threats as part of its government coverage (Andersen, 2006; Bamford, 2005; 
Bumiller, 2002; From, 2004a, 2004b; Hallock, 2012; Theodoulou & Watson, 2002).  
When substantial evidence of those threats failed to materialize, many journalists 
returned to their original reportage and found shortcomings in their work. “The marketplace of 
ideas, however, failed to fulfill this function in the 2002-03 U.S. foreign policy debate over 
going to war with Iraq,” wrote one analyst (Kaufmann, 2004, p. 5). Statements by the Times 
editors in particular reveal an underlying consequentialist valuation at work: first, in the state’s 
given justifications for the war; second, in an assumed civic responsibility to examine those 
claims by the press generally and the Times particularly; and finally, in society’s questioning of 
the ongoing war’s decidedly increasing costs versus its apparently decreasing benefits.  
This “weighing of goods and harms to maximize benefit” (Craig, 2009, p. 204) is a key 
aspect of utilitarianism, whose best-known proponent, John Stuart Mill, remains an influential 
thinker. Some 150 years ago, Mill argued in his treatise Utilitarianism that all moral traditions 
appeal in some way to its ideal of happiness when justifying their definition of the good. This 
literature review reveals significant support for Mill’s claim in both historic and current debates 
over society in general, and over war and the press in particular. Further, it reveals an ongoing 
incomplete understanding of utilitarianism, despite new interpretations and considerations – and 
especially despite novel applications to both war ethics and media ethics. Finally, it suggests that 
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a revised reading of Mill’s concept of security as the greatest good, informed by recent 
utilitarianism scholarship, might address shortcomings in war coverage by the Times and others.  
Problematic Utilitarianism: Ubiquitous yet Incompletely Understood  
When the Times editors turned “the bright light of hindsight” upon themselves and 
confessed to “have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should 
have been” (From, 2004, p. A10), they re-enacted the timeless human tradition of self-
examination: “We all think in retrospect about actions we have done ... How have I come to have 
the projects I now have, and the attitudes I now have to those projects, and to many other things 
and people?” (Annas, 1995, p. 28). This particular example demonstrates several layers of 
consideration: first, a nation’s government attempts to justify its decision to go to war; second, 
the nation’s leading news outlets report these government claims; and finally, these professionals 
critique their work as more complete information emerges.  
In a number of public statements made throughout these events, both government 
agencies and the journalists who cover them reveal significant insights into their underlying 
attitudes about their goals, their distinct roles, and their larger social context – and a clearly 
normative, consequentialist, utilitarian professional ethic emerges from their words.  
“War is a complicated business. Due to the importance that civilized humans have given 
to it since the very beginning, it simply cannot be taken lightly” (Coetzee & Eysturlid, 2013, p. 
xix). Neither the U.S. officials nor the nation’s press took the invasion of Iraq lightly – and both 
entities relied on consequentialist arguments while deciding to go to war in 2003. However, new 
research suggests that the classic utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, in particular, has been 
incompletely understood and applied in both military ethics (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016) and 
journalism (Christians, 2007; Elliott, 2007). The intersection of these two trends, reflected in the 
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problematic approach to coverage of the 2003 invasion debate by the Times and others (Hess & 
Kalb, 2003; Kellner, 2004; Kull, Ramsay & Lewis, 2003), offers an opportunity to apply a 
revised reading of Mill to a reconsideration of war coverage standards and practices.  
An emerging public ethic.  
For social Weal, alike, each State was made,  
And every Calling meant the other’s Aid:  
Together all, in mystic Numbers, roll;  
All in their Order act, and serve the Whole. (Welstead, 1741, p. 5)  
“America will not accept a serious and mounting threat,” said then-President George W. 
Bush in his January, 2003 State of the Union address (Bush, 2003a, para. 78), in one of many 
statements by government officials justifying plans to invade Iraq that year. However, soon after 
that invasion, editors at the Times editors insisted that “we fully intend to continue aggressive 
reporting aimed at setting the record straight” (From, 2004, p. A10). Both statements reflect 
consequentialist attempts to justify one’s actions to the public.  
Statements like these reflect a larger tradition in Western culture of codifying and then 
pursuing ethical work standards for those whose actions affect the public interest, an “attempt to 
identify and justify principles that govern actions in general and actions within professions and 
fields of endeavor” (Ward, 2005, p. 6). However, these specific actions also reflect a growing 
trend in both U.S. government as well as media outlets, one of greater public transparency on 
issues of public interest. Technological and cultural trends combine to create a growing 
expectation among citizens for increased transparency from both state and non-government 
entities – and in this case, this transparency reveals utilitarian arguments at work.  
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Technology accelerates a culture of transparency. “We are suddenly eager to have 
things and people declare their beings totally,” noted one media thinker of electronic 
communications technology’s tendency to both enable and encourage transparency (McLuhan, 
1964, p. 6). Prophecy fulfilled: A half-century later, a recent survey of the 10 largest social 
media platforms tallied more than 11 billion individual accounts (Most famous, 2018), through 
which “things and people declare their beings totally” – and in such detail that users often cry 
“TMI” when someone publishes personal information traditionally considered inappropriate or 
intimate (Gil, 2018). In this increasingly uncomfortable environment, the same citizens who 
report feeling that they have lost control over their own digital information also assert that the 
increasing release of even classified government information serves the public interest (Rainie, 
2016).  
 The public demands greater government transparency. “Transparency is an intrinsic 
value of democratic societies” (Ruijer, 2017, p. 354). One former U.S. president succinctly 
summarized this ideal when he stated that a “democracy requires accountability and 
accountability requires transparency” (Obama, 2009, para. 1), then quoted former Justice Louis 
Brandeis’ famous observation that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” Within five 
years, heads of nearly 40 journalism advocacy agencies signed a letter to this same president, 
asking him to “stop the spin and let the sunshine in” (Cuillier, et. al., 2014, para. 1). In the end, 
secrecy by government agencies “nourishes the worst excesses of power” (Weiner, 2012, p. 54).  
For the U.S. government, transparency reflects “themes of fairness and equity, and 
impose a high level of expectation on the democratic process” (Finkelstein, 2000, pp. 1-2; 
Cooper, 2011; Ruijer, 2017), in which a “new culture of disclosure” informs a “monitory 
democracy” (Schudson, 2015, p. 276; p. 25). While this greater access to information may create 
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chaos (Vattimo, 1992), even once-sacrosanct state realms such as military planning (Kaspar, 
2001), and international relations (Larkin, 2016) continue to adapt to the new reality.  
Journalists aspire to greater transparency. Perennially, “accuracy and bias are important 
factors, but items that touch on transparency are also among the items that Americans rate most 
important” when asked why they distrust the news media (Indicators, 2018, p. 13). The Times’ 
2003 comments reflect both sides of a journalistic ideal of mutual transparency: “to ensure that 
the public’s business is conducted in the open, and that public records are open to all” (Society, 
2014, p. 1), as well as to themselves “[b]e accountable and transparent ... [a]bide by the same 
high standards they expect of others.” The roots of these press ideals date back more than a 
century (Simkin, 2014; Fabos, Martin & Harmsen, 2013; Ritchie, 1991), as revealed in the 
ongoing evolution of industry ethics codes (Hulteng & American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
1981; Merrill & Odell, 1983; Myers, 1922; Sigma Delta, 1926; Society, 2014; Rodgers, 2007).  
The emerging conviction that the press also carried a social responsibility (Commission, 
1947) “has won wide global recognition” (Christians & Nordenstreng, 2004, p. 4); today’s 
journalist must be increasingly “accountable” and “transparent” (The Society, 1973; Society, 
1996; 2014) – and transparency “must inform every decision made” (Plaisance, 2007, p. 205).  
U.S. government and media actions reveal a Western ethics tradition. Ever-more 
transparent government efforts to justify war, and news media attempts to cover it, reflect a 
larger cultural context that, while continually evolving, remains deeply rooted in a Western 
philosophical tradition in which states and professional callings alike work together for the 
common good. “Statesmen, as well as philosophers and historians, have attempted to account for 
the behavior of states in peace and in war” from the ancient Greeks through modernity (Waltz, 
2001, p. 7; Moseley, n.d., d). Similarly, the study of “media ethics historically has been ... largely 
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Western” (Christians, 2005, p. 3). The actions of both government and press actors in 2003 
reflected this tradition, which began in individual virtue ethics, developed through communal 
duty ethics, and eventually shifted its focus onto consequence as a guidepost.  
The ancient virtue ethic. Professionals of all disciplines continue to invoke ethical 
concepts of personal responsibility dating to the ancient Greeks, whose early thoughts on virtue 
were summarized by Aristotle (Aristotle, n.d.; Johnstone, 2002) “Aristotle’s works shaped 
centuries of philosophy ... and even today continue to be studied” (Shields, 2015, para. 1), 
including profession-related concepts of judging and practical action (Annas, 1995; Johnstone, 
1980; Johnstone, 2002; Reese, 1991; Beiner, 1983) as well as accountability (Nussbaum, 1986). 
The oft-quoted Hippocratic Oath from the fourth or fifth century BC included a practitioner’s 
promise to do one’s work to the best of one’s ability, and to refrain from deliberately causing 
harm (Conrad, Neve, Nutton, Porter & Wear, 1995). Within a half millennium, the proverb 
“physician, heal thyself” (Luke 4:23) revealed an evolving ethic of self-examination.  
This tradition celebrated individual-actor virtues such as truth and justice (Aristotle, n. d.) 
that are still consulted as guideposts for professional ethics (c.f. Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 
2006; Pellegrino, 1989; Borden, 2008; MacIntyre, 1984). One particularly enduring ancient 
virtue, perennial in both official statement and war coverage, is the concept of an honorable 
citizen sacrifice for the good of the state (Koenigsberg, 2009; Pfaff, 2016; Marvin & Ingle, 1998; 
Murray, 2016a, 2016b).  
 The Judeo-Christian duty ethic. While virtue ethics continue to influence contemporary 
society, the actions of both government and news agencies instead reflect a greater reliance on 
the deontological, or duty-based, ethic that emerged in Europe beginning in the Middle Ages 
(Mastin, 2009; Duty, 1999). “While the ethics found in Aristotle was based on the virtues, Judeo-
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Christian ethics came to be based on laws ... involving moral duties rather than the virtues” 
(Stern, 2014, p. 3; Anscombe, 1958). This shift in focus from on the virtuous actor to an 
emerging set of ideal actions informed later considerations of rights, justice, and social contract 
theory (Hobbes, 1645/1991; Locke, 1689/2014; Rousseau, 1754/2010) and a recognition of 
others as ends in themselves (Kant, 1781/1965; Beiner, 1983; Herman, 1993; Duty, 1999).  
 Modern heirs to this tradition who influenced both government and media ethics include 
W. D. Ross, who listed seven overriding “prima facie” duties towards one’s self and others 
(1930, p. 20; Prima, 1999; Patterson & Wilkins, 2013); John Rawls, who proposed an equalizing 
“veil of ignorance” furthering equal rights (Rawls, 1999; Ethics, 1999; Patterson & Wilkins, 
2013); and Hannah Arendt, who argued for responsible citizenship in mass culture (Arendt, 
1977; Benhabib, 1988; Biskowski, 1993). However, although this tradition largely informed the 
U.S. Constitution (1787/2016), state and media apologists alike often argue instead by 
consequence.  
Normative theory mediates philosophical and practical ethics. In considering the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, both government and media actors sought justifications drawn from the 
Western ethical tradition. “In ancient ethics the fundamental question is, How ought I to live? or, 
What should my life be like?” (Annas, 1995, p. 27). Modern Western philosophers delineate 
three distinct areas of thought: “the enquiry into the rational life ... the good life ... [and] the 
moral life” (Baier, pp. 3-4) – or the realms of metaethics, normative theory, and applied ethics.  
“Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, 
metaethics focuses on what morality itself is” – a “basic philosophical concern” that “goes back 
to the very beginnings of philosophy” (DeLapp, n.d., para. 1-4). As Mill himself observed, “from 
the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum … has occupied the most 
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gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools” (Mill, 1863, p. 1). Indeed, both 
“ancient philosophers and learned men of divers ages ... found no greater difficultie, than in 
searching out ... his greatest or sovereign good or happiness” (Barckley, 1631, pp. 1-2).  
“Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the Chief Good,” wrote 
Cicero in the 1st-Century BC (1931, pp. 409-413); 500 years later, Lactantius described “ten 
severall Opinions ... concerning mans chiefest happiness” (2003, p. 170). After 2,000 years:   
Not only do philosophers still disagree ... but they disagree on or are in serious doubt 
about how such disagreements should be resolved; indeed some are not even sure that 
there can be any generally acceptable method for resolving them. (Baier, 1995, p. 2).  
But neither federal officials nor Times editors wrestled with the nature of the greater good 
in 2003: Not one seriously questioned the inherent goodness of, say, the common defense or a 
free press. Instead, they were concerned with how best to pursue those goods, concerns reflecting 
the more practical philosophical realms of normative theory and applied ethics.  
Normative concepts guide practical applications. Normative theory “involves 
substantive proposals concerning how to act, how to live, or what kind of person to be” (Kagan, 
1998, p. 2). And “while the bonum consummatum of each man is different from that of every 
other man, still there are common elements in the bona consummata of men who are members 
together of some community” (McGilvary, 1904, p. 20). Communities then reflect these 
elements in the guidelines they craft linking their metaethical values with normative guides 
applied to everyday issues – such as those facing both federal and Times actors in 2003.  
Normative theory. “We consider it to be a bad thing to be inconsistent. Similarly, we 
criticize others for failing to appreciate ... [the] logical consequences of their beliefs” 
(Steinberger, 2017, para. 1). So, we “criticize and justify primary normative orders like morals, 
 24 
law, politics, conventions ... by producing some sort of normativity and situating it within our ... 
beliefs” (Pfordten, 2012, p. 450). This “involves arriving at moral standards that regulate ... 
conduct” – for example, the well-known Golden Rule (Fieser, n.d., para. 12; Kant, 1793/2000).  
In 2003, both government “measures to protect our people and defend our homeland” 
(Bush, 2003a, para. 47), and the Times’ pledge to set “the record straight” (From, 2004, p. A10) 
reflected normative standards that channeled general moral goods into specific agent ideals.  
Applied ethics. Eventually, these esoteric ideals must interact practically with real-world 
“issues of enduring and special contemporary importance” (Cohen & Wellman, 2005, p. 1). 
Applied ethics contextualize normative standards to address “specific, controversial moral issues 
such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia ... [or] convenient groups such as medical ethics, 
business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics” (Fieser, n.d., para. 32; Shoemaker, 
2017). In 2003, the philosophical rubber met the reality road for U.S. officials in justifying pre-
emptive invasion; for journalists, in comprehensively covering that discussion and its 
consequences.  
Normative ethics lean Teleological / Consequentialist. Virtue ethics, the earliest 
Western normative theory, led to deontological ethics by the 19th century, though remaining 
influential (Fieser, n.d.; Ross, 1930; MacIntyre, 1984; Annas, 1995).  
In turn, successive theorizers increasingly considered factors such as consequences, 
harm, and consent. (Alexander, 2000; Sen, 2000; Kagan, 1998). Among the earliest of these were 
the Scottish philosophers Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith (Pojman, 1995). In 
the emerging “view that normative properties depend only on consequences” (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2017, para. 1), “morally right choices are those that increase ... the Good” 
(Alexander & Moore, 2017, para. 6; Soifer &Szabados, 1998), based on the real-world 
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consequences of those choices (Hooker, 2000; Arneson, 1999; Fieser, n.d.). In this vein, the 
arguments of both officials and editors in 2003 tended to appeal to potential consequences, of 
both good and ill: for the nation, pursuing “liberation” versus “horror” (Bush, 2002, paras. 74-
77); for the Times, reporting “accurate” versus “questionable” material (From, 2004, p. A10).  
Act Consequentialism. In these stances, both parties appear to be judging the morality of 
their particular actions – in this case, invasion and publication – based on their consequences. 
This concept that “the rightness of actions depends on the value of the states of affairs they 
produce” (Scanlon, 2001, p. 40) – was initially the basis of act consequentialism, which “focuses 
only on the consequences of individual actions when making moral judgments” (Dimmock & 
Fisher, 2017, p. 22; Mosdell, 2011a), an approach expanded by utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789).  
Rule Consequentialism. Act consequentialism eventually evolved into “a theory that 
directly assesses rules ... and assesses acts only indirectly by reference to such rules” (Alexander 
& Moore, 2017, para. 12; Alexander, 1985). Proponents of rule consequentialism argue that 
“general rules or practices are more likely to promote good effects than simply telling people to 
do whatever they think is best in each individual case” (Nathanson, n. d., para. 50; Cowen, 
2011). In 2003, both the state and the media invoked the utilitarian rule of aggregate well-being 
(Hooker, 2017) in their defenses.  
Utilitarianism seeks specific consequences: The Greater Good.  
Samantha Power, a senior White House official before she became U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, used to say, “We are all consequentialists now.” We ... had an 
obligation to choose words, and policies, according to their consequences, not according 
to some abstract moral scale. (Traub, 2013, para. 3)  
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In much of the ongoing public discourse surrounding state martial action — and the 
mediated communication surrounding both discourse and action — arguments on both issues 
often resonate with the consequentialist-oriented ethical philosophy of utilitarianism. This 
tradition begins with the premise “that consciousness is more than a state of mindful equanimity 
in the present; it is a consideration of the consequences of one’s work in a broad space, and over 
a long time” (Petriglieri, 2018, para. 28). However, it goes further: “The paradigm case of 
consequentialism is utilitarianism” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2017, para. 2), which is “committed to a 
particular conception of right-making consequences” (Mosdell, 2011c, pp. 1118-1119) that 
considers “the relevant effects of the decision on the world” (Pettit, 1993, p. xiii). “Historically, 
utilitarianism has been the best-known form of consequentialism ... [It] assesses acts and/or 
character traits, practices, and institutions solely in terms of overall net benefit ... aggregate well-
being or welfare” (Hooker, 2017, para. 2; 2000). It “has been one of the most commonly 
accepted ethical theories in the Anglo-Saxon world” (Crane & Matten, 2007, p. 98), and “in 
historical context ... exerted considerable ... influence on the scope of moral concern, the design 
of public institutions, the responsibilities of government, and the interests and rights of the 
governed” (Brink, 2018); today, it remains “as alive as ever” (Shaw, 2006, p. 201).  
Utilitarianism before Mill.  
As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other  
men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers,  
kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is  
that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes.  
(Cicero, trans. 1931, p. 471) 
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While the ancients taught that “the Ends of Goods ... [is] to live in accordance with nature 
and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible” (Cicero, trans. 
1931; Aristotle, trans. 1925), they also extolled the good of community and global well-being. 
Their European heirs situated this good in divine ordinances of civil authority, including the rare 
but defensible just war (Aquinas, 1267/2003; Augustine, 1957; Bell, 2009). However, beginning 
with the Enlightenment, later philosophers continued to wrestle with identifying the good and 
ensuring its promotion, while also situating more authority for pursuing and obtaining the good 
through community in secular arguments. These precursors to the English utilitarians included 
such influential thinkers as Thomas Hobbes (1645/1991), John Locke (1689/2014), Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1754/2010; 1762), Adam Smith (1776/1909), and Immanuel Kant (1781/1965, 
1793/2000; Beiner, 1983; Cormier, 2003; Herman, 1993; Peck, 2007; Plaisance, 2007; 
Timmerman, 2014).  
English precursors. Along with Locke and Hobbes, British empiricists such as England’s 
Francis Bacon, Ireland’s George Berkeley, and Scotland’s David Hume influenced trends in 
seeking natural, rational reasons for morals, ethics, and laws. Though Bentham, and later Mill, 
rejected the idea of natural law, some of these thinkers professed concepts that sound utilitarian. 
Berkeley, for example, described a morality “entirely guided by the public good of mankind” 
(Berkeley, 1712, p. 26), a concept previously expressed by Richard Cumberland (1672/1750). In 
addition to the concept of an empirically defined general good, 18th-century proponents of 
“Anglican utilitarianism,” such as John Brown, John Gay, Soame Jenyns, Edmund Law, William 
Paley, Thomas Rutherford, and Abraham Tucker, also championed a consequentialist “pleasure” 
value system in their debates over the proper derivation of morality (Heydt, 2014, p. 17). Other 
English writers, including Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Francis 
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Hutcheson, and Joseph Butler joined Hume in arguing for a positive basis for morality in human 
nature, instead of a dark Hobbesian destiny (Yousef, 2011).  
These and others, in the generations immediately preceding Bentham and Mill, “sought, 
in their own words, the greatest good of the greatest number” (West, 1913, p. 2; Irwin, 2009a; 
Nicholson, 1990; Schultz, 2017; Shaw, 1999). A more focused version of the consequentialist 
approach continued to take shape, with a more developed conception of the good and the larger 
community.  
Jeremy Bentham.  
In all liberty there is more or less of danger: and so there is in all power. The question  
Is – in which there is most danger – in power limited by this check [press freedom], or  
in power without this check to limit it. In those political communities in which this  
check is in its greatest vigour, the condition of the members, in all ranks and classes  
taken together, is, by universal acknowledgment, the happiest. (Bentham, 1820, p. 279)  
Jeremy Bentham, “who coined the term utilitarian, is generally considered to be the 
founder or at least the first systematic expounder of utilitarianism” (Shaw, 1999, p. 7). He is also 
often credited with crafting the tradition’s defining phrase: The preface to his first essay includes 
his assertion of “this fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham, 1776, p. i) – though scholars trace Bentham’s 
appropriation of this ideal to Hutcheson (1729), to the French Enlightenment egoist philosopher 
Claude-Adrien Helvétius’s De l’Esprit (1758), and to the Milanese Enlightenment legal reformer 
Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments (1764) (Heydt, 2014; Kors, 2011; Shaw, 1999; 
West, 2013); he did coin the term “to maximize happiness” (Rosen, 1998).  
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As with some of the later British empiricists, he rejected the natural law concept 
(Crimmins, 1998, 2013, 2014; Shaw, 1999) and argued for extending the vote to all men who 
could be judged literate (Crimmins, 2014). Further, he insisted that a given action had utility 
“when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has 
to diminish it” (Bentham, 1780, p. 3); for him, “one must take into account the happiness or 
unhappiness of everyone affected by the action” (Shaw, 1999, p. 8).  
Though he became best known outside of England, he was not without his detractors; a 
century later, as his influence had grown through the subsequent work of John Stuart Mill, Karl 
Marx judged him as the “arch-Philistine ... that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the 
ordinary bourgeois intelligence of the 19th century” (Marx, 1887, p. 426).  
James Mill.  
A man must have looked abroad upon the world to very little purpose, who has not  
observed how invariably every class of men have provided themselves with a set of  
opinions, grounded upon the feelings connected with their own interests, and not upon  
the evidentials of the case. (Mill, 1837, p. 12).  
Bentham’s friend James Mill is often overlooked, though he contributed several 
influential essays and concepts to the developing philosophy – including this call for empiricism 
and independent thought. He – and later, John Stuart – were among Bentham’s English 
supporters (Shaw, 1999); ultimately, though, he “had the misfortune to be the parent of John 
Stuart Mill, whose greater fame has almost eclipsed the father’s reputation as economist and 
philosopher” (Schroeder, 1913, p. 4). Among other essays, he wrote forcefully in utilitarian 
terms in favor of the good of commerce (Mill, 1808), democratic governance (1820), a free press 
(1811, 1821), a rights-based jurisprudence (1825), a rights-based international diplomacy (1825), 
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and the benefits of mutual tolerance (1837). However, he differed from his friend Bentham in 
defending the utility of limiting the franchise to certain classes of men, and no women – a stance 
his son John Stuart later rejected (Crimmins, 2014).  
John Stuart Mill.  
[J. S.] Mill popularized utilitarianism and dignified it by a defense from the greatest  
British philosopher of his time. He also worked out a complex theory that is not subject  
to many of the criticisms that have been directed against utilitarianism in its more  
simplistic forms ... In some details of psychology and argument it may be subject to  
criticism, but it is a plausible theory that must be taken seriously by ethical philosophers.  
(West, 2014, p. 79)  
James’ son, John Stuart, “was the foremost British philosopher” (West, 2006, p. 2), “the 
most famous and influential British philosopher” (Brink, 2018, para. 1), “the most influential 
English language philosopher” (Macleod, 2016, para. 1), or “perhaps the greatest purifying 
force” of the 19th century (West, 1913, p. 7; Nicholson, 1998) – and even “said to be the last man 
who knew everything” (Gore, 1995, p. 324). “No calculus can integrate the innumerable little 
pulses of knowledge and of thought that he has made to vibrate in the minds of his generation,” 
wrote one contemporary (Bain, 1882, p. 195). “There can be no doubt that J. S. Mill exerted a 
wonderfully broadening effect over English political thought” (West, 1913, p. 22), so much so 
that Sidgwick stated in 1873 that “from about 1860-65 or thereabouts he ruled England in the 
region of thought as very few men ever did” (as cited in Duckett, 1998) – especially through his 
essays On Liberty and Utilitarianism. As late as 1902, “the great pragmatist William James 
dedicated his extraordinarily wide-ranging Varieties of Religious Experience to none other than 
John Stuart Mill” (Schultz, 2017, p. 7).  
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“The latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth saw Mill’s 
influence eclipsed, but so profound and pervasive was that influence that his thought is part of 
the very fabric of our thinking today” (Duckett, 1998, para. 1), and there is no “ignoring the 
broad range of Mill’s contributions to political philosophy” (Devigne, 2006, p. 91). “His 
influence on his generation was enormous and if advocates of democracy, political economists, 
sociologists, and moralists of today see farther than their fathers, it is because they stand on the 
shoulders of John Stuart Mill” (Cadman, 1971, p. 139). In a real sense, his thought ultimately 
became a victim of its own success, as “during the period between the two great wars, Mill was 
regarded as one of those outmoded figures of the recent past whose ideas have ceased to be 
interesting because they have become commonplace” (Hayek, 1963, p. xv).  
Major contributions.  
In defending and circumscribing the right to liberty, Mill implicitly develops a view of  
the function of the state; in brief, that the end of the state is to maximise the goods of  
true knowledge, rational belief, self- direction, self-perfection, moral character and  
responsibility, happiness and progress. (McCloskey, 1963, p. 144)  
“More than any other thinker, Mill is responsible for laying down the principal directions 
ethics has taken since his day” (Dryer, 1969, p. lxiii). “Utilitarian theories still define one of our 
principal options in moral philosophy and Mill remains a major figure in the utilitarian tradition” 
(Sumner, 1979, p. 99). Most importantly, “Mill identifies himself as a utilitarian, in the tradition 
of his father and Jeremy Bentham, but departs from and modifies their doctrines in many ways” 
(Saunders, 2010, p. 52). “Through Mill[,] English Utilitarianism gave the fullest account of its 
method and its presuppositions” (Stephen, 1900c, p. 74).  
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An index of late 19th-century British thought gave Mill eight pages and 24 references 
(Black, 1996), while a 32-chapter overview of classic philosophy texts included both On Liberty 
and Utilitarianism (Warburton, 2014); today, “Mill scholarship is voluminous” (Brink, 2018).  
On Liberty and other essays.  
Mill’s On Liberty, then, is justly esteemed not only for the cogency of its arguments for  
social freedom but also for the profundity and eloquence of its expression of the faith in  
humanity upon which a large part of the case for social freedom ultimately rests.  
(Ladenson, 1977, p. 180)  
Until recently, Mill’s most important contribution to utilitarian media ethics was his 
eponymous defense in 1859 of personal freedom, which he ended with a discussion of the 
potential for harm that freedom, by necessity, entailed (Rees, 1985; Shaw, 1999). Yet this harm 
is tolerable in the larger marketplace of ideas he sees as a means to ensure freedom and 
flourishing: “A plurality of beliefs and opinions, Mill famously argues in On Liberty, is essential 
to both social and individual moral progress” (Smits, 2004, p. 298).  
As expressed in On Liberty, his utilitarianism sought a greater and better “greater good.” 
Indeed: “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (Mill, 1859a, 
p. 224). This meant a greater tolerance than those outside the traditional definition of 
community: “Mill was also concerned with ... the political representation of minorities – whose 
interests could not adequately be represented by others, no matter how sympathetic or 
intellectually advanced” (Smits, 2004, p. 323; Ahn, 2011). Most recently, Mill’s free speech 
defense resurfaced in the growing campus speech policy debate, in a student-friendly illustrated 
collection of excerpts from On Liberty and other writings (Reeves, Haidt, & Cicirelli, 2018).  
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For this study, perhaps, one recent event indicates the lasting influence of this particular 
Millian contribution: within a year of this writing, friends of retiring University of Oklahoma 
President David L. Boren erected a statue in his honor, marking only the fourth time an OU 
president had been so honored. “Standing 10 feet tall, it depicts Boren dressed in formal 
academic regalia holding a copy of Jo[h]n Stuart Mill’s On Liberty” (Boren statue, 2018).  
In subsequent essays, Mill’s further elaborations on the utility of equality are seen as 
particularly forward-thinking (Ahn, 2011) – especially in his insistence on protecting and 
expanding the rights of minorities (1850), his opposition to slavery (1859b, 1862a, 1862c), and 
his prescient support of equal rights for women (1869) – throughout, because these practices 
benefit a very few while they are usually abhorred by a large majority. And his System of Logic 
(1868a, 1868b) was considered influential for the next 50 years: “Mill’s System of Logic may be 
regarded as the most important manifesto of Utilitarian philosophy” (Stephen, 1900c, p. 75), and 
its author “perhaps the leading historical proponent ... Mill did much to articulate the 
justification, content, and implications of utilitarian ... principles ... [and] he has left an enduring 
legacy” (Brink, 2018). However, in the century-and-a-half since its writing, his collection of 
essays published simply as Utilitarianism remains the tradition’s lodestar.  
Mill’s Utilitarianism: Perennially popular, problematic, polarizing  
Perpetually “carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another ... after more than two  
thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the  
same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to  
being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old  
Protagoras, and asserted ... the theory of utilitarianism” (Mill, 1863, p. 1).  
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John Stuart Mill began his defense of utilitarianism with this ambitious assertion that its 
roots reach as far back as the ancients (Scarre, 1996; Stephen, 1900). Regardless of one’s 
reaction to this particular claim, “something drives us towards utilitarianism ... It is remarkable 
how utilitarianism tends to haunt even those of us who will not believe in it” (Foot, 1985, p. 
196). Long after Mill’s initial claim, for “much of modern moral philosophy, the predominant 
systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism” (Rawls, 1971, p. vii).  
Today, utilitarianism “continues to be one of the most prominent ethical theories of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and Mill’s Utilitarianism is the classic work defining and 
defending that theory” (West, 2006, p. 2) – “one of the most important works in the history of 
moral philosophy” (Eggleston, 2017, p. 3). This collection of “unpublished papers ... shaped ... 
with some additional matter, into the little work entitled Utilitarianism” (Mill, 1981, p. 265) is 
now considered “Mill’s definitive statement of his doctrine” (Priestley, 1969, p. vii), where he 
finally “put all of his own cards on the table” (Reeves, 2007, pp. 324-325) and distinguished his 
theory from “previous iterations” (Wright, 2014, p. 13; Irwin, 2009b). “Here ... Mill stands out - 
an adult among the children” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 68). “Mill’s opinions were quite stable by the 
time Utilitarianism appeared” (Robson, 1969, p. cxxv); herein, “Mill’s ethical theory ... is most 
extensively articulated” (Schefczyk, n.d., para. 1), and here scholars increasingly returned, first 
with a resurgence of interest in the last half of the 20th century, then with attention focused on the 
anniversaries of Mill’s birth and Utilitarianism’s publication, and, most importantly, in search of 
moral war guideposts in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  
Anniversaries.  
Utilitarianism is a very resilient theory. Once the darling of both philosophers and  
economists, it lost favor in the first half of this century as methodological developments  
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in both fields undercut its conceptual standing ... But in the fifties ... utilitarianism  
staged its comeback. (Strasnick, 1981, p. 63)  
In today’s sound-bite environment, “we need to be careful about staking the important 
ethical decisions in our lives on bumper sticker catch phrases” (Wilkens, 2011, p. 12; Bowen, 
2010) – and typically, “many people think that the bumper sticker for ... Mill’s utilitarianism 
reads, ‘Do the greatest good for the greatest number’” (Elliott, 2007, p. 100). However, such a 
simplistic summary “is a caricature of his approach to morality and justice” (Lyons, 1994, p. 
106); further, “it is imperative to get Mill right” (Elliott, 2007, p. 100).  
Elliott’s media ethics essay emerged amid a wave of recent Millian research aimed to do 
just that, not only by considering his continuing influence on contemporary philosophical 
thought, but also by addressing several long-debated controversies.  
While Millian scholarship increased significantly during the latter half of the 20th century 
(c.f. Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Urmson, 1953; Packe, 1954; Harsanyi, 1955; Lyons, 1994, 
1997; Smart, 1956; Robson, 1968; Schneewind, 1968; Ryan, 1970; Brown, 1973; Ryan, 1974; 
West, 1982), the 2006 bicentennial of Mill’s birth and the 2013 sesquicentennial of 
Utilitarianism occasioned renewed scholarly interest in his longstanding contributions.  
Beginning with Utilitarianism’s 1963 centennial, a “gradual but steady revival ... in the 
course of the last twenty years is based on a truer understanding of the significance of his work” 
(Hayek, 1963, p. xvi). “The scholarly literature on Mill has been greatly enriched in recent years 
by significant articles and book-length studies,” wrote utilitarian scholar David Lyons near the 
end of the century (1994, p. vii). And this new interest in Mill was “by no means confined to the 
Western world. A [Japanese-published] bibliography ... lists, in addition to about 350 works 
 36 
about Mill in European languages, over 180 in the Japanese language alone!” (Mineka, 1963, p. 
366).  
And many are “finding Mill’s work to be creatively synthetic in bridging the antinomies 
inherent in liberal democratic thought” (Clark & Elliott, 2001, p. 467). “Recent scholarship 
offers a different picture ... [including] new readings of Mill’s essay as well as of the theories 
that he helped to develop ... A reappraisal of Mill’s essay was inevitable” (Lyons, 1997, p. ix) – 
if for no other reason than that “Mill ... suggests lines of development somewhat different and in 
some ways more promising than the usual versions of utilitarianism” (Lyons, 1979, p. 1).  
Increasingly, Millian scholars pursued those more promising lines, applying his thought 
to topics as diverse as liberty (Lyons, 1979; Rowley and Peacock, 1975), human rights (Lyons, 
1977), fairness (Berger, 1979), women’s equality (Shanley, 1981, 1986), education (Gutmann, 
1982), liberty with justice (Berger, 1984), law (Lyons, 1984), pleasure (Riley, 1989, 1990), 
personal character (Long, 1992; Railton, 1988; Woodcock, 2010), psychology (Wilson, 1990), 
ethical empiricism (Anderson, 1991), moral reasoning (Brennan, 1993, 1989; Jones, 1992), 
politics (Ruggie, 1998), religion (Crimmins, 1998; Millar, 1998; Matz, 2000), and the “entire 
mode of life” (Tarrant, 2004; Heydt, 2010).  
Mill’s birth bicentennial (2006) invites revaluation.  
John Stuart Mill is widely known, these days, for his moral and political philosophy, but  
let us not forget his influential A System of Logic ... which became the then standard  
university text book, still discussed today, which covered material far wider than its title  
suggests. Mill also wrote on economics ... religion, psychology, and translated Plato.  
(Cave, 2006, p. 38)  
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As Mill’s bicentennial approached, scholars increasingly returned their attention to his 
contributions, beginning in Utilitarianism’s centennial with a 28-year, 33-volume collected 
works project (Robson, 1969). A special edition of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Cooper, 
Nielsen, & Patten, 1979) included a dozen articles on various aspects of his legacy, a two-
volume reference examined his economics (Hollander, 1985a, 1985b), and other retrospective 
books considered his continuing influence (Berger, 1984; Brink, 1992; Carlisle, 1991; Donner, 
1991; Lyons, 1994; Skorupski, 1989; Sommers & Fogelin, 1985). Further, Utilitas dedicated a 
special issue to the 250th anniversary of predecessor Jeremy Bentham (Bentham 250, 1998).  
Bicentennial-themed activity. Closer to the anniversary itself, scholars published a 
substantive retrospective on his contributions (Skorupski, 1998), a reconsideration of his three 
most important essays (Miller, 2002), an analysis of his promotion of human religion (Raeder, 
2002), an exploration of his views on religion (Sell, 2004), a reprint of the 1873 Life and Works 
collection (Project Gutenberg, 2005), applications of his political philosophy (Fitzpatrick, 2006; 
Howland, 2005), and several appraisals of his place in the development of ethics (Heydt, 2006c; 
Skorupski, 2006). This “great defender of liberty” (Cave, 2006, p. 35) “deserves a rediscovery” 
(Wolfe, 2008, p. B6): A group of academic societies convened a “John Stuart Mill Bicentennial 
Conference” in April, 2006, at University College, London (Grollios, 2011); later, the University 
of Bucharest presented an international “John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873” conference in November 
(Mureşan & Ducu, 2007). Similarly, scholars published numerous articles addressing the 
continuing influence of “one of the truly great thinkers in the world” (Sen, 2006, p. 80; Heydt, 
2006a; Heydt, 2006b), and several new biographies (Capaldi, 2004; Reeves, 2007).  
Subsequent activity. New considerations of Mill continued afterward, with a set of essays 
revaluing On Liberty (Ten, 2008), a collection of essays on his conception of practical reason 
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(Eggleston, Miller, & Weinstein, 2010), a review of his contributions to the ethics canon (Irwin, 
2009b), an introduction to his work (Fitzpatrick, 2010), and scholarly applications of his thought 
to issues including politics (cf. Urbinati, 2007; Miller, 2010a; Claeys, 2013), gender 
(Hirschmann, 2008), globalism (Driver, 2014), positivism (cf. Esanu, 2019), rationalism (cf. 
Varouxakis & Kelly, 2010; Millgram, 2010), liberalism (Brink, 2013), economics (Staveren, 
2007), corporate responsibility (Renouard, 2011), social systems theory (Valentinov, 2017), 
virtue ethics (Russell, 2014; Donner, 2010; Riley, 2010), deontological ethics (Hooker, 2014; 
Mulgan, 2014; Timmerman, 2014), and even utilitarianism itself (Ahn, 2011; Brink, 1992). 
Further, an entire issue of Utilitas presented contemporary scholarship on consequentialism 
(Miller, 2010c).  
Utilitarianism’s sesquicentennial (2013) invites further revaluation.  
Utilitarianism is one of the most important works in the history of moral philosophy.  
Though just a fraction of the size of most philosophy books ... it provides a rich  
articulation and defense of an influential approach ... Mill’s essay is probably more  
widely read by today’s students and scholars than any other utilitarian work. It might  
well be the single most widely read work in moral philosophy. (Mill & Eggleston, 2017)  
Concurrent with the Millian bicentennial revival, scholars began to reconsider 
Utilitarianism well before its 2013 sesquicentennial, beginning with a defense of its argument 
(Alican, 1994), an overview of its social implications (Riley, 1988), a series of critical essays 
(Lyons, 1997), several comprehensive studies (Crisp, 1997; Shaw, 1999), an overview of the 
philosophy (Tännsjö, 1998), and a critical edition of the text itself (Crisp, 1998). The 
publication’s approaching anniversary invited increasing reflection, including several general 
overviews (Baybrooke, 2004; Mulgan, 2007; Troyer, 2003; Rosen, 2003; West, 2004), another 
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defense of its stance (Sheng, 2004), a second critical edition (West, 2006), an appreciation of his 
“new liberalism” (Weinstein, 2007), and a pair of comprehensive reader’s guides (Bykvist, 2010; 
West, 2007). Scholarly applications included an analysis of Mill’s distinguishing among various 
levels of pleasures (Saunders, 2010), and an overview of utility (McClennen, 2010).  
Sesquicentennial-themed activity. The essay’s anniversary itself inspired a series of 
essays on its continuing relevance (Russell, 2013), a defense of its principles (Brink, 2013), a 
review of its social philosophy (Su, 2103), an entry in a new ethics encyclopedia (West, 2013), 
and an entire encyclopedia of its own (Crimmins, 2013). Scholarly expositions included 
considerations of its applications in business ethics (Gustafson, 2013; Luetge, 2013), corporate 
responsibility (Idowu, Capaldi, Zu, & Gupta, 2013), economics (Hodgson, 2013), education 
(Schrader, 2015), moral decision making (Kortenkamp & Moore, 2014), and religion (Runehov, 
& Oviedo, 2013). Further, several more overviews of its contributions (Crisp, 2014; Perry, 
2014), and a major commemorative 15-chapter collection of companion essays (Eggleston & 
Miller, 2014), appeared within a year.  
Subsequent activity. In the five years since its sesquicentennial, Utilitarianism continues 
to attract scholarly attention, including an overview of the text (Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2017), 
another critical edition with observations (Eggleston, 2017), an introduction to major utilitarian 
thinkers (Schultz, 2017), and ongoing reconsideration of Mill’s influence on areas as diverse as 
women’s equality (Botting, 2016) the literary works of Stephen King (Held, 2016), and the 
importance to democracy of an educated citizenry (Barker, 2018).  
Finally, as of the date of this writing, one open-source database of nearly a million 
higher-education syllabi ranks Utilitarianism as second only to Aristotle’s Ethics as the most-
assigned philosophy text, and as 22nd most-assigned text in all disciplines – closely behind only 
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such notables as Plato (2nd), Marx (3rd), Aristotle (6th), Hobbes (7th), Macchiavelli (8th), Martin 
Luther King Jr. (18th), and his own On Liberty (19th) (Open, 2018).  
Major contributions.  
A sure route to philosophical immortality is to produce a work both too important to  
ignore and too enigmatic to understand. Whether J. S. Mill consciously elected this  
strategy or not, his Utilitarianism is destined to enjoy a very long life indeed ...  
Although the principle of utility was the centrepiece of Mill’s normative system of ethics  
and politics, he devoted only this slender volume to the nature and implications of that  
principle. And we are still not sure just what he said. (Sumner, 1979, p. 99).  
It is, indeed, interesting that this work of such singular, “persistent influence” (Eggleston 
& Miller, 2014, p. 2), dedicated to the underlying philosophy of “this architect of our liberal 
order, this most penetrating of minds” (Sullivan, 2018, para. 10), would be comparatively brief. 
Nevertheless, at 155 years old, Mill’s Utilitarianism “has proved compelling over the ages 
because it contains a subtle awareness of human complexity that few philosophical works can 
rival” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 68). For many, this explication of “Mill’s revised version” (Irwin, 
2009b, p. 398) of the utilitarian tradition continues to invite inquiry – if for no other reason than 
that, “ever since its publication, Utilitarianism has prompted its readers to ask questions that the 
text itself does not fully answer” (Eggleston, 2017, p. 4).  
Mill refined the Happiness Principle. The consideration of ethical happiness, or human 
flourishing, is central to “the rich philosophical tradition that runs from Aristotle through to John 
Stuart Mill’s criticisms of Bentham” (Nussbaum, 2008, p. S81) – and in this essay, Mill 
immediately distinguishes himself from his teacher by departing from a hedonistic to a more 
holistic conception of happiness. For one thing, he expanded Bentham’s original definition of 
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happiness as pleasure to also include “an exemption from pain” (Lindebaum & Raftopoulou, 
2017, p. 814). Further, he argued for a rational distinguishing among different levels, or qualities, 
of happiness (Peck, 2006; Saunders, 2010), representing a “deliberative conception of happiness” 
as rational (Brink, 1992, p. 68; Hruschka, 1991; Skorupski, 1989). Indeed: “Mill’s more nuanced 
version of utilitarianism ... recognized not only quantitative but also qualitative differences in the 
nature of pleasure or happiness” (Horner, 2015, p. 58). This is essential to negotiating true 
ethical dilemmas: “Tough choices, typically, are those that pit one ‘right’ value against another” 
(Kidder, 2009, p. 4; Ross, 1930).  
He also enlarged the scope of the ideal good by “maximizing the aggregate” (Shaver, 
2004, p. 250; Fehige & Frank, 2010) so that these benefits could be “secured to all mankind” 
(Mill, 1863, p. 14). In his attempt to extol “especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-
feeling with the collective interests of mankind” (p. 17), Mill’s revised definition of happiness 
makes appeals to benevolence (Harsanyi, 1982; Smart & Williams, 1973) – and even virtue 
(Jamieson, 2007; Slote, 1988). This represents Mill’s extension of happiness as not only self-
realization (Skorupski, 2006) through self-improvement (Horner, 2015), but also an inclusion of 
others as more than just ends (Cohen-Almagor, 2009).  
Ultimately, “his original work on the ‘greatest happiness principle’ emphasizes 
something much more nuanced than contemporary interpretations of his theory” (Lindebaum & 
Raftopoulou, 2017, p. 814; Crane & Matten, 2007).  
Mill negotiated Utilitarianism and liberty. In this essay, Mill worked to unify his ideals 
of utility and liberty (Gray, 2000; Monro, 1979; Stegenga, 1973). “Mill consistently points out 
that both the romantics and the ancients advocate the cultivation of qualities that foster human 
agency, and he persistently develops arguments from both schools in the process of reforming 
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English liberalism” (Devigne, 2006, p. 103); certainly, “he is the critical transitional figure 
between the ideas of the liberalism of limited government and the values of the liberalism of the 
active public-welfare state” (Kors, 2011, p. 1).  
The only limits to liberty, for Mill, represent those that represent the larger happiness: 
“The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the 
means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits 
imposed by the collective interests of mankind” (1863, pp. 20-21). Therefore, to address one 
perennial criticism of a purely hedonistic ethic, “unjust pleasures do not count in the social 
welfare function” (Nussbaum, 2008, S97).  
Further, a Millian “Liberal Utilitarianism” may be seen as a series of vectors (Riley, 
1988, 1996b), in which both freedom of thought (Skorupski, 2006) as well as the “Harm 
Principle” work to limit an overreaching state paternalism (Skorupski, 2006; Villa, 2017).  
Mill negotiated Act-and Rule-Based Utilitarianism. While the ethics literature is full of 
debates over which of the consequentialist camps might claim Mill, in Utilitarianism, he also 
articulated a more holistic approach to this dilemma in his inherited tradition: “He doesn’t seem 
to have noticed the difference, and there seem to be aspects of both theories in his work” 
(Pojman, 1995, p. 115).  
“Mill is neither an act-utilitarian nor a rule-utilitarian” (Dryer, 1979, p. 63); instead, “Mill 
evidently thinks that there is a convergence between act-utilitarian considerations, rule-utilitarian 
considerations, and the virtues” (West, 2014, p. 69). In his reconsideration of act utilitarianism 
(Eggleston, 2014), Mill does not hold strictly to traditional act utilitarianism (Dryer, 1969, 
arguing instead to balance the morality of a given act with Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
(Brown, 1974).  
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However, Mill’s argument in favor of articulating some “intermediate generalizations” 
(Mill, 1863, p. 29) does not represent his adoption of a wholesale rule utilitarianism, either 
(Bykvist, 2010; Hooker, 2000, 2017; Miller, 2014, 2010b; Eggleston & Miller, 2008; Riley, 
2010). These guidelines must be considered in context (Martin, 2010; Weinstein, 2010), in an 
approach one scholar called “Sanction Utilitarianism” (Lyons, 1994, p. 57; Lang, 2004), to 
answer Scanlon’s (1982) critique that neither extreme actually works. The resulting hybrid has 
been called Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism (Harrison, 1979, 1995) or Iterated Utilitarianism 
(Copp, 1979).  
“There is nothing inconsistent about this,” concludes West (2014, p. 71): “The ultimate 
principle for Mill is promotion of the greatest happiness. Whether to calculate consequences case 
by case, or to act in accordance with rules, or to respect rights, or to practice justified virtues, is a 
matter of choosing the appropriate means for the promotion of greatest happiness.”  
Mill appealed to justice. “Mill was the one great utilitarian theorist to confront the 
seeming conflict between justice and utility and to sketch a utilitarian approach to justice” 
(Lyons, 1994, p. 13; Berger, 1979; Elliott, 2007). Departing from his forbears, “Mill rejected the 
traditional utilitarian formula of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ ... concerned that 
‘harm to others’ could be taken too broadly” (Kors, 2011, p. 2). Indeed: “nine sadists cannot 
torture one victim for maximum pleasure!” (Foreman, 2016, p. 81). Ultimately, utilitarians 
assume a “duty to be just (Harrison, 1952).  
“This revisionist interpretation of Mill is advanced by an understanding of his theory of 
justice and its role in shaping his policy positions on issues such as welfare, education, voting 
rights, property rights, taxation, government intervention, and the future of capitalism” (Clark & 
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Elliott, 2001, p. 467; Rawls, 1971; Skorupski, 2006). Therefore, “utilitarians were more sensitive 
to distributive justice issues” (Treviño, Weaver & Reynolds, 2006, p. 957).  
Ultimately, Utilitarianism’s “goal is to justify the utilitarian principle as the foundation of 
morals” (Schefczyk, n.d., para. 1). And that meant justice for all: “I must again repeat, what the 
assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which 
forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but 
that of all concerned,” wrote Mill about his community-based conception of utilitarian justice 
(1863, p. 21). “As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be 
as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”  
Discontents, critics, and misunderstandings.  
[Millian utilitarianism enjoys a] current unpopularity in analytical political philosophy ...  
Although hugely influential, this solution is now usually considered inadequate. Buoyed  
by John Rawls’ systematic Kantian liberalism and the successes of communitarians such  
as Michael Sandel and Will Kymlicka, Jonathan Riley’s work notwithstanding, forms of  
neo-Kantianism or communitarianism have superseded liberal utilitarianism”  
(Goldstone, 2010, p. 79).  
Just shy of a century after Utilitarianism appeared, one scholar declined to “indulge in 
the familiar pastime of ferreting out inconsistencies and fallacies in the thought of one of the 
keenest, noblest, and least expendable thinkers and doers of the XIXth century” (Spiegelberg, 
1961, p. 475). Familiar pastime, indeed, as “utilitarianism’s preeminence has been evinced in the 
remarks of those who would most fervently wish it gone” (Eggleston & Miller, 2014, p. 2; Irwin, 
2009a), so perennially condemned that “it is scarcely recognizable in the pervasive caricatures 
floated by everyone from Dickens to Marx to Foucault” (Schultz, 2017, p. 4). On the centennial 
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of Mill’s essay defending the theory, one philosopher wrote that the “day cannot be too far off in 
which we hear of it no more” (Williams, 1963, p. 150); a few years later, it was declared 
“destroyed, and no part of it left standing” (Plamenatz, 1966, p. 145).  
“For many today – and many then – utilitarianism is a discredited moral doctrine” (Cave, 
2006, p. 35); it is “false as a philosophical theory of ethics ... a fallacy, most egregiously 
committed by J. S. Mill but perpetuated ever since” (Taylor, 1995, p. 531); more recently, 
Utilitarianism appeared in a collection of “books that screwed up the world” (Wiker, 2008).  
Ultimately, as his birth bicentennial approached, “Mill’s detractors seemed to outnumber 
his defenders” (Lyons, 1997, p. ix). Indeed, “It is only the individuals or thinkers one loves who 
truly break one’s heart. In the case of those thinkers, who has broken more hearts than John 
Stuart Mill?” (Kors, 2011, p. 1) – or, as one scholar put it, “When will your consequentialist 
friend abandon you for the greater good?” (Woodcock, 2010, p. 1). As part of a unique British 
intellectual tradition, his epitaph might well have been similar to how George Orwell 
characterized Mill’s contemporary, Charles Dickens, as “a nineteenth-century liberal, a free 
intelligence, a type hated with equal hatred by all the smelly little orthodoxies which are now 
contending for our souls” (Beadle, 1969, p. 502). In our post-modern era, such “is truly the plight 
of Mill – everyone can find something to dislike” (Gustafson, 2009, p. 348).  
Scholarly debates usually address one of the “two elements to utilitarianism: an account 
of what makes actions right or wrong – the ... consequences ... and a theory of intrinsic value, or 
what counts as good and bad ... Each ... is a subject of controversy” (West, 2103, p. 5261). And 
these controversies usually levy one of two perennial charges at the tradition: “The two 
criticisms pertinent here are that [it] is, on the one hand, overly demanding, and, on the other 
hand, that it is not demanding enough” (Alexander & Moore, 2017, para. 7; Williams, 1963); 
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either way, “the wheel is turning again: utilitarianism is giving way once again to a recognition 
of individual rights” (Dworkin, 2011, p. 414).  
Overly demanding: Utilitarianism expects too much. For Mill’s contemporaries, his 
philosophy rendered human pleasure as merely that of swine, made true happiness unattainable, 
turned humans into automatons, was essentially godless, justified the expedient, and ultimately 
takes too long to figure out (West, 2006). For many philosophers, “Mill has traditionally been 
portrayed as self-contradictory and failing to construct a unified social theory” (Clark & Elliott, 
2001, p. 467; Kymlicka, 1990; Williams & Smart, 1963). Ultimately, Utilitarianism is just “not a 
fully developed work. It frustrates philosophers who look for a tidy resolution to the many 
tensions it introduces into the Utilitarian system” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 68).  
Utilitarianism, as defined by Mill, is “a fallacy” (Taylor, 1995, p. 531); it is undone by its 
own complexity (Woodcock, 2010), and is too demanding to actually be useful (Kagan, 1984) – 
because the good it seeks is, in the end, unquantifiable (Thomson, 1994), and its precepts for 
attaining that good incoherent (Eggleston, 2010; Miller, 2010). Further, it fails in articulating a 
just distribution of the good (Crane & Matten, 2007; Duncan & Gray, 1979; Arneson, 1979), 
ultimately rendering it unjust in actual practice (Fitzpatrick, 2001; Fleurbaey, Salles & 
Weymark, 2008; Kasachkoff, 1979; Rawls, 1971, 1999; Valentinov, 2017). In the end, 
utilitarianism is impossible, as most of us rarely maximize utility. (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2017).  
Overly licentious: Utilitarianism expects too little. On the other hand, Mill’s philosophy 
is seen as too flexible, which makes it attractive – but also makes it a “double-edged sword” 
(Sachs 2010, p. 258). This flexibility is both the strength and the weakness of the theory 
(Foreman, 2016). In this view, critics charge that it relies too much on subjectivity (Ewin, 1990; 
Foot, 1985) or intuition (Rosen, 1998; Tedesco, 2011).  
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Therefore, utilitarianism is often criticized for being too open to situational abuse (Sosa, 
1993; Tarrant, 2004; Riley, 2006), and for its undue focus on ends (Wininger, 1986), thereby 
sometimes suggesting actions that violate intuitive moral values (Brandt, 1959; Sandberg, 2013) 
or applications that actually lead to less good (Baron, 1994). Further, some rights are always 
going to be nonutilitarian (Narveson, 1979), and that leads to confusion when egoism and 
altruism conflict (Norman, 1979) – because “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction 
between persons” (Rawls, 1971, p. 27).  
One particular egregious offense blamed on Mill, especially quoting problematic 
passages from On Liberty, is that his philosophy may be used to justify a paternalistic 
exploitation of non-Western cultures by a Euro-centric utility: This “other side of Mill’s 
celebrated stance against conformism ... is a form of elitist paternalism that he adopted towards 
those he considered still politically immature: the uneducated classes in ‘advanced nations’ and, 
even more, the people of ‘barbarian’ societies” [40] (Ballacci, 2018, p. 3; Saint-Paul, 2011). Of 
course, Mill is not alone in being reconsidered thus: “The authority of the canon is under attack 
at present. The classic lists of big-name theories have been rejected as largely Western, male, and 
paternalistic. Credible theory must be multicultural, gender inclusive, and transnational instead” 
(Christians & Merrill, 2009, p. 3; see also Coleman & Fararo, 1992).  
Ultimately, however, most of the basic “objections are ... often seriously misguided” 
(Shaw, 2006, p. 202; Ball, 1998; Harrison, 1998), especially those accusing Mill’s ethic of being 
practically unknowable. For example, when read in its entirety and original context, Mill mounts 
“one of the most vehement antipaternalist defences of individual liberty and social openness 
imaginable” (Villa, 2017, p. 233). Furthermore, “little attention has been paid to Mill’s 
arguments that class and gender ascription fundamentally construct individual identity” (Smits, 
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2004, p. 298). Instead, “when discussed ... utilitarianism is usually sketched, criticized, and then 
dismissed – usually because these ‘utilitarianisms’ are quite different than Mill’s classical 
utilitarianism” (Gustafson, 2013, p. 328). Indeed, “for it is only in contemporary moral 
philosophy textbooks that we find utilitarians prepared to sacrifice innocent Indians, or lynch 
guiltless bystanders. We do not find such scenarios in the writings of Bentham or J. S. Mill” 
(Kelly, 1998, p. 165). Indeed: As presented in such simplistic, unrealistic scenarios, most 
respond to Mill by charging that “his position was stupid” (Anscombe, 1958, p. 9).  
Despite these and other protests from its legion detractors, however, “utilitarianism was 
not dislodged from its place at the core of moral philosophy ... even authors who doubted the 
adequacy of utilitarianism nonetheless affirmed its centrality” (Eggleston & Miller, 2014, p. 2).  
Utilitarianism’s continued relevance.  
 Utilitarianism occupies a central place in the moral philosophy of our time. It is not the  
view which most people hold; certainly there are very few ... But for a much wider  
range of people it is the view towards which they find themselves pressed when they try  
to give a theoretical account of their moral beliefs. (Scanlon, 1982, p. 103)  
More than 150 years after Mill claimed that happiness – whether acknowledged or not – 
formed a major part of all ethical traditions, scholars continue to affirm his assessment. The 
arguments of U.S. administrators to support their planned 2003 invasion of Iraq, as well as the 
underlying basis for the Times editors’ self-critique of their coverage of that issue, appeal to a 
“greater good” assumption that Mill would recognize. Indeed: “Despite its inadequacies … 
utilitarianism is an attractive and powerful ethics in democratic societies ... [remaining] 
enormously influential in North American society” (Christians, 2007, pp. 113-119). It is 
“probably the basic moral philosophy of most nonreligious humanists today” (Harris, 2002, p. 
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119); and its principles “will probably be central issues in debates for centuries to come” 
(Sandberg, 2013, p. 2328).  
Moreover, “in our society utilitarianism operates as a kind of tacit background 
assumption against which other theories have to assert and defend themselves” (Kymlicka, 1990, 
p. 10); therefore, it ultimately “has the distinction of being the moral theory that, more than any 
other, shapes the discipline of moral philosophy and forms the background against which rival 
theories are imagined, refined, and articulated” (Eggleston & Miller, 2014, p. 1). For example, as 
Mill himself might have written:  
Ironically, all this criticism comes while we continue to use greatest good or common  
good analysis for most of our societal ethical issues. Considering societal benefit and  
harm is usually the basis for much of our discussion regarding the ethical failures of  
... the subprime mess and recent Wall Street Meltdown. Taxcheating, welfare or  
insurance fraud, racism, gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace,  
undermining trust, stealing from the company, dishonest bookkeeping, and nearly any  
unethical business practice we can imagine are argued against and considered wrong in  
part, at least, because of the harm these activities do to the greater good. Utilitarianism  
in this sense is already widely used as an ethical appeal and business ethic approach,  
although it is seldom discussed in the literature. (Gustafson, 2013, pp. 327-328)  
 Utility seeks greater empirical precision.  
To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look  
like a struggle to escape from utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one  
utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another.  
(Korsgaard, 1993, p. 24)  
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“In the twentieth century, both the practice and the theory of utilitarianism were 
developed extensively ... [and] most of all what characterized utilitarian theorizing in the 
twentieth century was the aim for greater precision” (Bykvist, 2014, p. 103). Applications and 
further elaborations of Mill’s thought by later proponents such as Sidgwick (Lazari-Radek & 
Singer, 2014; West, 2014), Moore (1903, 1953), Brandt (1959; Palmer, 1999), Harsanyi (1953, 
1955, 1977, 1982), Hare (1981, 1982), and Singer (1981, 1994, 2002; Perry, 2014) included 
attempts to find more clarity in defending utility against its perennial critics. “The first advantage 
[of utilitarianism] is sensitivity to empirical conditions” (Bailey, 1997, p. 8); in war, especially, 
ethicists seek objective criteria for defining victory or success (Angstrom & Duyvesteyn, 2007).  
These refinements informed various applications of utilitarian thought to education 
(Kitcher, 2010; Verburg, 2006), criminal justice (Brandt, 1959); criminal law (Bykvist, 2014; 
Martinelli, 2014), leadership (Lindebaum & Raftopoulou, 2107); economic justice (Schefczyk, 
2014), sustainable development (O’Conner, 1997), resolving capitalism and socialism (Riley, 
1996a); business ethics (Gustafson, 2103; Meinster, 2008; Crane & Matten, 2007), financial 
services confidentiality (Nixon, 1994), economic policy (Bykvist, 2014), health care policy 
(Gandjour & Lauterbach, 2003), bioethics (Callahan, 2003; Singer, 1981), institutional justice 
(Baily, 1997), climate change (Mulgan, 2015), and political policy (Bykvist, 2014).  
Utility seeks greater sympathetic sensitivity.  
Harsanyi’s and Hare’s arguments are not just abstract theoretical constructions ... they  
both identify moral decisions with decisions based on sympathetic identification ...  
refining the golden rule so that it tells you what to do to others what you would want  
them to do to you, if the roles were reversed and you were in their exact objective and  
subjective circumstances. Conceived in this way, utilitarianism is not a number- 
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crunching, cold-hearted theory; it is a theory that tries to articulate one crucial aspect of  
our common moral experiences: the moral importance of putting yourself in another  
person’s place and seeing things from her point of view. (Bykvist, 2014, p. 123)  
In addition to a greater focus on precision, as it has evolved over the past century and a 
half, “the doctrine has the advantage of proximity to real human interests … real preferences of 
real persons” (Bailey, 1997, pp. 9-10). This provided an alternative to a purely emotional 
argument, in which “questions of this sort ... are not settled by reason: they are settled by 
prejudices and sentiments or by emotion. When they are settled they do not stay settled, for the 
emotions change as new stimuli are applied” (Clarence Darrow, 1922, as cited in Coyne & 
Entzeroth, 2006, p. 3). Instead, enhanced utilitarianism offers an impartial, sympathetic, and 
rational approach (Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1953, 1955; Bykvist, 2014), finding applications in 
social considerations of rationality (Bailey, 1998) and political education (Villa, 2017). “For 
example, one obvious [utilitarian] reason for building a strong welfare state was that it actively 
promotes the well-being of the citizens” (Bykvist, 2014, p. 103).  
This is where the theory’s flexibility finds its own utility. Utilitarianism, “although 
perhaps theoretically simple, is an enormously flexible moral framework. And perhaps it is this 
flexibility which explains utilitarianism’s longstanding place as one of the main contenders in 
moral philosophy” (Sandberg, 2013, p. 2328). Here, it can offer a Kantian “universalizability [as] 
it is a general truth that if an action ought to be done in a situation, then it ought to be done in 
any situation that shares the same universal features” (Bykvist, 2014, p. 122).  
Finally, the perennial challenges addressed in Utilitarianism itself continue to speak to 
each new generation in meaningful ways: Indeed, “many of the topics ... such as the nature of 
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happiness, the role of rules in morality, and the compatibility of justice with promoting overall 
good – are ones that especially interest today’s readers” (Eggleston, 2017, p. 3).  
Utility seeks new opportunities.  
 Many of us who work in moral philosophy spend a lot of time worrying about  
utilitarianism. Our problem isn’t merely that it continues to have its friends, though it  
does; our problem is deeper, lying in the fact that we haven’t found – and its friends are  
delighted to draw our attention to the fact that we haven’t found – a way of positively  
killing it off. No amount of mowing and tugging seems to work; it keeps on reappearing,  
every spring, like a weed with a long root. (Thomson, 1993, p. 145)  
It is no wonder, then, that some form of utilitarianism – acknowledged or not – appears in 
everyday ethical considerations in business, politics, civics, and journalism. “Despite its 
detractors, utilitarianism is an attractive ethical theory. Its claim that our fundamental obligation 
is to promote a balance of good over evil is plausible, the theory admits of relatively clear 
formulations, and it continues to have its adherents” (Wierenga, 1984, p. 311).   
“Today, the utilitarian tradition is as alive as ever, and the theory is at the center of a 
number of contemporary debates in ethics, with critical discussions of it continuing to fill the 
leading professional journals” (Shaw, 2006, p. 201). Every new generation of aspiring 
philosophers must read Mill as a sort of academic rite of passage (Nussbaum, 2004); meanwhile, 
“utilitarianism continues to vex its critics” (Shaver, 2004, p. 235) and “refuses to fade from the 
scene” (Scheffler, 1982, p. 4). And wars, and rumors of wars, continue to invoke its framework 
for ethical decisionmaking. “For example, in order to judge whether the invasion of Iraq was 
wrong we need to know the consequences this will have on Iraqi lives and the political situation 
in the Middle East” [Bykvist, 2010, p. 8-9).  
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Especially now, in revisiting the Times coverage of that invasion, because “utilitarianism 
continues to flourish ... in philosophical ethics” (Crisp, 2014, p. 231), “Mill is worth revisiting 
because … his thought shed light on the way we produce and circulate ideas in the United 
States” (Wolfe, 2008, p. B6). And we have yet another reason: “He was … a journalist.”  
Situating Millian Conflict Coverage in the Utilitarian War Literature  
Mass destruction and mass corruption: The souls of sufferin’ men  
Clutchin’ on deaf ears again: Rapture is comin’  
It’s all prophecy: and if I gotta be sacrificed for the greater good 
Then that’s what it gotta be. (Tesfaye, Duckworth, Feeney, & McKinney, 2018)  
The commitment of a nation’s resources, citizens, and stability – and, ultimately, its 
future security and even survival – to warmaking surely represents one of the most seriously 
consequential actions any state leader could ever consider; in fact, “war has been perhaps the 
most consequential enterprise in human history” (Jenkins, 2017, p. 963).  
“Sending Americans into battle is the most profound decision a president can make” 
(Bush, 2003a, para. 81), claimed then-President George W. Bush as he prepared to do just that in 
Iraq, echoing – though not acknowledging – Mill from almost 150 years earlier: “There are few 
questions which more require to be taken in hand by ethical and political philosophers” than that 
of when “it is allowable to go to war” (Mill, 1859b, p. 118). And invariably, just as Mill claimed, 
appeals to utility – whether explicitly acknowledged or not – spring eternal, especially when the 
state seeks to justify waging war: “When we call on society to shared sacrifice, the reason given 
is almost always ‘for the greater good’ ... the greatest long-lasting happiness for the most – the 
prosperity of society into perpetuity” (Gustafson, 2013, p. 328). Ultimately, this unacknowledged 
appeal to utility often underlies the state’s specific argument for such shared sacrifice: the 
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communal pact that “war is legitimate as an extreme means of preventing greater evil for 
humanity” (Ellul, 1969, p. 6). Or, as Mill wrote about the U. S. Civil War: there are worse evils 
for a nation than war (Mill, 1862a).  
The decision to wage war may represent one of the most perennially utilitarian questions: 
“While this tension between means and ends infects much of our moral life, nowhere is this 
dilemma more starkly drawn and so difficult to resolve than in wartime” (Whitman, 1993, p. 
261). Meanwhile, “the search for the multifaceted answer of how to achieve victory in war has 
consumed the mental efforts of kings, soldiers, and wise men for millennia” (Set introduction, 
2013, p. xix). Unfortunately, “the tendency to destroy the adversary which lies at the bottom of 
the conception of war, is in no way changed or modified through the progress of civilization” 
warned one of the subject’s greatest theorists (Clausewitz, 1873, para. 10), describing the 
timeless debate between emotion and reason when war talk arises (Scheipers, 2018). And even 
“modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity ... of his ancestors ... War is the strong life; it is 
life in extremis; war taxes are the only ones men never hesitate to pay” (James, 1910, p. 4) – 
because “it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for 
living ... war is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble” (Hedges, 
2002, p. 3).  
Further, such war talk carries real power in and of itself: In fact, “if actors believe that 
war is imminent when it is not in fact certain ... [this] can be a causal factor in the outbreak of 
war, by raising the perceived probability of military victory and encouraging hawkish and 
provocative policies” (Johnson & Tierney, 2011). Perennially, despite any human claims of 
progress, war still “feeds and fires the population’s martial enthusiasm … if unchecked by 
political goals” (Hamblet, 2005, p. 39; Fiala, 2008; Hedges, 2002) or other, usually 
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consequentialist, restraints – often with some appeal to some greater good: “So war is not just 
about blowing things up – it’s about achieving political goals” (Tierney, 2018, para. 15).  
What is it Good For? Utility Challenges Perennial ad Bellum Claims 
Ultimately, “one of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or seem to act 
morally” (Walzer, 1977, p. 497); in fact, “a true warrior must be morally superior in some way” 
(French, 2017, p. 2) to a mere killer. And so we cry, with the famous Vietnam-era song, “War: 
What is it good for?” (Whitfield & Strong, 1969), whenever, as a more recent hit cried, “I gotta 
be sacrificed for the greater good” (Tesfaye, Duckworth, Feeney, & McKinney, 2018). Upon 
review, unfortunately, it appears “extremely unlikely that any war, viewed as a whole, has been a 
welfare-optimal event ... There will almost certainly have been some alternative state of affairs ... 
that would have been better on utilitarian grounds” (Shaw, 2014, pp. 306-307). In hindsight, that 
seems obvious: “There was too much killing in the twentieth century” (Walzer, 2009, p. 42), 
brought on by increased imperial expansion and “two terrible wars” (Mann, 2012, p. 2), making 
it “the bloodiest era in history ... In all, between 167 million and 188 million people died because 
of organized violence in the twentieth century – as many as one in every 22 deaths in that 
period” (Ferguson, 2006, p. 61). By any conceivable measure, what possible greater good could 
ever justify such industrial-scale bloodshed?  
“War is the hardest place” to judge, so there we must begin: because, if “comprehensive 
and consistent moral judgments are possible there, they are possible everywhere” (Walzer, 1977, 
p. 221). And, just as Mill observed 150 years ago, scholars of all traditions often invoke some 
form of (often unacknowledged, incomplete and/or misunderstood) “greater good” utilitarianism 
in considering, first, whether to go to war – the perennial, quintessential ad Bellum question. Yet, 
as Mill also charged, these various appeals to the greater good fail to completely understand and 
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apply a truly utilitarian calculus in their different ethical arguments – and nowhere is that more 
evident than in the ongoing debate between the various critics of utilitarian war ethics and the 
growing influence of a myopic, incomplete utilitarian war ethic (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016).  
In a sense, the synergy of the resurgent interest in Mill surrounding the anniversaries of 
his birth and of Utilitarianism with the exponentially expanding war ethics debate surrounding 
the 2001 terrorist attacks and their aftermath created a perfect opportunity of sorts for new 
approaches to consequentialist and utilitarian war ethics, culminating in Shaw’s Utilitarian War 
Principle (2011, 2014, 2016). However, as these ongoing discussions evolved to include a more 
complete and just utilitarianism, nothing in this review of the literature suggests that any of them 
invoked Mill’s definition in Utilitarianism (1863) of security as the greatest good. This study 
will offer an initial attempt at outlining a security-focused utilitarian reporting model.  
Non-utilitarian ad Bellum ethics.  
Let us disqualify at the outset utilitarianism ... Torture has been used on suspected  
terrorists in the name of maximizing utility ... encouraging utilitarianism would risk  
exacerbating a mentality already manifested by some people engaged in the “war on  
terror” ... that “the ends justify the means.” ... utilitarianism would lend itself to abuse in  
precisely those kinds of situations in which ethical safeguards are most needed, and  
should, for this reason, be stricken from the list of viable ethical alternatives for the  
military. (Snow, 2009, p. 560)  
Until recently, war ethicists almost unanimously adopted this assessment, throwing an 
incomplete and misunderstood utilitarianism out with the bathwater instead of addressing the 
common abuses of its “bumper-sticker” version. Utilitarianism “has been brushed aside a bit 
hastily in military ethics on the mistaken assumption that it condones calculative behavior” 
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(Olsthoorn, 2011, p. 89). Indeed: “Nonconsequentialist approaches to military ethics have 
enjoyed supremacy as long as the tradition has existed,” observed Jenkins (2017, p. 963); “It is 
the conventional wisdom that utilitarianism was at best moot on the subject or at worst 
downright hostile to widely accepted moral constraints on declaring and fighting war.” 
These critics most often address concerns about just conduct during war – the jus in Belo 
question of just war theory. However, Mill’s apparent ethnocentric paternalism, especially as 
expressed in problematic passages in On Liberty, makes his utilitarianism an easy target in ad 
Bellum debates as well. Ultimately, some critics claim, “the common good of a political 
community cannot be defined in utilitarian terms, as the greatest good for the greatest number ... 
[because] the common good would become the good of the majority ... [not] to benefit all” 
(Moltchanova, 2011, p. 166). Yet many still appeal to utility (Hooker, 2000; Traub, 2013) to 
settle questions of existential significance – especially in the realm of state-directed violence.  
For example, proponents of capital punishment claim that it may “deter future criminal 
conduct” – however, opponents also apply a very utilitarian calculus in insisting that “if a lesser 
penalty achieves the same or a greater level of deterrence, no ... justification supports” it (Coyne 
& Entzeroth, 2006, p. 25). In fact, in his concurring opinion in the landmark U. S. Supreme 
Court decision that temporarily ended capital punishment, Justice William O. Douglas invoked 
the existing sentencing’s consequence as the basis of his argument: “A law which in the overall 
view reaches that [unjust] result in practice has no more sanctity than a law which in terms 
provides the same” (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 256).  
Further, and somewhat counterintuitively, utility’s proponents have largely ignored these 
critiques, and utilitarians “bear some responsibility for this situation ... for despite the enormous 
impact that war and the threat of war have had on human well-being, they have had relatively 
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little to say about when, if ever, we may fight wars” (Shaw, 2011, pp. 381-382). Yet, as Mill 
claimed, the “principle of utility … has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of 
those who most scornfully reject its authority” (1863, p. 4), and utility often appears – again, 
usually unacknowledged, incomplete and/or misunderstood – in arguments for the three most-
commonly accepted ethical approaches to war (Ellul, 1969; Shaw, 2016). Indeed, like Mill, 
utility may be a victim of its own success, going largely unacknowledged because it became so 
accepted: “Whether [martial] actions can be justified or not, it is clear that ... act-consequentialist 
thinking plays prominently in our intuitive moral judgments, and, consequently, we should 
expect the view to have influence in considerations of this kind” (Mosdell, 2011a, p. 2). And 
such thinking is evident even in longstanding U.S. military tradition: The honorary three-volley 
rifle salute always performed at military funerals represent “Duty, Honor, and Country” – in that 
order (Watson, 2016, para. 4; Military, 2007); three shell casings are traditionally inserted into 
the memorial flag as it is folded after being removed from lying over the deceased veteran’s 
coffin, and three spent cartridges from the funeral salute are presented to next-of-kin – all with 
the same designation of these three ideals. Though perhaps unintended, this deeply meaningful 
tradition references all three of the major philosophical traditions in Western war ethics: 
deontology, virtue, and teleological communal service.  
Nevertheless, any such influence goes largely unacknowledged: “Textbooks and other 
surveys of the ethics of war and peace typically lay out three basic positions: pacifism, realism 
and just war theory” (Shaw, 2011, p. 380). However, proponents of each often invoke utility in 
defending their positions, as Mill predicted they would. In fact, utility often appears as a kind of 
third option, balancing between competing virtue and duty claims in a toxic triad, being invoked 
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in hopes to justify each approach’s argument by appeal to the supposed greater-good 
consequences of the proposed action.  
Pacifism: Virtue, duty and utility all reject ad Bellum.  
Aristotle’s example is the courageous warrior ... who faces death in battle for the sake of  
a noble end. It is absurd to say that this warrior is pleased at the prospect of death ...  
Indeed, the better his life is, the more he thinks he has to lose and the more pain he is  
likely to feel at the prospect of death. Nonetheless, he is acting in accordance with  
excellence, and is aware of that; and so he is happy. (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 65)  
At one extreme on the spectrum of ethical responses to the perennial ad Bellum question, 
pacifism, the categorical refusal to fight, represents “the absolutist view that war is immoral and 
that therefore it is always wrong, always morally unjustified, for either nations or individuals to 
fight them” (Shaw, 2011, p. 380). However, a number of anti-war and pro-peace positions 
overlap and co-exist under the broad term “pacifism” – which is not itself a passive approach 
(Fiala, 2018). Various approaches to pacifism may apply virtue, deontological, or 
consequentialist ethics – or combinations thereof – and may be absolute or conditional (Moseley, 
n.d.b; May, 2015).  
The ancients extolled the virtuous flourishing of Aristotle’s “happy warrior” – courage, 
nobility, selflessness, sacrifice (Koenigsberg, 2009; Marvin & Ingle, 1998) – and, though such an 
absolute idolizing of war for its own sake is not as strong among the modern Western heirs of 
that philosophical tradition, deeply rooted elements of a nationalist noble-warrior virtue ethic 
may be found in recent systems, such as the pre-World War II German Anschluss ideal of “a 
grossdeutsch national community linked to democratic values” (Hochman, 2016, p. 22; Bukey, 
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2000; Rempel, 1989), or the similarly widespread U.S. folk beliefs attached to military service 
and the flag (Marvin & Ingle, 1998).  
Conversely, however, the noble citizen willing to die rather than to fight also acts from 
virtue (Chatfield, 1973). Many “conscientious objectors ... have often been accorded a special 
recognition for their moral bravery” (Moseley, n.d.b, para. 1), and pacifists may be motivated by 
a virtuous religious mandate (Hauerwas, 1984; Yoder, 2009), a duty to avoid causing harm, or a 
call to utility (Donner, 2010; Riley, 2010; Russell, 2014).  
Indeed, Bentham argued for a “perpetual peace” from utility (1789); later, John Stuart 
Mill made “justice ... grounded on utility” the basis for his defense of utilitarianism itself: “The 
moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another ... are more vital to human well-being than 
any maxims ... It is their observance which alone preserves peace” (1863, pp. 74-75). So while 
pacifism echoes some of utilitarianism’s appeal to the greater good, it does so incompletely: such 
a rigid kind of rule-utilitarianism fails to account for the reality of an imperfect world, resulting 
in “the wrong-headed idealism we find in the naïve pacifist” (Bykvist, 2010, p. 149). Even policy 
designed to avoid war can cause harm: For example, between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 
invasion, some “quarter-million Iraqi children have died under sanctions who would otherwise 
be alive and healthy; we may call this international governance ... but the human consequences 
are the same as [those] of warfare ... against the unarmed” (Gordon, 1999, p. 150; Early, 2015).  
Ultimately, however, for the pacifist, “there are additional arguments against war ... [So] 
the case for war is weaker and the case for many of the alternatives is stronger that commonly 
thought ... it is, in general, morally obligatory to pursue the alternatives” (Pattison, 2018, p. 2).  
Realism ad Bellum and a utilitarian rejection.  
Instead we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get ...  
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since you know as well as we do that ... the standard of justice depends on the equality  
of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the  
weak accept what they have to accept. (Thucydides, 5.84-116; trans. 1997) 
The opposite extreme from pacifism on the spectrum of ad Bellum responses, realism 
holds that expedience is the only law in war (Clausewitz, 1873; cf. Bataille, 1991; Hamblet, 
2005). Rival agents are motivated solely by “the famous Thucydidean paradigm of fear, honor, 
and interest” (Kaplan, 2019, para. 12); the victors define justice, as the fifth-century B.C. 
Athenians argued in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, above; ultimately, as, “in Plato’s Republic ... 
Thrasymachus defends the idea that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger” (Sayre-
McCord, 2012, para. 6; DeLapp, n.d.). Or, as first-century BC philosopher Cicero was cited as 
writing, “inter arma silent leges – in time of war, the law falls silent” (Safire, 2001, p. A35).  
Much later, an American satirist presented this argument as “might is right ... and 
everything to the winner” (Redbeard, 1927, pp. 1-3) – or, as one U.S. songwriter later put it, 
“might makes right, playin’ chicken delight,” (Taylor, 1983, track 5), both reflecting a popular 
inversion of Abraham Lincoln’s famous “right makes might” appeal to a just duty (Raymond, 
1865, p. 99). That the victors get to write the history remains a valid observation: “Why did the 
United States invade Iraq? ... It was something that some people wanted to do” (Packer, 2005, p. 
46). Ultimately, then, realism “remains the primary or alternative theory in ... addressing general 
theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs ... There can be little doubt that realist 
theories rightfully retain a salient position in international relations theory” (Legro & Moravcsik, 
1999, p. 5).  
Realism represents “the amoralist thesis ... that war ... is neither right nor wrong, but 
simply a matter of national interest ... that when it comes to war moral categories and moral 
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analysis do not apply” (Shaw, 2011, p. 380). “Classical political realism views force as the 
extension of politics by other means: an instrument of state power. Moral judgments, if 
considered at all, primarily serve as window dressing” (Carlson, 2008, p. 620; Clausewitz, 1873).  
Indeed, “many doubt ... that ethics can be meaningfully applied to war” at all (Shaw, 
2016, p. ix), asserting that “no plausible moral theory could license the exceptional horrors of 
war” (Lazar, 2016, para. 1). Well, perhaps no moral theory other than a myopic, incomplete, or 
misunderstood “bumper-sticker” utilitarianism: as many critics agree, “although Mill’s ... 
philosophy cannot be held accountable for the Eurocentric imperialism of the nineteenth century, 
it at least played an important role in justifying ... Western colonialism in the name of the 
‘greater good’” (Ahn, 2011, p. 87; Ballacci, 2018; Habibi, 1999; Jahn, 2005; Saint-Paul, 2011). 
However, in a more complete context, “Mill was highly critical of a government that only cares 
about its national interest” (Ahn, 2011, p. 86; Lindebaum & Raftopoulou, 2017; Villa, 2017).  
Overall, the English utilitarians categorically rejected classic realism’s defense of 
conquest for its own sake. James Mill, for example, insisted that “the only just ends of war are 
compensation for the injury received and security against any fresh injury” (Shaw, 2014, p. 305). 
In Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill also rejected realist reasoning, as then “we could be deprived 
of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves” (1863, p. 66). 
Further, even in more recent applications of realism, statements hailing “ethical realists ... 
embracing stratagem and force as instruments of justice, power and self-interest so as to curtail 
human suffering” (Carlson, 2008, p. 647) sound more like the enlightened English than they do 
the ancient Athenians, with appeals to the greater good. Like pacifists, some realists often appeal 
to some beneficial consequence when defending their ambitions: “These are not wars of 
annihilation. They are wars of Americanization” (Tierney, 2010, p. 16), for example. Or, some 
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abandon any good but expedience: “War is immoral but (or ... therefore) all is fair in war. The 
thing to do is is get the war over as fast as possible and forget all the discriminations and 
distinctions fostered by moralists and armchair soldiers” (Finn, 1970. p. 3). Whether publicly 
acknowledged, some form of this particular stance has informed U.S. military actions after the 
end of the Cold War: “Before 1990, America’s use of war was reluctant, limited, and discreet; 
since 1990 it has gradually shed those inhibitions” (Strachan & Herberg-Rothe, 2007, p. 5).  
Meanwhile, in arguing that a truly realist position would have actually opposed the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, some scholars claim that “realism as we conceive it offers the prospect of 
security without war” – avoiding the harms associated with most major wars of the past century 
(Rosato & Schuessler, 2011, p. 804). In fact, “restraint realists stood firm and vocally 
condemned the war ... [and] predicted that the forceful imposition of democracy in the alien 
culture of Iraq was surely doomed to fail” (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2017, pp. 12-13).  
However, whether in these and other realist appeals to the greater good of avoiding war, 
or to the more common realist justifications for strong states to wage war, even realists also fail 
to apply a complete utilitarian war ethic (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016).  
Just War Theory approaches utility.  
If we claim to be a just war people and yet do not know what a just war is, there is  
something wrong. At best we are exposed as hypocrites; at worst, we are susceptible to  
being manipulated and misled into endorsing forms of war and fighting that we ought  
not, perhaps simply because just war language is invoked by those doing the  
manipulating. (Bell, 2009, p. 16)  
Utilitarian arguments appear especially in discussions of just war theory (JWT), a 
mediating consequentialist tradition that requires a given war to be justified in three distinct 
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moral arenas: why it started, how it is fought, and how it ends. In a sense, just war serves as a 
compromise between pacifism and realism, offering a consequentialist alternative to both.  
“Just war theory contrasts with realism in holding that moral categories can and ought to 
be applied to war. It contrasts with pacifism, on the other hand, in maintaining that sometimes it 
is morally permissible to fight” (Shaw, 2011, p. 380). “The task of just war theory is to seek a 
middle path between them: to justify at least some wars, but also to limit them” (Lazar, 2016, 
para. 1; Ramsey, 1961). It can also satisfy the ends of both extreme approaches, when a war 
actually achieves some sort of peace as well as tangible stability and benefits for the majority 
(Carlson, 2008). Ultimately, for Augustine, the theory’s authoritative architect, “the aim of a just 
war is that the unjust enemy will turn from their wicked ways, make amends, and rejoin the 
community of peace and justice” (Bell, 2009, p. 31) – all consequences well resonant with the 
demands of a more completely understood Millian utilitarianism (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016).  
Though many ethical traditions include the discipline of justifying war, the roots of the 
just war tradition reach back through European thought to the 4th-century Christian philosopher 
St. Augustine; however, the concept was first expounded by the 13-century theologian Thomas 
Aquinas and later expanded by others (Moseley, n.d.a; see also Bell, 2009; Dubik, 2016; Lazar, 
2016; Ramsey, 1961; Walzer, 1977). Though developed in the Judeo-Christian Western world, 
the “just war tradition did not begin with Christianity. Rather, Christianity adopted it from 
ancient Greek and Roman cultures and then developed it” (Bell, 2009, p. 25). As far back as 
Hammurabi’s 18th-century B.C. Code, “the authority to punish wrongdoing became part of the 
sovereign’s ‘divine right’ (Coyne & Entzeroth, 2006, p. 4), an authority later extended to other 
state officials in the ancient world and Roman empire (Miller, 1987).  
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Eventually, JWT evolved as a framework for considering the relative justifications for 
war by strictly secular, rights-based criteria, without the traditional recourses to religion 
(Cavanaugh, 2009). “Today no one believes in a ‘Christian war’ or a war to defend Christianity 
… no one believes that God is with ‘our’ armies” (Ellul, 1969, p. 7) – though some Christians 
publicly argued for the invasion of Iraq on sectarian grounds (Fisher, 2011b; Olsen & Hertz, 
2003). However, where recent Christian ethicists have argued for a better-grounded JWT, their 
arguments are for acting in a more Christian manner, and not for spreading the faith through 
force (Bell, 2009; O’Donovan, 2009). Instead, a secular, patriotic civic religion often drives 
public sentiment: “Terms such as ‘chosen people’ are rarely heard anymore, but the sense of 
[American] exceptionalism and the belief in individual rights are woven into our inherited 
customs and produce a reflexive crusading instinct in wartime” (Tierney, 2010, p. 30). 
Ultimately, “just war theory ... has been used to bless questionable and even unjustified wars. 
But international politics is complex and morally fraught. It demands to be dealt with if even an 
imperfect peace is to be maintained” (Colby, 2016, p. A6).  
Initially, the theory involved two major criteria: Jus ad Bellum, or justification for going 
to war, and Jus in Belo, or justification in how war is conducted. More recently, scholars have 
also considered Jus post Bellum, or justification in how wars are ended and peace established.  
In part due to the horrors of the two world wars, just war theory informed the 1929 and 
1949 revisions of the Geneva Convention (Lazar, 2016, para. 6; O’Donovan, 2009), especially in 
negotiating limits on wartime conduct, or jus in belo concerns. Later in “the twentieth century, 
just war theory has undergone a revival mainly in response to the invention of nuclear weaponry 
and American involvement in the Vietnam war” (Moseley, n.d.a, para. 7), in books by Ramsey 
(1961), Walzer (1977), Paskins and Dockrill (1979), Holmes (1989), Norman (1995), and 
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Robertson (1999) – focusing again on the crucial, initial ad bellum question because of the 
exponentially increasing and disastrous potential consequences of such decisions.  
Most recently, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, “academics have turned their attention to 
just war once again with international, national, academic, and military conferences ... Just war 
theory has become a popular topic ... of scrutiny and debate” (Moseley, n.d.a, para. 8) – so much 
so that it now occupies a “de facto monopoly ... over nonpacifist moral discourse about war” 
(Shaw, 2011, p. 381). Studies invoking JWT in considering challenges from conflict’s changing 
horizons include Alexsander and Ellis (2001), Caney (2005), Coady (2002), Fabre (2012), Fabre 
and Lazar (2014), Fisher (2011a), Frowe (2014), Gross (2010), Lazar (2015), Lazar and Frowe 
(2016), May (2012, 2015), McMahan (2002, 2009), Moseley and Norman (2001), Orend (2001, 
2006), Robinson (2003, 2006), Rodin (2002), Rodin and Shue (2008), Shaw (2011, 2014, 2016), 
Shue and Rodin (2007), and Valentino (2004).  
Most significantly, Shaw (2011, 2014, 2016) proposes that war ethicists adopt the classic 
just war tenets as Millian “intermediate generalizations” (Mill, 1863, p. 29), and not complete 
criteria, because their adherence tends to increase war’s universally desired “good” outcomes 
while reducing war’s most universally condemned harms.  
Jus ad Bellum: Justification in going to war.  
I am a bit of history, I was born in April 1918, seven months before the end of World  
War I and in my early years heard World War I called the war to end all wars. It was no  
such thing. The policies adopted after its ending laid the groundwork for World War II,  
in which I served as a United States Marine ... I did not serve ... in Korea, Vietnam,  
Desert Storm, or any of the constant and sometimes grossly misnamed peace-keeping  
ventures ... My experiences on Iwo Jima ... made it clear beyond my ever forgetting,  
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that armed combat is merciless, cruel, dirty and soul searing, and rips human beings to  
pieces, not just physically but often psychologically. (Woodd-Cahusac, 2000, paras. 2-4)  
A cursory review of U.S. history finds any number of appeals to some aspect of the just 
war tradition, especially in the essential, perennial quest to justify going to war in the first place; 
unfortunately, “in deciding to wage war states typically neglect or discount the consequences for 
other peoples ... what is thought to be good for one side ... is presumed to be thereby good for 
humanity as a whole” (Shaw, 2011, p. 384) - including the ubiquitous appeal to an eventual 
peace. Yet this incomplete approach ignores the very real consequences for both friend and foe 
alike: “Moral injury is real, and any nation that desires to truly honor its warriors must place 
perceptions of ‘what is right’ at the forefront of its deliberations on when and how to wage war” 
(Pryer, 2014, p. 34; Grossman, 2009). In an era of increasing attention to Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and other once-overlooked war-related harms, the “painful paradox is that fighting for 
one’s country can render one unfit to be its citizen” (Shay, 1994, p. XX?; Carlin, 1990): “Few 
things are more corrosive than knowledge that one fought and possibly killed in a cause that 
lacked moral legitimacy, even if one fought honorably and within the rules of war” (Shaw, 2016, 
p. 164). No matter what, for “soldiers and civilians alike, war is often a traumatic experience. It 
is bound up with our very identity” (Tierney, 2010, p. 6).  
A similarly incomplete utilitarianism appears in nearly every historic U.S. calls to arms: 
“Combat ... has been with us from the start. American history is punctuated by episodes in which 
aggrieved parties have settled their differences not through conversation, but with guns” 
(Duhigg, 2019, para. 19). “Gentlemen may cry, peace, peace—but there is no peace ... Our 
brethren are already in the field!” cried Patrick Henry in 1775 (Wirt, 1817, p. 123), invoking the 
Old Testament prophet Jeremiah (8:15; 14:19). “Then conquer we must, when our cause it is 
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just,” wrote Francis Scott Key in the second war against the British nearly 40 years later, in a 
poem later to become the National Anthem (Key, 1814, para. 5). Two decades later, 
sympathizers were implored to “Remember the Alamo” and “Remember Goliad!” in the fight for 
an independent Texas (Frasca, 2005, p. 387). A quarter century beyond, Abraham Lincoln 
promised in his inaugural address to avoid war, so long as he could “preserve, protect, and 
defend” the Union (Raymond, 1865, p. 169); meanwhile, successionist state officials claimed 
their cause was to defend the “necessities of the world ... commerce and civilization” (Rizga, 
2018, para. 17). Within two years of Lincoln’s assassination, one of his most famous Civil War 
generals was quoted as insisting that “The only good Indians I ever saw were dead” (Brown, 
1972, p. 166), because of their danger to white settlers. As the century closed, U.S. citizens were 
called to “Remember the Maine, to hell with Spain!” (Edgerton, 2005, p. 1), avenging an unjust 
attack; a generation later, they were inspired to “make the world safe for democracy” (Freidel & 
Sidey, 2006, para. 1) in a monstrous “war to end all wars” (Woodd-Cahusac, 2000, para. 2).  
Another generation after that, the country’s “greatest generation... answered the call to 
help save the world” (Brokaw, 1998, p. xxvii; 1999, 2001; Bostdorff, 2011) in the Second World 
War, seen largely as a justified war in which, “by contrast [to most history], military victory was 
transformed into strategic victory” (Metz & Millen, 2003, p. 23). Today, a “greater good” 
symbolism is evident in the way statues of Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses Grant, along with the 
National World War Two Monument, dominate the Reflecting Pool on the National Mall in front 
of the U.S. Capitol: “The shimmering water bridges America’s two ‘good wars’: the first to save 
the Union and free the slaves … the second to defeat fascism” (Tierney, 2010, p. 5).  
However, the significant success of that singular event transformed every subsequent 
U.S. military experience, other than the Korean conflict, into an interstate war – a quest for a 
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similarly justified victory: “The fitting objectives of interstate war are different and altogether 
grander [than mere victory]: to compel unconditional surrender, create a new democratic 
government, and transform the world” (Tierney, 2010, p. 15). This incomplete utilitarian ideal 
informed the debates surrounding conflicts in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War.  
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, through the subsequent public debate in 
the United States and the eventual U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing 
discussion has often invoked various appropriations of just war theory. For example, as the U.S. 
government considered the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, USA Today devoted 
an entire op-ed page two weeks later to a brief discussion of what just war meant to five different 
religious leaders – but did not explain the meaning or reasoning behind the doctrine itself 
(Grossman, 2001, p. 7D). Almost a decade later, the doctrine appeared prominently in 
discussions of President Barack Obama’s West Point speech, at which he announced a troop 
increase in Afghanistan (Baker, 2010). Most recently, the concept of jus ad Bellum appears in 
arguments defending President Donald Trump’s decision to send troops to the border to defend 
against an “invasion of our country” by Central American migrants representing a “National 
Emergency” (Shear & Gibbons-Neff, 2018, A18).  
Generally, classic just war theory’s first and essential concept, jus ad Bellum, “has 
existed for centuries as a set of criteria that must be argued and met before the extreme action of 
war can be morally undertaken ... [or] what moral criteria justify going to war” (Brislin, 1992, 
pp. 209-211). These principles are: Just cause, the need for an existential reason for going to 
war; Competent authority, the socio-political authority to wage war; Right intention, the justified 
goals of going to war; Comparative justice, the just balance of redress of injury versus harm 
expected as a result of going to war; Proportionality of ends, the just cost-benefit analysis of 
 70 
harm and good expected as a result of going to war; Probability of success, the expected high 
degree of likelihood that the goods will significantly outweigh the harms; and Last resort, the 
“utilitarian calculus” that allows going to war only after all other avenues of alternative action 
are either exhausted or convincingly argued as unworkable (Bell, 2009; Brislin, 1992; Dubik, 
2016; Lazar, 2016; Moseley, n.d.a.; Shaw, 2011; Walzer, 1977).  
Most recently, some of these classic jus ad Bellum principles appear in arguments 
surrounding various aspects of the U.S. “war on terror” (Dubik, 2016; Fleck, 2011; Garraway, 
2011; Miller, 2013; Sarat, Douglas, & Umphrey, 2104). In particular, the “U.S. invasion of Iraq 
was broadly seen as a violation of international norms ... contrary to much international opinion 
and a departure from prevailing normative conventions” because, among other standards, it 
failed to meet several of the internationally adopted ad Bellum criteria (Shannon & Keller, 2007, 
pp. 79-80; Totten, 2006). The resulting problems reflected this “lack of diligent preparation” 
(Wyatt-Brown, 2014, p. 184). In retrospect, “the war’s rising costs and uncertain benefits 
confirm important questions that were present from the outset ... [especially] why this costly and 
controversial war was even considered a viable option” in spite of its many critics (Flibbert, 
2006, p. 318). “Military action at that time was not a last resort” (Chilcot, 2016, para. 4). Indeed: 
“Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that 
has been there for 20 years, and which we helped to create?” asked one British legislator (Rao, 
2016, para. 5). Worse, Calabrese (2005) found that most U.S. media missed reporting the fact 
that the 2003 “Bush Doctrine” of pre-emptive war actually departed from traditional just war 
tenets.  
As Mill himself observed, the decision to go to war represents one of the most 
consequential of all political responsibilities (1859b). Perhaps, then, it comes as little surprise 
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that some war ethicists invoke Mill in their deliberations. For example, several have argued that 
Mill’s stance on non-intervention could convincingly have argued against U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam (Shaw, 2014; Walzer, 1977). Others have asked: “Did the 1991 Gulf War against 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the more recent invasion and occupation of Iraq fulfill the last-resort 
requirement?” (Whitman, 2007, p. 28). Ultimately, applying a utilitarian ethic to the nation’s 
history, noted Mill scholar David Lyons concluded that, again, “violence was conducted by our 
government, at least some of it contrary to U.S. law” (2012, p. 835).  
Jus in Belo: Justification in wartime conduct.  
Chaplain, is it right that we’re here? Are we doing any good? And even if we are,  
should we have invaded this country in the first place? ... How do we maintain our  
moral standards and fight ‘justly’ when our enemies seem to have no moral scruples at  
all? Should we? How do we protect innocent noncombatants in villages when we have  
to find and kill the terrorists living there?  
(Chaplain Lt. Col. Scott A. Sterling, as cited in Bell, 2009, pp. 7-8)  
Besides setting forth strict guidelines for deciding whether to go to war, the classic just 
war “doctrine also sets the moral boundaries within which, once declared, war can be fought ... 
jus in bello – under what moral criteria a war may be fought” (Brislin, 1992, pp. 209-211). The 
ideal of a justified warrior “carried a moral weight, from the Greek and Roman sense of virtue, 
of properties and qualities of right conduct” (Der Derian, 2001, p. xv). The two main criteria of 
the larger JWT tradition are seen as “independent arguments ... [as] a just war may be fought 
unjustly, while aggression is unjust but must be conducted justly… defense and resistance are 
just but must also be justly limited” (Walzer, 1977, pp. 502-507). In practice, beyond “simply a 
tool for judging battlefield conduct, law now seeks to subdue warfare and to enlist it into the 
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service of legal goals ... to authorize and restrain, to declare and limit, to justify and condemn” 
(Sarat, Douglas, & Umphrey, 2104). And it is no accident that these concepts are still taught to 
officer-students in the U.S. military academies; ultimately, “the command climate plays an 
important, if not the most important, role in preventing unethical and unprofessional behavior” 
on the battlefield (Tripodi & Todd, 2017, p. 77).  
The two main principles of jus in Belo are: Discrimination (non-combatant immunity), 
the distinction between combatants and civilians in a just war that allows for the targeting of the 
former and the protection of the latter; and Proportionality of means, the insistence that only the 
minimum force required for victory be applied to strategy and tactics in a just war (Bell, 2009; 
Brislin, 1992; Dubik, 2016; Lazar, 2016; Moseley, n.d.a.; Shaw, 2011; Walzer, 1977). Some 
scholars include another principle: Necessity, the injunction against any harm that does not 
provide tangible military benefit (Shaw, 2016).  
That these two principles of the just war tradition collide head on with a number of both 
distinct events and overall policies in recent U.S. military history is well documented, as rising 
issues related to non-state actors, asymmetrical warfare, terrorism, assassination, regime change, 
and torture significantly challenge both of these jus in Belo precepts (Banks, 2008; Cogen, 2012; 
Fleck, 2011; French & Jack, 2015; Gourevitch & Morris, 2008; Hurka, 2005; Liivoja & 
McCormack, 2016; Power, 2002; Sarat, Douglas, & Umphrey, 2104; Steinhoff, 2007). “In 
peacetime, few countries have been as vocal as the United States in arguing for the need to 
protect civilians from the scourge of war. But once battle is joined, restraints on the use of force 
tend to fall away” (Tierney, 2010, p. 15).  
Unsurprisingly, as the various ethical traditions enter uncharted territory, their proponents 
often revert to utilitarian arguments to help limn guidelines for just conduct during war. On the 
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battlefield itself, “soldiers and their leaders are best educated on the Laws of Land Warfare and 
will more readily comply with these laws when understood and justified by appeal to utilitarian 
considerations” (Whitman, 1993, pp. 262-263). Wherever one may fight, “one of the sustaining 
conclusions of just war theory is that escalation or retaliatory measures (tit for tat policies) 
should be avoided for their destabilizing nature” (Moseley, n.d.a., para. 29), therefore,  
“[c]ounterterrorism operations must ... minimize collateral damage, which invariably creates 
dislocation, social isolation, and calls for revenge” (Abrahms, 2008, p. 105).  
In particular, the changing reality of war challenges traditional just war views on the 
treatment of prisoners, when both proponents and opponents of torture, for example, appeal to 
utility to argue their side (Griffin, 2010; Gushee, 2008). Even Bentham has been invoked in 
discussions of how best to bring terror suspects to justice (Resnik, 2011). Meanwhile, Walzer 
and others applied Mill to jus in Belo concepts such as proportionality (cf. Walzer, 2009), 
Ultimately, though consequentialist, these jus in Belo tenets still do not apply a truly utilitarian 
calculus.  
In Vietnam, for example, where the U.S. first encountered large-scale asymmetrical 
warfare, “some military leaders adopted what they called ‘utilitarian calculation’ when they 
deliberated about how to fight the war. I do not think it is too wild to guess that these 
calculations were often skewed in favour of American lives” (Bykvist, 2010, p. 95). Since then, 
this one-sided valuation is reflected in how the government – and the press – report conflict-
related deaths: “We can rattle off casualty rates … Yet most of us would not know the casualty 
figures for the other side … Post-Vietnam, the U.S. has made many digital advances; public 
announcement of enemy body counts is not one of them” (Der Derian, 2001, p. xv).   
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Worse, from Vietnam through the present, an incompletely utilitarian good of shortening 
a conflict may have instead actually created more civilian deaths in the long run: “Qualms about 
targeting civilians melt away as we try to end the slaughter. The major barrier stopping the 
United States from destroying women and children in wartime is not our moral inhibitions, but 
the enemy’s failure to offer sufficient resistance” (Tierney, 2010, p. 26). Finally, an incomplete 
focus on ends can become a self-perpetuating cycle of consequentialist self-justification: “The 
Vietnam War is a spectacular example … in the late stages of going in the wrong direction 
policy-makers may hold that all their previous efforts will have been in vain unless one more 
effort is made” (Braybrooke, 2004, p. 75). In situations like this, an incomplete utilitarianism 
ultimately serves to violate the just war tenet that requires a just warrior to cease fighting when 
the original justification for the war changes and is no longer valid.  
Jus post Bellum: Justification in war’s end and aftermath.  
Why and how nations go to war matters crucially from a moral point of view. Yet the  
morality of war also encompasses concerns broader than the jus ad Bellum criteria  
justifying the resort to war or jus in Belo constraints on war’s conduct. In some cases, a  
war’s moral legacy may outshine – even contrast starkly with – the political reasons for  
war or its conduct. (Carlson, 2008, p. 620)  
Joining a growing insistence on also seeking jus post Bellum, or justice in war’s 
aftermath, a just conflict must result in the greater goods of “not just peace, but peace-with-
rights, a condition of liberty and security,” declared Michael Walzer in his landmark treatise on 
just war (1977, p. 872). For example, even when considering jus ad Bellum, “[w]ar should be a 
path to peace,” argued Tom Brislin; “Just as important, the peace must be just” (1992, p. 211). 
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Even from a realist perspective, “order precedes justice in the strategy of government; but ... only 
an order which implicates justice can achieve a stable peace” (Niebuhr, 1944, p. 181).  
Though a later addition to the traditional JWT criteria of jus ad Bellum and jus in Belo, an 
emerging jus post Bellum requirement includes five principles: an adaptation of Discrimination 
(non-combatant immunity) to post-war treatment of civilians; a Rights-based respect and 
consideration for the vanquished people; an adaptation of Proportionality that balances the 
victors’ demands with the nature of the conflict; a Compensatory Discrimination and 
Proportionality approach to reparations and penalties imposed on the vanquished; and, at times, 
the Rehabilitation and Re-Education of the vanquished (Evans, 2009; Gheciu & Welsh, 2009; 
Moseley, n.d.a; Orend, 2001, 2006; Recchia, 2009; Zaum, 2009).  
In a passage resonant with the anti-war of the early utilitarians, one religious writer 
recently reminded her readers that these consequences affect warrior and civilian alike:  
Veterans experience physical, psychological, and spiritual consequences of war: spilled  
blood, broken bodies, families torn apart, and wounded souls. The people in the nations  
in which they fight experience all of this as well, and the further tragedies of land and  
infrastructure and economies destroyed, the poverty of destabilization, epidemics,  
displacement and refugee crises. (Paris-Lopez, 2018)  
The post-World War II Marshall Plan represents for many the gold standard of jus post 
Bellum thinking, grounded in human rights concepts (O’Donovan, 2009). President George W. 
Bush made a number of comparisons to “the greatest generation” of that war and the present 
generation’s war in Iraq (Bostdorff, 2011). Indeed: “The false analogy of Saddam Hussein … 
with Hitler’s onslaught in Europe was ludicrous but firmly repeated in Pentagon and White 
House circles” (Wyatt-Brown, 2014, p. 185) – and that powerful symbolism continues to 
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resonate with many. Yet recent generations appear to have forgotten the final, crucial JWT 
criterion: Increasingly, it seems, Postman (1985) may have been right about modern 
entertainment values driving the coverage of political decisions and national policy:  
Americans are addicted to regime change and allergic to nation-building ... When the  
first shot is fired, the public rallies around the flag. Crusading enthusiasm sweeps the  
nation until the great dictator is overthrown. But once the United States begins nation- 
building in a conquered land, hope quickly turns to regret (Tierney, 2010, pp. 7-8).  
This recurrent failure to consider long-term consequences – such as the reaction of the 
invaded populace – is reflected in the result of almost every U.S. war since 1945. “Moreover, 
since the end of the Cold War, regardless of the margin of victory, it has been rare for military 
triumphs in battle to yield substantial postwar payoffs” (Mandel, 2007, p. 13). Especially in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, myopic, incomplete utilitarian goals of efficiency and limited military 
footprint backfired: “American policy-makers certainly would have benefited from a better 
understanding of the political implications ... the ways in which small war actually can constitute 
a people ... and thereby arouse passions that make foreign control unlikely, if not impossible” 
(Davis, 2018, p. 4; Scheipers, 2018) – just as Bentham had observed 200 years earlier (1789). 
Especially in Iraq, “U.S. leadership ... failed to assess correctly the prospects of post-Saddam 
counterinsurgency ... [nor] the Sunni reaction to the loss of control over Iraq, nor to the 
escalation of conflict ... between radical Islam and the West” (Merom, 2007, p. 178).  
“The danger lies in the ambiguity of the U.S. strategy regarding the next phase of the war 
... Undoubtedly, the United States possesses the military capability to win wars; yet the real 
difficulty comes after victory on the battlefield” (Gerges, 2002, p. 20). And then, as always, 
public support for the war plummets. “So why do we go to war if we hate counterinsurgency and 
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we struggle at it? The reason is the White House convinces itself it doesn’t need to stabilize or 
help rebuild a country after a war” (Tierney, 2018, para. 33).  
Among other problems, this apparent lack of any significant “exit strategy” and 
inadequate considerations of long-term consequences are cited by some as reasons why the 2003 
Iraq invasion failed to satisfy various jus post Bellum criteria (Burns, 2003; Fisher, 2011b; Fleck, 
2011; Freedman, 2004; Zaum, 2009). “In Iraq, we are paying a terrible price for these attitudes. 
The failure to plan for post-conflict reconstruction proved catastrophic” (Tierney, 2010, p. 9). 
The coalition “Shock and Awe” approach aimed to quickly overwhelm Iraq and compel its 
relatively rapid surrender (War plan, 2003, p. 7A; Ullman & Wade, 1996). Instead, the “initial 
war was won in about six weeks, but the peace was lost soon thereafter” (Flibbert, 2013, p. 67). 
“In other words, it could take years to undo 48 hours of “Shock and Awe” (Bunch, 2003, p. 6). 
The long-lasting and compounded-interest costs of war outlive the actual shooting for many 
years: a dozen years, for veterans – and civilians – affected by burn pits in Iraq (Steinhauer, 
2019); decades, in terms of depleted-uranium munitions that remain in war zones (Gibbons-Neff, 
2017); and even longer, in unexploded ordnance from Vietnam (Black, 2016; Webster, 1996), 
Korea (Talmadge, 2017), the Cold War (Blue, n.d.; Webster, 1996), World War II 
(Higginbotham, 2016; Webster, 1996), World War I (Webster, 1996), and even the Civil War 
(Perkins, 1996) and the American Revolution (Kimberlin, 2019). The cost in time, money, and 
lives paid every year by these forgotten weapons alone is incalculable.  
Ultimately, in utilitarian terms, even the anticipated greater good end of a military victory 
may not justify the multiple harms of its means: “Inadequate understanding of the complexities 
surrounding victory can result in decision-making paralysis, loss of internal and external support, 
escalating post-war violence, pyrrhic triumphs, and, ultimately, foreign policy failure” (Mandel, 
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2007, p. 13; Mellow, 2003). However, where even these recent increasing appreciations of jus 
post Bellum concerns are decidedly utilitarian in and of themselves, the applications of these and 
other JWT tenets do not rise to the level of a completely utilitarian calculus (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 
2016). To obtain that, I return to England – and to John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism itself.  
Classic utilitarian war ethics.  
During the forty years after his death he governed liberal thought as did no other man,  
and as late as 1914 he was still the chief source of inspiration of the ... men whose  
dream of an indefinitely peaceful progress and expansion of Western civilization was  
shattered by the cataclysms of war and revolution. But even to that development Mill  
had unquestionably contributed by his sympathies for the rising aspirations of national  
self-determination and of socialism. (Hayek, 1963, p. xvi)  
In considering why nations wage war, Clausewitz’ classic On War distinguishes between 
instinctive hostility, which informs a fight between individuals, and hostile intention, which 
guides larger, inter-state conflict (Clausewitz, 1873, para. 7) – a distinction later maintained by 
the classic utilitarians (Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1890). The “pure conception” or “political object” 
of the latter motivation is the “disarming of the nation” so as to impose one’s own will; this 
requires three outcomes: the destruction of its “military power,” the control of its physical 
“country” and resources, and the subjection of “the will of the enemy.” Without success in each 
of these three arenas, one cannot consider “the business of war as ended, by a peace” 
(Clausewitz, 1873, para. 77-82). And while the original German-language treatise predates 
Utilitarianism by about 30 years, the language surrounding each of these desired outcomes is 
also decidedly utilitarian: The enemy nation must be disarmed to be subdued; therefore, its 
ability to wage war must be destroyed so it cannot resist, its territory must be controlled to ensure 
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that no resistance arises, and its will must be broken so that no thought of resistance becomes 
action. Each arena of war, therefore, is tied to a specific consequence – the most important of 
which is peace itself.  
“Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril,” 
goes the famous 5th-century BCE mandate from ancient China (Tzu, 1963, p. 84); from the oft-
quoted 4th-century BCE maxim “si vis pacem, para bellum” – “If you want peace, prepare for 
war” (Vegetius & Milner, 1996, p. 63) – to the 1st-century AD observation that “what king, going 
out to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and deliberate whether he is able 
with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand?” (Luke 14:31, 
English Standard Version), utilitarian war calculations appear perennially. Yet, where the 
ancients considered war from the virtues of courage and conquest (cf. Brennan, 1994; Chan, 
2012; Koenigsberg, 2009), and later thinkers argued from duties of defense and justice (cf. Fabre 
& Lazar, 2014; Harrison, 1952; Rodin, 2002), some recent war ethics scholars choose to consider 
utility.  
Early utilitarians categorically reject war.  
In Bentham’s hands ... utilitarianism is opposed to the sacrifice of individual lives or  
security merely for the greater happiness ... Bentham identified universal and  
overridingly important ‘secondary principles’, most notably security and subsistence,  
which call for protection of fundamental individual interests. These normative  
protections differ from rights virtually in name only and stand in the way of sacrifice of  
individuals to aggregate happiness in the community. (Postema, 1998, p. 144-145)  
From his forebears in rationalism and early utilitarianism, Mill inherited an abhorrence of 
war. Such a stance seems obvious: what greater threat to the greater good could possibly exist? 
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And the pioneering utilitarians wasted no words in judging war as “almost always deleterious. 
Whatever good a given war might conceivably produce or whatever evils it may forestall, by 
definition it involves death and destruction, mayhem and misery” (Shaw, 2014, p. 303.). The pre-
utilitarian Leibniz, for example, emphatically decried Europe’s many “bloody sacrifices of the 
innocent by ambitious rulers” (Leibniz & Riley, 1972, p. 111; Bojanić, 2013). 
Bentham: Unjust individual sacrifice. Unequivocally, Jeremy Bentham declared that no 
matter “the injury in question, the expense of war will always outweigh it” (1843, p. 544). For 
one thing, “wars ... so often attack the resources of subsistence, that a society which has no 
superfluity would often be exposed to want necessaries” (1789, p. 304) – demonstrably true of so 
many “destructive wars, which have impoverished nations” (p. 310). Further, even social norms 
suffer in “a time of war, when the laws which give security are in part suspended. Every instant 
of its duration is fruitful in calamity” (p. 308).  
On one hand, he observed, war unites a people: “The necessity of acting in concert 
against a common enemy, subjects a whole tribe to the orders of a common Chief” (p. 265); 
however, such power may also be perverted by politicians in order to distract citizens from more 
pressing internal concerns. For example, “Cromwell ... had no other means of occupying the 
minds of his countrymen, than engaging the nation in foreign wars ... and preventing them from 
occupying themselves with the affairs of government” (p. 541). Similarly, the U.S. revolution 
was a “war of misgovernment, against the only possible good government” (p. 251).  
Arguing for a universal, perpetual peace, Bentham saw absolutely nothing good war and 
its usual causes: “The happiest of mankind are sufferers by war; and the wisest, nay, even the 
least wise, are wise enough to ascribe the chief of their sufferings to that cause” (1789, p. 546); 
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the best national interest, for Bentham, would be for England to join no foreign treaties, 
relinquish its colonies, and maintain a navy only large enough to defend against piracy.  
As Bentham consistently “maintained that wars usually benefited the governors at the 
expense of the governed” (Conway, 1989, p. 87), he would not allow such an individual 
“sacrifice of happiness” (Harrison, 1998, p. 164) – and J. S. Mill’s later adoption of Bentham’s 
conviction “would clearly preclude ... the sacrifice of individual happiness simply for the sake of 
aggregating a greater amount of happiness” (Rosen, 1998, p. 143). Bentham particularly 
condemned the usual consequence: the unfair allocation of the cost of war onto the masses, who 
always must “murder one another for the gratification of the avarice or pride of the few” (Mill, 
1789, p. 21) – who, in turn, rarely must suffer the “complex mischief” of war’s consequences 
(Bentham, 1843, p. 101; Conway, 1989; Shaw, 2014). For Bentham, such imbalance of costs and 
benefits is ultimately immoral: “A king, for the sake of gaining the admiration annexed to the 
name of conqueror ... engages his kingdom in a bloody war” (Bentham, p. 52).  
James Mill: War devours national economy. Significantly influenced by Bentham in this 
regard (Conway, 1989; Hinsley, 1963), James Mill insisted that war is “the cause of the 
stagnation and misery which appear so general in human affairs ... the pestilential wind which 
blasts the prosperity of nations ... the devouring fiend which eats up the precious treasure of 
national economy” (1808, p. 119). Coincidentally, like the author of this study, James “Mill 
started his career as a journalist, and initially approached the subject of peace and war in that 
capacity” (Yasukawa, 1991, p. 180). Eventually also influenced by Adam Smith (Mill & Winch, 
1966), he opposed war on mostly economic grounds, as it obstructed progress (Mill, 1808; 
Silberner, 1946). For James Mill, echoing three guidelines from the just war tradition’s jus ad 
Bellum tenet, a nation “should have recourse to war only when some right has been violated, 
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when that violation is a serious one, and when remedying it requires the extreme measure of 
war” (Shaw, 2014, p. 305).  
However, some of his statements on war also resonate with the just war concept of jus in 
Belo. For example, James “Mill held that although combatants may attack other combatants, they 
are not justified in inflicting harm on them beyond what is necessary to take them out of the 
fight” - so soldiers should “take prisoners whenever possible and ... treat them humanely” (Shaw, 
2014, p. 305). Meanwhile, non-combatant civilians – as well as their property – are considered 
off limits “unless in certain very extraordinary instances” – warriors must exercise “forbearance 
and preservation” in dealing with non-combatants, because any supposed advantage gained in 
battle by indiscriminate harm “bears … no sort of proportion to the evil inflicted upon the 
individuals” (Mill, 1825, p. 22).  
Mill refines a utilitarian war ethic.  
[W]ar, in a good cause, is not the greatest evil which a nation can suffer. War is an ugly  
thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic  
feeling which thinks nothing worth a war, is worse ... As long as justice and injustice  
have not terminated their ever renewing fight for ascendancy in the affairs of mankind,  
human beings must be willing, when need be, to do battle for the one against the other.  
 (Mill, 1862a, p. 141).  
Writing in response to the U. S. Civil War, at a time of significant personal and 
professional crisis just a few years after On Liberty and a year before publishing the book version 
of Utilitarianism (Cohen-Almagor, 2009; Gade, 2000), John Stuart Mill expressed a rare position 
that war, as anti-utilitarian as it usually concluded, might still be justified by utilitarian criteria in 
very limited situations. And, though it was Mill’s most fundamental “belief that the use of reason 
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can settle fundamental social conflicts,” (Gray, 1988, p. 149), “it is clear that there are numerous 
examples of his support for the use of violence” by the state (Williams, 1989, p. 102) — but only 
when justified by utility. However, when so justified, the “Greater Good” can even include 
personal sacrifice: “Imagining a virtuous man in the present ‘imperfect state ...,’ [Mill] concludes 
that this man must sacrifice his own happiness if he wishes to promote the happiness of others ... 
like the happy Warrior who endures pain for a noble cause” (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 66). However, 
unlike the ancients, Mill justifies this virtuous sacrifice for others by a utilitarian “noble cause.”  
Reflecting a paradox as ancient as Plato (1967) and Vegetius (1996), Mill also seeks to 
prepare for the inevitability of conflict by suggesting utilitarian guidelines to justify its rare use 
and limit its innate appetite for destruction: “If good is to come of evil it must be practised with 
an awareness of the need to curtail its general tendency to produce yet more evil” (Williams, 
1989, p. 103), a sort of “commonsense morality of ... necessary evils” (Shaw, 2016, pp. 1-2). 
Here, Mill echoes one long-forgotten orthodox concept of the just war tradition that holds that 
even justified violence is still evil (Bell, 2009).  
Unfortunately for war ethics scholars, “John Stuart Mill seems never to have discussed 
the causes of war or how to avoid it, and he said very little about the ethics of war in general” 
(Shaw, 2014, p. 305). Instead, war ethicists are left to carefully sift through his few statements on 
the subject, and then attempt to reconcile and orient them to his larger conception of utility. Such 
a review of Mill’s key propositions reveals an emerging yet consistent argument that expands 
one’s personal right of self-defense into a larger aggregate right of national security.  
Early essays: National security justified as aggregate self defense.  
We have no objection to anything which can possibly be said in denunciation of  
medicines, if we can first get rid of diseases. We are quite ready to join in the cry of  
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“No prisons,” when the thieves shall all be converted ... War may be stigmatized  
universally, and we are quite ready to give our vote for its abolition in a universal  
congress of mankind: but while the enemies of freedom are allowed to levy their vassals,  
embattle their slaves, and organize their dupes, assuredly the friends of freedom have a  
right to employ their own thews and sinews to check the onward flow of barbarism and  
tyranny. (Mill, 1837, pp. 363-364)  
 Much of the research on Mill’s conception of utilitarianism and how he applied it 
to war draws from the explicit statements he made on the subject in A Few Words on Non-
Intervention (1859) and in The contest in America (1862), during a period of productive 
publication that began with On Liberty and encompassed the initial Utilitarianism essay. 
However, he had considered war and utility decades before that, and had apparently concluded 
that, as he wrote in response to the U.S. Civil War, war could be justified in rare instances of 
self-defense. In these essays, a concept of aggregate self defense emerges as an extension of 
individual security, or one’s “inbred principle of selfe preservation” (Browne, 1652, p. 2).  
In one early essay, he appeared to depart somewhat from his predecessors, Bentham and 
James Mill, in arguing against the idea that war created an unbalanced drain on the economy 
while providing non-utilitarian, unreasonable, nonproductive expenditure for otherwise surplus 
goods and capital (Mill, 1824b; see also Bataille, 1991; Hamblet, 2005). He did, however, insist 
that “a government ought not to take from any of its subjects more than it gives” (Mill, 1832, p. 
11), and sympathized with the wartime lot of the “poor conscripts, compelled to serve” (Mill, 
1849, p. 36). Nevertheless, in debating freedom for conscientious objection, he wrote “I regard 
war as an infinitely less evil than systematic submission to injustice” (Mill, 1847, p. 729).  
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Justice would later become the key to his defense of security in Utilitarianism; as his 
ideas evolved during these preceding years, his comments in several essays reveal his stance that 
self-defense (and just defense of the defenseless) is the only socially acceptable justification for 
violence, and that a state or nation could defend itself with force by extension of that same 
principle on behalf of an aggregated group of individuals. “Self-defence justifies much” (Mill, 
1837, p. 373), he wrote in justifying anti-piracy naval action by the British government. For Mill, 
the state’s only right to employ force is the same as that of an individual: “the right of self-
defence” (1862b, p. 597): “The only right by which society is warranted in inflicting any pain 
upon any human creature, is the right of self-defence” (Mill, 1834b, p. 79).  
An emerging ethic: Balancing individual and aggregate rights.  
I am quite aware of the volley of argument and oratory which may be opened from the  
old topic of the danger of yielding to unjust pretensions, the imprudence as well as  
spiritlessness of submitting to aggression in order to avoid inconveniences, the  
preferableness of actual war to the reputation of an over-dread of it. (Mill, 1842, p. 834)  
In Mill’s evolving ethic, an aggregate, state-level self-defense could mean security from 
internal as well as external threats: “The strongest of all cases of coincidence between public and 
private interest, is that of protection against open violence” (Mill, 1862b, p. 596). In such a case, 
“Revolutionary France ... had the amplest justification” (Mill, 1837, p. 373). Therefore, for any 
unjustified “intentional and unwarranted aggression upon an indisputable right ... it was 
incumbent on us to repel, even though war were the result” (Mill, 1842, p. 834).  
Further, for this champion of individual freedom, a state’s right to aggregate self-defense 
could also mean compulsory military service; as he opined in On Liberty, any form of 
“compulsion, is ... justifiable only for the security of others.” (Mill, 1859a, p. 224). Here, he 
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disagrees with Bentham’s hedonistic insistence that everyone sacrifices public interest to their 
own, and argues that many are motivated by patriotism or benevolence (Mill, 1833; 1842), 
willing even “to bear his fair share in the common defence” (Mill, 1859a, p. 225). This he also 
framed in terms of aggregate justice in On Liberty: “every one who receives the protection of 
society owes a return for the benefit ... bearing his share ... of the ... sacrifices incurred for 
defending the society” (p. 276). The reverse, he argued, is also true for the legitimate state: “The 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community against his will is to prevent harm to others” (p. 223).  
Ultimately, he imagined, people could be educated to see a “universal right of self-
defence” (Mill, 1834b, p. 79) as a universal duty of service, similar to that for one’s own country, 
finding the best balance between individual and aggregate rights and duties: “neither sacrificing 
the individual to the aggregate nor the aggregate to the individual, but giving to duty on one hand 
and to freedom and spontaneity on the other their proper province” (Mill, 1874, p. 421).  
However, in several letters to his wife and to friends during those productive years, he 
also lamented in very utilitarian terms that a British victory over Russia would also rehabilitate 
Napoleon’s standing in France: “To destroy the power & prestige of Russia is a great thing, but it 
is dearly bought at that price” (Mill, 1854, p. 264). Meanwhile, that particular war distracted 
public attention from what he considered very necessary parliamentary reforms (Mill, 1854). 
Further, in an essay written around the same time but published much later, he also bemoaned 
“the marked absence [of self-control] in soldiers and sailors” (Mill, 1874, p. 395), whose 
numbers swelled in wartime: all costs to be considered when evaluating a war’s utility.  
An applied ethic: Non-intervention and just cause.  
A war to protect other human beings against tyrannic injustice; a war to give victory to  
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their own ideas of right and good, and which is their own war, carried on for an honest  
purpose by their free choice – is often the means of their regeneration.  
(Mill, 1862a, p. 142)  
 The concurrent debates surrounding the Civil War in the United States provided this 
energetic essayist with an opportunity to apply his evolving utilitarian ethic to a real-world 
conflict, one philosophically very close to home, by first engaging the idea of intervention on 
behalf of other peoples or states, then later considering the concept of just cause, or right 
intentions when choosing to go to war.  
In A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), Mill considers three ethical principles: 
humanitarian protection, national self-determination, and national security or “national self-
defense” (Doyle, 2015, p. 12). For the first, he argues that one nation may be justified in 
interfering with another’s sovereignty when the latter abuses its own citizens “by severities 
repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country” (Mill, 1859b, p. 
121). And, as he argued three years later, this particular instance involved what for him 
represented a serious matter of injustice of this nature: “Unless we abandon the principles we 
have for two generations consistently professed and acted on, we should be at war with the new 
Confederacy within five years about the African slave-trade” (Mill, 1862a, p. 141).  
Second, to respect the principle of national self-determination, Mill insisted, a nation 
should avoid any intervention in another’s internal struggles other than “legitimate self-defence 
... Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful” (Mill, 1859b, p. 123). “The 
attempt to establish freedom by foreign bayonets is a solecism in terms,” he had written two 
decades earlier (Mill, 1837, p. 374). Mill could only justify intervention in civil wars or uprisings 
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when “against foreign rule or domestic tyranny supported by outsiders” (Shaw, 2014, p. 306), as 
weaker peoples “must be protected against ... external injury” (Mill, 1859a, p. 224).  
Finally, in The contest in America (1862), he argued that war was always to be avoided – 
unless it addressed a direct threat to national security. Here, Mill insisted that “self-preservation, 
in a State, as in an individual, is a warrant for many things which at all other times ought to be 
rigidly abstained from” (Mill, 1862a, p. 131). Nations must eschew “the immorality of wars of 
conquest ... [or] the wickedness of commencing an aggressive war for any interest of our own, 
except when necessary to avert from ourselves an obviously impending wrong” (Mill, 1859b, pp. 
120-121). For example, as he opined several years later, the nation’s appropriately utilitarian 
balancing of goods means that one instance of unjust “misconduct of Russia ... does not entitle us 
to bring upon millions of innocent persons the unspeakable evils of war” (Mill, 1870, p. 348).  
Somewhat myopically, however, he observed at the time that England’s politicians were 
consistently motivated only by national “security ... the common right of self-defence” – not 
glory or expansion (Mill, 1859b, p. 114). Nevertheless, he argued that this same sense of restraint 
should apply to conflicting religion or ideology as well: “To go to war for an idea, if the war is 
aggressive, not defensive, is as criminal as to go to war for territory or revenue” (Mill, 1859b, p. 
118). And, contrary to European thinkers like Clausewitz, who theorized that the strength of 
emerging nation-states would deter warmaking (Daase & Davis, 2015), Mill wisely worried that, 
in his own historical context, “the new ideas [of self-rule and socialism] will be inaugurated by a 
century of war & violence like that which followed the Reformation of Luther” (Mill, 1852, p. 
87). Sadly, his prophecy was in many ways fulfilled within a half-century, as those increasingly 
powerful nations rushed into an exponentially more evil World War (Hayek, 1963).  
However, he conceded that even such wars might still be justified by utility:  
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There assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having been  
ourselves attacked, or threatened with attack; and it is very important that nations should  
make up their minds in time, as to what these cases are. (Mill, 1859b, p. 118)  
Today, Mill’s balancing of the often conflicting values of beneficence, sovereignty, and 
self-determination find continuing relevance in the largely consequentialist contemporary 
arguments over humanitarian aid and intervention, as nations perennially attempt to “make up 
their minds in time” about armed conflict (Doyle, 2008, 2015; Walzer, 1977; Shaw, 2016). For 
instance, at the time of this writing, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen defended his own country’s 
lengthy, deadly and controversial intervention in that African nation by saying that the “most 
important thing for us is national security” (Kristof, 2018, para. 41) – and not necessarily the 
well-being of the Yemeni people. 
A mature ethic: National security as aggregate utilitarian justice.  
But ... the powers, one after another ... threw off, and were allowed with impunity to  
throw off, such of the obligations of the treaties as were distasteful ... and notsufficiently  
important to the others to be worth a fight ... even those [violations] which were  
disapproved, were not regarded as justifying a resort to war. (Mill, 1870, p. 344)  
Though Mill never devoted as much attention to war in his later years as he had during 
this turbulent Civil War period of publication, statements such as this 1870 essay on treaty 
obligations reveal his fully evolved thinking on the role of the social contract: Each citizen’s 
security relied on promises of justice enforced through community consensus, as he described at 
length in Utilitarianism. In any case of contemplating any war, the properly justified state must 
consider the consequences for its people of their collectively undertaking any war.  
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While he never mentions the word “war” in Utilitarianism, Mill’s beliefs emerge clearly 
between the lines. Considered as a whole, his mature utilitarianism for a just-acting state 
resonates with just war theory: any act of war or political violence ultimately may only be 
justified by a defensibly just outcome, with a reasonable chance of success (Shaw, 2014).  
Building on his earlier expansion of an individual right to self defense into an aggregate 
right to national security (1834b), Mill explicitly argues in Utilitarianism that one’s own security 
represents “this most indispensable of all necessaries ... [and] the claim we have on our fellow-
creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence” (1863, p. 67). 
Such, he insists, is a basic understanding “in all states of civilization ... every one is obliged to 
live on these terms ... abstaining from all the grosser injuries, and (if only for their own 
protection) living in a state of constant protest against them” (p. 39). Here, he balances individual 
freedom with “the public interest ... demanded by every system of morals ... [that] all enjoin to 
abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to society” (p. 23).  
Finally, Mill argues that such an obvious argument for the greater good should drive a 
society’s discourse itself, until public “education and opinion, which have so vast a power ... 
should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble 
association between his own happiness and the good of the whole” (p. 21).  
As with his conception of security, Mill also expands an individual’s right to justice into 
a larger, aggregate mutual claim. In Utilitarianism, justice balances “a mixture of ... an instinct 
for self-protection and revenge and a concern for the general utility” (Anderson, 1991, p. 23); 
eventually, “nourished by the contagion of sympathy and the influences of education ... a 
complete web of corroborative association is woven” (Mill, 1863, p. 40). For Mill, this puts a 
particular burden on leadership to eschew mere political expediency, “as when a minister 
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sacrifices the interests of his country to keep himself in place” (p. 27), in favor of justice. This 
manifestly war-wary stance is in keeping with those of his predecessors, Bentham (Postema, 
1998) and James Mill (Shaw, 2014), who both decried the unbalanced division of public sharing 
of the costs and benefits of war.  
Post-Millian Utilitarians Re-Engage with ad Bellum Ethics  
Consequentialist theories may include all sorts of things ... as intrinsically valuable or  
disvaluable, such as ... peace (vs. war or violence) ... Utilitarians usually recognize all of  
these other things as valuable, but regard them as of instrumental value, contributing to  
pleasure or reduction of pain. (West, 2013, p. 5262)  
After Mill, some subsequent utilitarians also wrestled with adjusting their elusive ideal of 
eliminating war to the harsh reality of mitigating its damages; however, as the 20th century 
arrived, most theorists ignored war in favor of more elevated philosophical contemplations.   
“Utopia would certainly include the suppression of war,” lamented Henry Sidgwick 
(1874, p. 19), Mill’s philosophical heir and “the last of the great nineteenth-century utilitarians” 
(Shaw, 1999, p. 8); unfortunately, “war ... is a conflict in which each side conceives itself to be 
contending on behalf of legitimate interests” (Sidgwick, 1890, p. 5). Worse still, “this has been 
strikingly manifested in the sincere belief of religious persons generally-ordinary plain honest 
Christians on either side-that God is on their side.” While echoing Mill in arguing for peace 
based on social justice, Sidgwick saw no end to wars in the near future, and called for regulation 
to minimize harm (1874).  
G. E. Moore, the next influential writer in the utilitarian tradition, preferred to consider 
more esoteric applications of the philosophy, and took no major positions on war (1903, 1953); 
later, John C. Harsanyi applied classical utilitarian thought to similar big-picture concepts such 
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as welfare, Rawlsian justice, rational choice theory, and game theory (1955, 1977, 1982; cf. 
Fleurbaey, Salles, & Weymark, 2008).  
Similarly, most 20th-century theorists applied utilitarianism to specific martial ills, instead 
of grappling with the ethical issues of larger concerns, thereby allowing perennial critiques of the 
tradition to increase largely unchallenged. “The blame falls partly on utilitarian theorists, who 
have neglected the clear challenge presented by our commonplace uses of the concept of justice 
... [because] a utilitarian theory of justice had hardly been explored in the philosophical 
literature,” charged David Lyons (1994, p. 12; Elliott, 2007; Rawls, 1999); in fact, “a 
thoroughgoing defense of utilitarianism’s ability to contribute to discussions of the morality of 
war has been lacking,” observed Jenkins (2017, p. 963): “This is surprising ... given the attention 
that the classical utilitarians – including Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, and Sidgwick – 
paid to the conduct of war.”  
Lyons himself wrestled with balancing Mill’s concepts of individual liberty with the 
ethical mandate to avoid harming others (1965, 1979); his contemporary, Fred Berger, 
considered similar conflicts among individual freedom, justice and fairness (1979, 1984). And, 
as the millennium approached, Peter Singer applied utilitarianism to non-war life and death 
issues such as health care, sociobiology, euthanasia, and abortion (1981, 1994).  
Meanwhile, other 20th-century scholars continued to consider utilitarianism, justice, and 
violence (cf. Miller & Walzer, 1995) from mostly outside the tradition: “Where utilitarianism has 
established a beachhead, it is only on the margins of these discussions” (Jenkins, 2017, p. 963). 
For example, in his landmark work on justice, John Rawls – the “most important … political 
philosopher of the 20th century” and himself a decorated war veteran (Gordon, 2008, p. 24) – 
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noted that utilitarianism could be seen as implying elements of both justice and communitarian 
values (Rawls, 1971).  
Writing in response to Rawls, Richard Brandt argued that a “utilitarian view of [the moral 
rules of war] is essentially sound” (1972, p. 145), because of its focus on consequences. 
Concurrently, R. M. Hare applied utilitarianism to specific war-related concerns, such as jus in 
Belo criteria. For example, all “military training should … include instruction in the laws and 
usages of war … backed up by legal enforcement where possible” (1972, p. 176), to minimize 
war’s harm. Further, he argued, a truly utilitarian stance would enjoin physicians from 
participating in torture (1993).  
Overall, Hare found most anti-utilitarian arguments largely unconvincing when dealing 
with difficult, practical problems like war (Hare, 1981, p. 139). And even controversial non-war 
actions such as “sanctions are unacceptable from a utilitarian perspective because their economic 
effectiveness necessarily entails considerable human damage, while their likelihood of achieving 
political objectives is low” (Gordon, 1999, p. 124). Ultimately, “most arguments that purport to 
justify violating human rights on utilitarian grounds are nothing more than rationalizations ... 
even when the arguments are in good faith, the supposed utility calculations are overwhelmingly 
likely to be erroneous” (Shaw, 1999, p. 189). In other words, as the millennium closed, scholars 
agreed that a myopic utilitarianism can lead to unjust assumptions and conclusions.  
Post-9/11 ethicists seek utilitarian justifications.  
For example ... [considering] actions during war, the moral rightness of certain actions 
are determined by their effects. It is frequently the case that innocent civilians are killed  
during bombing attacks, yet the action is judged morally blameless in virtue of a net  
increase in perceived good as a result of the action. (Mosdell, 2011a, p. 2)  
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 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, 
politicians and philosophers alike often applied utilitarianism to guide their reconsiderations of 
security, justice, and war. While just war theory remained the most-invoked school of thought 
(Shaw, 2011), statesmen and scholars both increasingly applied utilitarian approaches. In a 
perfect storm of sorts, the approaching 2006 bicentennial of John Stuart Mill’s birth as well as 
the 2013 sesquicentennial of his publication of Utilitarianism provided opportunities for the 
tradition to find new currency in the many public debates that continued to emerge.  
 For example, the use of “targeted sanctions” against alleged terrorists and their supporters 
were ultimately judged “no more successful than traditional sanctions” – and no less harmful: “It 
seems that the common view is that since sanctions are now “smart,” we no longer have to worry 
about harming the innocent. But that is clearly not the case” (Gordon, 2011, p. 332); meanwhile, 
“sanctions experiences generally have been disappointing” (Tostensen & Bull, 2002, p. 402).  
The United States would not be satisfied with sanctions for much longer: within a year of 
the attacks, pursuit of justice had widened from the new, asymmetrical battlefield of targeting the 
non-state actors who had assisted in these attacks to the more traditional warfare of invading 
Afghanistan, their leader’s base of operations. Within another year, the U.S. further widened its 
“War on Terror” to invade Iraq. Despite their “perceived good,” the generally incomplete 
utilitarian public justifications for these U.S. military actions came under increasingly more 
complete utilitarian ethical scrutiny. For example, “strategic bombing is justified only if there is 
no other option available that would not have the bad side effects” (Bykvist, 2010, p. 135).  
Ultimately, “if we are to develop a new conceptual framework that is both operationally 
effective and consistent with democratic values and ideals, we must first revisit the assumptions 
of the war on terror narrative” (Zalman & Clarke, 2009, para. 5). This would include a more 
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robust version of utilitarianism. One scholar who did just that proposed a “deontological-
utilitarian principle [for] the promotion of peace and prohibition of war ... In the contemporary 
world ... there would be certainly many more efficacious ways to maintain the security of nations 
and people without the necessity of promoting wars” (Nahra, 2013, p. 187).  
Al-Qaeda and asymmetrical warfare: Utility and the ‘War on Terror’.  
We last met in an hour of shock and suffering. In four short months, our nation has  
comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great 
coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed 
Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a 
country from brutal oppression. (Bush, 2002, para. 2)  
In considering the unprecedented challenge thrust upon him on the morning of September 
11, 2001, President George W. Bush thought much like a virtue ethicist; whether one chooses to 
“call it ‘moral clarity’ ... ‘moral superiority,’ or even ‘moral naïveté’ ... the concept animates Mr. 
Bush’s broadest thinking about a world that he divides reflexively into black and white, wrong 
and right, day and night” (Purdum, 2003, para. 2; Bostdorff, 2011; Singer, 2004). His frequent 
invocation of the term “evil” throughout his first term when describing terrorists and their 
supporters (Bush, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004) reflects this thinking. However, reflecting Mill’s 
claim in Utilitarianism, he frequently invoked deontological, consequentialist, and utilitarian 
“greater good” security justifications for U.S. military reactions when attempting to defend them. 
At first, “no single course of action was self-evident or pre-ordained” (Flibbert, 2006, pp. 310-
311). But soon, Bush’s rhetorical invention of “the global war on terror ... represents an 
extraordinarily powerful narrative” (Zalman & Clarke, 2009, para. 4; Gerges, 2002) for moral 
justification.  
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Traditional appeals to justice and security invoke utility. “Justice!” was the immediate 
national outcry on the morning of September 11, 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Even 
the United Nations Security Council had, within one day of the attacks, condemned them “as a 
threat to international peace and security” (Fleck, 2011, p. 351). In reviewing the contemporary 
discussions of asymmetrical warfare that arose in response to these attacks, Walzer (2002, p. 
932) insisted that the “triumph of just war theory is clear enough.” However, these security 
concerns also resonate with Mill’s utilitarian concept of justice: “the natural feeling of retaliation 
… applicable to those injuries … which wound us through, or in common with, society at large” 
(p. 64). Meanwhile, Singer (2002) soon offered utilitarian guidelines for military interventions in 
humanitarian crises, as failed states were seen as harboring terrorists. Further, Endre Begby 
proposed that while “Mill is generally very hesitant to recommend that military means be put to 
humanitarian ends … some situations may present us with no choice” (2003, p. 61).  
“Our cause is just ... America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security,” 
he insisted in his first State of the Union address (Bush, 2002, paras. 10-22), while at the same 
time listing several benefits for Afghanistan of the new U.S. War on Terror. “To protect our 
country, we reorganized our government and created the Department of Homeland Security, 
which is mobilizing against the threats of a new era,” he explained a year later (Bush, 2003a, 
para. 5). Security was a constant mantra: “Our greatest responsibility is the active defense of the 
American people,” he reiterated as his first term drew to a close (Bush, 2004, para. 5) 
 No matter how the U.S. chooses to act, “when it acts unilaterally, it must be able to 
defend this action as a contribution to the general welfare” (Patrick, 2003, p. 50). Yet the 
incomplete utilitarianism of some claims quickly became apparent in several areas of concern in 
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this grave new world of terrorism, non-state actors, and asymmetrical warfare, where benefits 
might not justify costs, or actions failed to address actual security (Singer, 2004; Smith, 2005).  
The very nature of the attacks created conceptual problems for those used to seeing 
conflict in traditional war terms: “Terrorism is as old as human history ... A modern urban 
society, with its enormously complicated and interdependent institutions of life support, is 
particularly vulnerable to terroristic disruptions: Terrorism against fragile means of 
transportation is a promising strategy,” prophesied one analyst a quarter-century before (Berger, 
1976, p. 29); apparently, 25 years later, many still struggled with understanding the concept.  
Meanwhile, playing the utilitarian devil’s advocate, some scholars reminded that, in rare 
instances, as a matter of fact “Mill believed that insurrection, revolution and other coercive acts 
intended to subvert the authority of government could bring about a greater good and be justified 
or excused for that reason” (Whitham, 2006, pp. 409-410; Williams, 1989). At the same time, the 
previously paradigmatic, Cold-War-era “industrial army became effectively obsolete” (Smith, 
2005, p. 267); further, as “without a clear political purpose it is not possible to have a military 
strategic objective” (p. 291), the U.S. leadership struggled to find new tools for its new war. As 
the U.S. had not ratified the 1977 adjustments to the Geneva Conventions regarding non-state 
actors, irregular combatants, and other legal issues, political leaders had fewer restraints when 
dealing with asymmetrical warfare in the new global war on terror (Cadwalader, 2011; 
Brunstetter & Holeindre, 2018).  
New approaches to new challenges also invoke utility. Conflicting conceptions of justice 
and utility in response to terrorism also created conflicting approaches and mixed results. Most 
immediately, of those persons suspected of assisting the 9/11 terrorists, only one had been 
convicted within five years of the attacks (Coyne & Entzeroth, 2006), as concerns over national 
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security trumped utilitarian criteria for justice (Resnik, 2011). “Terrorists who once occupied 
Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay,” the president claimed a few months after the 
attacks (Bush, 2003a, para. 3); fifteen years later, some are still imprisoned there.  
Further, imprisoned terrorist suspects often faced new “enhanced interrogation” 
techniques, or torture, justified by a nearly impossible utilitarian “ticking bomb” scenario 
(Schultz, 2016, p. 255), which fails to produce useful intelligence – and, instead, ultimately 
imperils troop morale and future safety (Hutson & O’Meara, 2008, p. 39). States that torture 
demonstrate that an individual person’s rightful, “intrinsic value can be overridden by utilitarian 
arguments” (The National, 2007, para. 7.9); nevertheless, though some might attempt to “claim 
[it] is justified on utilitarian grounds ... state-sponsored torture only diminishes social well-being, 
crippling its victims and sapping the humanity of its perpetrators” – thereby reducing aggregate 
good (Shaw, 1999, p. 189).  
 Finally, strategists and ethicists alike struggled to adapt pacifist, realist, just war, and 
even utilitarian responses to the new implications of autonomous weaponry, information warfare, 
electronic warfare, and cyberwarfare – or the “end of war as we know it” and the rise of a new 
“Military-Internet Complex” (Harris, 2014, p. xxii; Berger, 2018; Coleman, 2016; Cohen, 2007; 
Dipert, 2010; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018; Farwell & Arakelian, 2016; Floridi & Taddeo, 2014; 
Hauptman, 2013; Nakashima, 2019; O’Connell, 2012; Rid, 2011; Roff, 2015; Sainato, 2013; 
Schmitt, 2013; Singer, 2002, 2004; Smith, 2005; Stone, 2012; Zetter, 2014).  
Afghanistan: Appeals to self-defense and beneficence.  
You media pansies may squeal and squirm 
But a fighting man knows that the way to confirm 
That some jihadist bastard is finally dead 
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Is a brain-tappin’ round fired into his head 
To hell with you wimps from your Ivy League schools 
Sitting far from the war telling me about rules 
And preaching to me your wrong-headed contention 
That I should observe the Geneva Convention. (Solis, 2010, pp. 368-369)  
 In this poem from the front, a U.S. soldier defends the practice of “double tapping” – 
shooting wounded or apparently dead enemy combatants to make sure they are dead (Borch, 
2016, p. 591). Such a realist approach, however, conflicts with established U.S. military 
guidelines: “While battlefields demand decisions, the Army demands that decisions be 
ethical, and in-line with Army Values,” wrote one military judge (Cox, 2016, p. 542; Dubik, 
2016; U.S. Department, 2016). In countless examples like these, soldiers, commanders, civilians, 
politicians, and ethicists continued to wrestle with ethical challenges of the new global war on 
terror – even when that new war resembles traditional interstate land wars of the past. 
Unfortunately, on these new battlefields, “the military ethic risks losing traction with 
practitioners, who often see restrictions on the use of force as misguided, or worse, cynical 
efforts of higher authorities to avoid bad publicity, often at the soldier’s expense” (Pfaff, 2016, p. 
59).  
 “War and intervention, according to Mill, has to be justified by morally relevant reasons 
of self-defense or beneficence” (Doyle, 2008, p. 352) – and, in justifying the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan, President George W. Bush invoked both reasons: “America and Afghanistan are 
now allies against terror. We’ll be partners in rebuilding that country” (Bush, 2002, para. 4).  
 Immediately, success seemed apparent, at least from a military standpoint: the ability of 
Afghanistan, either as a nation or as a terrorist haven, to significantly threaten the United States 
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ceased to exist overnight. “Mission Accomplished” read a banner displayed behind the president 
as he declared the same, some 18 months after the invasion – yet both the origin and the veracity 
of this display and its claim were immediately challenged (Bumiller, 2003, p. A16). 
And a truly utilitarian success remained elusive for long after: “The ongoing armed conflict in 
Afghanistan provides a stark example of the challenging and complex operating environment in 
which the international community is seeking to establish and maintain the rule of law” (Watkin, 
2009, p. 411). Fifteen years after that ambitious declaration, the new U.S.-backed government 
struggles to meet a basic utilitarian “responsibility to protect” citizens (Doyle, 2015, p. 7; 
Freking, 2016). At least at this point, the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan fails to fulfill its 
original incomplete utilitarian goals, much less any robust utilitarian promise. As one longtime 
Times war corresponded wrote a dozen years after the initial invasion: “The war has been a 
tragedy costing untold thousands of lives and lasting far too long ... it could have been prevented 
... The human suffering has been far too great” (Gall, 2014, p. xii). Mill would agree.  
Iraq: Preemptive war appeals to self-defense.  
Depictions of nuclear mushroom clouds by the administration were hype, not fact. It is 
now clear more diplomatic pressure could’ve been brought to bear before resorting to 
war. And now, a couple more families every day learn that their sons and daughters have 
been killed in action. Not killed for some grand and noble cause. Not killed to combat 
terror, but killed needlessly. (Edney IV, 2003, para. 3)  
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. appealed to moral reasoning that included 
utilitarianism (Linnan, 2008, p. 171), and President Bush again made appeals to both security 
and beneficence in justifying plans to invade Iraq in 2003, claiming that, “as ... in Afghanistan, 
we will bring to the Iraqi people food and medicines and supplies – and freedom” (Bush, 2003a, 
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para. 81; White House, 2002). However, this time, his appeal to self-defense relied on the 
unprecedented “Bush Doctrine” of preemptive war: “America will not accept a serious and 
mounting threat to our country ... If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our 
people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him” (para. 76).  
“The war in Iraq represents the first time the administration has acted on the basis of a 
doctrine of preventive war ... [raising] implications far beyond ... for ... [any] states that may find 
utility in ... preventive self-defense” (Sapiro, 2003; White House, 2002). In light of new 
challenges to the world order established after World War II, some defended the “Bush 
Doctrine” of preemptive war as utilitarian (Bradford, 2004; Judis, 2003; Wheat, 2006), especially 
because actors can violate international law when they use Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) in ways contrary to established limits (Pennington, 2012). “In this kind of world, Mill is 
the better moral guide,” argued one scholar (Cormier, 2003, p. 4); however, most scholars 
claimed that the preemptive war violated long-standing international norms against intervention. 
Indeed: the “Bush administration ... uses the same utilitarian logic in advancing its aims that 
European and American proponents of empire used a century ago” (Judis, 2003, p. 13; Rodin & 
Shue, 2008; Shue & Rodin, 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2007; Strachan, 2007); further, it did so 
while promoting premises of Iraqi connections to terrorism that were “pure fiction” (Patterson, 
2013, p. 3; Wheat, 2006).  
 As administration arguments for the war shifted from preventive to nation-building, just 
as they had previously in Afghanistan, “officials have tried to justify the war ex post facto 
entirely on utilitarian grounds – that is, the war will lead to the democratization or modernization 
of the Arab region” (Judis, 2003, p. 13; Christie, 2006). However, this incomplete utilitarianism 
failed again to consider the consequences of all involved parties, inviting significant backlash 
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from the conquered peoples: “Even a superficial look at the aftermath of American interventions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests ... Clausewitz’s most famous dictum is right. People’s war is 
not merely a form of instrumental state policy; rather, it is politics by other means” (Davis, 2018, 
p. 4; Daas, 2007; Daase & Davis, 2015; Scheipers, 2018). Further, irregular violence in civil 
disobedience, civil wars and similar conflicts do not always follow patterns predicted by utility 
(Balcells, 2011; Whitham, 2014).  
Ultimately, the “US-led war, and particularly the occupation of Iraq, raised calls to 
further develop jus post bellum, the theory of justice after war” (Gerson, 2014, p. 7). Indeed: the 
“American involvement in Iraq suggests that international powers usually are too distant, in 
various ways, to correct all the many domestic failures of state legitimacy, security, and 
administration induced in the course of a major intervention” (Flibbert, 2013, p. 93).  
Further, from a utilitarian viewpoint, traditional war strategy and tactics often fail on this 
new battlefield: U.S. war colleges teach “the wars of the past ... the wars of a different era of 
conflict, [and not] the patterns of new kinds of struggle” (Cohen, 2007, para. 12; Smith, 2005). A 
complete utilitarianism makes “a distinction between intended effects and foreseen effects” 
(Bykvist, 2010, p. 134) in war; further, this “moral challenge has reappeared with the Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq” (Rabkin, 2015, p. 329) – and it’s not going away anytime soon.  
Shaw: Towards a Utilitarian War Principle.  
 The costs of the war have been staggering. Politically, the United States has forfeited its  
reputation as an icon for democracy and justice, even among its closest allies. Ethically  
... it has undermined its moral authority by having flouted the internationally accepted  
rules of war. Economically, total external costs for the global war on terror as of the end  
of 2008 approached $900 billion. (Zalman & Clarke, 2009, para. 3)   
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Amidst the loud and long soul searching over the various shortcomings of the U.S. global 
war on terror, one can almost hear the ghosts of Bentham, both Mills, and Sidgwick wailing: 
“We told you so!” As with most wars, “there will often have been an outcome open to the 
belligerents that would have been better ... That’s why wars so often look like collective folly ... 
When, then, should a state go to war?” asked utilitarian ethicist William H. Shaw (2014, p. 307).  
The consequences of getting that basic ethical question wrong, he and others note, are 
dire: “International actors that display ethical incompetence can expect negative outcomes, not 
only for those affected by their actions, but also for themselves in the form of losses of power, 
authority, and prestige” (Frost, 2009, para. 1; Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016). For this reason, “it is 
important to get these central matters straight before exploring other issues and other sorts of 
armed conflict” (Shaw, 2016, p. xi) – lest we continue to fail on battlefields of all kinds.  
Within this rising tide of general interest in Mill resulting from the anniversaries of his 
birth and of Utilitarianism, ethicists increasingly invoked Mill in considering new questions 
surrounding conflict. Gruzalski (2006) suggested that any conventional war approach to 
terrorism failed to pass utilitarian muster. Because of the predominance of just war theory, 
Whitman proposed “a utilitarian conceptualization of just war theory” to address terrorism 
(2006, p. 25), considering the tradition from Aristotle and Aquinas to Walzer, Rawls and Orend. 
“Rule-utilitarianism provides the most reasonable and practical moral basis for the criteria of just 
war theory ... concerned as it is with limiting, as far as practical, the great harms of war” (p. 41), 
he concluded. Other scholars continue to find congruence between just war and utility.  
However, observing that recent JWT scholars “either ignore or express hostility to the 
utilitarian or consequentialist tradition,” Shaw (2011, pp. 381-382) took a uniquely opposite 
approach: Instead of finding utilitarian support for just war theory, he synthesized disparate 
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elements of the war ethics debate into what he called a utilitarian war principle (UWP) for 
considering ethical recourse to war (2011, 2014, 2016). Informed by the recent wave of Millian 
scholarship, Shaw developed this UWP ethic, first in an article on the crucial decision to go to 
war (2011), then in a book chapter on both going to war and waging war (2014), and finally in an 
entire book explicitly exploring utilitarianism and war (2016). In this contrary approach, which 
puts utility at the core of the decision-making process, he “swims against the current of 
contemporary … largely non-consequentialist” approaches to war ethics (2016, p. x).  
Though resonant with just war criteria such as just cause, right intention, comparative 
justice, proportionality of ends, probability of success, and last resort, Shaw first subsumed, 
delimited, and superseded these vague guidelines with a focus directed not on intent, but instead 
on outcomes: “Consequentialism entails that it is morally right for a state to wage war if and only 
if no other course of action would have better results” (2011, p. 382). However, he added a 
distinctive utilitarian argument, adding that “because utilitarians believe that individual welfare 
or well-being is the only thing that is valuable for its own sake, they would refine ... by replacing 
‘have better results’ with ‘result in greater well-being’.”  
This argument completes Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle – in effect, an appeal to a just 
war with real teeth and concrete definition: “It is morally right for a state to wage war if and only 
if no other course of action available to it would result in greater expected well-being; otherwise, 
waging war is wrong” (2011, p. 382). Ultimately, he insisted, the UWP would require pro-war 
arguments to rest on empirical, rational criteria – subsuming pacifist and just war tenets as 
Millian “Intermediate Principles” (2014, p. 311; Mill, 1863), because “utilitarianism underwrites 
them” (2016, p. 100), but going beyond the limitations of both, requiring deliberate decisions:  
When war and peace are at issue, we want our decision-makers to focus on the  
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consequences of their actions and to be committed to acting so as to make people’s lives  
go as well as possible. We want them to be impartial, dispassionate and empirically  
minded – to be rational deliberators who look objectively at the big picture and the long  
run, basing their decisions on the most accurate and detailed understanding they can  
obtain of the circumstances in which they are operating and the likely results of the  
alternatives open to them. (Shaw, 2011, p. 387).  
 Utility ad Bellum: UWP and going to war ethically.  
We usually describe a just war as one that avenges wrongs, that is, when a nation or state 
has to be punished either for refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects or 
to restore what has been seized injuriously.  
(Augustine, cited in Boyle, 2003, p. 160)  
 As originally described by Augustine and Aquinas, jus ad Bellum involved a reactionary, 
punitive sense of righting a wrong. However, this proved too religious for post-Enlightenment 
ethicists: “One of the major developments of just war thinking in the twentieth century is the 
rejection of the legitimacy of this punitive conception of just cause, and the limitation of just 
cause to defense” (Boyle, p. 161). Therefore, “the punitive nature of just cause has largely been 
replaced in the twentieth century by an emphasis on self-defense. A just war is a defensive war 
aimed at defeating aggression” (Whitman, 2007, p. 27).  
 In proposing his UWP, Shaw attempted to address some shortcomings in the perennial ad 
Bellum question of “when, if ever, are we morally justified in waging war” (2014, p. 303). First, 
he addressed the incomplete, consequentialist cost-benefit analysis that often plagues such 
debates by applying a complete utilitarian calculus: “UWP requires not only that the benefits of a 
contemplated war outweigh its costs, but also that nothing else a state could do would bring 
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about a better outcome, that is, an outcome with more well-being” (2011, p. 383). Or, more 
emphatically: “From a utilitarian perspective, it is not enough that the war’s benefits outweigh its 
costs, taking into account the interests of all. There must also be no alternative course of action 
open ... that would lead to better results” (2014, p. 307). Like JWT’s jus ad Bellum, this puts the 
burden of proof on those proposing war, but Shaw’s utilitarian formulation demands a more 
precise, empirical justification: “War’s ill effects are a given; by definition, it involves injury, 
death and devastation ... By contrast, the presumed benefits of any prospective war lie further in 
the future and are inevitably less certain and more speculative” (2011, p. 384; 2016).  
 Second, he requires the ad Bellum argument to focus on tangible costs and benefits: 
“Throughout history, wars have been defended in terms that either ignore consequences 
altogether or focus on consequences that have little or nothing to do with human well-being ... 
how well or poorly real people will fare as a result” (2014, p. 308). This includes wars fought for 
national pride, destiny, religion, or to avenge some historical wrong (2011, 2014, 216).  
 Third, Shaw’s UWP addresses a myopic, nationalist utilitarianism by proposing a robust 
universalism in the spirit of Bentham and Mill (Mill, 1863, p. 77). Unfortunately, history also 
shows that “in deciding to wage war states typically neglect or discount the consequences for 
other peoples” (2011, p. 384), “even when consequentialist-sounding considerations are adduced 
in support of war” (2014, p. 308). The UWP requires a more complete accounting for all those 
who might be affected by a proposed war.  
 Fourth, UWP requires empirical, objective reasoning instead of appeals to emotion. All 
too often, “it is uncommon for either side to have thought through, in any detailed or serious 
way, the probable gains and losses of fighting” (2011, p. 385); instead, proponents argue “that 
the stakes are extremely high, and that the consequences of not fighting would be too terrible to 
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contemplate” (2104, pp. 308-309). However, Shaw insisted, “conviction is not justification, and 
these beliefs are typically overconfident and only loosely grounded in fact. Even when they have 
some factual basis, they are riddled with mistaken assumptions and flawed assessments of 
likelihoods” (2011, p. 385).  
 Fifth, the UWP requires serious considerations of the entire range of all other options: a 
truly utilitarian approach sees the calculation as more than “a choice between waging war and 
not waging war but rather between the latter and possible wars of differing scope, type, or 
intensity” (2014, p. 308). Therefore, when myopic proponents argue that “there is no feasible 
alternative” (2011, p. 385), the more complete utilitarian replies that “there are various kinds of 
war that states can fight” (2014, p. 307). Even further, “seldom is sufficient thought given to 
alternatives that fall outside the political or ideological consensus of the time, such as not 
responding to the initial provocation, conceding land or influence, relying on non-violent 
resistance, or even surrendering” (2011, p. 385).  
 Finally, the UWP requires a war to be justified by utilitarian criteria throughout, so that 
incomplete, myopic appeals to utility do not lead to immoral justifications. In the real world, “the 
decision whether to wage war is not a one-time, once-and-for-all decision. Even if war is initially 
warranted on utilitarian grounds, circumstances can change so that a state ceases to be justified in 
continuing it” (2014, p. 308). Therefore, “a war that was initially justified according to UWP 
may cease to be so, and vice versa ... a war was morally justified at time t does not entail that it is 
morally justified at time t + x” (2011, p. 384).  
 In the long run, Shaw argues, UWP would therefore support the general prohibition 
against preventive war: “In the real world, we know the bad consequences that have followed 
from states believing that preventive wars are permissible ... there have been few, if any, justified 
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preventive wars” (2016, p. 91). Nor are there any cases in which, in retrospect, most would agree 
a state failed to undertake a preventive war that “would have maximized expected well-being” 
(p. 91; Betts, 2003; Crawford, 2007). Indeed: “Because costs in initiating either preemptive or 
preventive war are certain, while the probability that the enemy will eventually strike is less than 
100 percent, the burden of proof is on the case for striking first” (Betts, 2003, p. 24).  
 Ultimately, Shaw concludes that applying his UWP would invite some tough questions, 
especially this more fully utilitarian one: “in terms of their long-run contribution to human well-
being, are the goods that this war seeks to secure, and that it has ... a likelihood of securing, 
worth the projected loss of these many lives and this much material damage?” (2011, p. 389).  
Utility in Belo: UWP and the recognized rules of war.  
 Utilitarians wish to promote the well-being of sentient creatures as much as possible. For  
them, well-being is all that ultimately matters ... when it comes to war, we are not dealing 
with subtle questions of value. Killing and maiming people, orphaning children, 
destroying farms and factories, dislocating citizens, ripping up the economic 
infrastructure of a country and damaging its cultural heritage – these are patently 
disruptive of well-being. (Shaw, 2014, pp. 309-310)  
 Walzer (1977) insisted that most of us want to appear moral, especially in war. This 
means that a war must not only begin with moral justification, but it must be conducted and 
ended with similar justifications. Indeed: “Ethical military decision-making requires balancing 
moral obligations associated with achieving a just cause, minimizing harm to civilians, and 
protecting soldiers. The balance, however, depends on the character of the war being fought” 
(Pfaff, 2016, p. 60). And, largely because of the still-debated just character of the global war on 
terror, ongoing “disputes about the law of armed conflict fueled debates about American 
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detention policies at Guantanamo Bay as well as American military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq” (Rabkin, 2014, p. 2). Many of these disputes seem to involve the kind of circular, 
incomplete consequentialism that throws good money after bad (Braybrooke, 2004).  
 Therefore, informed by the second just war criteria of moral conduct in war, Shaw also 
attempted to answer the perennial in Belo question of “if recourse to arms is warranted, how are 
we permitted to fight the wars we wage?” (2014, p. 303) in proposing his UWP. “What 
constraints, if any, are there on one’s conduct?” (2016, p. 99). In answering this question, the 
utilitarian rejects the realist position that “all’s fair in love and war” and instead applies the 
“double-effect doctrine” of utility to judge among varying levels of harms in war. For Shaw, 
utilitarians “care not only about how much good a course of action can be anticipated to produce, 
but also about the costs of bringing that outcome about” (2014, p. 318). This means “that it is 
morally worse to do good by intentionally doing something bad than to do good and only 
foreseeing that this will have bad effects. In slogan form, the ends do not justify the means” 
(Bykvist, 2010, p. 134). Ultimately, Shaw claimed, the means and ends must align: “If the harm 
of of fighting in some way is too great, then the utilitarian calculus will entail that the war cannot 
be fought that way, even if this makes victory impossible” (2014, p. 318).  
Though challenged by post-Cold War changes in the nature of warfare (Brunstetter & 
Holeindre, 2018), JWT tenets such as jus in Belo remain powerful guidelines for morality in war 
(Walzer, 2002). As with jus ad Bellum, Shaw insisted that appeals to utility also underwrite both 
pacifist and just conduct ideals, and that “utilitarianism ... provides the most satisfactory account 
of why they have the moral force they do” (2016, p. 100).  
 Applying the UWP, Shaw first addressed the restraints imposed by the various aspects of 
the international law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions and other treaties, 
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“often referred to as international humanitarian law” (2016, p. 100; 2014). These reflect “the 
laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience” (Roberts & Guelff, 2000, p. 70) as well 
as “the reproaches of [one’s] own conscience” (Mill, 1863, p. 60; Sidgwick, 1874).  
 Second, Shaw addresses three aspects of JWT’s jus in Belo criterion – necessity, 
proportionality, and discrimination and civilian immunity – and again finds that, as with the 
international law of armed conflict, “utilitarianism not only strongly endorses the received rules 
of war, but also provides the most plausible and coherent moral basis for them” (2016, p. 104). 
For example, civilian immunity clearly promotes the greater good: “From a utilitarian 
perspective, it is desirable to affirm and ... entrench the right of civilians not to be attacked and to 
oblige warring states to take whatever steps ... to avoid injuring them or their property” (2014, p. 
320). Because of this, “utilitarianism itself contends that we should inculcate in combatants a 
blanket opposition to targeting civilians. Respect for civilian immunity should be a firm, 
virtually absolute part of their intuitive moral code” (2016, p. 131; Brandt, 1972).  
Ultimately, Shaw concludes: “Utilitarianism clearly, staunchly, and unequivocally 
supports the recognized rules of war because adherence to them, even those rules that seem 
purely conventional or even arbitrary, reduces the carnage of war” (2014, p. 319).  
UWP and utility’s discontents: Answering some perennial challenges.  
Hypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse, because it is especially important at such a time  
to appear to be in the right ... The hypocrite presumes on the moral understanding of the  
rest of us, and we have no choice, I think, except to take his assertions seriously and put  
them to the test of moral realism. (Walzer, 1977, p. 486)  
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 For its perennial critics, utilitarianism remains an easy target for its many supposed 
shortcomings in moral theory generally, and in war ethics particularly. However, in defending 
his formulation of a Utilitarian War Principle, Shaw claimed that utility can answer its critics.  
 Primarily, he argued, a fully realized utilitarian calculus would refute the critique that 
many unjust warriors “frequently claim to be acting for the greater good and defend their actions, 
at least in part, on grounds that sound utilitarian” (2011, p. 387). Historically, he agreed, 
“utilitarian reasoning is susceptible to abuse ... it can be, and has been, used to justify all sorts of 
immoral wars” (2014, p. 309). But so has every other ethical tradition, he argued, and these 
abuses do not negate the value of the approach: “No normative principle is shown to be incorrect 
because the deluded or unscrupulous abuse it” (2011, p. 388). Instead, he concluded, “the proper 
response ... is not to abandon consequentialist thinking ... but rather to examine with as much 
specificity and meticulousness as possible the likely results of waging war ... taking into account 
the interests of all” (2014, p. 309). There is, indeed, a “distinctive appeal, when it comes to 
questions of war, of a consequentialist procedure, especially one that emphasizes, as 
utilitarianism does, the moral centrality of human well-being” (2016, p. 165); therefore, what is 
needed instead of a non-utilitarian approach is for utilitarian war ethicists “to strive to do it better 
– more accurately and more carefully and with greater awareness of the various illusions and 
mishaps to which human reasoning is prone” (2011, p. 388).  
 Further, he noted, critics claim that “well-being is an uncertain concept, and that it is hard 
to know what really does make people’s lives go better or worse” (2014, p. 309), therefore 
challenging a calculated approach. However, he contended, “when it comes to questions of war, 
as previously suggested, subtle questions of well-being are rarely involved: the relevant evils and 
goods are gross and unmistakable” (2011, p. 389). Further, “there is no question that physical 
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and psychological security, personal liberty, political self-determination, and respect for 
territorial integrity promote well-being and that war may sometimes protect these values” (2014, 
p. 310). Ultimately, common sense would side with a basic, objective measure of well-being, in 
peacetime or war: “Utilitarians need affirm only that we can rank many states of affairs as better 
or worse” (2016, p. 24). The UWP requires such a ranking in calculating the costs of war.  
 Beyond this, Shaw observed, critics of utilitarianism also often object that, “when it 
comes to specific questions about war and peace, the future is too unpredictable for us to make 
reliable judgments about the likely consequences” (2014, p. 310). “Nevertheless, the critic ... 
overstates the hopelessness of our epistemic situation. Much of the time we manage to navigate 
through the world with some success. We anticipate future events more or less correctly ... We 
can learn from history” (2011, p. 390) – especially when it comes to issues related to war.  
 Finally, Shaw noted, critics charge that utilitarianism “sometimes requires us to do 
immoral things” (2016, p. 26), proposing “some far-fetched set of circumstances” that create an 
ethical dilemma; however, “the more strongly and categorically people oppose such conduct, the 
more likely they are to behave in happiness-promoting ways in the real world” (p. 29).  
 Overall, “the fact that an ethical criterion is sometimes, or even often, difficult to apply 
does not show that it is incorrect” (2014, pp. 310-311). Instead, Shaw’s application of his UWP 
may represent the most complete and compelling defense of a utilitarian war ethic to date. Yet, 
absent Mill’s definition of security as the “most vital of all interests” (1863, p. 67), it lacks the 
potential of a more specific analysis of proposed war claims such a perspective might offer.  
Situating Millian Conflict Coverage in the Utilitarian Media Literature  
Of the laws and rules of law made against the liberty of the press, the object and 
endeavour has been to secure not only impunity, but non-divulgation, to all misdeeds 
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committed on the part of any of the persons concerned in the exercise of the powers of 
government – of the public trustees of every class – to the prejudice of those for whom, 
for form’s sake, they every now and then acknowledge themselves to be in trust. 
(Bentham, 1837, p. 121)  
 Despite the significant contributions of recent war ethics scholarship, utilitarianism 
remains the bastard sibling of more palatable martial traditions; at the same time, however, it has 
always enjoyed a prominent place in media ethics. As reflected in this statement from the “Father 
of Utilitarianism” himself, arguments and prophesies abound in the literature, promoting the 
many benefits of free speech, and warning of the myriad harms of suppressing it.  
“Utilitarianism is prevalent in the media professions, and in quasi-form is the mind-set of 
most students preparing for careers, such as journalism, that serve democratic societies ... A 
predilection toward utility ensconces the status quo” (Christians, 2007, p. 113) – so much so that 
professional “codes of ethics, and media textbooks are dominated by various strains of” the 
tradition (p. 116). From the outset, journalism is often seen in utilitarian terms of serving the 
greater good: “Most of the journalists I know do what they do as journalists for highly moral 
reasons. They seek to benefit others by telling them what they need to know in order to live their 
lives ... Journalism is a service occupation” (Hodges, 1983, p. 5) aimed at a consequential good. 
Mill himself argued, from a similarly service-oriented stance, that, “in making the nearest 
approach” to the Golden Rule, “utility would enjoin... that education and opinion, which have so 
vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every 
individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole” 
(1863, p. 21); he would be pleased to see that his theory still significantly informs media practice 
and education.  
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“All the news that’s fit to print”? Utilitarianism Significantly Shapes Media Ethics  
Primarily, invocations of Mill’s thought appear in defenses and definitions of press 
freedom, and most often from his earlier On Liberty rather than Utilitarianism: “Utilitarianism ... 
works hand-in-glove with the democratic process ... Mill’s On Liberty ... combined with John 
Locke to establish an individualist democratic politics ... it is natural that utilitarian ethics 
pervade North American life, politics, and the professions” (Christians, 2007, p. 116). The 
essence of U.S. press freedom, as a negative freedom, seems more regulative than normative, 
and appears virtuous: “Some things, indeed, are good in themselves, and this is because they are 
not only instrumental goods ... something which is supremely good, prized for itself and not as a 
means to something else” (Emmet, 1994, p. 61). This ideal was evident from the nation’s 
founding, as the Declaration of Independence’s primary author famously asserted that, “were it 
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (Jefferson, 1787, pp. 
252-253). However, for Mill, this virtuous free speech and press reflected “the importance of 
intellectual freedom to individual growth and personal development” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 24; 
Horner, 2015), and is essential to his utilitarian stance.  
However, practitioners also turn to Mill to inform more normative prescriptions of how 
such a free press could best employ this freedom in furthering the greater good, as later 
applications both expand the scope of news coverage and enjoin potential harm. “Ethical 
journalism means taking responsibility for one’s work and explaining one’s decisions to the 
public,” reads one such statement in the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics 
(Society, 2014) – in essence, making one’s self accountable for the consequential goods and 
harms of one’s work. And the unprecedented 2004 mea culpa by the Times editors appeared to 
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attempt just that: “Editors at several levels who should have been challenging reporters and 
pressing for more skepticism were perhaps too intent on rushing scoops into the paper” (The 
From, 2004a, para. 5), they explained. In their apology, they defended their paper’s creed of “All 
the news that’s fit to print” (Folkenflick, 2011, p. xiii) by largely utilitarian arguments. Such 
arguments have informed the development of media ethics in the U.S. from the very beginning, 
first in defending the overall freedom of speech and the press, then in upholding the rights of the 
press to report on its own government, and finally in suggesting the responsibility of a free press 
to inform citizens on all aspects of public life, while making good decisions about balancing the 
potential goods and harms of such coverage and media practice.  
Finally, some recent attention to new applications of Mill directs utilitarian approaches to 
the actual focus of news coverage onto areas of concern that address citizen flourishing.  
“Congress shall make no law”: Utilitarianism defends a free press  
The law hath amply provided against overt acts of sedition and and disorder, and to  
suppress mere opinions by any other method than reasoning and argument is the height  
of tyranny. Freedom of thought being intimately connected with the happiness and  
dignity of man in every stage of his being, is of so much more importance than the  
preservation of any Constitution, that to infringe the former under pretense of supporting  
the latter, is to sacrifice the means to the end. (Hall, 1913, p. 6)  
This thoroughly utilitarian defense of free expression could’ve been written by Mill 
himself, as it points to the utilitarian ideal of freedom he outlined most clearly in his On Liberty 
(1859a; Dryer, 1979; Howland, 2005; Riley, 2005; Stegenga, 1973; Ten, 2008). In fact, an 
underlying consequentialist good of individual flourishing may justify this libertarian ideal of 
individual freedoms (Greenawalt, 1989; Christians, 2007): A useful press is a free press.  
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From a libertarian stance, it would seem that the First Amendment to the Constitution 
seeks no justification for protecting “the freedom of speech, or of the press” (The Bill, 2016, 
para. 5), other than that the inherent good of these goods is such that they enjoy “an absolute or 
complete barrier to government censorship” (Pember & Calvert, 2008, p. 43). U.S. citizens and 
the courts have both struggled ever since to balance the freedoms enshrined in the First 
Amendment with the civic responsibilities it implies, most especially “the hard cases governed 
by normative goals, including, conspicuously, those of utilitarian policy ... under a rights-based 
constitution” (Richards, 1990, p. 272; Baker, 1989; Greenawalt, 1989). Like the Constitution 
itself, the “American concept of press freedom stemmed from the Enlightenment” (Merrill, Gade 
& Blevens, 2001, p. 5; Merrill, 1974; Siebert, 1956), and “up until the present [20th] century, the 
emphasis in the discussions of press freedom and freedom of expression generally was on 
laissez-faire ... on personal and media autonomy” (Merrill, 1974, p. 76; Siebert, 1956).  
Such freedom, a part of the nation’s very essence from even before its founding, is now 
both means and end of almost every activity: “Today, we live in an information society – our 
economy depends primarily on the production and consumption of information” (Straubhaar, 
LaRose & Davenport, 2017, p. 12). From the beginning, Jefferson argued, information was 
meant to move freely: “That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for 
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been 
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature” (1813, pp. 333-334). Two centuries later, a 
widely misquoted online echo of this founding ideal – that “information wants to be free” (Gans, 
2015, para. 2; Levy, 2014) – “has become the “defining slogan of the information age” (De 
Coutere, 2009, p. 117). And Mill would feel right at home today: “To the end of his life, Mill 
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continued to maintain that liberty held the key to human happiness, and that intellectual freedom 
was the first and most important part of such liberty” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 6).  
 In considering five organizing categories of communication ethics, the influence of 
“Mill’s social utilitarianism” fits neatly in the area of altruism, though he would also belong just 
as well in the realm of press freedom (Christians & Merrill, 2009, pp. 2-4). However, recent 
scholarship shows his thought transcends binary classification in either social responsibility or 
libertarian press theories alone: “Mill’s theory is richer than interpreters and critics generally 
allow ... it is not abstract truth for its own sake that Mill defends but, rather, the discovery of 
truth for the sake of individuality” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 6). Ultimately, for Mill, “human nature is 
most completely expressed in a society in which the freedoms of autonomy and individuality are 
respected and prized” (Gray, 2000, p. 149) – in other words, a truly free marketplace of ideas.  
The Marketplace of Ideas: Utilitarianism defends individual freedom of expression.  
Liberty by permission is slavery; only tyrants and slaves live where any sane adult can  
be precluded from receiving – even the most odious opinion – about the most obnoxious  
subject – expressed in the most offensive manner – by the most despised person. 
 (Schroeder, 1913, p. 38)  
 That the authors of the Constitution and the champion of utilitarianism all drank from the 
same Enlightenment fountains is most evident in their defense of individual freedom. As the 
First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” (The 
Bill, 2016, para. 5). This explicit defense of the individual right to freedom of thought and 
expression being primary to any consideration of secondary social benefit resonates with Mill’s 
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mature Utilitarianism: “The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the 
world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up” (1863, p. 23).  
So, before considering Mill’s contributions to specific issues in practical media ethics, 
and before considering his defense of the press “watchdog” role, scholars point to his evolved 
ideal of individual freedom as primary. “Mill moved from ... freedom of the press as a security 
against corruption in government, to ... the necessity of intellectual freedom for individuals in 
order to achieve true well-being and thereby contribute to the greatest happiness of society” 
(O’Rourke, 2001, p. 1). “The conception of human flourishing that [Mill] invokes is one in 
which the goods of personal autonomy and individuality are central” (Gray, 2000, p. 137).  
Free expression preserves an individual’s right to access any opinion. Ultimately, “the 
philosophical speculations of John Stuart Mill ... [influenced] the making of the constitutional 
conception of free speech” (Chafee, 1920, p. 32). From this stance, a later scholar defines “the 
Millian paradigm as a predominant, if not the dominant, discourse of freedom of speech in the 
United States. This discourse defines the system of speech to be a marketplace of competing 
ideas” (Passavant, 2002, p. 156; Baker, 1989; Patterson, 2013).  
A century before Mill, John Milton laid the basis of this marketplace model when he 
argued that truth will always conquer falsehood whenever the two encounter each other (Milton, 
1644). “No reason existed for government censorship because lies would always be exposed and 
ultimately discounted,” Milton believed (Moore & Murray, 2012, p. 103). John Stuart Mill later 
inherited the seeds of this competitive market ideal from his father, James, whose version of 
Milton’s ideal insisted that “if the people ... must choose opinions for themselves, discussion 
must have its course ... and no opinion ought to be impeded more than another, by any thing but 
the adduction of evidence on the opposite side” (Mill, 1821, p. 36; Day, 2003). In particular, he 
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argued that an opinion may best be “thoroughly understood, when, by the delivery of all 
opinions, it is presented in all points of view, when all the evidence upon both sides is brought 
forward ... by the freedom of the press” (p. 25).  
In keeping with his father’s ideal, John Stuart Mill’s priority in On Liberty is to defend 
one’s “right to hear all opinions over the right to express all opinions ... The right to hear is 
grounded in the notion of individuality, which is ... at the heart of Mill’s arguments for freedom 
of thought and discussion” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 4) – so much so that, for Mill, the suppression of 
opinion always leads to worse consequences than does its free exchange (Stephen, 1873; Horner, 
2015). This “rule utilitarian approach [means] that giving the widest possible latitude to freedom 
of expression will, on balance and in the long run, produce the greatest amount of good ... for the 
greatest number of people” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 31). Absent such latitude and liberty: 
“Incompetence and aimlessness, corruption and disloyalty, panic and ultimate disaster, must 
come to any people which is denied access to the facts. No one can manage anything on pap. 
Neither can a people” (Lippmann, 1920, p. 6) – especially not one called to go to war.  
Free expression preserves an individual’s right to express any opinion. Ultimately, “Mill 
is deservedly celebrated as a great champion of freedom of expression ... He insists that the 
freedom of expressing and publishing opinions is ‘practically inseparable’ from the liberty to 
think” (Riley, 2005, p. 147) – and “almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, 
and resting in great part on the same reasons” (Mill, 1859a, pp. 225-226) in pursuit of the greater 
good. “Freedom of thought and discussion play a primary role in encouraging diversity and 
individuality, regarded by Mill as essential if society is to progress and achieve the greatest 
possible happiness for the individuals who are its members” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 6; Cohen-
Almagor, 1997a; Merrill, 2000). “In Mill’s view ... every idea has some societal value and 
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therefore deserves protection from the government” (Moore & Murray, 2012, p. 103). So, 
Millian principles appear perennially in considering such mass media issues as hate speech 
(Brink, 2001; Scanlon, 2003) and pornography (Dworkin, 1981; MacKinnon, 1984). This 
principle was perhaps most famously articulated by the late Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who 
insisted: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence” 
(Whitney v. California, 1927). More recently, a study of hate speech concluded “that the most 
prudent, responsible, and ethical course is to permit outrageous speech and counter it with 
positive messages” (Harmon, 1991, p. 146) – and that Milton, Mill, Hume, Locke, and Rawls 
would all support the “more speech” approach championed by Brandeis and others. So the U.S. 
press carries every imaginable kind of information on all topics, ranging from music (Pen, 2010; 
Stauffer, 1998) to sports (Kerr, 2016; Thompson, 1970) to politics (Summers, 1994).  
Heirs to this “marketplace of ideas” tradition, the SPJ Code of Ethics states: “Ethical 
journalism strives to ensure the free exchange of information that is accurate, fair and thorough.” 
(Society, 2014, p. 1). However, this ideal is no guarantee of success. In considering the debate 
surrounding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, “the marketplace of ideas failed to correct 
the administration’s misrepresentations or hinder its ability to persuade the American public” 
(Kaufmann, 2004, p. 6). In other words, the marketplace failed its monitorial function.  
The Fourth Estate: Utilitarianism defends corporate redress of grievances.  
In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must  
have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed,  
not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that  
the press would remain forever free to censure the government. The press was protected  
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so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and  
unrestrained press can effectively expose deception ... And paramount among the  
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent ... the government from deceiving  
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die ... In revealing the workings ...  
that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the founders  
hoped and trusted they would do. (New York Times v. United States, 1971, p. 717)  
In defending the right of the Times to publish the Pentagon Papers in spite of the federal 
government’s attempts to enjoin it, Justice Hugo Black’s famous opinion channeled the second 
Millian free press defense – that of the so-called “Fourth Estate,” or the monitorial function of 
the press (Commission, 1947; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng & White, 2009; 
McChesney & Scott, 2004; Nerone, 1995; Purvis, 1982; Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956).  
This particular defense of the marketplace of ideas theory, which “dominates the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of freedom of speech” (Baker, 1989, p. 7), “can be traced back to … 
Mill” (Pember & Calvert, p. 45), who championed “the ‘liberty of the press’ as one of the 
securities against corrupt or tyrannical government” (Mill, 1859a, p. 228). Here, Mill again 
echoes the Founders and their shared Enlightenment forebears. The First Amendment concludes 
with an affirmation of “the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances” (The Bill, 2016, para. 5). In, fact, wrote one of the Founders, to guard against the 
inevitability of tyranny, “the most effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate, as 
far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them knowledge 
of those facts” (Jefferson, 1778, pp. 526-527).  
A free press is free to report on its own government. That the Founders and the English 
Utilitarians drank from the same Enlightenment stream is also evident in the First Amendment’s 
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protection of the people’s right to speak freely about their own government. As late as the 17th 
century, British citizens who said the wrong thing about their leaders were tried secretly on 
charges of seditious libel and sentenced to torture and death (Moore & Murray, 2012). Railing 
against such a wide-ranging restriction on a supposedly free press, Jeremy Bentham argued that 
“whatsoever evil can result from this liberty, is everywhere, and at all times, outweighed by the 
good” (1820, p. 279). James Mill lamented that “to point out any such fault in government, is a 
liberty not allowed to the press by the law of England” (1811, p. 101). This restriction, he 
insisted later, always leads to no good: “To give a body of rulers ... a power of choosing, for the 
rest, opinions upon government, without [free] discussion, we have already seen, upon good 
evidence, is the way to secure the prevalence of the most destructive errors” (Mill, 1821, p. 26). 
On the contrary: “We think it may be satisfactorily shown, that no operation of the press ... ought 
to be treated as an offense” (p. 8). For his part, John Stuart Mill charged that this “law of libel is 
justly considered the most dangerous: as it enables [officials] to free themselves from that which 
is in itself a considerable check upon them, and without which all other checks are ineffectual, 
free discussion” (Mill, 1824a, p. 297).  
In a very real sense, even before independence, the colonies were already ahead of their 
British rulers in moving towards a Fourth Estate freedom for criticism of the government, when 
John Peter Zenger was acquitted of libel charges in 1735 for his provably true commentary about 
a local official of the crown (Moore & Murray, 2012). The Enlightenment ideals of free speech 
championed by the English Utilitarians form the basis of the “Fourth Estate” function of a free 
press in a democracy, in which “individual citizens monitor the performance of the state and 
have a mechanism for punishing actors in the form of a standing threat of removal from office” 
(Bailey, 1997, p. 110). This goes beyond the idea of pure freedom of expression to fix one key 
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focus of such expression upon the government and its actions. Therefore, “the First Amendment 
protects two kinds of speech. It protects the individual interest in self-expression necessary to 
make life worth living, and the social interest in the attainment of truth” (Passavant, 2002, p. 
157; Chafee, 1920). These two kinds of free speech are reflected again in the “two sides of Mill – 
the side ... that values free speech for the development of the individual, and the side ... that 
values free speech for more social purposes such as its role in the discovery of truth.” Indeed: 
Under “Mill’s doctrine of freedom of expression ... a broad policy of laissez-faire is generally 
expedient” (Riley, 2005, p. 177), promoting both individual freedom and social responsibility.  
A responsible press is obliged to report on its own government. However, where some 
see the First Amendment primarily as a defense of a completely free press – free as well of any 
monitorial mandate – others balk: “Few have subscribed to this notion wholeheartedly” (Pember 
& Calvert, 2008, p. 43); instead, most claim that the amendment’s “press clause is a structural 
provision that has a fourth-estate function” (Baker, 1989, p. 4). In other words, the press is free 
in order to serve as a check on potential abuses by powerful entities such as the government.  
James Mill is credited as being “the conceiver of the ‘watchdog’ function” of the press, which 
makes “known the conduct of … government” (Merrill, 1974, p. 87). Later, in his support for a 
free press in France, John Stuart Mill “was a constant commentator on the changing fortunes of 
the freedom of the press ... [and] He considers the growth of newspapers to be one of the 
important reasons for the spread of ideas” that eventually led to governmental reform in his own 
England (O’Rourke, 2001, pp. 38-39). In fact, “Mill took a strong stand for unrestricted 
freedom” of the intellect (Berger, 1984, p. 232), especially when it came to government.  
This normative ideal remains prominent among U.S. news media: “That principle 
supports the idea that a free press is essential to a democracy in which the government is 
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accountable to the people; where the media serve to check powerful institutions, notably the 
government,” opined one radio station manager recently (Pryor, 2019, para. 6). Ultimately: 
“Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public enlightenment is the 
forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy,” reads the very Millian preamble to the 
most-used U.S. media code of ethics (Society, 2014, p. 1). Specifically, it continues, “Journalists 
should ... Recognize a special obligation to serve as watchdogs over public affairs and 
government.” In practice, this includes the concept of editorial independence, first from 
government, but also from any other interference: “The highest and primary obligation of ethical 
journalism is to serve the public” – an ideal previously embraced by Mill, whose description of 
utilitarian justice included his concept of “impartiality ... being solely influenced by 
consideration for the public interest” (Mill, 1863, p. 56). John Stuart Mill’s defense of the 
media’s watchdog role remains influential in social responsibility press theory (Vold, 1999), and 
can still provide guidance for ethical reporting in the fraught post-9/11 reporting environment 
(Reid & Alexander, 2005).  
“Education and opinion”: Utilitarianism defines press scope and practice  
There are ethics you need to embrace as a reporter. There is a reason why journalism is  
the only profession specifically cited in the Constitution. In the First Amendment, the  
press has a protected status. Now why is that? It’s not that anyone who declares that  
they’re a journalist can say whatever they want. It says that we’re going to have a press  
that’s free but is also playing a role that strengthens a democracy. (Sitting Down, 2013)  
For Mill, “true freedom is not just being able to effectively calculate how to move 
towards already determined ends, but to possess the ability to express and defend one’s own 
goals” (Devigne, 2006, p. 96). As the idea of a socially responsible press developed further in the 
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20th century, so did utilitarian ethics for how to pursue the greater good in both the scope of the 
emerging journalism profession as well as in its practice. “When we engage in a pursuit, a clear 
and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need,” Mill 
claimed (1863, p. 2) – and every theory of ethical media practice invokes some consequence it 
claims to pursue. And for a very good utilitarian reason: “Journalism has been beset by ethical 
problems that have over the years eroded the credibility of journalists” (Moore & Murray, 2012, 
p. 99). Virtue ethics, with its “internal” focus (Quinn, 2007, p. 168), seeks to produce ethical 
practitioners who flourish under a free press: “By cultivating moral virtues, doing what is right 
… can become a matter of course” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 19). Deontological ethics, 
focused on the moral action itself (Patterson & Wilkins, 2013, p. 11), invokes “Kant’s notion of 
‘duty’ to others [as] a core principle in the journalistic mission to ‘serve the public’” (Plaisance, 
2007, p. 204). A justice ethic further focuses such service on “permissible uses, good 
stewardship, and justice” (Christians, 1989, p. 125), as all media practitioners “must be mindful 
of what constitutes a just use of the media system” and its freedoms (Plaisance, 2009, p. 100).  
Even though not explicitly consequentialist, each tradition at least partly justifies itself as 
producing good for the larger community. However, Mill alone focused instead on the outcomes 
of actions (Patterson & Wilkins, 2013), and “regarded utility alone as the ultimate appeal on all 
ethical questions” (Christians, 2007, p. 115) – especially in the realm of public debate, as he 
insisted in Utilitarianism that “education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble 
association between his own happiness and the good of the whole” (Mill, 1863, p. 21).  
Ultimately, then, “utilitarian rationalism has served as the prevailing paradigm in 
communications for more than a century ... As media ethics took definitive shape in the 1920s, 
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utilitarian ethics was attractive for its roots in individual autonomy and its this-worldly 
humanism” (Christians, 2007, p. 118; 2010). By the turn of the century, the influence of 
utilitarianism could be seen in two major areas of media ethics concern: first, utility defined the 
scope of what news an ethical media should cover, and second, it guided practical decisions on 
how an ethical media should act while covering that news. “Whatever the position and tradition 
... it is impossible to disregard ethical assumptions and implications when we examine the 
decisions information professionals make from day to day” (Hannabuss, 2000, p. 328) – 
especially when considering the effects of media professionals and similarly influential 
institutions on the larger community (Stern, 2008; Werhane, 1990). Meanwhile, this increased 
attention to ethics carries its own consequences: “It is paradoxical to some degree that a growing 
concern for ethics can diminish press freedom ... So freedom and ethics are closely connected” 
(Merrill, 2011a, p. 8). Ultimately, as Mill might ask, how should free-press reporters act to 
maximize the greater good and minimize harm?  
 Maximize good: Utilitarianism expands watchdog’s scope for greater good. 
Th’ newspaper does ivrything f’r us. It runs th’ polis foorce an’ th’ banks, commands th’  
milishy, controls th’ ligislachure, baptizes th’ young, marries th’ foolish, comforts th’  
afflicted, afflicts th’ comfortable, buries th’ dead an’ roasts thim aftherward.  
(Dunne, 1906, p. 240)  
As reflected in this satirical observation by one American journalist just over 100 years 
ago, the monitorial function of the press quickly evolved from serving in a Fourth Estate role as 
government watchdog to one of covering any item of public interest – or of an interested public. 
“The press has a long and storied history of “muckraking” investigative reporting in various 
aspects of society ... This watchdog role is often cited as one of the most important functions of 
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the press” (Miller, 2003, p. 1; Serrin & Serrin, 2002) – for public servants and private citizens 
alike. Indeed: “More crime, immorality and rascality is prevented by fear of exposure in the 
newspapers than by all the laws, moral and statute, ever devised,” wrote famous publisher Joseph 
Pulitzer in 1878 (Serrin & Serrin, 2002, p. xx). Reflecting a scope of coverage expanded beyond 
just the government, the first SPJ Code of Ethics argued in 1926 in words Mill himself might 
have written that such a wider freedom carried with it a greater responsibility: “The right of a 
newspaper to attract and hold readers is restricted by nothing but considerations of public welfare 
... It is the unquestionable right to discuss whatever is not explicitly forbidden by law” (Sigma, 
1926, p. 1). By mid-century, “the importance of the press to the people has greatly increased” 
reported the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press – so much so that potential abuses of 
“the machinery of the press” meant that “the freedom of the press is in danger” (Commission, 
1947, p. 1). To refocus its practitioners on its responsibility, the Commission insisted that “our 
society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a 
context which gives them meaning” (p. 20; Nerone, 1995; Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956). 
If anything, today’s press is even more powerful than ever: “Collectively, the news media wield 
perhaps the greatest power there is in politics: the power to define reality. The journalistic 
choices of news organizations send a message, consciously or not, about what is – and isn’t – 
important” (Hertsgaard, 2017, para. 5).  
The public interest includes powerful entities beyond government. Further, as “Mill 
consistently thought of the failure to provide aid as a form of causing harm” (Berger, 1984, p. 
256), increasing efforts by modern journalists to discover and cover sins of omission as well as 
those of commission served utilitarian ends. “The public’s right to know of events of public 
importance and interest is the overriding mission of the mass media,” is how the 1973 revision of 
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the SPJ Code put it (The Society, 1973, p. 1). By then, press freedom as it was understood in the 
latter half of the century “carries with it the freedom and the responsibility to discuss, question, 
and challenge actions and utterances of our government and of our public and private 
institutions.” As the century closed, the 1996 revision of the SPJ Code further reflected the 
conviction that “public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of 
democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by seeking truth and providing a 
fair and comprehensive account of events and issues” (Society, 1996, p. 1). And, at the end of the 
day, most practitioners do just that: “Most journalists, I suspect, try hard – and with considerable 
success – to follow the utilitarian prescription of having their work benefit the greatest number of 
people” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 274; Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987). “The expectation in 
the United States ... is that journalists will provide information the public needs to carry out the 
duties of citizenship and ... [also] will provide a forum for ... ideas and opinions” (Klaidman & 
Beauchamp, 1987, p. 5); overall, the journalism craft is an “enterprise based on a moral 
obligation to contribute to an informed populace” (Black & Barney, 1992, p. 3).  
 As a new century brought with it unprecedented, seismic shifts in the media landscape, 
media ethicists returned to this basic premise as a defense of traditional journalism values. “The 
primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free 
and self-governing” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 12); in other words, the profession’s 
“ultimate goal … is to help citizens know well in the public sphere” (Borden, 2007, p. 50) – and 
“journalism has, throughout the centuries, and continuing today, made America better” (Serrin & 
Serrin, 2002, p. xix). Ultimately, “democracy and journalistic excellence rise or fall together” 
(Scheuer, 2008, p. xii).  
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The public interest includes anything that affects the public. In what may be seen as a 
significant, while unacknowledged, influence of utilitarian thought on the profession is the 
increasing focus in recent years on investigating the outcomes of policies, and those affected by 
public policy or private practices, instead of the classic “grip ‘n’ grin” coverage of those in 
power and their routine meetings and press statements. “Journalists also apply the perspectives of 
sociologists ... of scientists, artists, political scientists, or others to find the patterns in which 
events occur” (Shaw, McCombs & Keir, 2000, p. 5; Houston, Bruzzese & Weinberg, 2002; 
Patterson, 2013) in community-based and computer-assisted reporting. Such civic journalism 
may be defended in utilitarian terms (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 260), though it may also 
constrain the practice in significant ways (Merrill, Gade & Blevins, 2001).  
Revised again within 20 years to reflect the increasing challenges of the new media 
technologies, the 2014 Code challenged journalists to “Be vigilant and courageous about holding 
those with power accountable. Give voice to the voiceless ... [and] Boldly tell the story of the 
diversity and magnitude of the human experience. Seek sources whose voices we seldom hear” 
(Society, 2014, p. 1). As the impact of these new media technologies continued to be felt in 
massive job losses in the industry, significantly reducing the ability of the press to cover its 
traditional beats, observers cried, for the greater good: “What replaces that flow of information? 
What will nourish our democracy?” (Lewis, 2007, p. 32) – because “our beloved United States of 
America depends on the decisions we make in our newsrooms every day” (Rather, 1996, p. 64). 
This is particularly vital in the area of security concerns and war coverage.  
Mill, who argued for the liberty to express and access the widest range of opinions, and 
for whom “freedom of the press is regarded as the highest good on a political rather than a 
personal level, working primarily for the benefit of society generally” (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 22), 
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would be proud of these modern media practitioners – and would also be concerned about the 
diminishing range and depth of opinions available for public expression and consideration. Yes, 
“Mill would love the World Wide Web with its conglomerate of varied opinion” (Elliott, 2007, 
p. 102). However, like Dunne’s fictitional Irish-American pundit Mr. Dooley, he would also 
worry over the potential harms from the abuse of such a powerful, omniscient, free press.  
Minimize harm: Utilitarianism enjoins responsible watchdog’s practice.  
Thus a man will say he has a right to publish his opinions ... but he assumes thereupon,  
that in publishing his opinions, he himself violates no duty ... depending, as it does,  
upon his having taken due pains to satisfy himself, first, that the opinions are true, and  
next, that their publication in this manner, and at this particular juncture, will probably  
be beneficial to the interests of truth, on the whole. (Mill, 1832, p. 10)  
As refined by Mill, and later developed by Henry Sidgwick, utilitarianism’s “main idea is 
that society is rightly ordered … when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the 
greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it” (Rawls, 
1999, p. 19). So an ethical utilitarian press may guide its own actions as one such institution, and 
judge those of others, in light of that balance. For Mill, this involves two duties to minimize 
potential harm. First, the speaker must ensure the accuracy of one’s own opinion. Second, the 
speaker must consider the potential harm such a published opinion might cause. Both of these 
aspects are normative: The first deals with the effects of how the press conducts itself, and the 
second deals with the effects of publication. Both aspects are reflected in the 2014 SPJ Code’s 
call for journalists to minimize harm: “Ethical journalism treats sources, subjects, colleagues and 
members of the public as human beings deserving of respect” (Society, 2014, p. 1).  
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Perhaps the best-known example of this among America’s most-respected newspapers is 
the motto printed on the masthead of every edition of The Christian Science Monitor: “The 
object of the Monitor is to injure no man, but to bless all mankind” (Eddy, 1901, p.1), reflecting 
Mill – and, even before the English Utilitarians, John Locke (1689/2014). A few years later, 
plans for a journalism curriculum at Harvard included one class called “Ethics of Journalism. 
Proper sense of responsibility to the public on the part of the newspaper writer” (O’Dell, 1935, p. 
84); in response, Joseph Pulitzer insisted that “Ideals, character, professional standards not to be 
infringed without shame, a sense of honor ... these will be the motif of the whole institution, 
never forgotten even in its most practical work” (1904, p. 667).  
“The study of ethics has long been an integral part of journalism education,” concluded 
one scholar’s lengthy review of journalism textbooks going back more than a century (Mirando, 
1998, p. 26); however, “textbook authors ... confine substantial lessons on ethics to a single 
chapter ... usually placed near the end ... In this setting, important moral and intellectual 
questions are easily overlooked” (p. 35). Overall, authors of a 1980 study concluded that the state 
of media ethics education was woefully inadequate to the demands of the discipline: “Media 
ethics are in a very rudimentary, unsophisticated form at present ... On a comparative basis with 
other programs having a professional dimension, journalism and mass communications seem less 
developed by a substantial margin” (Christians & Covert, p. 7).  
Nearly two decades later, two media scholars argued that “a case can be made that 
journalism ethics has matured somewhat ... Journalism ethics is showing subtle but significant 
signs of developing into an academically and professionally respectable field” (Black & Barney, 
1992, p. 2). Unfortunately, despite several advances, “journalism ethics has a long way to go 
before it reaches philosophic maturity” (p. 14). As media ethicists continued to work to improve 
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the understanding of ethics in media education, they also continued to wrestle with 
understanding and applying Mill’s utilitarianism.  
“Utilitarianism has dominated media ethics for a century ... These concepts fit naturally 
with media ethics theory and professional practice in a democratic society” (Christians, 2007, p. 
113), and its “approach to ethics is a popular one” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 8). Indeed: “In 
actual application, utilitarianism uniformly applied has a way of puncturing self-interest” 
(Patterson & Wilkins, 2013, p. 12). As a result, it “has been a prominent perspective in media 
ethics textbooks” (Craig, 2009, p. 204), though other traditions have gained attention in the past 
several decades, especially deontological approaches to responsibility.  
A 1999-2000 survey of 16 introductory reporting textbooks found that only seven 
mentioned a specific philosophical tradition; however, four of the five that addressed at least two 
traditions included utilitarianism among them (Peck, 2004, p. 350). Unfortunately, while the 
tradition does dominate the discipline, this doesn’t mean that it is properly treated, or even 
understood: “Although Mill is most often identified in the same breath with utilitarianism in 
journalism textbooks, a thorough examination of his beliefs about morality – including his ideas 
on ‘quality’ – is often lacking” (Peck, 2006, p. 206). Also lacking is a thorough discussion of his 
“Harm Principle” (Day, 2003; Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987; Patterson & Wilkins, 2013). A 
similar oversimplification is often true for both Aristotle’s Golden Mean (Peck, 2004) as well as 
Kant’s Categorial Imperative (Peck, 2004, 2007). For example, one author claims that “Mill’s 
utilitarianism, like Kant’s categorical imperative, is easily recalled and easily applied” (Leslie, 
2000, p. 82) – giving force to some of its detractors’ arguments. And this has been a problem for 
at least four decades: “Utilitarianism in some sense has dominated our general ethical scene, yet 
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it scores an amazingly small percentage (9%) of media course work,” noted Christians in 1978 
(p. 5).  
As expected, Mill and utility get more attention in dedicated media ethics texts; 
disappointingly, however, one scholarly review of seven such references “yields a conclusion not 
inconsistent with Peck’s observation” (Elliott, 2007, p. 102) – that is, they don’t do the utilitarian 
tradition, or Mill, justice: “His theory is much more than ‘the greatest good for the greatest 
number’” (Peck, 2006, p. 206; Crane & Matten, 2007; Lindebaum & Raftopoulou, 2017; 
Plaisance, 2014) – even though that remains its most common presentation (cf. Christians, 
Fackler, Rotzoll & McKee, 2001; Fink, 1995; Gordon & Kittross, 1999; Hulteng, 1985; Leslie, 
2000), with a few significant exceptions (cf. Day, 2003; Patterson & Wilkins, 2013; Plaisance, 
2014; Horner, 2015).  
Some recent media ethics texts barely mention Mill (cf. Moore & Murray, 2012) – or not 
at all (cf. McBride & Rosenstiel, 2104). A cursory examination of the more than a dozen media 
ethics texts available a dozen years after Elliott’s study reveals similarly incomplete 
representations; moreover, from a utilitarian stance, an incomplete Millian ethic may yield worse 
outcomes than no Mill at all: “The purpose of ethical analysis is to consider all relevant factors ... 
[to] best determine the range of permissible actions ... Getting Mill wrong by limiting utilitarian 
analysis to a method of subtraction fails to fulfill that purpose” (Elliott, p. 111). And ultimately, 
for utilitarianism, what “is often overlooked ... is the focus on minimizing harm” (Day, 2003, p. 
61); in fact, “it has gone almost unnoticed in journalism that this work discusses harm as much as 
it does liberty” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 94). However, the Society of Professional 
Journalists encourages “all who engage in journalism to take responsibility for the information 
they provide” (Society, 2014, p. 1). A utilitarian journalist “should analyze the benefits and 
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harms to everyone (including themselves) affected by the decision” (Day, 2003, p. 61). 
Moreover, all ethicists should think “beyond the conventional interpretation which holds that the 
only true end for Mill is utility and all else is a means to utility” (Cohen-Almagor, 1997b, p. 
141), “to understand ... how one end may serve as a means to a further end.”  
Along these lines, Millian utility arguments often appear in consideration of three main 
areas of potential harm the profession might inflict: harm arising from its untruthful practice, 
from its inordinate purview, and from its long-lasting and far-reaching product.  
Utility minimizes harm caused by journalism’s practice.  
Thus, ensuring that data are accurate becomes a cardinal principle in professional codes  
of journalism ethics. Fabrications, fraudulent materials, omissions, and contrivances are  
both nonscientific and unethical. Data that are internally and externally valid are the coin  
of the realm, experimentally and morally. (Christians, 2007, p. 119)  
 Mill’s first concern with ethical opinion expression – that citizens work ‘‘to form the 
truest opinions they can’’ (Mill, 1859a, p. 23; Day, 2003) – remains central to the journalist’s 
work ethic. Mill himself could have written the various renditions of this concept in the evolving 
SPJ codes over the years: From the first, “a newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be 
excused for lack of thoroughness or accuracy” (1926); “Truth is our ultimate goal” (1973); “Seek 
truth and report it ... Journalists should be honest ... Test the accuracy of information from all 
sources and exercise care to avoid inadvertent error. Deliberate distortion is never permissible” 
(1996); “Journalists should be accurate ... Journalists should take responsibility for the accuracy 
of their work. Verify information before releasing it. Use original sources whenever possible. 
Remember that neither speed nor format excuses inaccuracy” (2014). An examination of these 
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and similar codes reflect a perennial concern with veracity (Hulteng & American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, 1981; Merrill & Odell, 1983; Rodgers, 2007).  
 These increasingly specific guidelines reflect a growing industry concern over its public 
perception of unethical behavior (Coming, 2011; Epstein, 2016) – and this included a greater 
emphasis on media ethics education. Thirty years ago, two media ethics scholars warned of a 
serious lack of appropriate depth “that leaves a large majority of the media ethics courses with 
apparent weakness in their normative posture ... Some of the courses may do little more than 
entrench certain conventions and teach students to appeal to epithets ... slogans” such as freedom 
of the press or First Amendment rights (Christians & Covert, 1980, pp. 18-19; Braman, 1988).  
 For that matter, though Milton and Mill both “defend freedom of speech on the ground 
that the truth will prevail ... the Constitution does not make the dominance of truth a necessary 
condition for freedom of speech” (Easterbook, 1995, p. 181). In fact, the First Amendment is 
“problematic as a basis for moral responsibilities because one cannot derive duties from rights” 
(Elliott, 1987, p. 7; Rachlin, 1988), though some argue otherwise (cf. Glasser, 1986). So some 
extend Mill’s mandate for individual truth to the profession: so, for the journalist, the “first step 
is acknowledging the significance of truth in the workplace” (Bugeja, 1996, pp. 68-69; Clark, 
2014; Ryan, 2001) – especially in the areas of accurate information, accurate images, and 
credibility. This ideal may also be seen as an example of Millian rule utilitarianism: “truthful and 
complete reporting – and truthful public relations – as a general rule will ... provide the greatest 
service to the public” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 79), because objective, reliable reports are 
“the necessary elements of a self-critical, authority-defying free society” (Nanda, 1998, p. 303). 
“Theories of truth are in total dispute these days ... But the issues are inescapable for a 
viable media ethics. The press’ obligation to truth is standard in media ethics at virtually every 
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period of history” (Christians, 2008, p. 11; Ryan, 2001). The same can be said for the 
longstanding U.S. media’s “Contract of Correction ... [which] has been in place for hundreds of 
years. It’s designed to instill and build trust by making it clear ... that the press is accountable, 
that we acknowledge our mistakes and do so publicly” (Silverman, 2014, p. 153).  
Clearly, this ideal that a “journalist’s obligation to the truth is a standard part of the 
rhetoric” (Christians & Covert, 1980, p. 30), and perhaps most important in war coverage. In 
their critique of one Vietnam-era story, for example, two media ethicists insist that the reporter’s 
“first obligation was neither to history nor to CBS. His principal responsibility as a journalist was 
to accurately represent to the public a complex controversy” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 
89). This concept of independence, or automony – what Mill called impartiality (1863) – is a key 
element of utilitarian truth-telling. As one media ethics text put it: “Broadly, principled 
journalists are loyal to the greater good of society, a utilitarian view that obviously can create 
conflict with your other loyalties” (Fink, 1995, p. 19; Gordon & Kittross, 1999: Leslie, 2000; 
Ryan, 2001; Smith, 1980). And this kind of mature utilitarianism is more faithful to Mill: 
“Journalists who simply rely on the catch-phrase ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ 
without deliberating ... can create consequences – but not the ones they think they are creating. 
The consequences are about the credibility and survival of the media” (Peck, 2006, p. 212).  
Utility minimizes harm caused by journalism’s purview. The old adage that “a half truth 
is a whole lie” finds resonance with modern journalism’s expansion of truth-telling to a growing 
responsibility to both increase the diversity of voices and viewpoints while also being more 
sensitive to the potential for harm from coverage. In his day, “Mill strongly defended the rights 
of minorities” (Fink, 1995, p. 12), as well as those of children and young people (Mill, 1859a; 
Day, 2003). And “Mill was not a free speech absolutist. He argued that no one should be free to 
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wantonly violate someone else’s rights, unjustly damage another’s reputation, disclose secrets 
vital to the public interest, and so on” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 10). Additions and 
modifications of the SPJ Code reflect these concerns: “Boldly tell the story of the diversity and 
magnitude of the human experience. Seek sources whose voices we seldom hear” – while, at the 
same time, treat “sources, subjects, colleagues and members of the public as human beings 
deserving of respect ... Balance the public’s need for information against potential harm or 
discomfort” (Society, 2014, p. 1). In particular, journalists should “[s]how compassion for those 
who may be affected by news coverage. Use heightened sensitivity when dealing with juveniles, 
victims of sex crimes, and sources or subjects who are inexperienced or unable to give consent.” 
And, finally, in a response to today’s electronic elephant-memory, search-engine society, all 
journalists are encouraged to “[c]onsider the implications of identifying criminal suspects before 
they face legal charges,” and “[c]onsider the long-term implications of the extended reach and 
permanence of publication.”  
“Journalists ... are not unexposed ... they have been examining moral problems in their 
own and other professions for decades” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987). However, four decades 
ago, a survey of 237 journalism programs revealed that only 27% included a designated media 
ethics class (Christians, 1978). So, media theorists declared: “Journalism needs the equivalent ... 
of the ‘Commission on the Teaching of Bioethics’ ... Research in descriptive ethics ... Support 
for teaching ... a separate newsletter on media ethics and even a specific journal ... [and] 
Continuing education for practitioners” wrote Christians and Covert in 1980 (pp. 53-56). Since 
then, the industry has seen significant growth in each of these areas of normative concern (cf. 
Association, 2008; Bivins, n.d.; Christians, 2008; Ethical, 2018; Hulteng & American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, 1981; Hulteng, 1985; Pew, n.d.; Poynter, 2018; Society, 1996, 2014; Stroud, 
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2018; Urban, 1999; Who, n.d.). Over the more than three decades since the first “Media Ethics 
Summit ... media ethics established its legitimacy, summarized into recommendations for the 
field’s future fluorescence” (Christians, 2008, pp. 3-4), yet weakness remains (Patterson, 2013).  
Such professional self-critique remains essential: “At a certain level, only journalists can 
really be watchdogs for other journalists. An ordinary reader might not pick up on inaccuracies 
or problems with tone and angle” (Seiff, 2018, para. 8). And a utilitarian perspective can inform 
any number of other everyday media practice issues – including advertising, altering images, 
checkbook journalism, diversity, economic marketplace, information access equity, 
infotainment, interviews, media manipulation, product placement, pubic relations, religion 
coverage, undercover reporting, and violent content (Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll & McKee, 
2001; Elliott, 1997: Gordon & Kittross, 1999; Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987). Ultimately, under 
a Millian “harm principle ... individual liberty may be reasonably restricted to prevent harm to 
others” (Day, 2003, p. 325; Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987) – and reasonable journalists, in a 
mature Millian ethical stance, will usually agree to restrict their own liberty in most cases when 
their actions can be seen as potentially harming others in unjustifiable ways.  
Utility minimizes harm caused by journalism’s product.  
Of importance here, apart from the fact that freedom of the press is accepted as an 
absolute in itself (nobody has a right to prevent another from publishing anything), is the 
notion that there is a moral obligation on the part of the person who publicly expresses an 
opinion to ensure not only its truth but also that the wider good is served by its 
publication. Thus, for example, it would seem morally reprehensible to publish true but 
private details of a person’s life for no reason other than to satisfy a public appetite for 
gossip. (O’Rourke, 2001, p. 35)  
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In several instances, Mill took positions to oppose the publication of private or otherwise 
embarrassing material when he saw very little utility in doing so, and much harm (Klaidman & 
Beauchamp, 1987; Mill, 1834a; O’Rourke, 2001). This resonates with the social responsibility 
theory of the press: a journalist must balance right to privacy with society’s right to know 
(Hodges, 1983). The most recent version of the SPJ Code includes several guidelines that Mill 
would second: “Recognize that legal access to information differs from an ethical justification to 
publish or broadcast ... Weigh the consequences of publishing or broadcasting personal 
information. Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity, even if others do” (SPJ, 2014, p. 1).  
Indeed: “Some of the media’s most agonizing ethical problems arise specifically from the 
public/private nexus – reporting the private lives of public officials, for example, the 
confidentiality of sources, and the government’s right to secrecy for ensuring public safety” 
(Christians & Covert, 1980, p. 29; Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll & McKee, 2001; Gordon & 
Kittross, 1999; Horner, 2015). Media law scholars identify four distinct areas of legal concern: 
intrusion, embarrassment, false light, and appropriation (Prosser, 1960; Moore & Murray, 2012; 
Warren & Brandeis, 1890); however, for the utilitarian, freedom is not the only concern (Mill, 
1859a). “Although the legal parameters ... have not been definitively established, we do 
generally acknowledge the relevance of ethical considerations in this domain ... that it may be 
legal ... does not necessarily make it ethically neutral” (Gross, Katz & Ruby, 1988). Here, a 
utilitarian emphasis on the greater good protects journalists from the need to compete in the 
marketplace of audience ratings instead of pure ideas, even when publication might be legal, as it 
“would place the needs of the public ... above the fiduciary responsibility and greed of the 
market” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 204). Ultimately, then, the ideal journalist “is not thinking 
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of his wages or of the profits of his owners. He is there to watch over the safety and welfare of 
the people who trust him” (Pulitzer, 1904, p. 656) – the people who fight the wars.  
 In at least one instance, Mill argued against such publication of private information, 
concerned that such abuse would either constrain everyone to act in constant fear of public 
exposure, or worse, that the press would devolve to the lowest common denominator, as it did in 
the yellow journalism era in the U.S., ultimately degrading all press credibility (and utility). 
Indeed: “freedom would work ... by what seems to have taken place in America, calumny & 
scandal carried to such a length that nobody believes anything which appears in print, & as none 
can escape such imputations, nobody regards them” (Mill, 1834a, p. 214) – a very prescient 
assessment of a credibility gap that plagues the press to this day (Moore & Murray, 2012; 
McBride & Rosenstiel, 2104). In fact, “the public has developed a blinding, irrational cynicism 
toward reporting and other material that the media have handled and processed – an overreaction 
to a century of advertising, propaganda, and hyperbolic TV news” (Foer, 2018, para. 6).  
Worse, the evolution from government censorship of the news media (Mill, 1824a) to 
general disregard for the news media (Mill, 1834a), has apparently now arrived at a future too 
awful for Mill to imagine, one in which politicians rhetorically shoot the messengers, foreseen 
four decades ago in the Times by longtime journalist Daniel Schorr, who was himself labeled 
“[A] real media enemy” by members of the Nixon administration (Bell, 1971, p. 75; Reston, 
1970): “We are getting to the point where a politician will be able to run against the news media 
as he used to run against Communism, crime or corruption – issues no longer available to some 
of them” (Kaufman & Schorr, NYT, 1979, p. A15). This “may be an overstatement,” wrote two 
media ethicists almost a decade later (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987) – but that was before 
newly-elected President Donald Trump tweeted “The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, 
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@NBCNews, @ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American 
People!” (Trump, 2017, p. 1), reflecting comments often made during his campaign (Shear, 
Haberman & Thrush, 2017, p. A1; Johnson & Gold, 2017).  
This proclamation appears to belong to a completely different universe than that of the 
Jeffersonian insistence, nearly two centuries earlier, that “the only security of all, is in a free 
press. The force of public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The 
agitation it produces must be submitted to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure” (Jefferson, 
1823, Letter CLXXVII; Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987).  
And perhaps we really are in a different universe: for some critics, Jefferson, Mill, and 
anyone else rooted in rational Enlightenment don’t have much to say to a post-truth era 
(Anderson, 2017; Ballacci, 2018; Coleman & Fararo, 1992; Christians, 2015; Haidt, 2012; 
Merrill, 2011a, 2011b). As one U.S. administration aide told a Times writer in 2002, reporters 
were part of “what we call the reality-based community ... [who] believe that solutions emerge 
from your judicious study of discernible reality ... That’s not the way the world really works 
anymore ... we create our own reality” (Susskind, 2004, para. 62) – without enlightenment or 
empiricism. “In this environment, the definition of news has much more to do with demand than 
supply ... At the same time, public consensus has shrunk dramatically ... and ... ethical norms 
can’t be backed up by force” (Shirky, 2014, p. 14), despite their apparent utility. Worse, 
traditional journalistic routines may actually add to the problem: “Journalism – as one of the 
traditionally authoritative institutions – plays a leading part in this spiral of dwindling trust” by 
trying to keep one foot in orthodoxies of objectivity and independence while tentatively stepping 
into practices of transparency and multiple perspectives (Temmerman, Moernaut, Coesemans & 
Mast, 2019, p. 1; Gans, 2011). So, just what is the greater good of society, when society itself is 
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increasingly tribal and fragmented – and how best may a free, responsible press identify and 
pursue it?  
“Not as simplistic:” Recent Utilitarian Media Ethicists Respond to Critics  
 This is probably the most influential of ethical theories ... In spite of its troublesome  
nature, utilitarianism is probably the most popular ethical theory. It is both rational and  
freely chosen. It is both individualistic and socially concerned. It is concerned with  
actions and consequences, not just lofty rhetoric or ideas ... By contrast ... [there is] the  
difficulty of predicting the effects of an action ... And there is also the very real concern  
that in maximizing the “good” for the majority, utilitarianism also makes it easy to  
overlook harmful effects that the minority may experience. (Merrill, 2011a, pp. 20-22)  
As in general philosophy, as well as in war ethics, utility has no shortage of perennial 
critics in the realm of media practice, despite its dominance of the discipline’s conversation on 
proper practice. The approach “has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal” (Christians, 
2007, p. 120) – and, as it faces new challenges from post-Enlightenment approaches, it continues 
to attract criticisms from several sides of media ethics based on the same problems philosophers 
have had with it from the beginning.  
“Utility and its discontents:” A theory no longer adequate for media ethics?  
The goal for journalists is identifying representative voices and communities rather than  
spectacular ones ... In contrast to utilitarian individualism, conceptions of the good  
reflect the values of the community rather than the expertise of academic ethicists  
removed from everyday struggle. (Christians, 2007, p. 126)  
As with consequentialism generally, critics claim that it “is, on the one hand, overly 
demanding, and, on the other hand, that it is not demanding enough” (Alexander & Moore, 2017, 
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para. 7; West, 2006). For one such critic, the same “simple-mindedness” that makes the ethic 
deceptively easy to apply actually “consists in having too few thoughts … to match the world as 
it really is” (Williams, 1963, p. 149). And, for at least one media ethicist, it’s time to openly 
acknowledge that reality: “We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the 
media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches” (Christians, 
2007, p. 120).  
Overly demanding: Utilitarianism expects too much of the journalist. Even without the 
post-modern turmoil of the meaning of truth, the professional faces the perennial challenge of 
attempting to carefully consider the many possible consequences of one’s actions. So “even for 
the utilitarian journalist, one of the main problems of using such a theory would be the difficulty 
(many would say the impossibility) of predicting which action would bring greater future 
happiness” (Gordon & Kittross, 1999, p. 17; Leslie, 2000; Milgram, 2000; Patterson & Wilkins, 
2013; Quinn, 2007). In the end, no one can truly reduce the good to one single value, nor can one 
accurately predict the outcome of a proposed action (Quinn, 2007, p. 175). This latter complaint 
especially places “utilitarianism … among the most criticized of philosophical principles” 
(Patterson & Wilkins, p. 12; Plaisance, 2014). Ultimately, utilitarianism’s inherent ethical 
quandary over means and ends eventually leads to “hypocrisy and confusion” (Bovée, 1991, p. 
136).  
Overly undemanding: Utilitarianism expects too little of the journalist. On the other 
hand, critics point at several shortcomings arising from the abuse of a utilitarian argument. When 
applied incorrectly, the tradition exhibits a bias toward short-term benefit (Patterson & Wilkins, 
2013), as in abuses such as the unwarranted invasion of privacy: “The standard of minimizing 
harm ... is subject to rationalization” (Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll & McKee, 2001, p. 116), so 
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that the public’s “right” to know can become a license for sensationalism aimed at increasing 
audience share (Lambeth, 1992, pp. 57-58; Horner, 2015). Similar problem areas of an 
inappropriate utilitarian calculus for journalistic activity include community, confidentiality, 
misrepresentation or deception, paternalism, privacy, truth-telling, and whistle-blowing 
(Christians & Covert, 1980; Christians, Fackler, Rotzoll & McKee, 2001; Horner, 2015).  
Nelson (2015) claimed that strict utilitarianism cannot account for violations against 
individuals. Ultimately, the approach can lead to the unethical sacrifice of personal integrity for 
some end valued greater by its supposed utility (Bivins, 2007; Leslie, 2000). These and other 
issues invite criticism of the Enlightenment ethicists’ overemphasis on individual freedom. Even 
“Kant's theory of rational maxims was based originally on something akin to the theory of good 
consequences that Mill developed later on” (Merrill, 2011b, p. 492; Nahra, 2013). “Despite their 
major differences, for these two [theorists] ... the individual is their centerpiece. Individuals are 
free to make choices and are accountable ... Mill’s ... is an ethics of the autonomous individual, 
and ... Kant’s ethics is a rational being” (Christians, 2010, p. 142).  
Ultimately, despite recent defenses of the tradition, several media ethicists have 
concluded “that’s all well and good, but utilitarianism still has basic flaws and here’s a better 
alternative theory” (Myers, 2007, p. 98). Instead, some recent scholars have sought guidance 
elsewhere, including from ancient, universal and non-Western traditions: For some, “universal 
solidarity is the normative core of the social and moral order” (Christians, Ferré & Fackler, 1993, 
p. ???), reflected in more recent non-utilitarian approaches based in communitarianism 
(Christians, Ferré, and Fackler, 1993; Craig, 1996); universal sacredness of life (Christians, 
1997), agape and care (Craig & Ferré, 2006); justice (Craig, 2009), Ubuntu (Christians, 2015), 
and dignity (Christians, 2017).  
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Overly enlightened: Utilitarianism relies too much on the rational. If these perennial 
complaints weren’t enough, for some critics, utilitarianism represents a compromised approach 
in today’s post-truth world: “Mill is presuming – uncritically – the tradition (known since 
Athenian Greece) of rational choice theory” (Christians, 2017, para. 21). Consequently, “Mill 
valued ... the way in which the truth is held ... He valued holding beliefs that were formed by 
employing one’s rationality, with knowledge and awareness of the significance of these opinions 
and the grounds for holding them” (Cohen-Almagor, 2017, p. 579). However, today’s thinkers 
claim that “the worship of reason is itself an illustration of one of the most long-lived delusions 
in Western history: the rationalist delusion” (Haidt, 2012, p. 103). And rationality is empirical 
(Gordon & Kittross, 1999; Ryan, 2001), which is no longer a safe defense.  
Unfortunately for adherents of Enlightenment ethics, rational choice theory has been 
challenged: “Correspondence models have no resonance on this side of Einstein and Heisenberg, 
and coherence views are caught up in the naturalistic fallacy” (Christians, 2008, p. 11). Even the 
historical “march of civilization ... the standard narrative” of continual human progress has been 
dealt recent research-based wounds that may be “life threatening” (Scott, 2017, pp. 9-10; 
Coleman & Fararo, 1992). And, at the end of the day, for some, only money really talks: “that’s 
the First Amendment in action. That is how the marketplace of ideas works. We float our ideas 
in the marketplace, and we see which idea sells” (Randazza, 2014, para. 5). And, as history 
reveals, citizens and their governments don’t always choose the best or most rational option: 
“Unfortunately, many governments did not act in accordance with Mill’s expectations and lofty, 
other-regarding paternalistic aspirations,” concluded one scholar (Cohen-Almagor, 2012, p. 582). 
“Theoretical principles should always be tested against the brute facts of reality.”  
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However, while some media ethicists were seeking ethical guides in different directions, 
or giving up altogether, the attention of a significant number of moral philosophers returned to 
Mill, as his bicentennial (2006) and Utilitarianism’s sesquicentennial (2013) came and went. 
And among those finding new approaches to perennial problems in applied ethics were several 
media ethics scholars who began to look beyond utilitarianism’s traditional scope to consider a 
revised, more robust understanding of Mill and his work – and its implications for more ethical 
media practice. These scholars not only addressed several of the concerns raised by Mill’s 
discontents (especially in the areas of community and justice), but perhaps more importantly 
brought the discipline to the brink of a new application of the tradition, beyond press freedom 
and responsibility: A new look at utilitarianism reveals that the theory not only defends press 
freedom and defines press responsibility, but it can also direct coverage focus onto specific 
utilitarian topics for the greater good.  
“Getting Mill Right”: Utilitarianism directs press focus onto flourishing.  
Certainly the First Amendment allows news organizations to publish whatever they  
want – and Mill would enthusiastically support this liberty. But, in “Utilitarianism,” 
Mill answered the question of what one is supposed to do with all of that freedom. The  
answer is promote the good of all. (Elliott, 2007, p. 107)  
 As with general philosophy and with military ethics, the 2001 terror attacks, Mill’s 200th 
birthday, and Utilitarianism’s 150th anniversary may have inspired media ethicists to reconsider 
his thought in light of recent scholarship. Most significantly, a special double issue of Mass 
Media Ethics dedicated to “utilitarianism, its critics, and its alternatives” reflected the currency 
of these debates a year after the bicentennial, “by first taking on one of the more popular media 
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ethics theories – utilitarianism – and then offering up various alternatives” in a half-dozen essays 
addressing various approaches to Mill and utility (Myers, 2007, pp. 97-98).  
Writing during Mill’s bicentennial, Lee Anne Peck emphasized that “utility is not an 
excuse for unethical behavior … Ultimately, using Mill’s theory correctly means responsibly 
serving the public” (2006, pp. 211-212). Building on this, Deni Elliott blamed the perennial 
“simplistic reasoning” about utilitarianism on an inadequate understanding of Mill’s element of 
justice. Instead, “Mill requires calculating what is truly good for the whole community” (2007, p. 
100). These recent approaches do more than expand Millian definitions of proper media practice 
and product; they begin to limn the parameters of a new utilitarian reporting model that might 
better guide a free, responsible press to the kinds of coverage that would better serve utilitarian 
ends. So, if the press in the United States is free to publish virtually anything, including critiques 
of its own government, and most anything else that can influence citizens’ well-being, what 
questions in what arenas would best advance that end? In other words, what kinds of stories 
should a free, responsible, utilitarian reporter pursue? Or, to paraphrase one popular bumper 
sticker, “WWJSMD – What Would John Stuart Mill Do?”  
Addressing a crisis: Consequentialism focuses on media audience. As mentioned 
earlier, aspects of a more focused, consequentialist journalism approach could already be seen in 
the increasing attention on a more community-oriented reporting aiming to, in effect, “‘Think 
like a reader.’ This relates to anticipating readers’ questions, then answering them quickly on a 
page” (Ryan & O’Donnell, 2001, p. 257). This outcome-driven journalism begins with focusing 
on the specific information needed, and harnessing teamwork among reporters, photographers, 
graphic artists, designers, and editors to obtain and present it (Harrower, 2002; Ryan & 
O’Donnell, 2001; Schierhorn, Endres, & Schierhorn, 2001).  
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Rapid changes in media technology – first in the 1980s with pagination software, and 
later in the 2000s with online and new media – and ongoing staff attrition forced practitioners 
back to the drawing board to find new ways to do more with less. By leveraging contemporary 
Management-By-Objective models, such as Deming’s industrial quality-control-by-teamwork 
approach (Deming, 1986; Creech, 1994; Gabor, 1990; Gitlow & Gitlow, 1987; Walton, 1990), 
media practitioners refocused on reader service and satisfaction as their ideal outcomes: 
“Quality, according to Deming, has no meaning except as defined by the desires and needs of 
customers” (Gabor, 1990, p. 9); for media managers, this means answering reader’s questions by 
directing practitioners to refocus on the industry’s core product: “hitting readers up-front with 
the best information they have” (Ryan, 1997, p. 21).  
This consequentialist-normative approach found applications in photography, graphics, 
design, online reporting, database reporting, computer-assisted reporting, entrepreneurial 
reporting, and shifts in media audience environment, as well as the rise of support organizations 
such as Investigative Reporters and Editors (Adam, 2000; Bass & Associated Press, 2001; Black 
& Barney, 1992; Blom, 1997; Briggs, 2012; Cripe, 1998; Deuze, 2008; Gordon & Kittross, 1999; 
Gibson, 1997; Herzog, 2003; Houston, Bruzzese & Weinberg, 2002; McBride & Rosenstiel, 
2104; Nelson, 2003; Olson, 1997; Patterson, 2013; Paul, 2003; Ryan, 1997, 1998; Ryan & 
O’Donnell, 2001; Saksena & Hollifield, 2002; Shaw, McCombs & Keir, 2000; Stempel & 
Hargrove, 1996).  
Longstanding prophets of doom perennially warn of the demise of quality journalism 
under the onslaught of new media technology: “And as we perfect our mastery of the second 
god, we must realize that we have given the god we created the power to change us and our 
ways” (Schwartz, 1981, p. 197; McLuhan, 1964; Postman, 1985); meanwhile, many practitioners 
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over the past quarter century have instead worked to leverage new media tools to serve audience 
well-being (Briggs, 2009). This journalistic focus on greater-good outcomes resonates with 
Mill’s utilitarianism – though it does not acknowledge it – and represents an early example of 
using a kind of consequentialist thinking to actually direct the focus of story development and 
enterprise reporting, and not just to defend the rights and define the scope of a free press to cover 
its government and community.  
Meanwhile, even the perennial prophets of doom resort to utilitarian accusations against a 
failing watchdog: “The American people are by no means stupid, but they’ve been swimming in 
a sea of media-imposed ignorance for many years,” concludes one practitioner (Hertsgaard, 
2017, para. 30). Perhaps, if utilitarian assessments of journalism’s outcomes provide new 
insights into community good, utilitarian approaches to journalistic practice might also offer new 
reporting tools to better serve this supposed greater good.  
Peck: Utilitarian journalism responsibly reports profound importance.  
Mill said quality should be factored into the calculation of the greatest amount of  
happiness. He believed that quality was more important than quantity ...Mill insisted that  
it was part of our human heritage to have desires higher than those that lent themselves  
to [Bentham’s hedonistic] calculus of felicity. (Peck, 2006, p. 207)  
Lee Ann Peck (2004, 2006, 2007) was among the first mass communication scholars to 
adapt a revisionist approach to Mill in a consideration of media ethics. Particularly in the realm 
of journalism, she argued, based on her survey of beginning reporting texts (2004), Mill’s 
concept of utilitarianism has long been included in discussions of ethical reporting, both in terms 
of gathering information as well as publishing it. The potential harm of investigation, and of 
disclosure, surface in discussions of media ethics, and utility is often invoked as a measure.  
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 In these textbooks, Peck first found a general confusion between Bentham’s conception 
of utilitarianism as the greatest pleasure, and Mill’s refinement of this idea in terms of differing 
qualities of pleasures. Further, she noted, the reduction of Mill’s stance as a formulaic “greatest 
good for the greatest number” is both inaccurate and dangerous, because it might lead students to 
conclude that any number of unethical newsgathering approaches might be somehow defended 
by the “greater good” supposed to benefit from public enlightenment.  
A revised Millian utility balances competing values. Invoking the philosophical 
distinction between “act” utilitarianism and “rule” utilitarianism, Peck decried the absence of 
these details in textbooks. Further, she insisted that Mill’s conception of moral education, in a 
line from Aristotle through Kant, means journalism students need to develop the habit of making 
good “act” decisions, and not only “rule” ones – and it is a matter of habit: “In Chapter IV of 
Utilitarianism, Mill wrote extensively on the importance and power of habit in the principle of 
utility,” she observed (p. 355), quoting Mill’s claim that “those who in their opportunities of 
experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are 
best furnished” (Mill, 1863, p. 14). Unfortunately, “Aristotle’s, Kant’s and Mill’s theories are 
oftentimes dumbed down to quick quips or one-paragraph explanations. Therefore, when these 
misleading versions are used to settle journalism ethics questions, the answers they give are 
either faulty or too contentious” (p. 355).  
 “Mill’s ideas are not as simplistic as journalism textbook authors would have students 
believe (p. 210); indeed, “it is clear that merely following a quantitative approach to the greatest 
happiness, or greatest good, is not an adequate way to make decisions for Mill. More reflection 
and reasoning is needed.” Leveraging Mill’s discussion of the quality of higher pleasures to help 
negotiate among competing values, Peck suggested that journalists make better decisions by 
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taking into consideration the various values of the potential outcomes: “When decision making 
gets complex, Mill would say that the more journalists factor these variables into their decision 
making, the better their choices” (p. 207) – and this hold true for considering the practitioner’s 
actions as well as the possible outcomes: “Mill’s view is not only about the calculation of the 
consequences, but about the quality of the means to the end” (p. 210). Ultimately, “Utilitarianism 
does not furnish journalists with excuses for whatever behavior they might choose; there are 
conflicting obligations with which they must deal” (p. 211). In her reading of Mill, Peck provides 
an alternative utilitarian approach to balancing competing claims to the deontological negotiation 
of duties proposed by Ross (1930; Prima, 1999).  
A revised Millian utility values profound importance. Ultimately, while Peck’s articles 
apply Mill largely to questions of ethical press behavior, her discussion of Mill points to a 
utilitarian focus on story selection as well as on storytelling and reporting techniques. For 
example, in considering whether to use a hidden-camera approach to reporting on an offer of 
discounted carpet cleaning, she concludes: “Journalism students need to understand more 
thoroughly that a carpet-cleaning scam is not a life-or death situation for the public and that the 
principle of utility does not justify their action of deception” (p. 210). Instead, the use of “lies, 
deceit, and manipulation are only justified when this is the only way to get a story that is of 
extreme importance to the public’s well-being.” Even then, there are greater goods to consider: 
“For journalists, “there might be times when using hidden cameras may be the only way to tell 
an important story about a significant issue” (p. 211; Lisheron, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Steele, 
2002). But the overarching value of the story itself is emphasized as the determining factor of 
quality here: “Unfortunately, examples of quality investigative work are being outweighed by 
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this overabundance of hidden camera stories that focus on small-scale consumer scams or 
‘gotcha pieces’ that don’t justify deception” (p. 211; Lisheron, 2007; Steele, 2002).  
 In remembering Steele’s (2002) guidelines for ethical use of deceptive reporting 
techniques, Lisheron (2007) notes that such actions may only be defensible “[w]hen the 
information obtained is of profound importance. It must be of vital public interest, such as 
revealing great system failure at the top levels, or it must prevent profound harm to individuals” 
(para. 53). Further, such actions may be ethical only “[w]hen all other alternatives for obtaining 
the same information have been exhausted” and “[w]hen the harm prevented by the information 
revealed through deception outweighs any harm caused by the act of deception” (paras. 55-60) – 
all criteria resonant with just war theory, consequentialism and utility.  
 In light of Peck’s insistence that, for journalists, “that utility is not an excuse for unethical 
behavior (p. 211), a startling congruence emerges between these harm-restraining guidelines for 
justifying the use of potentially unethical reporting techniques and the tenets of just war theory. 
Indeed: one media ethics scholar proposed a “just journalism” rubric exploring similar methods 
for guiding conduct based on just consequences (Brislin, 1992). Further, in Peck’s exploration of 
Mill’s views on the inseparable relationship between means and ends, a focus on the essential 
importance of vital story selection begins to emerge. “Misconstruing Mill’s theory to justify 
reasons for using hidden cameras for work that is not of profound importance might give the 
public the idea that the media is abusing freedom of the press,” she concludes; “Ultimately, using 
Mill’s theory correctly means responsibly serving the public” (pp. 211-212). In other words, a 
utilitarian journalist best exercises press freedom by responsibly serving the public’s greater 
good through the considered selection and ethical pursuit of stories of profound interest. Mill 
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himself would be hard pressed to find any stories of more profound interest than those 
interrogating a government’s justification of calling its citizens to war.  
Elliott: “Getting Mill right” means aggregate good and justice for all.  
The mistaken understanding of utilitarianism as “arithmetic good” violates Mill’s  
requirement of impartiality as well as the dependency that each individual has on the  
community for ... happiness ... The mistake allows one to conclude that having some  
happy and others not happy is good for the community. Mill’s notion of aggregate good  
stresses the importance of valuing all people involved. (Elliott, 2007, p. 105)  
Also building on the emerging Millian scholarship, Deni Elliott (2007) blamed the prevalent and 
perennial “simplistic reasoning” (p. 100) usually attached to utilitarianism on a fundamentally 
inadequate understanding of Mill’s element of justice. Like Peck, Elliot decries the perennial 
“simplistic arithmetic formula: Do the greatest good for the greatest number. This quantification 
approach, when attached to Mill, misinterprets this philosopher and robs media ethics 
discussions of the rich reflection that an important classical theory can bring.” Echoing Rawls 
(1971, 1999), she concludes that “Mill requires calculating what is truly good for the whole 
community” (Elliott, 2007, p. 100), and that those citizens who learn the most about themselves 
also “learn that their happiness is dependent on the happiness of the community as a whole” in 
the process (p. 105). In a topical synthesis of On Liberty and Utilitarianism, Elliott applies 
revised Millian interpretations to free speech, liberty and responsibility, the importance of 
community, happiness, the greater good, and justice, and builds a decision tree to aid journalists 
in making nuanced utilitarian decisions about proposed actions. However, her emphasis on an 
aggregate rather than arithmetic calculus, and her distillation of a Millian justice analytical tool, 
also points beyond the weighing of practitioner actions toward the concept of story identification 
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and selection. In other words, what would Mill cover that would address injustice or promote 
justice in ways that would further the most aggregate good? These are important questions to 
address, as “the ethical norms of journalism have never been tougher – nor tougher to enforce” 
(Clark, 2014, p. 27). Rather than turn away from utility in search of greener pastures in other 
traditions, Elliott confronts the tradition’s perceived inadequacies head on, insisting instead that 
“the prevalence of utilitarian pronouncements in the teaching of media ethics makes it essential 
that instructors of media ethics get Mill right” (Elliott, 2007, p. 101).  
A revised Millian utility seeks aggregate, higher good. Elliott began with what she sees as 
the most common error in applying Mill: “Many people think that the bumper sticker for John 
Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism reads, ‘Do the greatest good for the greatest number.’ However, they 
would be wrong” (p. 100). As did Peck, Elliott insisted that “Utilitarianism ... does not teach us 
to add up the people potentially helped by an action and subtract from that number the people 
potentially harmed, with the presumably ‘ethical’ choice of having the majority win.” Instead, 
she introduced the concept of a different kind of calculus: “Mill’s utilitarianism requires the far 
more difficult analysis of determining ... the aggregate good – the overall good for the 
community as a whole, or for all of the people who can be identified as being affected.”  
 “Reasoning that correctly employs Mill’s utilitarianism is not foreign to everyday moral 
consideration, even in the newsroom,” she observed (p. 101); for one thing, his thought “is 
embraced by media practitioners and scholars because ... Mill also provided a foundation for 
balanced news presentation in arguing that public discussion must include minority opinion in 
order to discover truths” (p. 102). Further, she argued, a free and responsible press reflects Mill’s 
ideal free and responsible citizen; therefore, “while individuals should not be held legally 
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accountable for their speech or action as long as they are not violating others’ rights, their 
personal duty is to seek the truth and, thus, become fully developed human beings” (p. 104).  
 And, like Peck, Elliott sees a finer distinction of the quality of happiness than the usual 
bumper sticker version: “The kind of happiness Mill had in mind when he counseled that human 
action should promote happiness is that which adheres to the most fully human experience” (p. 
104) – and this invokes the larger community: “Indeed, when one focuses on his or her own 
personal interests, it is certain that happiness will not follow” (p. 105). Noting similarities in this 
revised reading of Mills with the “veil of ignorance” proposed by John Rawls, she concludes that 
a “fully developed individual sees no conflict between the welfare of the community and that of 
the agent (p. 107). Ultimately, therefore, “Mill’s self-developed individual grows to see himself 
or herself as necessarily involved in pursuing the good of the community,” she concluded. “It 
would follow that the good journalist and good news organization acting well have the good of 
the community as a practical priority.” Like Peck, Elliott is primarily interested in a normative 
application of revised Millian precepts to help journalists maximize good and limit harm through 
their actions; however, these same guidelines point to story selection as well. As a practical 
priority, Mill would pursue stories that investigated the good of the community.  
 A revised Millian utility seeks justice as both means and end. Any one of the points 
Elliott elaborated provides a revised, enhanced approach to Mill and suggests more robust and 
novel applications for journalistic practice and purview. However, in her concluding review of 
Mill’s exploration in Utilitarianism of justice as a basis for utility, she takes Peck’s Millian 
synthesis of means and ends a step further, outlining an approach that not only marries act and 
rule utilitarianism in true Millian fashion, but begins to reflect both Kantian and Millian values. 
Previously, a conscientious reporter was encouraged to appeal to either or both traditions in 
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ethical deliberations; “the reporter can test whether actions are ethical by holding them up to 
predetermined rational maxims, or by considering the consequences. Either way, he or she is 
ethical” (Merrill, 2011, p. 492; Staveren, 2007). But Elliott, by invoking Mill’s five precepts of 
justice as media practice maxims, and then inviting practitioners to consider the consequences at 
each step, merges means and ends in a reflexive manner: act justly to promote justice; seek 
justice to guide action. Indeed: “we are also morally required to make sure that providing for our 
own does not violate what is due others. Mill was adamant that no one be sacrificed in the 
process of attaining happiness” (p. 108).  
 Mill’s first principle of justice proposes “that it is unjust to deprive people of that to 
which they have a legal right ... [so] it is unethical to violate the law in the process of getting a 
story, even if ... for the public good” (p. 108). “Next, it is unjust to deprive people of that to 
which they have a moral right ... in this case mean civil rights, whether recognized by current 
law or not.” This means that the press must provide a wide range of viewpoints: “When news 
media provide only the message that seems to be supported by public opinion, they deprive the 
community of opinions that citizens need to hear and deprive those with minority views the right 
to express them,” she concluded. Under Mill’s third principle, no one should suffer a harm that 
they do not deserve, or obtain a good they have not earned. In one application of this concept, 
“Mill might well argue against the publication of a photo of a private individual who is 
unwillingly ‘caught’ in a moment of picture-worthy grief,” Elliott argued (p. 109). “Assuming 
that private individuals do not want to have their grief portrayed to the community without 
consent, just treatment of such individuals would dictate that such pictures not be published ... 
[regardless of any] good for some citizens to see.” Mill’s fourth principle of justice requires that 
one keep faith. One example of this principle in journalistic practice, she posited, would be the 
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promise to protect one’s sources: “Because it is unjust to break promises of confidentiality to a 
source, journalists should not make promises that they would be unwilling to keep, regardless of 
the cost to themselves” (p. 109). “Last of all, Mill counseled that treating people impartially is a 
matter of justice” – which “may be difficult to see how to operationalize ... In a practice like 
journalism that thrives on individual example,” she concluded, noting the tendency to focus on a 
single individual in some stories, which may ignore or overlook the plights of other persons.  
 However, Mill allowed that, while paramount, these requirements might be justly 
contravened in a situation of dire necessity; regardless, they are to be consulted before a 
journalist considers applying a final “utilitarian calculus” of considering the aggregate good. In 
this approach, Mill is more of a rule utilitarian most of the time, Elliott observes: “The rules are 
justified because of their utility in advancing the aggregate good. Exceptions to following those 
rules are justified because those exceptions contribute to the aggregate good” (p. 110). No matter 
what, “the morally correct answer will always be the type of action that provides social utility or, 
more specifically, the aggregate good.”  
A revised Millian utility informs a Utilitarian Decision Tree. In synthesizing Mill’s ideals 
of freedom, responsibility, and justice, Elliott proposes a checklist for ethical decisionmaking: 
“A decision tree, founded on Mill’s theory of utilitarianism” (pp. 110-111).  
A Utilitarian Decision Tree:  
1. What is the intended action? 
2. Will it cause harm? If not, no analysis needed. If yes, review principles of justice. 
3. Is someone being denied legal rights? If so, action is unjust.  
4. Is someone being denied moral rights? If so, action is unjust.  
5. Is the person being harmed getting what s/he deserves? Or, is the person being helped  
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getting what s/he deserves? If so, action is just. 
6. Has the person being harmed had a promise broken to him/her? If so, action is unjust.  
7. Has everyone in the situation been treated impartially? If so, the action is just.  
“In the rare occasions that exceptions to following these rules are justified, it is essential 
to show how the exception will lead to the aggregate good and how following the rule will not 
lead to the greatest good,” she included, from an act utilitarian approach (p. 111).  
This is already a process of careful consideration. However, this is only the first step: 
“Only if the action has been determined to be just, advance to the utilitarian calculus,” which 
includes two reflexive questions (p. 111):  
8. How will harming this individual promote the overall good of the community?  
Consider whether the community will be better or worse if everyone knows that 
individuals can be harmed in this way for this reason.  
9. How will the community be harmed if the proposed action is not taken? 
Consider whether the community will be better or worse if everyone knows that 
individuals will NOT be harmed in this way for this reason. (p. 111).  
 “Getting Mill right will not necessarily provide different conclusions of what is ethically 
permissible from those provided by a deontological analysis or even one based on virtue theory,” 
Elliott concluded. “The conclusion may be the same, but the process of getting there may differ.”  
 However, by outlining this justice-based Millian decision tree, Elliott does more than 
guide journalists to “what is ethically permissible” in practice; she also provides an interesting 
tool for judging the ethical nature of actions taken by government agencies or officials, or those 
taken by powerful non-government actors, or even those of individual citizens. Further, her 
checklist provides a process of generating and evaluating enterprise reporting agendas in terms 
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of communal justice: Where does injustice exist in the community? What unforeseen injustice 
might result from proposed actions of any kind by any member of the community?  
As Peck did with her reconsideration of Millian happiness, Elliott also approaches a 
normative guide for utilitarian enterprise reporting, but based on a revisionist Millian justice 
rubric: What stories would Mill report by applying his conception of justice and utility to the 
community? In specific terms of ad bellum war coverage, Elliott provides the basis for a very 
useful checklist of questions to ask of government officials who call their citizens to war: How 
will this promote the overall good, and how will it harm the community if we choose not to do 
this? However, it remains to address the remaining gap in the media ethics literature by 
attempting to provide an accounting for Mill’s conception of security, based on justice in 
community, as the greatest good – and the only defensible utilitarian goal of any war.  
Triangulating Millian Conflict Coverage in the Utilitarian Citizen Literature  
Among these myths are the superior virtue of military over other kinds of public service;  
that battlefield experience is the most authoritative source of military policy expertise;  
and that an exclusively civilian background is inadequate for strategic defense  
leadership. In the United States, these myths are nurtured and perpetuated by both  
military and civilian communities and affect general public opinion as well as the  
attitudes of national security professionals. These myths are also corrosive. Unless they  
are acknowledged, addressed, and challenged, future civilian leaders may struggle to  
control the use of force – a profound problem for a democratic system. Downgrading  
civilian leadership will weaken U.S. national security and the military itself.  
(Karlin & Friend, 2018, para. 2).  
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 Regardless of the myriad perennial philosophical arguments surrounding both “wars and 
rumors of wars” (Matthew 24:6; Mark 13:7), each of these two ubiquitous human endeavors 
were immediately enshrined in this nation’s birth: The new government was at the same time 
both empowered to “provide for the common defence” in the first sentence of the Preamble (The 
Constitution, 1787/2016, para. 1), and enjoined from “abridging the freedom of … the press” 
(The Bill, 2016, para. 5) in the First Amendment – thereby uniquely endowing the people with 
both the rights and the responsibilities of war’s cost as well as of its coverage.  
However, because war is unique among human activities, even the best-intentioned 
civilian journalists often lack a useful paradigm for comprehensive coverage of armed conflict 
for their equally ill-equipped civilian audiences. While revisionist approaches to utilitarianism 
extend the theory’s potential for ethicists in both war and media studies, the remaining gaps in 
each tradition’s literature find critical mass at this uniquely American nexus of a civilian-
command military staffed by citizen-soldiers, and covered by free-press journalists.  
Utilitarianism and a free U.S. civilian command  
A review of the utilitarian ethics literature at this unique nexus – where the citizen 
commander, the citizen soldier, and the citizen chronicler meet – reveals the ongoing influence 
of the tradition as well as the need for a revisionist Millian approach to addressing shortcomings 
in essential ad bellum war coverage – especially that identified by The New York Times in 2003. 
In many ways reflecting the development of the study of ethics, the history of the United States 
reveals from the beginning an appeal to the virtue of freedom and democratic control of the 
military, a call to the responsible civic duty of military service for the citizen, and throughout, 
utilitarian arguments in support of both. What is missing is a truly utilitarian guide to what war 
coverage should aspire to accomplish in such a democracy.  
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 “Congress shall have Power”: Utilitarianism defends civilian command.  
The Congress shall have Power ... To declare War ... To raise and support Armies ... To  
provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the  
land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the  
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming,  
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in  
the Service of the United States ... according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ...  
and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased ... for the Erection of Forts,  
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.  
(Constitution, 1787/2016, paras. 36-42)  
From the very beginning, the U.S. Constitution reserved control of the nation’s martial 
might in two key, quintessentially American, mandates: First, Article I, Section 8 instituted a 
unique, democratic civilian command of all military (Constitution; Offley, 2001; Millett & 
Maslowski, 1994; Nielsen & Snider, 2009; Weber, 1946). “By design, the army and navy were 
intended to be creatures of the Congress” (Stevenson, 2006, pp. 5-6; Huntington, 1957), which 
was thereby empowered to oversee military funding, staffing, deployment, and even 
investigations into military affairs.  
Further, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution stipulates another layer of civilian 
command: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States” (Constitution, para. 63). As such, the democratically elected president also holds 
“important powers over the military, ones more direct and practical than those of the Congress 
(Stevenson, p. 7; Huntington, 1957; Millett & Maslowski, 1994). This separation of powers in 
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the command structure incorporated an inherent point of conflict between the legislative and 
executive branches of the new government, as well as between the government and other 
powerful entities (Desch, 1999; Huntington, 1957; Nielsen & Snider, 2009). And the supposed 
check-and-balance doesn’t always function as designed: “Congress asserted its constitutional 
prerogatives through the 1973 War Powers Resolution but then consistently failed to enforce it in 
contests with the executive” (Betts, 2009, p. 21).  
Finally, the people hold the purse: and, as “the Department of Defense ... gets about two 
thirds of the money that Congress approves each year” (Welna, 2019, 4:19), the people – and the 
press – also retain the right to access and review where Congress spends their money:  
Public access to information about government spending is presumed – and required –  
by the US Constitution, which directs that “a regular Statement and Account of the  
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time”  
(Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7). (Aftergood, 2018, p. 1)  
However, in all these elements of Constitutional design, an appeal to virtue is evident in 
the unquestioned good of this democratic flourishing by a well-reasoned free citizenry through 
its mutually chosen leaders. “For most of its history, the United States has conformed to the 
general patterns of civilian control of the military” (Desch, 1999, p. 23); therefore, “the United 
States, like other democratic republics, requires public support to muster, deploy, and sustain 
military operations” (Bradford, 2015, p. 290).  
A “utilitarianism perverted” allows victors to justify war.  
In a time of war the nation is always of one mind, eager to hear something good of  
themselves and ill of the enemy. At this time the task of news-writers is easy: they have  
nothing to do but to tell that a battle is expected, and afterwards that a battle has been  
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fought, in which we and our friends, whether conquering or conquered, did all, and our  
enemies did nothing ... The writer of news never fails in the intermission of action to tell  
how the enemies murdered children and ravished virgins; and ... scalps half the  
inhabitants ... Among the calamities of war may be justly numbered the diminution of  
the love of truth, by the falsehoods which interest dictates, and credulity encourages. A  
peace will equally leave the warriour and relater of wars destitute of employment; and I  
know not whether more is to be dreaded from streets filled with soldiers accustomed to  
plunder, or from garrets filled with scribblers accustomed to lie.  
(Johnson, 1758, para. 11)  
Such unprecedented reliance on a democratic civilian command makes the U.S. military 
vulnerable in some ways to uninformed public opinion (Rid, 2007) as well as to incompetent 
democratic command: “To be a voter in a democracy one does not need to be informed, or smart 
– only registered. Similarly, the top leaders and lawmakers in a democracy do not need to be 
wise or moral or logical – only elected” (Stevenson, p. 1). And this strikes at the heart of the 
utilitarian definition of a free and responsible press: “Being informed is neither a motive nor a 
requirement for talking about or participating in politics. How well most citizens are informed is 
a debatable question, and ... precious few participate in the democratic conversation” Ganz, 
2010, p. 8). Worse still, voters and leaders alike apparently “don’t learn very well from history. 
Presidents convince themselves that the next time will be different” (Tierney, 2018, para. 36) – 
which can lead to “results that are hideously disastrous ... [as] utilitarianism perverted, like 
Kantianism before it by Adolf Eichmann in the justification of his architecture of the Final 
Solution, permits all” (Wheat, 2006, p. 281; Arendt, 1994). Regardless of the outcome, win or 
lose, the lessons of any given war may not be accurately passed on to the future anyway:  
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We know, however, that memory – including the remembrance of war – is selective as it  
strives for coherence. We generalize and simplify to cull the moral lessons of war:  
lessons enshrined by the victors, by the force of their military might or the persistence of  
their values. (Carlson, 2008, p. 621)  
“Among the hoariest aphorisms about military history is this one: ‘History is written by 
the victors.’ Sources attribute the remark variously to Niccolò Machiavelli, Winston Churchill 
and others” (Robbins, 2012, para. 1) – as well as writers from George Orwell (Orwell, 1944) to 
William F. Buckley, Jr. (Loewen, 1994) to Dan Brown (Brown, 2003). An equally widely 
attributed, and even more frightening, truism is the oft-repeated statement that “Truth, famously, 
is the first casualty of war” (Preble, 2015, para. 11; Knightley, 1975).  
“Impartiality” remains crucial to the informed civilian.  
While Mill was suspicious of the government tendency to abuse its powers for personal  
gains, he still expected decision-makers to weigh short and long-term implications of  
any given conduct, to interfere directly and indirectly in maintaining a well-ordered  
liberal society, to take special interest in the upbringing of future generations, and to  
protect society’s moral codes. (Cohen-Almagor, 2012, p. 582)  
Therefore, Mill’s insistence in Utilitarianism upon impartiality (1863) carries particular 
weight with the U.S. press in its Fourth Estate function in wartime: For example, one scholar 
noted the devastating “Tet Effect” that the 1968 Tet Offensive had on U.S. public morale, as 
their military leaders as well as their media watchdogs had been grossly misled about their 
enemy’s potential: “A democracy, without trust in its military and the intelligence upon which 
decisions are made, cannot long continue the fight ... Objectivity is the guardian to trust and the 
shield against the Tet Effect” (Blood, 2004, p. 51). Speaking early in the “War On Terror,” 
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veteran CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite emphasized the essential nature of a free U.S. press in 
wartime: “Well, the press has to be a leader in that. The press has to be the most skeptical, so that 
the people do not become cynical” (Brown, Arena, Zarella & Koppel, 2002, para. 108). ABC 
news anchor Ted Koppel, reporting while embedded with U.S. troops during the 2003 Iraq 
invasion, also reflected this tension: “If the principle here is that a free people have a right to 
know what the military is doing at a time of war, we are putting that principle to the test. I am 
trying to be responsible” (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, p. 48) – amid concerns that embedded 
journalists lost some degree of independence that affected their reportage (Pfau et al, 2004). As 
one media critic complained, “the Pentagon’s brilliant public relations scheme for ‘embedding’ 
U.S. journalists into military units in Iraq served military needs far more than it provided the 
public with necessary information” (Wicker, 2005, p. 62). In times of controversy, the influence 
of the press can work both ways: At one point, Mill accused the Times of London of attempting 
to suppress existing popular support for a proposed war with Russia (Mill, 1854); 150 years later, 
Wicker and others denounced what they saw as “the disgraceful eagerness of the U.S. press to 
‘play on the team’ whenever the President or the Pentagon brings on a war.”  
 Utilitarianism informs an ideal civilian command.  
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this  
consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its  
diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready  
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union  
among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more  
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs. (Address, 1774, p. 108) 
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Members of the Continental Congress saw a Fourth Estate function for a free press even 
before there was a democracy for it to cover, and defended it in decidedly consequentialist 
language. Though largely unacknowledged, the tradition remains influential. “Utilitarianism is 
nearer than any other philosophy to a scheme of how democratic governments actually make 
their decisions” (Bealey & Johnson, 1999, p. 333), and Mill’s conceptions of aggregate security, 
justice, community, and duty (1863) in light of his statements on war (1862a) and command 
(1859b) offer support for the U.S. civilian command approach. Though Mill’s underlying 
premise – and the entire rational choice universe – is under interrogation in a post-truth era 
(Gans, 2011; Giddens, 1994; Kortenkamp & Moore, 2014), a properly-informed utilitarianism 
would support both the right of the people to make rational choices about war through their 
elected officials and their votes, as well as the right of the people to speak and publish freely 
about the details of any such martial debates and its supposed good and harm. It is from this 
traditional stance that the Times editors critiqued their own Iraq coverage (2003). A revisionist 
Millian approach to war coverage might help them “get it right.”  
 “Once-embattled Farmers:” Utilitarianism defines the citizen soldier.  
United States armed forces take an oath to support and defend a piece of paper – the   
Constitution ... [This] means that US military personnel must protect not only the  
structure of the Federal Government but also its processes. It means that they must even  
accept outcomes that are contrary to the wishes and interests of those in uniform. The  
dirty secret about democracy is that its test is fairness and faithful observance of the  
rules, not the wisdom or justice of the outcomes. (Stevenson, p. 1)  
Soon after the beginning – and reflecting the new reality of the Revolution’s militia 
Minuteman – the ever-since-debated Second Amendment enlisted the citizen soldier: “A well 
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regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” (The Bill, para. 6; Millett & Maslowski, 1994). In a sense, 
this apparently deontological appeal to the duty of service, in pursuit of the virtue of freedom, 
may also be read to include a Millian argument from security and greater good. As seen here, 
from the beginning, the traditionally separate caste of the professional European military 
submitted to democratic control in the United States, from the lowest private to the highest 
general. Even before there was a nation, “here once the embattled farmers stood, And fired the 
shot heard ‘round the world” (Emerson, 1835, p. 220) against an organized professional army, 
germinating the enduring U.S. ideal of the “Minute Man” home guard or citizen soldier (cf. 
Cohen, 2015; Messer, 1918; Millett & Maslowski, 1994; Officer, 1861; Puddefoot, 1895; 
Sidney, 1886).  
A citizen soldier begins and ends as a citizen.  
Patriotism is ... one’s devotion to what one believes to be right for his or her country and  
its policies and its performance. That may not agree necessarily with the policy of the  
administration itself. We have a right to stand up and say, wait a minute. Hold it a  
minute. That’s possibly wrong. Let’s look at this ... Let’s go through that once more  
time. What did you say? And how does it apply to this situation precisely?  
(Brown, Arena, Zarella & Koppel, 2002, para. 108).  
Walter Cronkite’s journalism career began in World War II, a time of unprecedented 
civilian involvement in a large-scale military action (Brokaw, 1998) that informed his ideal of 
the journalist as an active, responsible citizen whose love for country supersedes any loyalty to 
the country’s government. His defense of the right to petition the government, as stated above, 
evolved from his coverage of citizen soldiers in wars that were almost universally supported by 
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the larger community, as well as in wars that were just as almost universally opposed. But it 
represents the ideal of shared sacrifice essential to the tradition of the American citizen soldier.  
This has always been a fraught relationship, as in many ways, the soldier has an inherent 
“need to be different” from the civilian (Dandeker & Freedman, 2002, p. 465; Cohen, 2015; 
Finer, 1962; Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977). However, “democracy will falter unless the 
principles of good governance are applied equally and impartially across all sectors of 
government, including, and especially, the defence and security services” (Cleary & McConville, 
p. 3; Gans, 2003; Karlin & Friend, 2018) – especially since, in a democracy, “the citizen’s 
commitment to the nation-state contains a normative dimension that requires citizens to accept 
responsibility for their nation-state’s transgressions” (Sepinwall, 2011, p. 239). Further, in a 
civilian-command, civilian-manned military, citizens themselves actually participate in state 
security not only by casting votes and paying taxes, but also by serving in the trenches as soldiers 
(Cohen, 2015; Janowitz, 1961) – and they retain their rights as citizens. The enduring strength of 
the mythical minuteman remains especially evident in the perennial debates over the modern-day 
meaning of the Second Amendment (c.f. Gulasekaram, 2010; Hardy, 2011; Levinson, 1989; 
Will, 1991; Williams, 1991).  
A standing army begins and ends as an army.  
Yet for most people, lack of personal military experience makes it more difficult to  
evaluate military-related issues … Such personal dissociation from the military weakens  
the ability of civilian society to make informed judgments about military issues, let  
alone influence military decision-making. (Sarkesian, 1989, p. 149)  
In the literature on the U.S. militia tradition, the citizen soldier is defined throughout the 
nation’s history by four key traits: “Obligatory” service (duty and shared sacrifice), “Universal” 
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reflection of the larger general nation, “Legitimate” mission and authority in the eyes of the 
general citizenry, and “Civilian” identity as non-permanent, non-career service (Cohen, 2015, pp. 
6-7; Doubler, 2008; Janowitz, 1979, 1960; Janowitz & Moskos, 1979). And, from the earliest 
days of the nation, “the military, the political elites, and the citizenry learned to respect and work 
with the overlapping and the blurring of civilian and military boundaries” (Schiff, 2009, p. 62). 
However, after World War II, a growing gap between the increasingly professional U.S. military 
and the larger U.S. society – a “civil-military dichotomy” – created a sense of separation. Indeed: 
“Civilian control was a relic of the past which had little place in the future” (Huntington, 1957, p. 
336).  
More recently, after conscription ended in the 1970s, the percentage of civilians with 
experience fell – and “many traditional military support functions were privatized by shifting 
them to civilian firms” (Betts, 2009, p. 41). As a result, “frequently since World War II, 
American civil-military relations have been so strained that both policy and strategy have 
suffered” (Moten, 2009, p. 43). “In the inevitably tense dialogues with their military advisers, 
civilian policymakers might be both historically and militarily illiterate, given the current lack of 
military experience among America’s political leaders and the collapse of the study of history” 
(Murray, 2009, p. 148). Ultimately, “civilian control of the military has weakened after the Cold 
War” (Desch, 1999, p. 33) – and further “dysfunction in this critical area is sure to produce 
incomplete options and ineffective outcomes” (Gibson, 2009, p. 239). “The gap between US 
perceptions and realities of the security environment poses a challenging and often dangerous 
dilemma for US national security policy” (Sarkesian, 1989, p. 149).  
In view of the importance of the press to the larger community in general and political – 
and even martial – causes in particular, from colonial times on (Andrlik, 2012; Copeland & 
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Humphrey, 2005; Denvir, 2010), what else but a free, responsible press could cover the nation’s 
military, especially if it already “commands th’ milishy” (Dunne, 1906, p. 240), and can “stir the 
pulse of nations, and make brave men do brave deeds, and soldiers die” (Davis, 1930, p. 3)?  
Utilitarianism and a Free Wartime U.S. Press  
I do not know why the press of this country has laid down and played dead over this  
issue, when it is fundamental, it seems to me, in regards to our freedom of speech and  
press, our right to know, what the forces that we send into a foreign country to act in our  
name, [that] we are not entitled to know what they’re doing in our name. That to me just  
does not follow at all what I would call a democratic process. ... We’re sending our boys  
and our girls over there. We’ve got a right to know what our boys and our girls are  
doing over there. We’ve got a right to know what our military is ordering them to do.  
We’ve got a right to know how they are performing in this chore that’s been given them.  
This is a fundamental. If we don’t know that, how can we know how our government is  
performing in the most difficult chore that it has chosen to pursue?  
(Brown, Arena, Zarella & Koppel, 2002, para. 108)  
Concurrent with these ongoing debates over martial powers, U.S. journalists continue to 
struggle with the First Amendment’s implications for their craft in general, and for wartime 
correspondence in particular. Several normative press theories propose “ideas of how media 
ought to, or are expected to, operate” (McQuail, 1994, p. 121; Baran & Davis, 2000; Christians, 
Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng & White, 2009). Fundamentally, a free press means just that: 
“Freedom is essential to authentic journalism,” insists the truly libertarian reporter (Merrill, 
1974, p. 63; Scanlon, 2003), and just might include military coverage – or might not, as a self-
determining press sees fit. More civic-minded journalists in the social responsibility and 
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communitarian press traditions (cf. Peterson, 1956; Craig, 1996) see the press’s “government 
watchdog” role as a democratic mandate, or a virtuous striving “to help citizens know well” 
(Borden, 2007, p. 50). Throughout, conscientious practitioners balance their freedom with 
responsibility, often in ways resonant with Mill’s Harm Principle: “When it comes to sensitive 
matters of national security, journalists frequently weigh whether publication would endanger 
lives or further the public interest” (Zelinsky, 2017, p. 289). Nevertheless, as Cronkite stated 
above (2002), American citizens have the right to know what is being done in their name.  
“We’ve got a right to know”: Utilitarianism directs the wartime watchdog. 
Ultimately, “the First Amendment guarantee of a free and unfettered press is absolutely essential 
to American democracy, and applies to the nation’s military” (Aukofer & Lawrence, p. vii; 
Chafee, 1919; Denvir, 2010). Ideally, such a press would assume what one veteran soldier and 
journalist described as “a grave and important task: Serving as an independent and honest link 
between the military at war and the wider civilian society it is sworn to defend” (Offley, 2001, p. 
15). In other words, in a democracy with a civilian-command military made up of its own citizen 
soldiers, one of the most obviously utilitarian ends of a free press would be to report 
comprehensively on any proposed conflict. “Citizenship is a tough occupation,” observed one 
20th-century war correspondent: “The evils of the time change, but are never in short supply and 
would go unchallenged unless there were conscientious people to say: ‘Not if I can help it’.” 
(Gellhorn, 1988, p. 408).  
A well-intentioned utilitarianism directs a great quantity of coverage.  
Questions of what is appropriate may lead to more acceptance of utilitarian actions  
because they get people to think more about practical, if not ideal or desirable, solutions  
to a problem than questions of morality. In moral dilemmas it may seem appropriate to  
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choose a course of action that is the lesser of two evils, but that does not necessarily  
mean the lesser evil is deemed morally right. (Kortenkamp & Moore, 2014, p. 380)  
When the citizen soldier goes to war, the citizen scribe can lose sight of larger issues of 
morality because the practical demands of covering fellow citizens in battle tends to obscure the 
enduring evil of war – even of a war undertaken for ultimate good, a war chosen as the lesser of 
two evils. Utilitarianism’s ability to balance among competing goods – and evils – makes it an 
attractive approach to war coverage – even if the correspondents and editors don’t know they are 
acting in ways resonant with Mill’s definition of security as “the most vital of all interests” 
(1863, p. 67). As the just war tradition also holds, it is possible to participate in apparent evil in 
the course of acting against evil (Bell, 2009), if the perceived consequences outweigh the 
foreseen harms – and, in covering fellow citizens in the trenches, the journalist risks losing sight 
of the long term because of a practical focus on the more immediate. Thus, an otherwise well-
intentioned – and generally unacknowledged – utilitarianism directs a great quantity of war 
coverage that may not include a wider, revisionist Millian scope.  
“The student of history cannot ... avoid the study of conflict” (Coetzee & Eysturlid, 2013, 
p. xix); and, as journalism represents the “first draft of history” (i.e. Barth, 1943, p. 667), conflict 
coverage represents a perennial, significant news peg: “Most of all ... wars are the major story of 
their day, and journalists, as storytellers competing for the big story, want to be the ones to tell 
it” (Thomsen, 2007, p. 1; McLaughlin, 2016). “Since the start of the Republic, Presidents of the 
United States have taken the American people into major wars roughly once in a generation” 
(Beschloss, 2018, p. vii); therefore, U.S. journalists have had no shortage of opportunity. A brief 
review of literature on U.S. media history reveals a staggering amount of coverage, from the very 
beginnings of colonial and Revolutionary times (Andrlik, 2012; Copeland & Humphrey, 2005; 
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Humphrey, 2013), through the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War (Copeland, 
Humphrey & Frasca, 2005), the Civil War (Bierce, 1898; Reynolds & von Tuyll, 2005), the 
various Indian wars (Finerty, 1890; Knight, 1993), the Spanish-American War (Coward & 
Campbell, 2005; Crane, 1899; Davis, 1912), the first and second world wars (Collins & 
Washburn, 2005; Gibbons, 1918; Hallock, 2012; Hamm, Shaw & Daniel, 2005), Korea and 
Vietnam (Blood, 2004; Caputo, 1996; Cook & Martin, 2005; Hallin, 1986; Mermin, 1999; 
Pilger, 2010; Starr, 1995), through the War on Terror (Allan & Zelizer, 2004; Barnett, 2005; 
Boettcher, 2011; Cohen & Cook, 1990; Foote, 1998; Nikolaev & Hakanen, 2006; Rid, 2007) and 
even beyond (Zelinsky, 2017).  
Further, a significant number of well-known U.S. journalists, authors, illustrators, 
photographers, and even politicians saw combat action themselves, as reporters, as soldiers – and 
sometimes, as both (Bierce, 1898; Cooper, 2006; Crane, 1899; Cronkite, 2013; Gore, 1970; 
Halberstam, 2002; Hedges, 2002; Hemingway, 1942; Herr, 1978; Koppel, 2000; London, 1900; 
Mauldin, 1971; Moore, 1965; Moore & Galloway, 1993; Murrow, 1941; Pyle, 1946; Rather, 
1999; Rooney, 2000; Safer, 1990; Steinbeck, 1958). This shared experience reflects the nation’s 
larger citizen soldier tradition via a mass-mediated platform.  
“If your pictures aren’t good enough, you’re not close enough,” said Robert Capa, whose 
famous blurry D-Day photos remain iconic even in an age of nearly unlimited access (Cosgrove, 
2014, para. 2); meanwhile, “I’m not an artist,” said longtime war photographer Don McCullin 
recently (Marshall, 2019, para. 1). In their practical focus on covering their fellow citizens at 
war, today’s heirs to this larger-than-life group of “thrill freaks, death-wishers, wound-seekers, 
war-lovers, hero-worshippers, closet queens, dope addicts, low-grade alcoholics, ghouls, 
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communists [and] seditionists” (Herr, 1978, p. 183) continue to risk injury and death to answer 
readers’ questions. However, as with the Times, other questions remain.  
Incomplete utilitarianism can threaten balanced coverage.  
Certainly, the press raised some useful questions and doubts along the way as presidents  
ordered or considered military action. But the evidence is overwhelming that the press,  
relying for its information on government officials who had a strong interest in shaping  
the news coverage, supported the various administrations in their framing of the policies  
used to justify war, and in their agendas and explanations behind the wars.  
(Hallock, 2012, p. 265)  
 In a landmark study of newspaper editorials after World War II, Hallock found that an 
enthusiasm for covering war, coupled with an overreliance on U.S. officials’ statements, created 
an atmosphere of support and eroded traditional journalistic values like independence and 
skepticism. Indeed: “Clearly, with the possible exception of Granada, this nation’s press, as 
represented by our newspapers in this book, has never met a war it didn’t like” (p. 265). In 
editorials surrounding post-World War II U.S. military actions in Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, 
Iran, Afghanistan, Grenada, Panama, the collapse of the USSR, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan 
(again), Iraq (again), and Libya, Hallock found the recurrence of typical story frames such as 
intervention, the defense of freedom and democracy, the domino effect, nation building, first 
strike issues, and Pearl Harbor. These had lasting effects: “A primary ingredient in this process 
would be language, invoked by the administration and shared by the press, to create ideological 
framing that would resonate in future foreign military undertakings and debates through the 
modern day” (p. 60). For example, “during the Cuban missile crisis ... I feared that the [U.S.] 
media coverage was hastening the arrival of nuclear war” (Ganz, 1983, p. 175).  
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Journalistic conventions can threaten editorial independence.  
The year leading up to the Iraq war witnessed a barrage of reasons to go to war given by  
the U.S. Administration, some reasonable, some unreasonable, some valid, some  
invalid, some factual, and some fictional. Reasons given for war changed almost daily.  
Americans and people around the world were undoubtedly confused. And the media  
clearly contributed to the confusion. (Hakanen & Nikolaev, 2006, p. 1)  
“While the role of war correspondent has long been associated with a certain romantic 
lore, in actuality it is beset by an array of problems associated with allegiance, responsibility, 
truth, and balance” (Allan & Zelizer, 2004, p. 3). The procedures of journalism can themselves 
exacerbate the problem, argues Hallock, with its overreliance on official sources, often without 
corroboration, without regard to “the weight and credibility that official sources lend to news 
reports and to editorial arguments” (2012, p. xvi; Gans, 2004). Unfortunately, those same official 
sources might not be as reliable as they seem, as “few statesmen and military commanders in 
history have paid much attention to what wars should achieve, much less how to end them in a 
fashion that ensured the peace for the long term” (Murray, 2009, p. 135). As a result, “U.S. 
history offers ample evidence of press complicity in presidential and congressional decisions to 
go to war” (Hallock, 2012, p. 3; Andersen, 2006) – and not much evidence of press 
independence and tenacity.  
For example, in studying broadcast news coverage of the U.S. invasion of Panama, two 
scholars noted a marked discrepancy in the focus of the reporting: “In the first days of the 
invasion, TV journalists had one overriding obsession: How many American soldiers have 
died?” (Cohen & Cook, 1990, para. 7). In one sense, this coverage serves the larger community’s 
practical interest in knowing what is happening to its soldiers. In fact, public support for 
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intervention wanes when media reports of U.S. soldier deaths increase, as seen historically in 
coverage of World War II (Cripps, 1998; Roeder, 1993), and more recently in war 
correspondence from Panama (Cohen & Cook, 1990), Somalia (Baum, 2004) and Iraq (Tumber 
& Palmer, 2004). However, especially “TV’s continuous focus on the well-being of the invaders, 
and not the invadees, meant that the screen was dominated by red, white and blue-draped coffins 
... remarks by Dan Rather about ‘our fallen heroes’… but no Panamanian funerals” (Cohen & 
Cook, 1990, para. 9) – despite the larger reality of a death toll of perhaps 50 Panamanian 
civilians for every U.S. soldier. In other words, a well-intentioned utilitarian reportage focused 
on the practical, immediate security issues of its fellow citizen soldiers, but failed to focus on the 
larger ad bellum issues that had put “our boys and our girls” in harm’s way “over there” in the 
first place (Andersen, 2006; Hallock, 2012).  
Journalistic realities can threaten editorial independence.  
I began to understand this as a young reporter during the American war in Vietnam. On  
the walls of the Saigon bureaus of major American news organisations were often  
displayed horrific photographs that were never published and rarely sent because it was  
said they were would “sensationalise” the war by upsetting readers and viewers and  
therefore were not “objective.” (Pilger, 2010, p. ???)  
Even more troubling, war correspondents like John Pilger – as well as the soldiers whom 
they cover – often report finding a discrepancy between the realities they experience in battle and 
the portrayal of the conflict in their country’s media (Anderson, 2006; Blood, 2004; Hallock, 
2012; Knightley, 1975; Mauldin, 1971; Moore, 1965; Rooney, 2000).  
And worse, the commercial pressures on for-profit media lead to gatekeeping practices 
that often mean that even compelling war coverage can be pushed aside for more viewer-friendly 
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or market-driven stories. One major newspaper editorial observer lamented in 2010 that “You 
would hardly know, from following this year’s election campaign or the extensive coverage of 
last week’s primaries, that America is at war.” (Hiatt, p. A19; Sullivan, 2010).  
While a kind of myopic, episodic focus plagues journalism in all aspects of today’s news 
media, the crucible of war coverage throws it and its shortcomings into sharp relief, and calls for 
significant attention in a democracy. “The process is open-ended, not determined by rule. The 
ongoing task is to use reason to choose a course of action that is militarily effective and that is 
justifiable by the values and customs held by liberal democratic societies” (Burk, 2009, p. 171). 
A free, responsible, and fully focused Fourth Estate is essential to balancing these oft-competing 
interests among the various powers. With the ongoing divergence of civil and military 
experience in the U.S., and the media’s historical focus on the practical and immediate, the 
nation has “a need, now as great if not greater than ever, for watchdog journalism that is on the 
wane – and that never really has existed during the crucial buildup to war” (Hallock, 2012, p. 
xvi) – instead of a “lap dog journalism, as some contended about the press coverage to the 
buildup of the Iraq war” (p. 9). Because “wars rarely go according to plan. And if the absence of 
debate reflects not full-bodied consensus but a wishful averting of eyes, then ... a U.S. surge that 
yields fruit more slowly than hoped, could tip public opinion” (Hiatt). Because an “element of 
uncertainty is present in all wars ... [War] is a three-handed game, Chance being the third player 
... [and] sometimes the strongest of the three,” wrote Ambrose Bierce, himself a Civil War 
veteran (1898, p. 26). Therefore, a more robust, Millian press might want to regain its 
independence and responsibility, and redirect its focus on the essential ad bellum conversation.  
Multiple challenges constrain the conscientious correspondent.  
Modern American journalism considers itself a “bulwark of democracy.” Journalists  
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argue that they report the news so that the citizenry can inform itself and participate in  
the “conversation” that journalists believe is crucial to a democracy. According to what  
might be called bulwark theory, being informed also enables citizens to participate in  
politics, choose their political representatives, and instruct them on how they want to be  
represented. The theory expresses journalism’s noblest democratic ideals, but it could  
stand some rethinking. (Gans, 2010, p. 8).  
“War as an activity has no equivalent in a settled, civil society,” declared Walzer (1977, 
p. 127): so historians and journalists alike perennially struggle to find appropriate meanings. 
Shifting paradigms of statehood and war (cf Gross, 2010; Schmitt, 2013; Whitman, 2006), new 
communication technologies (Briggs, 2009; Paul, 2003), and a radically different news media 
landscape (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Briggs, 2012; Saksena & Hollifield, 2002) increasingly 
exacerbate these eternal challenges; yet ethical, comprehensive wartime journalism remains vital 
for a civilian-command democracy. So the poor reporter, already struggling to perform 
adequately to the expectations of a free, responsible, and focused press, finds the everyday 
challenges to the craft magnified on the battlefield. As with the peacetime newsroom, the war 
correspondent model could also use some rethinking.  
Ultimately, war “is understood and interpreted, justified and judged through the images 
and narratives that tell the stories of war” (Anderson, 2007, p. xvi). To confront war’s paradox of 
heroism and horror, each prospective correspondent must balance its “terrible fascination … that 
draws one near” (Times, 1862) with the public’s similarly strong revulsion to the details of 
“sausagemaking” – and its fear that some media disclosures might somehow aid the enemy.  
Perennial problems arise from audience constraints.  
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Perennially, “waging war is living life in the moment; telling stories is making meaning 
of those moments” (Robinson, p. 3). So “war journalists return repeatedly” (Feinstein, 2006, p. 
46) and must ethically balance the “compelling use of journalistic storytelling” (Craig, 2006, p. 
3) against “pandering to lurid curiosity” (Society, 2014, p. 1).  
Paradoxically, this curious audience decries coverage that might ruin their breakfast 
(Patterson & Wilkins, 2013, p. 214), so “key pressure comes from ... the tolerance of readers and 
viewers” as “war and … violence … raise special concerns” (Keith, Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2006, 
pp. 250-257). Despised “drive-by journalists” (Rowse, 2002), “ambulance chasers” (Post, 2004, 
pp. 48-54), and “vultures” (Dunford & Thatcher, 1975, para. 2) exclaim that “it’s interesting 
when people die” (Henley & Kortchmar, 1982, para. 4). These “sins … add insult to injury … 
[through] hysterics, hyperbole and hot air” (The 9/11 attacks, 2004, p. 66). So “[j]ournalists 
should [b]alance the public’s need for information against potential harm or discomfort” 
(Society, 2014, p. 1).  
Worse, the correspondent also risks offending the now-frightened audience’s aroused 
patriotism: “The news media … are often unpopular,” while “[t]he military is perennially 
popular” (Lawrence & Aukofer, 1995, p. vii), sometimes making any reporting by the former on 
the latter suspect. Though “it may be difficult to draw the line between treasonable incitement 
and legitimate expressions” (Warren, 1918, p. 314), the “media is frequently implicated in this 
charge … of ‘aid and comfort to the enemy’” (Maxwell II, 1987, p. 2), creating a palpable 
chilling effect. “Anyone who tries to bring the people back down to earth is denounced as a 
traitor” (Monbiot, 2005, p.??), as “[h]ypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse” (Walzer, p. 486), and 
citizens sing “my country, right or wrong” (Hirst, 1993, para. 2).  
New problems arise from evolving media environment.  
 180 
 Already burdened by the perennial and changing challenges of war coverage, today’s 
correspondent addresses an increasingly fragmented audience, whose diminishing support for 
traditional journalism continues to erode the industry’s reporting resources and capabilities. A 
recent conference to address “Is serious journalism still possible? … concluded that there was 
still a huge demand for this ill-defined product, but no known way of selling it at a profit … In 
the meantime … who was going to pay for the in-depth investigations and permanent foreign 
bureaus that were essential to serious journalism?” (Chancellor, 2013, p. 79) – now that “print 
revenue has been chewed up by a shift to less lucrative online advertising and readership” 
(Pérez-Peña & Cieply, 2009, p. 4).  
Many of those dollars found their way to partisan or ideological narrowcasting outlets 
targeted at a specific audience instead of the general public. Summarizing a study of the 2016 
U.S. presidential election coverage that documented the emergence of a highly polarized and 
isolated right-wing media bubble, analysts noted the ideological, as well as financial, uphill 
battle for its traditional moderate stance that the profession faces: “To accomplish this, 
traditional media needs to reorient ... by recognizing that it is operating in a propaganda and 
disinformation-rich environment” (Benkler, Faris, Roberts & Zuckerman, 2017, para. 25). “This 
infrastructure of cable-TV outlets, talk-radio stations, websites, newspapers, magazines, and 
publishing houses has exerted enormous influence on America’s public discourse and political 
life for nearly 30 years ... This right-wing infrastructure dwarfs its left-of-center counterpart” 
(Hertsgaard, 2017, para. 4) – though bubbles exist throughout the ideological spectrum.  
This continuing audience fragmentation means continuing revenue reductions for 
mainstream media outlets, which translate into fewer traditional newsroom jobs: One annual 
American Society of Newspaper Editors census of some 1,400 U.S. daily newspapers shows a 
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total loss of some 10,100 positions – nearly 25 percent – between 1978 and 2014, including a 10-
percent loss in just one year (ASNE, 2015). More recently, Canada’s largest newspaper chain 
announced 90 layoffs (Bradshaw, 2016). Fewer reporters especially results in “significant 
cutbacks in … international reporting” (Pew, 2014, pp. 19-21), because “[i]nvestigative 
journalism tends to be expensive.”  
The new media taketh away ... and taketh away more ...  
The rhythm of the Internet has made spending a week reporting a story a rare luxury ...  
[After] the virtual disappearance of local newspapers, their business models irrevocably  
broken by the disappearance of print advertising ... Some reporters never leave their  
screens to do on-the-ground reporting. (Abramson, 2019, para. 5)  
Meanwhile, the same technology convergence that hijacked the legacy news media 
monopoly’s revenue stream continues to steal its soapbox and separate its once-mass audience 
into disparate niches: “News is also becoming more diverse as publishing tools become widely 
available, barriers to entry fall and new models become possible” – including “millions of blogs. 
At the same time news is becoming more opinionated, polarised and partisan” (Coming, 2011, 
para. 9). And online, legacy news products are indiscriminately mixed with punditry, promotion, 
and pure entertainment in a confusing blend of Web search engine results. So, paradoxically, 
“more people trust Google for their news than the news outlets whose articles Google 
aggregates” (Epstein, 2016, para. 1) – due in no small part to the personalized news reports such 
search engines tend to provide (Pariser, 2011; Vaidhyanathan, 2011). But legacy outlets still do 
matter to many: “If newspapers abandon the relentless reporting that makes them special, then 
their future won’t be worth protecting, in any form” (Smolkin, 2006, p. 23). And that legacy is 
increasingly impossible to sustain (Lowrey & Gade, 2011).  
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Further, in this ongoing pursuit of disappearing consumers, legacy news organizations – 
especially those in for-profit corporations – continue to incorporate a more visual, narrative 
storytelling style that threatens both the quality and quantity of conflict coverage (Anderson, 
2006; Der Derian, 2001). Television especially demands a different kind of content than does 
print (cf McLuhan, 1964), one that must be entertaining – even when covering war (Cohen & 
Cook, 1990; Cui & Rothenbuhler, 2018; Foote, 1998; Martin, 2003; Postman, 1985). The 
industry’s loss of audience, first to television and then to the Internet, forced legacy newsrooms 
to adopt entertainment approaches (c.f. Urban, 1999; Rowse, 2002; Craig, 2006). A recurrent 
critique of for-profit “infotainment” (Scharrer, Weidman, & Bissell, 2003, p. 93) is its trend 
towards the trivial – hardly the kind of educational, edifying public discourse Mill envisioned. 
As noted in the fallout after the release of images of abuse at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, serious 
discussion of the “war and the manner in which it was being fought continued to take second 
place to questions about the impact and meaning of the pictures” (Andersen, 2006, p. xviii).  
The new media giveth ... and giveth more.  
The last time I had that kind of access to the military, was, curiously, back in Vietnam,  
when we had a lot of access. But back in those days, my copy, the film that we shot  
didn’t get on the air for two-and-a-half days. It would have to be shipped halfway  
around the world, and then it would have to be processed ... Now we’re getting on the  
air in two-and-a-half seconds. And I wanted to see how that combination of total access  
and immediate accessibility to air time, how that was going to work together.  
(Koppel, in Kurtz, 2004, para. 58).  
 Finally, the same new media technology that taketh away, conversely also giveth: This 
new audience’s insatiable appetite for content, delivered instantly and updated incessantly, can 
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only be fed by leveraging the same electronic tools, as fewer journalists must attempt to create 
more content to be narrowcast across multiple media platforms (c.f. Granatstein, 2008; Ives, 
2008; Craig, 2011). ABC’s veteran anchor Ted Koppel wasn’t kidding when he talked about a 
seconds-long publication cycle – and not just for text: Today’s “backpack reporter” must also 
produce audio, video, still photography, infographics, hyperlinks to related material, and social 
media updates on several different networks (Briggs, 2012) to an ever-changing “masspersonal 
communication” audience (O’Sullivan & Carr, 2018, p. 1161).  
 So traditional press deadlines, with their technologically determined schedule for quality 
control, are threatened by the new media realities. “This insistence on speed,” lamented veteran 
Watergate reporter Bob Woodward: “[C]an we get it on the Web site by 9 a.m.?” (King, 2005, 
para. 10). “60/60/24/7/365 are the key coordinates of the new networks” of an emerging military-
industrial-media-entertainment complex (Der Derian, 2001, p. 161). But for the ethical reporter, 
“time equals truth” (Houston, Bruzzese & Weinberg, 2002, p. 3). And while tech-savvy reporters 
attempt all this, also-savvy hackers – and the very government entities under investigation – can 
use the same power to invade, obstruct, disrupt and even “spy on journalists in secrecy” (Timm, 
2016, para. 1; Rushing, 2013; Zelinsky, 2017).  
Perennial problems arise from battlefield constraints. “Truth, it has been said, is the 
first casualty of war” goes the again-quoted proverb (Snowden, 1916, p. x; Knightley, 1975) – 
and the truth-teller is often the very next in line: Some 139 journalists died in covering the first 
six years of the second Iraq War (Iraq, 2008). Most fundamentally, the inherently chaotic, 
unpredictable, complex, and dangerous nature of warfare itself ensures a very real and daunting 
physical barrier to fact-finding and communication. The age-old “fog of war” (Hale, 1896, ???) 
confounds soldier and reporter alike. After one WW I battle, for example, “reporters struggled to 
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piece together what had occurred” (Carruthers, p. 60). War imposes “a logic all its own” 
(Hamblet, 2005, p. 39), and war “stories so often have many more sides than two” (Andersen, 
2006, p. xiv). Nevertheless, “war journalists return repeatedly … placing themselves at great 
personal risk” of injury or death (Feinstein, 2006, p. 46). “It should be self-evident that war is 
dangerous and that those who report on it run the risk of becoming casualties themselves” 
(Feinstein, Owen & Blair, 2002, p. 1570). Indeed: “For me, covering conflict and war is the 
essence of journalism,” wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning war photographer Anja Niedringhaus, just 
two years before she was killed in Afghanistan doing just that (Beaujon, 2014, para. 1).  
Unfortunately, this same high-risk environment also presents a psychological attraction 
for both participant and observer that defies logic – and endangers the profession’s tradition of 
disinterested scribe. “Journalists should … [a]void conflicts of interest, real or perceived” 
(Society, 2014, p. 1), and civilian reporters no longer bear arms themselves, as some did in 
earlier U.S. wars (Knight, 1993, p. 194). Still, by its very nature and internal “logic … war 
composes a compulsion” for most that “seeks absolutization as it feeds and fires the population’s 
martial enthusiasm” (Hamblet). War correspondents report becoming addicted to the adrenaline 
rush of combat (Feinstein), and their coverage risks joining in the public’s “wanton celebration 
of state power” (Hamblet).  
Amid this ever-challenging physical and psychological chaos, the state itself – both the 
media’s primary information source and its main subject – often constricts its cooperation in 
wartime, as the U.S. has done through evasion, intimidation, limitation of access, pooling or 
imbedding reporters, or outright refusals to grant access or information (Anderson, 2006; 
Copeland, 2005; Hallock, 2012; Knightley, 2004). While an ethical press is to “recognize a 
special obligation to serve as watchdogs over public affairs and government” (Society, 2014, p. 
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1), the “military, especially during war, goes into overdrive to protect information at all costs” 
(Melcher, 2007, p. 14). A U.S. official once defended “the inherent right of the government to lie 
to save itself when faced with nuclear disaster” (Sylvester, 1962, p. A-7); theoretically, 
“reporters could be kept from nosing about in ‘critical’ areas during ‘critical’ times” (Merrill, 
1974, p. 91). And a Supreme Court justice recently noted that a state is always “more efficient if 
it can suppress speech” (Totenberg, 2016, para. 33).  
New problems arise from evolving asymmetrical battlefield.  
We’re still stuck in this view that war is like the Super Bowl: We meet on the field, both  
sides have uniforms, we score points, someone wins, and when the game ends you go  
home. That’s not what war is like now. Now there are tons of civilians on the field, the  
enemy team doesn’t wear a uniform, and the game never ends. We need to know there’s  
no neat ending. The costs of this problem have been so catastrophic for the United  
States, in the form of thousands of military lives and billions of dollars spent. It’s time  
we fundamentally rethink our vision of what war is. (Tierney, 2018, para. 51)  
 As if these obstacles weren’t enough, reporters face new challenges from ongoing rapid, 
widespread, and essential changes to the nature of conflict itself. Increasingly, asymmetrical 
warfare rejects traditional battles fought among official militaries representing competing 
sovereign states (Duyvesteyn, 2007). “We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield,” notes 
Smith (2005, p. 17), and the “sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multinational 
grouping against some non-state party or parties.”  
Further, the “increasing use of terror ... represents the breakdown of a political code first 
worked out in the second half of the nineteenth century and roughly analogous to the laws of war 
worked out at the same time” (Walzer, 2006, p. 198). The confusion caused by addressing an 
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asymmetrical tactic like terrorism with traditional state-actor warfare actually enhances the 
effectiveness of the terror while barely addressing its effects. “The material harm terrorists have 
done to us is only the means to the end of terrorizing,” concludes one study of mediated terror 
(Cui & Rothenbuhler, 2018, p. 160). “In other words, the terror is rooted more in the cultural 
meaning we bestow upon the terrorizing acts than in the killing and disruption itself.”  
Additionally, “military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan have [also] found themselves 
dealing with development, governance, agriculture, health and diplomacy” (Bumiller, 2010, p. 
A28) “The requirements associated with winning such wars confound the American military 
ethic” (Pfaff, 2016, p. 61) – as well as the press attempting to cover them. In the new frame of 
nation building, “the ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a 
political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided” 
(Smith, 2005, p. 17); therefore, “conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending.” This shift in the 
essential nature of these conflicts also means that they become wars of attrition. “The English in 
1066 had to stake everything on the battle at Hastings; so did Israel when in the Six-Day War it 
struck first at the surrounding Arab countries” (Braybrooke, 2004, p. 74). Not so the contestants 
in this new era: “We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain the objective,” 
notes Smith (2005, p. 17) – and “new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which 
are the products of industrial war.”  
Meanwhile, ongoing advances in military technology, and the unorthodox strategies and 
novel tactics empowered by them, broaden the scope of potential coverage. Digital surveillance, 
covert operations, detainees, drone strikes and cyberwarfare all represent confusing answers to 
the question “Where are the front lines?” (Dipert, 2010; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018; Rid, 2011; 
Schmitt, 2013; Stone, 2012).  
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Further, tightened government controls seek to limit media access, even as technology 
offers greater investigative potential to both military public affairs officials and civilian 
journalists alike (c.f. Aukofer & Lawrence, 1995; Smith, 1999; Carruthers, 2011). “You can’t 
handle the truth!” retorts the fictitious Colonel Jessup in a popular movie (Sorkin, 1992, p. ???) – 
a line often heard quoted among veteran U.S. Army Public Affairs Officers speaking off the 
record (personal communication, February, 2010-September, 2011). Meanwhile, high-ranking 
officers openly admit to their need to control the conversation (Ricks, 2009), as once-
inaccessible materials leak to the public via hackers (Zelinsky, 2017) and new-media-wired 
citizen-soldier-prison guards themselves (Andersen, 2006; Gourevitch & Morris, 2008).  
Finally, the expanding range of media practitioners, empowered by this technology, now 
includes freelancers and representatives of all sides in a conflict (Christians, 2017; Rushing, 
2013) – and, increasingly, women, who face particular challenges and threats. (c.f. Craig, 2011; 
Storm & Williams, 2012).  
Most recently, journalists of all backgrounds have increasingly become targets of 
violence themselves. Industry experts observe that “killings, imprisonments and abductions … 
have reached historic highs” (Global safety, 2015, para. 3), as “extremists ... and reckless 
warring factions continue murdering journalists with impunity” (IFJ, 2016, para. 5).  
Addressing the gaps: A revisionist Millian utility focuses on security ad bellum.  
Your mother sits on the edge of the world, when the cameras start to roll 
Panoramic viewpoints resurrect the killing foe ...  
Your father drains another beer; he’s one of the few that care  
Crawling behind a Saracen’s hull from the safety of his living room chair ...  
You're just another coffin on its way down the emerald aisle 
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When your children’s stony glances mourn your death in a terrorist’s smile ...  
On the news, a nation mourns you: Unknown soldier, count the cost  
For a second, you’ll be famous – but labelled posthumous:  
Forgotten sons ... (Dick, 1983, Track 6)  
This review of the normative ethics, war ethics, and media ethics literature reveals 
several key gaps in approaching the increasingly difficult task of comprehensive war coverage in 
a civilian-command democracy for a decreasingly staffed and funded press corps. The realist 
correspondent might take what he can get, and publish and broadcast whatever war coverage fits 
into an increasingly shrinking and entertainment-driven newshole. The pacifist reporter might 
stubbornly insist on doing just as she has in the past, clinging to traditional journalistic values 
and routines, and hope for the best. Or the just war journalist might reason through some 
incomplete utilitarian calculus in hopes of addressing the greater good for the least harm.  
Uniting recent trends in these disciplines, I propose a different approach: In light of the 
significant new research on Mill and his thought, occasioned by his bicentennial, and the several 
significant revisionist readings of his Utilitarianism, surrounding that essay’s sesquicentennial, I 
will outline the basis for a Millian Conflict Coverage that can both evaluate existing coverage 
and inform future efforts.  
First, this model addresses what I perceive as an existing gap in the military ethics 
literature by taking Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle (2011, 2014, 2016) a step further. The UWP 
convincingly moves the discussion well beyond the just war tradition, and where at least one 
scholar has proposed a “just journalism” based on that theory’s criteria (Brislin, 1992), and I 
outlined a framework for a “just war coverage” (Todd, 2009), Shaw’s groundbreaking approach 
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points to an unabashed utilitarianism that successfully subsumes the just war guides into a larger 
theory.  
While Shaw’s seminal work in addressing several of the recurrent critiques of utility and 
war, and his innovative evolution of his UWP, both provide a number of opportunities for new 
research and application in both military ethics and media ethics, the philosophy of war still does 
not take into account Mill’s definition in Utilitarianism of security as the most vital element of 
the good (1863). The UWP provides a clear, dynamic utilitarian calculus for the crucial ad 
bellum conversation; my reading of Millian security offers some points for focusing that 
conversation on what would satisfy what I see as Mill’s standard for that calculus.  
Second, this model addresses what I perceive as an existing gap in the media ethics 
literature, which has pointedly moved away from utilitarianism. The recent contributions by Peck 
(2006) and Elliott (2007), however, have successfully addressed several of the most important 
critiques of utilitarianism in insightful ways. Most importantly, Elliott also moved the discussion 
forward in several important ways, especially in her addressing Mill’s definition of justice as key 
to a rights-based security, and her distillation of that definition into a Utilitarian Decision Tree 
for journalists. My Millian Conflict Coverage checklist is partly based on her approach. 
However, her model also does not include Mill’s definition of security; further, her valuable 
contribution rests solidly in the normative area of defining press responsibility. Though it hints at 
a more direct focus on press coverage content, it does not quite go as far as others have in taking 
a further step beyond press freedom and press responsibility.  
In synthesizing the work of Shaw and Elliott, I hope to present a workable process by 
which journalists may focus their coverage of the most important ad bellum question in ways 
suggested by Mill’s definition of security as ensuring justice through community. I believe such 
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an approach can shed light on past wars as well as offer reporting goals for future calls to arms. 
The larger academy has already proposed that “we deploy the US military with greater care and 
fight fewer wars. That means when we do fight, we have a better plan to win the peace” 
(Tierney, 2018, para. 41). I propose that a revisionist Millian conflict coverage approach, 
grounded in his definition of security, can help citizens in a civilian-command democracy 
address conflict with greater care and better plans toward that admirable and utilitarian end.  
Outlining a Millian Conflict Coverage Focus: Conceptual Framework  
My heart is broken by the terrible loss I have sustained in my old friends and  
companions and my poor soldiers. Believe me, nothing except a battle lost can be half  
so melancholy as a battle won: the bravery of my troops hitherto saved me from the  
greater evil; but to win such a battle as this of Waterloo, at the expens of so many  
gallant friends, could only be termed a heavy misfortune but for the result to the public. 
(Adams, 1863, p. 400).  
Arthur Wellesley’s famous 1815 “Letter from the field of Waterloo” was not the first nor 
the last military memoir to attempt to justify a war’s high human cost by some greater public 
good that this “terrible loss” and sacrifice supposedly secured. And the survivors must continue 
to justify the sacrifice: “Take up our quarrel with the foe: To you from failing hands we throw 
The torch; be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die, We shall not sleep” 
(McCrae, 1919, p. 3), wrote one Canadian World War I soldier. “They disembarked in ’45,” 
echoed Roger Waters from a post-World War II England – “And no one spoke and no one 
smiled: There were too many spaces in the line” (1983, track 9).  
Two centuries after Waterloo, a comprehensive report on global U.S. military actions 
found involvement in 40 percent of the world’s nations, and asked some very utilitarian 
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questions about costs, benefits, and the greater good (Savell, 2019, para. 3). Meanwhile, one 
longitudinal study of the Bush-declared War on Terror tabulated a tentative price tag of $5.9 
trillion in U.S. budgetary costs, a direct death toll of 480,000, 244,000 civilian deaths, 21 million 
displaced persons and refugees – as well as “violations of human rights and civil liberties, in the 
US and abroad” – since September, 2001 (Costs, 2019, para. 1).  
So, why even try to calculate such astronomical and difficult to acquire figures? “To 
identify less costly and more effective ways to prevent further terror attacks” (para. 7), of course. 
Because the ongoing martial debates in the public sphere often resort to some sort of 
utilitarianism, whether acknowledged or not, it makes sense to address those claims within a 
utilitarian framework. Therefore, with so much of the ongoing public discussion over war and 
terrorism continually invoking consequentialist and utilitarian elements, a revisionist utilitarian 
framework grounded in Mill’s conception of security might yield a useful and effective tool for 
both evaluating existing conflict coverage and for informing future war correspondence.  
Security: The “Most Vital of All Interests” Drives Discussion  
 The media no longer listen to the people they are mandated to serve. They rarely  
register opposing opinions or respond to the sound of public voices and they seem to  
have forgotten what the face of democracy looks like. Most tragically, they have  
forgotten the soldiers ... There is little room for reflection, compassion or responsibility  
in the world created by American commercial media. The culture that creates  
militainment also creates an atmosphere devoid of real empathy, humanity or  
responsibility. These are precisely the voices that form the heart and soul of American  
democracy. (Andersen, 2006, p. 317)  
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 “The problem [of comprehensive conflict coverage] is as old as the republic, only it’s 
now getting worse,” wrote one reporter within a week of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Kalb, 2001, 
para. 1). Reporting from Iraq in 2003, another agreed: “I think the American media may, when it 
looks back on this, say to themselves, Well, we didn’t ask quite enough questions. We didn’t ask 
quite enough tough questions. But that’s usually the case in wartime” (King, 2003, para. 14). 
Nearly two decades later, “with the journalism industry losing more than 1,000 jobs a month, the 
United States has reached a point where it no longer has more than the barest resources dedicated 
to news reporting” (Fullerton, 2016, para. 11) -  and much less the specialized, prohibitive 
military beat. However, while increasingly difficult, comprehensive war coverage – especially 
that involving the crucial ad bellum decision-making process – remains vital in a civilian-
command democracy. Because the public discourse surrounding war often invokes 
consequentialist arguments, I looked to Mill’s Utilitarianism for guidance on answering those 
arguments in a utilitarian manner as a first step towards meeting the press’ wartime challenges – 
perennial, contemporary and future.  
To that end, this paper addresses a significant gap in the media ethics literature by 
outlining a Millian war coverage model that goes beyond current utilitarian research in war and 
media ethics, synthesizes the previously disparate utilitarian philosophical traditions in both war 
and journalism research, applies recent Millian research, and focuses especially on my reading of 
the essential concept of security in his classic Utilitarianism.  
 Perennial appeals to the “greater good” abound.  
[A]s men’s sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what  
they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or  
... the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines  
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even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought  
which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and  
even predominant consideration ... however unwilling to acknowledge it as the  
fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. (Mill, 1863, p. 4)  
Mill might find much to support his 155-year-old charge in some of the more overtly 
consequentialist, if not strictly utilitarian, ethical appeal of much present-day public debate – 
especially when it involves tragedy or misfortune.  
These often sound like the much-bemoaned “bumper-sticker greater good” incomplete 
utilitarianism (Peck, 2006; Elliott, 2007): In a recent visit to the University of Oklahoma campus, 
NBC’s Al Roker spoke of advancements in weather forecasting technology as perhaps a way that 
the deadly 2014 tornado in nearby Moore had resulted in a greater good (Roker, 2017); 
meanwhile, a video kiosk at the Oklahoma History Center features former CNN reporter Bella 
Shaw, a University of Oklahoma journalism graduate, describing how Native American 
entrepreneurs focused on “the greatest good for the greatest number of people” (Shaw, n.d.).  
In a somewhat perverse reversal of this worldview, CBS chief executive Les Moonves 
was quoted as appreciating the high ratings most broadcast media outlets enjoyed as the 2016 
presidential campaign evolved: “It may not be good for America, but it’s damn good for CBS” 
(Wang, 2016, para. 6) – proof to many “that journalists care more about drumming up readers 
and viewers than they do about the country’s well-being.” Today, even the loudest complaining 
“editors ... remain addicted. After all, they are swimming in Trump-generated revenue, clicks 
and ratings” (Abramson, 2019, para. 11). Such an attitude flies in the face of the draft language 
of the First Amendment, which included a reference that such freedoms were “for the common 
good” (Inazu, 2010, 572) -  and Mill would certainly not approve, either (1821, 1859a).  
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 “Feeling of security” dominates debate.  
With an iron fist in a velvet glove - we are sheltered under the gun;  
In the glory game on the power train - Thy kingdom’s will be done ...  
Like a steely blade in a silken sheath - we don’t see what they’re made of:  
They shout about love, but when push comes to shove 
They live for the things they’re afraid of ...  
(Peart, Weinrib & Zivojinovich, 1982, track 5)  
Further, a great deal of this discourse, and the mediated news reflecting it, echoes Mill’s 
insistence that “no human being can possibly do without” security (pp. 66-67). Fearmongering 
dominates, as “everything is described as a maximum existential threat” (Brooks, 2016, p. A27) 
– and a deadly threat “warms the mind” (Boswell, 1921, p. 229). This is reflected at the national 
level, from the Constitution’s call to “provide for the common defence” (The Constitution, 2016, 
para. 1) to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s insistence on the right of freedom from fear (Donovan, 1966): 
“Security is at the base of the hierarchy of needs; it must be funded sufficiently regardless of the 
size of the economy” (Blume, 2019, para. 8).  
Nine days after the 9/11 terror attacks, President George W. Bush announced that his 
administration’s response to the new reality included the creation of a Cabinet-level Office of 
Homeland Security, and vowed that “I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and 
security for the American people” (Bush, 2001, para. 53); a promise repeated some 15 months 
later, claiming that Iraq had consorted with terrorists and possessed weapons of mass destruction 
(Bush, 2003a). However, by 2004, a series of surveys revealed that “few Americans selected 
criteria for success based on the original core premises for the war … Only 9-12 percent said that 
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the key … was the Iraqi government having no links to terror, and only 3-5 percent said it was 
the Iraqi government having no WMD” (Johnson & Tierney, 2006, p. 263).  
Within five years, critics claimed that neither the invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq had 
done much in the way of promoting U.S. security (Hadar, 2008) – in other words, an incomplete 
utilitarianism failed to justify the eventual costs of the war by its actual consequences. On the 
tenth anniversary of the invasion, one retrospective analysis reported that “for many Americans, 
the war’s faulty premise that Iraq was stockpiling deadly weapons of mass destruction continues 
to make the decision to invade difficult to justify” (Nowicki, 2013, para. 1), tallying the cost to 
that date as $806 billion in U.S. funds, more than 4,480 dead and 32,000 wounded U.S. soldiers, 
and more than 100,000 Iraqi civilian deaths. In other words, utilitarianism implies that there is a 
quantifiable as well as a qualitative difference between the the somewhat slippery “feeling” of 
security and an actual state of security.  
 Utilitarianism defines true security.  
There’s this romantic idea that’s built up around war. But the pragmatic view is there are  
tons of people of my generation who have lost their lives, lost their marriages, or lost  
their health as a consequence of being sent to wars which could have been avoided.  
 (Wallace-Wells, 2019, para. 3)  
A U.S. presidential candidate made this very Millian statement recently, in words Mill 
himself would approve: “The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of 
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others,” Mill wrote 155 years ago (1863, p. 
20). “It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not 
increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.”  
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Utilitarianism does affirm “the right to security of life and limb” (Braybrooke, 2004, p. 
93), as “in the morality of common sense there are cases of legitimate killing, for example, self-
defense … to preserve one’s life against aggressors, to uphold the rule of law against certain 
dangerous criminals …” (Bailey, 1997, p. 173). “Violent crime [for example] undermines the 
sense of order and shared moral values without which no society could exist ... organized society 
itself, the same society on which we depend for stability and security in our daily lives” (Bruck, 
1983, p. 19). Indeed, most “utilitarian-type views include the claims that the end of action is 
survival and growth” (Teleological, 2019, para. 5), as “only survival is unambiguous in content” 
(Doyle, 2015, p. 14).  
But the same justification does not automatically hold true for questions of national 
security, which is an “ambiguous symbol” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 481) – witness “the unclear 
boundaries of what the Bush administration calls its war on terror” (Saunders, 2004, p. 3; Banks, 
2008). “The problem with all of these metrics is that none of them tells us anything about how 
much defense spending is actually required to address the threats the United States faces at 
acceptable levels of risk” (Blume, 2019, para. 11). Nor do we know what level of sacrifice is 
needed – or even acceptable – on this different kind of battlefield in this different kind of 
conflict.  
Finally, ethical journalists could avoid the distracting appeals to fear, and to a mere 
“feeling of security,” and instead begin to more comprehensively cover a war’s actual utility, by 
focusing on Mill’s conclusion that “this most indispensable of all necessaries ... cannot be had, 
unless the machinery for providing it is kept unintermittedly in active play” (p. 67). For Mill, the 
“machinery” for ensuring true security involved the restoration of justice through communal 
action. By addressing these underlying utilitarian means and ends, and focusing especially on the 
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expected and realistic outcomes of war, ethical journalists could more accurately cover security’s 
preservation and perpetuation, avoiding the romance and the waste of an unjustified war. In other 
words, the only ethical war is one whose consequence is a true, sustainable Security through true 
Justice for All involved.  
Towards a Millian Normative Press Rubric: “Security & Justice for All”  
We ended up intervening in countries where we had little cultural understanding ... In  
addition, the US military has failed to adapt to this new era of war. The US military has  
this playbook for success against countries: technology, big-unit warfare, and so on. And  
when we started fighting insurgents, it was natural that we would turn to that same  
playbook. (Tierney, 2018, para. 23)  
“It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest opinions they can,” 
Mill asserted in his defense of press freedom in a democracy (1859a, p. 19). To that end, 
“education and opinion, which have so vast a power ... should so use that power as to establish ... 
a direct impulse to promote the general good” (1863, p. 21). In a democracy such as the United 
States, this duty becomes even more crucial when freely acting citizens, through their 
government, actively consider whether to declare war, to fund it, and to fight as its soldiers.  
 But how should such a press operate, when its government – and its warriors – might not 
have the correct approach to a very different kind of conflict? “There is no authoritative systemic 
guide to terrorism ... perhaps there never will be one, simply because there is not one terrorism 
but a variety of terrorisms and what is true for one does not necessarily apply to others” 
(Laqueur, 2003, p. 8; 1996; 2003). So, where does that leave the press? If, as the Times executive 
editor later admitted, the “mainstream press was not aggressive enough after 9/11, was not 
aggressive enough in asking questions about a decision to go to war in Iraq” (Hülsen & Stark, 
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2015, para. 60), how might a free, independent, responsible press focus on more Millian 
utilitarian outcomes to formulate more effective, rights-based questions to ask in the first place, 
whenever government officials call for war?  
 Such is the realm of normative press theory, or “how ideal media ought to operate within 
a specific set of social values” (Baran & Davis, 2000, p. 30; Christians et al, 2009; Glasser, 1986; 
Littlejohn, 1996; McQuail, 1994; Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956; Vaca-Baqueiro, 2018; 
Vold, 1999), and “what is desirable in relation to both structure and performance” (McQuail, p. 
121). So, how should a Millian press operate? Based on my reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism, an 
ideal war correspondence should operate within a utilitarian set of social values, beginning with 
Mill’s own definition of security based on justice in community.  
 Five basic precepts, drawn directly from Mill’s definition of security, should guide a 
more complete utilitarian journalism approach: First, Millian security protects against a vital, 
existential threat. Second, Millian security preserves both immediate safety and future stability. 
Third, Millian security promotes mutual justice. Fourth, Millian security produces true 
community. Fifth, Millian security practices a carefully-considered utility. How?  
A Millian conflict coverage defends a sustainable security.  
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend  
me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give him no  
other reason than general utility ... The interest involved is that of security, to every  
one’s feelings the most vital of all interests. All other earthly benefits are needed by one  
person, not needed by another; and many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully  
foregone, or replaced by something else; but security no human being can possibly do  
without; on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all  
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and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the gratification of the  
instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of anything the next instant  
by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. (Mill, 1863, pp. 66-67)  
How, then, should a Millian journalist ethically cover conflict? First, the correspondent 
should adopt Mill’s proposition of “security [as] the most vital of all interests” (p. 67) as both 
focus and filter for work that truly serves the public interest, instead of the interested public.  
From the beginning, a Millian utilitarian focus on security would address tangible threats 
and realistic outcomes while filtering fear-based appeals and claims based on expedience or 
profit. First, it would focus on a specific existential threat of “evil” that would need to be 
investigated and understood. Second, it would focus on specific threats to the ongoing “value of 
all and every good” (p. 67), which would also require investigation and understanding.  
For Mill, this threat of an evil deprivation of security and good encompassed “any 
conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, [which also] is threatening to his 
own” (p. 63), or an actual “wrong done” (p. 61) to a citizen or the larger community, including 
threats to rights, goods, and one’s existence itself – which “calls forth his instinct ... of self-
defence” (p. 63).  
Finally, Mill’s definition of security includes an element of stability or sustainability: He 
seeks to protect “the whole value of every good ... beyond the passing moment” (p. 67) from 
threat; therefore, a Millian approach would look to the long-term continuity of security, and 
would eschew the merely expedient response to threat.  
Writing 80 years after Mill, Maslow (1942, 1943; Maslow, Hirsch, Stein & Honigmann, 
1945) affirmed the primacy of safety concerns by placing it second only to immediate 
physiological needs in his hierarchy of motivators:   
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[W]e find that the dominating goal is a strong determinant not only of his current world- 
outlook and philosophy but also of his philosophy of the future. Practically everything  
looks less important than safety, (even sometimes the physiological needs which being  
satisfied, are now underestimated). A man, in this state, if it is extreme enough and  
chronic enough, may be characterized as living almost for safety alone. (1943, p. 376)  
However, a more holistic, sustainable conception of stable security remains to be 
adopted, as “the links between development and security are a relatively new concept” (Stohl & 
Grillot, 2009, pp. 118-119). “Only in the past two decades have organizations such as the World 
Bank and publications such as the Human Development Report acknowledged and addressed the 
ways in which security, or the lack thereof, affects development.” One example is the annual 
Human Security Report, beginning in 2005, which focuses on “the protection of individuals ... 
Human security and national security should be – and often are – mutually reinforcing. But 
secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples” (Human, 2005, p. 8).  
A Millian conflict coverage defines justice.  
Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but  
which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right ... Now it appears to  
me, that the desire to punish a person who has done harm to some individual is a  
spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments ... the impulse of self-defence, and the  
feeling of sympathy. It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done or  
attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we sympathise ... The  
sentiment of justice, in that one of its elements which consists of the desire to punish, is  
thus, I conceive, the natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance ... To recapitulate: the  
idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment which sanctions  
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the rule. (Mill, 1863, pp. 62-65)  
Second, the journalist should apply Mill’s conception of security as the pursuit of justice: 
a continuing “immunity from evil” which includes the “justice of self-defence” (pp. 67-68) 
against “any harm done or attempted against ourselves, or against those with whom we 
sympathise” (p. 63), as well as “a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe 
the rule” (p. 65). For Mill, as with security, justice is a rights-based construct: “When we call 
anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect him in the 
possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion” (p. 66).  
A Millian approach to ad bellum reportage focused on his elements of utilitarian 
distributive justice (Berger, 1979; Clark & Elliott, 2001; Elliott, 2007; Kors, 2011; Lyons, 1994; 
Riley, 1988; Schefczyk, n.d.; Schminke, Ambrose & Noel, 1997; Skorupski, 2006; Treviño, 
Weaver & Reynolds, 2006) would better inform conflict coverage – especially if it references 
just war tenets as secondary moral principles (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016), and applies Millian 
justice arguments “to best determine the range of permissible actions” (Elliott, p. 111) in 
considering a just response to “a violation of a right” (Mill, 1863, p. 66). 
A Millian conflict coverage directs focus on community.  
[A] human being is capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself  
and the human society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens  
the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own ... the power of  
sympathising with human beings generally enables him to attach himself to the  
collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind ... Our notion, therefore, of the  
claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork  
of our existence … and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in others  
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(all being alike interested), that ought and should grow into must, and recognised  
indispensability becomes a moral necessity. (Mill, 1863, pp. 63-67)  
Third, as Mill explains in Utilitarianism, security includes the restoration of justice by 
appeal to the larger community, to ultimately ensure the greatest amount of good for all. As “any 
conduct which threatens the security of the society ... is threatening to his own” (p. 63), a Millian 
journalist must also consider the larger “human society of which he forms a part.” So community 
involves the security of “our fellow-creatures” (p. 67) and in the sustainability of “the general 
good” (p. 64) for all involved parties – including the offending party. 
For Mill, the pursuit of security, via an agreed-upon justice, is beneficial and desirable for 
all, and can best be pursued, attained and perpetuated in community. Because war is waged for 
security on behalf of a specific public, ethical journalism should address these arguments and 
cover their implications for combatants, the larger community, the enemy, the enemy’s larger 
community, civilians and the global welfare of the larger human society. On this, Mill was clear: 
“I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to 
acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right ... is not the 
agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned” (p. 21).  
Two centuries before Mill made clear his connection between an individual’s security 
and the corporate security of the larger community, Hobbes described the isolated individual’s 
natural state as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (1645/1991, p. 89). In his turn, Mill 
would certainly recognize the very Hobbesian description Maslow offered of the poor 20th-
century soul, isolated from community, who did not feel at all secure:  
The insecure person, then, perceives the world as a threatening jungle and most human  
beings as dangerous and selfish; feels rejected and isolated, anxious and hostile; is  
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generally pessimistic and unhappy; shows signs of tension and conflict; tends to turn  
inward; is troubled by guilt-feelings; has one or another disturbance of self-esteem; tends  
to be or actually is neurotic; and is generally egocentric or selfish. (1942, p. 335)  
“Utilitarianism as Mill conceived of it was a profoundly social ethic; Mill was among the 
first to acknowledge that the good of an entire society had a place in ethical reasoning” 
(Patterson & Wilkins, 2013, p. 11; Elliott, 2007; Peck, 2006; Postema, 1998; Rawls, 1999) – an 
idea that is deeply rooted in Western culture today. Indeed: “Health, safety and well-being are 
not byproducts of societal function, they are the reason for it” (McClure, 2013, p. 204). Recent 
scholars have examined innovative community-based research to find causes and effects in social 
trends of despair and fragmentation (Carney, 2019; Putnam, 2000; Vance, 2016) – as well as 
electronic media’s complicity in these trends (Brooks, 2019; Ladd, 2012; Pariser, 2011; 
Patterson, 2013; Postman, 1985; Rowse, 2002; Rubin, 1988). In such a time of fragmentation 
and confusion, a Millian community-focused ethic would carefully consider the good of that 
larger society in its war coverage.  
A Millian conflict coverage remains free, independent, and useful.  
As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as  
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator ... [So] education and  
opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as  
to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own  
happiness and the good of the whole. (Mill, 1863, p. 21)  
Finally, the ethical war correspondent should assume and unapologetically assert the right 
– and utility! – of this democracy’s free press to act as Mill’s “impartial ... disinterested and 
benevolent spectator” (p. 21), to comprehensively pursue “the free exchange of information” 
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(Society, 2014) for the greater good of the community, “to promote the general good” (Mill, 
1863, p. 21), regardless of war’s unique, perennial challenges and the additional concerns of 
asymmetrical warfare and terror. And the burden of proof is on those calling for military action, 
which conclusively fails the utilitarian calculus in nearly every historical instance, because of its 
incalculable costs (Shaw, 2011). “Thus the moralities which protect every individual from being 
... hindered in his freedom of pursuing his own good, are at once those which he himself has ... 
the strongest interest in publishing and enforcing by word and deed” (Mill, 1863, p. 74; 1824b; 
1859a; 1859b; 1862a; 1864; 1870; O’Rourke, 2001).  
Therefore, for Mill, any public consideration of anything as consequential as military 
action must include background information on “the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, 
past and present, and their prospects in the future” (1863, p. 17); such public discussion should 
also revolve around data, as “a question of fact and experience, dependent ... upon evidence” (p. 
49); finally, “utility alone can decide the preference” when weighing all costs and benefits of the 
proposed action (p. 72). This requires consideration of the basic utilitarian calculus: Is this the 
very best possible action, for the most people, with the least harm – and none other? Or, to 
further focus Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle (2011, 2014, 2016): “It is morally right for a state 
to wage war if and only if no other course of action available to it would result in greater 
expected security with justice for all; otherwise, waging war is wrong.”  
Meanwhile, the Millian correspondent already possesses a few useful tools: For one 
thing, even “despite its shortcomings, rational choice theory can be a valuable theoretical tool 
through which to understand terrorist actors” (Duyvesteyn, 2007, p. 121; Crenshaw, 1998) – and 
utilitarian theory appears in scholarly research on terror (Gruzalski, 2006; Laqueur, 2003; 
Linnan, 2008; Resnik, 2011; Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2106; Smith, 2005; Steinfels, 2004; Totten, 
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2006; Walzer, 2002, 2004; Whitham, 2014; Whitman, 1993, 2006). Moreover, though 
nonconventional armed conflict may challenge existing war coverage paradigms, a great deal of 
the U.S. War on Terror has involved waging two traditional land wars of invasion, where these 
paradigms may still yield a great deal of utility.  
What is it Good For? Triangulating a Millian ad Bellum Focus  
Less than a month after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S.  
troops ... invaded Afghanistan ... More than 17 years later, the Global War on Terrorism  
initiated by President George W. Bush is truly global, with Americans actively engaged  
in countering terrorism in 80 nations on six continents ... Because we have been  
conservative in our selections, U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad are likely more  
extensive ... Even so, the vast reach evident here may prompt Americans to ask whether  
the war on terror has met its goals, and whether they are worth the human and financial  
costs. (Savell, 2019, paras. 1-3)  
“There’s never a day when I do not learn of another threat, or receive reports of 
operations in progress, or give an order in this global war against a scattered network of killers,” 
President George W. Bush claimed in his 2003 State of the Union address, 16 months after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and exactly two months before invading Iraq. “The war goes on, 
and we are winning” (Bush, 2003a, para. 43). Throughout this address, and the many statements 
made to justify the impending invasion, the administration promoted national security as its 
primary good and goal (Bostdorff, 2011; Bradford, 2004; Bumiller, 2002; Bush, 2004; Purdum, 
2003; Singer, 2004) – reflecting, however unintentionally, Mill’s definition of security as the 
greatest good (Mill, 1863). Now, nearly 20 years later, this particular “question concerning the 
summum bonum” (p. 1) continues to vex citizens, politicians, scholars, and journalists alike. 
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Indeed, what is this particular war on terror good for? A revised Millian ad Bellum coverage 
model, focused on security, might help formulate more effective questions.  
 While Mill argued that “war, in a good cause, is not the greatest evil” (1862a, p. 141), he 
also warned that the decision to go to war represents one of the most consequential of all ethical 
and political questions (1859b) – because of the deep, widespread, significant, and lasting 
consequences such a decision always produces (Bentham, 1789; Conway, 1989; Mill, 1825; 
Mill, 1862a, 1864; Walzer, 1977). “The question at hand when dealing with arguments for or 
against particular wars should be about which side has produced the best account of the world as 
it exists at that time” (Carnahan, 2013, p. 424); unfortunately, those who leverage utilitarian 
arguments in favor of war usually do so in an incomplete manner that does not take into 
consideration the good of all parties involved (Doyle, 2008; Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016; Walzer, 
2002, 2004). Because so much hinges on the crucial ad Bellum question, it seems that the most 
utilitarian focus of any so-motivated press would be on interrogating all utilitarian justifications 
for war, and doing so through a revisionist Millian lens. Such an approach not only might have 
aided the Times in its pre-invasion coverage in 2003, but might assist other journalists in the 
present and future when facing that fraught and frightening question. So, to move beyond 
“bumper sticker utilitarianism,” and parse some practical implications of a revisionist Millian 
approach, I paraphrase one particularly popular bumper sticker (Bowen, 2010) to pose a few 
answers to the question “What would John Stuart Mill ask?”  
What would Citizen J. S. Mill ask? “Security-&-Justice-for-All” overall.  
But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula  
should be correctly understood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily  
formed of [utility’s] meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that  
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could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be  
greatly simplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. (Mill, 1863, p. 6)  
While legitimate concerns over both implications and applications of Mill’s concepts as 
presented in Utilitarianism continue to challenge ethicists, a revisionist Millian approach, based 
on some of the more recent scholarship, may yield some useful insights from its unique 
viewpoint. For example, applying revised utilitarian principles in general society, a Millian free 
citizen would ideally first “consider only desirable and undesirable effects – their utility” (Lyons, 
1965, p. 1), asking primarily what “maximizes the good” (Johnson, 2013, para. 1) and only for 
“the general welfare” (Urmson, 1953, p. 35) of all involved (Peck, 2006), seeking a sustainable 
justice (Elliott, 2007) and rejecting “immediate expediency” (Brandt, 1972, p. 147) in favor of 
strengthening the larger community (Mill, 1863).  
However, a “Security-&-Justice-for-All” approach, focused on his definition of security 
as justice through community, might yield even more useful avenues of inquiry. For example, a 
citizen might begin to contemplate one’s own security in light of vital, existential threats by first 
identifying those threats, and considering a wide range of security elements, from both 
standpoints of safety and stability. Once identified and examined, each aspect may then be 
considered in light of Millian rights-based justice: What protects these elements? And, then, the 
question of who protects these elements opens the realm of community and citizenship. Finally, 
each proposed response to the identified threats may be considered in light of several extended 
utilitarian calculi: How would this proposed response specifically deter or “repel” this perceived 
threat with maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties? (Mill, 1863, p. 63; Kant, 
1965; Elliott, 2007) – including known contextual history and foreseeable consequences. For 
instance, all “counterterrorism strategies must reduce the demand for at-risk populations to turn 
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to terrorist organizations in the first place” (Abrahms, 2008, p. 105). Next, how would this 
proposed response represent the only action available that would foreseeably promote the 
greatest expected well-being for all involved parties? (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016) – including 
historical context and serious consideration of all feasible alternatives. And, finally, how would 
all involved parties be harmed if the proposed response were not undertaken? (Elliott, 2007) – 
including historical experience as well as foreseeable present and future consequences.  
What would Soldier J. S. Mill ask? “Security-&-Justice-for-All” ad Bellum.  
In Dr. Walzer’s own application of just-war theory, the massacres, ethnic cleansing and  
terrorism of recent years have increased his readiness to find that military intervention  
can qualify as just. But not in the case of Iraq. In 2002 and 2003, his conclusion that an  
American invasion there would be morally unjustifiable emerged in a series of essays ...  
that did not have today’s luxury of hindsight about faulty or manipulated intelligence but  
were based on what could be reasonably known at the time. (Steinfels, 2004, p. 6)  
 However, even more importantly, though perhaps “[n]onconsequentialist approaches to 
military ethics have enjoyed supremacy” (Jenkins, 2017, p. 963), for the ethical citizen, “the 
proper response ... is not to abandon consequentialist thinking ... but rather to examine with as 
much specificity and meticulousness as possible the likely results,” (Shaw, 2014, p. 309). By 
invoking his “Utilitarian War Principle” (Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016), informed by a better 
understanding of Millian justice principles (Elliott, 2007; Peck, 2006), ethical citizen-soldiers 
might move well beyond a Walzerian just war approach to more completely and effectively ask 
“when, if ever, are we morally justified in waging war and ... how are we permitted to fight the 
wars we wage? (Shaw, 2014, p. 303; Walzer, 1977, 2002, 2009).  
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 As useful as such questions might prove in adding to the public ad Bellum debate, the 
additional focus of a “Security-&-Justice-for-All” stance would certainly address the very issues 
such debates always raise: For most people, regardless of ethical ideology, the idea that the state 
and its citizens plan to create a clear and present vital, existential threat to someone else’s 
security must somehow be justified as a defense against some clear and present vital, existential 
threat to one’s own security. Building on the general citizen’s identification of what elements 
create and sustain such security, the citizen-soldier may ask for specific information about the 
nature of a supposed threat, and about the efficacy and propriety of a proposed defense. Further, 
one might ask about the long-term stability or sustainability of such efforts, as well as the 
layered, interactive aspects of justice invoked by such an extreme response. The impact, harms, 
benefits, and overall costs to the larger community of action sure to involve injury and death 
should also be considered here as well. Finally, a security-focused consideration of the various 
utilitarian calculi cannot be overlooked in such a vital situation.  
 Such thinking was evident in some quarters as the 2003 Iraq invasion loomed – and, in 
correctly identifying the threat of terrorism as primarily involving non-state actors, this list of the 
potentially disastrous consequences foreseen for a nation responding erroneously to the nature of 
this particular threat reads today as frighteningly prophetic:  
 Instability [not a state] is the home of terrorism. The train of war against Iraq may have  
already left the station. Yet we must not allow the prospect of watching the defeat of a  
ruthless dictator to blind us to the possible consequences: more regional instability, more  
potential recruitment of motivated terrorists and more reluctance by states around the  
world to cooperate with anti-terror efforts when the U.S. needs global cooperation the  
most. In the end, we must ask ourselves this question: Is the downfall of Saddam  
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Hussein worth the rise of another Bin Laden? (Telhami, 2003, para. 16)  
What would Reporter J. S. Mill ask? “Security-&-Justice-for-All” journalism.  
After all, we’re a country based on both the idea and the ideal that individual citizens are  
to get as much information as they possibly can, form their own opinion, and then the  
collective opinions become the will of the people. And never before in any war has there  
been anything close to the kind of real-time coverage, up-close, live television coverage  
in time, war presented as it happens, that happened in this war. Was it perfect? Of  
course, it wasn’t perfect. But in terms of coverage of war, this was about the most  
important development I can think of certainly since the Vietnam war.  
(King, 2003, para. 14)  
 Finally, the press has long defined and defended its discipline by utility, from Mill (1859) 
through today, as longtime ABC anchor Ted Koppel did during the Iraq invasion (King, 2003), 
echoing the mindset of much of the news media profession: “Utilitarianism ... works hand-in-
glove with the democratic process” (Christians, 2007, p. 116); moreover, the normative 
journalistic goals of “public enlightenment [and] democracy” (Society, 2014, p. 1) also address 
complex utilitarian elements of community (Peck, 2006) and justice (Elliott, 2007).  
 Yet the press, while quick to defend its independence from the government and 
community it covers, is sometimes not as free-thinking as it might want to be, especially in terms 
of security coverage. For example, in early 2001, when the U.S. Commission on National 
Security released its report on terror, which included a prescient warning that terrorists were very 
likely to strike in American soil, and that Americans would die, few media outlets reported on it, 
reflecting a lack of concern evidenced by the Bush administration, and largely missing a chance 
to warn the public of its intelligence experts’ growing concerns, which proved true:  
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 The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and CNN did substantial pieces. So did  
Chris Matthews on his cable program “Hardball” and Charles Osgood on CBS Radio.  
USA Today ran a brief item. The Associated Press sent a story out to its members, but it  
was given little play. The Courant, like most newspapers, had nothing. The broadcast  
television networks carried nothing. The New York Times, an agenda setter for the rest  
of the news media, and The Wall Street Journal published not a line. Even the news  
outlets that ran stories failed to do any follow-up reporting ... a Times reporter walked  
out 10 minutes before the news conference ended. “One of our people caught up with  
him and said, ‘What’s the problem?’” ... “He said, ‘There's no story here.’” Susan Page,  
USA Today’s Washington bureau chief, [said] that an editor at her newspaper said the  
report didn’t “sound compelling” and that he didn’t know what “homeland security”  
was. (Janensch, 2004, para. 13).  
However, covering terror demands an even greater independence from official sources 
and public entertainment distractions than ever before, as evidenced by the pre-9/11 failure:  
Seeing international news through a predetermined lens will exclude much that is  
important in the world ... [But] the world is too multidimensional to be depicted for our  
generation simply as the War on Terrorism. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, American  
news organizations rapidly lost interest in international news. Foreign stories in  
Newsweek magazine dropped from 463 in 1978 to 281 in 1989. Leo Bogart, writing in  
Presstime in 1997 (April, p. 60), noted that newspapers had cut space devoted to  
international affairs on the premise that “they can’t compete with television on the world  
front.” Yet, at the same time, television was also reducing its world news. Foreign  
datelines on ABC, for instance, dropped by two-thirds in the dozen years before 9/11. In  
 212 
many ways, the Cold War was a simpler story for the American press to cover than is  
the War on Terrorism. It is easier to gather information about nation states ... than about  
freelance terrorist groups. (Hess, 2003, para. 9)  
 Within two years of its failure to independently cover the prophetic warnings of January, 
2001, as media insiders began to revisit their coverage of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, “critics say 
too many news organizations are back to their old habits, ignoring world affairs in favor of 
tabloid stories” (Edwards, 2003, para. 1; Hess & Kalb, 2003). More recently, the same wag-the-
dog complaint critiques coverage of the president’s February, 2019, emergency declaration: “The 
news cycle around the emergency seems to be responding to what politicians are saying about it, 
rather than some independent standard of what is at stake. This is understandable ... but it’s also 
a problem” (Allsop, 2019, para. 5).  
How, then, should an independent, “Security-&-Justice-for-All” reporter focus his or her 
efforts to better address issues vital to the community, while avoiding the pitfalls of the 
expedient and the entertaining? A more complete Millian standard, with its focus on security, 
might guide the press back to basics and focus its attention on the most essential aspects of its 
community’ crucial safety and stability. In other words, a Millian journalism knows and covers 
its own community’s sense of well-being based on security – before even attempting to cover 
how that community might prosper or suffer in war’s consequences. Indeed:  
Journalists are often in the thankless position of knowing less about the subject at hand  
than the newsmakers they are covering ... newsmakers normally know more about the  
issue at hand than the journalists covering them. During the Persian Gulf War,  
journalists who visited the Pentagon press office were greeted with a sign that read  
“Welcome Temporary War Experts.” (Patterson, 2013, p. 66)  
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Ethical journalists have always been focused on the well-being of their particular 
communities and how issues of goods and harms interact with those of other communities. A 
Millian approach might further focus those efforts on identifying, defining, and understanding 
the nature of the community’s security and the sources of threats to that security. What makes 
this place “home?” This basic understanding is essential to then considering issues of protecting 
and preserving that security against those threats, both now and in the future. What has protected 
and sustained this community in the past, and what might do so when things change? When a 
journalist defines justice as a rights-based approach to protecting and sustaining security, issues 
of justice become central to enterprise reporting efforts and story selection. In considering how 
these elements exist and interact in the larger community, a journalist can better identify areas of 
concern that lack coverage, and better explain coverage to the public. Finally, when covering 
those issues of vital importance in ways no other institution can, and providing information that 
no other entity does, a Millian journalist practices true utility.  
What would J. S. Mill ask? A Millian ad Bellum coverage.  
 It’s hardly controversial to suggest that the mainstream media’s performance in the lead- 
up to the Iraq War was a disaster. In retrospect, many journalists and pundits wish they  
had been more skeptical of the White House’s claims about Iraq, particularly its  
allegations about weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, though, media  
apologists suggest that the press could not have done much better, since “everyone” was  
in agreement on the intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons threat. This was never the  
case. Critical journalists and analysts raised serious questions at the time about what the  
White House was saying. Often, however, their warnings were ignored by the bulk of  
the corporate press. (Iraq, 2007, para. 1)  
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In the run-up to the Iraq invasion, and in the years since, some journalists have, indeed, 
done insightful, somewhat utilitarian work. And some continue to do so, despite the continued 
hazards and difficulties associated with the beat, and the public’s general lack of interest about 
the ongoing wars involving U.S. military. For example, exactly one year before the 2001 terrorist 
attacks, Mother Jones magazine reported on several government agency reports to conclude that 
the millions of dollars spent under the Clinton and Bush administrations to prepare for a high-
tech, chemical or biological weapon terror incident represented a gigantic waste of taxpayer 
funds that didn’t address research-based threat analyses – and represented serious threats to civil 
liberties as well. “There is no question that some of the government’s counterterrorism efforts 
make perfect sense ... But those bricks-and-mortar projects make up a small fraction of the 
antiterrorism bonanza” (Dreyfuss, 2000, para. 25) – as they do with urban crime prevention 
budgets as well (Lurie, 2019). Instead, one internal audit complained instead that most of the 
spending was “taking place in the absence of sound threat and risk assessment ... What is 
important is the very critical distinction between what is conceivable or possible and what is 
likely” (para. 30). And what is most likely are “the human security consequences of conventional 
arms ... [which] can range from ... death and injury, to indirect effects, such as the inability to 
return home” (Stohl & Grillot, 2009, p. 119).  
A year later, the hijackers carried out the very kind of “comparatively low-budget affairs” 
(para. 15) Mother Jones had warned were more likely – by focusing on the nature of the specific 
threat to security, and the proposed response. Unfortunately, much of the media still tend to 
focus on high-tech, high-visibility, high-fear (and low-probability) weaponry, even after the pre-
9/11 and pre-2003 coverage failures, as this very utilitarian statement accuses:  
While headlines describing the dire threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)  
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often dominate the front pages of daily papers, conventional weapons deals often escape  
notice. But these weapons cause a far more deadly and current threat – one responsible  
for hundreds of thousands of deaths a year. Around the globe, people’s lives are being  
irrevocably changed by the effects of guns, tanks and missiles. (Stohl & Grillot, pp. 1-2)  
Recent trends in utilitarianism might better inform war correspondence.  
Finding a way through the moral and ethical arguments has never been more challenging  
than it is today, as we hear British politicians arguing that the 10,000 civilian Iraqis dead  
from our latest intervention are in some way acceptable in the light of Saddam Hussein's  
much greater atrocities. (Garden, 2004, p. 48)  
Similarly, as the war in Iraq ground on, enterprising war correspondents increasingly 
challenged official claims justifying the invasion, often asking questions of a distinctly utilitarian 
nature. In one example, USA Today published an investigative report on the Pentagon’s 
continuing failure to provide armored MRAP vehicles, instead of “death trap” Humvees, despite 
years of requests from troops and commanders seeking safety from the “makeshift bombs [that] 
are the No. 1 killer of U.S. forces” (Eisler, Morrison & Vanden Brook, 2007, para. 10). Another 
USA Today report found that a majority of IEDs encountered in Afghanistan, while homemade, 
included important ingredients made in U.S.-allied Pakistan (Vanden Brook, 2011). In both 
cases, a focus on the nature of a threat, and the inadequate responses to it, provided real utility 
for citizens seeking to better understand those wars. And throughout the war, various media 
outlets reported on its mounting human toll.  
More recently, a number of stories – such as one in the Washington Post, detailing health 
issues related to pricey, substandard subcontractor maintenance of housing at military bases 
(Horton, 2019), another from ProPublica, detailing the layers of neglect and degraded training 
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that led to two separate U.S. Navy warship collisions in 2017, nine weeks apart, that killed 17 
sailors (Faturechi, Rose & Miller, 2019), another from The New York Times, working through 
hundreds of hours of research, interviews, and file photos to conclusively name a dying U.S. 
Marine captured in an iconic Life magazine photo taken a half-century ago during the Tet 
Offensive (Shaw, 2019), and another from Times, chronicling the career and memorial service of 
a female Navy Chief recently killed in Syria (Ismay, (2019) – each focused in detail on issues of 
sustainable security, justice, community and utility in ways that Mill would certainly have 
appreciated – and brought attention to significant yet overlooked issues lurking perennially just 
under the surface of the military beat. Similarly, recent legal research on an international land 
mine ban (cf. Rizer, 2012) invokes similar constructs, and provides further avenues of story 
development  
Though it is not possible to determine the guiding principles of articles like these without 
interviewing the reporters and editors involved, the outcome – the consequence – of their work 
does meet some utilitarian goods suggested by recent trends in the tradition. And a military 
correspondent could do much worse than to incorporate, for example, Shaw’s Utilitarian War 
Principle (2011, 2014, 2016) as an ad Bellum basic tenet, to incorporate Shaw’s suggestion that 
just war theory concerns be treated as “as secondary moral principles” under a utilitarian 
umbrella (2011, p. 382), to consider Millian elements of justice as keys to a more complete 
utilitarian ethic (Elliott, 2007), and to consider larger issues of community and moral quality in 
identifying and pursuing news (Peck, 2006).  
Nevertheless, because “war has been perhaps the most consequential enterprise in human 
history” (Jenkins, 2017, p. 963), and “leaders have often rationalized the wars they wished to 
fight by spurious appeals to the greater good” (Shaw, 2011, p. 308), I propose that media ethics 
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scholars as well as journalism practitioners seeking to “tell the stories of peace and war alike” 
(Davis, 1930, p. 3) in the service of “public enlightenment” (Society, 2014, para. 1) might 
profitably reconsider Mill’s own definition of “the summum bonum” (1863, p. 1) as security. In 
light of his exploration of this definition in Utilitarianism, a more fully Millian ad Bellum war 
coverage approach must begin with his definition of security before incorporating these other 
very valuable and most useful approaches to his work. Mill’s focus on security speaks directly to 
the concerns expressed in 2003 by the both the Bush administration and the reporters who 
covered it, and offers five vantage points from which to examine those claims that led to a war 
that most agree failed to satisfy those same claims in the long run. These represent Mill’s aspects 
of security as invoking his conceptions of the distinct aspects of Threat, Safety and Stability, 
Justice, Community, and Utility.  
A Millian “Security-&-Justice-for-All” focus should inform war correspondence.  
I would give an arm never to have come here ... Never to have seen that. Your windows  
make it impossible for me to hate the enemy I have known all my life; they present me  
with another that turns my legs to water. (Harrison, 1971, p. 120)  
So, in an age of drastic changes to the nature of war itself, decreasing news media 
resources and increasing journalistic challenges, how would a more completely Millian war 
correspondent approach the fraught ad Bellum debate, and all that goes with it? What larger 
questions are implied by his definitions of security, justice, community, and utility – and what 
more detailed questions would follow? As with Harrison’s battle-weary hero, every change and 
challenge forces the practitioner to return to the basic concept of security.  
From Mill’s definition of security, I propose five guiding Millian Security Principles that 
should help to focus ad Bellum coverage more completely and effectively:  
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(1) Threat: Security protects against a vital, existential threat;  
(2) Safety & Stability: Security preserves safety and stability;  
(3) Justice: Security promotes justice;  
(4) Community: Security produces community; and  
(5) Utility: Security practices utility.  
A summary of these Principles, their definitions, and their corresponding Guiding 
Questions appear at the end of this study as Appendix A.  
MSP 1: Threat: Security protects against a vital, existential threat. Based on this review 
of the literature, and my reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism and his focus on security as the most 
vital of all interests, I propose that, first, Millian ad Bellum reporting should focus on security as 
protection against a vital, existential threat. For Mill, a true security, “the most vital of all 
interests,” protects against “a violation of a right,” a definite threat to “the very groundwork of 
our existence” (1863, pp. 66-67). Investigative reporting following this focal point should 
include questions about the specific nature of the perceived security threat in this particular 
situation, the identification of whose specific security may be threatened by this particular action, 
and the identification of who, specifically, may be threatening anyone’s security in this particular 
situation. This principle addresses the situation at hand, or nearly at hand, and seeks specific 
identities of harms, harmed, and harmful actors. 
After Shaw’s UWP (2011, 2014, 2016), this principle reflects the essential ad Bellum 
utilitarian calculus that very narrowly allows for very rare justifications of war. Also, as he 
suggested, it could be further focused to address several just war theory tenets as secondary 
moral principles, especially four of the seven jus ad Bellum criteria of Just cause, Competent 
authority, Right intention, and Comparative justice. It could also address, from the beginning, 
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issues related to two of the three jus in Belo criteria of Discrimination and Necessity, as well as 
any or all five of the jus post Bellum criteria of post-war Discrimination, Rights-based respect, 
post-war Proportionality, Compensatory Discrimination and Proportionality, and Rehabilitation 
and Re-Education – before war is even declared. Further, it could be profitably focused on any or 
all of Elliott’s five Millian principles of justice: legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise 
keeping, and impartial treatment (2007). Finally, it could easily include consideration of any or 
all of Peck’s three considerations of balancing competing values, differentiating quality of 
actions, and public service (2006).  
Grounded in Mill’s definition of security as protection against a vital, existential threat, 
and further informed by recent scholarship in war and media utilitarian ethics, I operationalize 
this first principle for research purposes as suggesting at least these three Security Guiding 
Questions:  
1. What is the specific nature of the perceived security threat in this particular action?  
2. Whose specific security is actually being threatened by this particular action?  
3. Who, specifically, is threatening anyone’s security in this particular instance?  
MSP 2: Safety & Stability: Security preserves safety and stability. Second, Millian ad 
Bellum reporting should focus on the idea that security preserves both immediate safety and 
long-term future stability. For Mill, a true and lasting security is one that preserves both the 
present safety, “all our immunity from evil,” as well as an ongoing and enduring future stability, 
“the whole value of every good ... beyond the passing moment” (p. 67). A Millian response to 
any invoked threat to security, then, would interrogate both the nature and duration of that threat, 
as well as the long-term outcome(s) of any proposed defense. This principle addresses the 
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proposed response to the threat, and seeks specific mitigations of potential harms, on behalf of 
the potentially harmed, through specific immunity from potentially harmful actors.  
This investigative stance should generate specific questions about the propriety and 
utility of proposed responses to the identified threat on behalf of the identified at-risk parties and 
the identified risk creators in this situation. Included among such questions should be inquiries 
about how a proposed response would specifically preserve the community’s present safety, as 
well as how it would preserve its enduring stability.  
Incorporating Shaw’s UWP (2011, 2014, 2016), this second principle also could be 
further focused by addressing any one or more of several congruent just war theory tenets as 
secondary moral principles, especially six of the seven jus ad Bellum criteria of Just cause, Right 
intention, Comparative justice, Proportionality of ends, Probability of success, and Last resort. It 
could also address the three jus in Belo criteria of Discrimination, Proportionality of means, and 
Necessity, as well as any or all five of the jus post Bellum criteria of post-war Discrimination, 
Rights-based respect, post-war Proportionality, Compensatory Discrimination and 
Proportionality, and Rehabilitation and Re-Education. Further, it could invoke any or all five of 
Elliott’s principles of Millian justice: legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise keeping, and 
impartial treatment (2007). Finally, it might also be informed by either or both of Peck’s 
considerations of balancing competing values, and public service (2006).  
Grounded in Mill’s definition of security as a preservation of both present safety and 
future stability, and further informed by recent scholarship in war and media utilitarian ethics, I 
operationalize this second principle for research purposes as suggesting at least these two 
Security Guiding Questions:  
4. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s present safety?  
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5. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s enduring stability?  
MSP 3: Justice: Security promotes justice. Third, Millian ad Bellum reporting should 
focus on the foundational rights-based argument that security promotes justice, not only during 
and after military action, but most importantly before. For Mill, a truly moral security promotes 
justice: both in pursuit of present safety to deter or “repel” unjust harm, as well as in service of 
future stability to “retaliate / punish” for “a violation” (pp. 62-63; p. 66). Mill’s conception of 
security emerges from his three-part utilitarian construction of justice: first, the identification of 
“a violation of a right” (p. 66); second, the identification of some “person who is wronged” (p. 
61); and third, a “desire to punish a person who has done harm” (p. 62). Therefore, a more fully 
Millian test of any security claim would seek to clearly identify its injustice(s), victim(s), and 
perpetrator(s). This principle addresses the various legal, moral, and ethical rights invoked in a 
proposed response to the threat, and seeks equitable justice for all involved.  
 This approach should begin with questions related to claims of injustices that threaten 
security, as well as questions about the nature of the eventual goal of justice to be pursued by a 
proposed military response. Included among these questions could be those asking how a 
proposed military response would specifically promote justice related to the community’s 
immediate, present safety, as well as those asking how a proposed military response would 
specifically promote justice in the community’s enduring stability.  
In addition to possible incorporation of Shaw’s UWP (2011, 2014, 2016), this principle 
also could incorporate focus on a number of just war theory tenets as secondary moral principles, 
as Shaw suggests, especially any or all seven of the jus ad Bellum criteria: Just cause, Competent 
authority, Right intention, Comparative justice, Proportionality of ends, Probability of success, 
and Last resort. Additionally, it could be addressed on any or all three jus in Belo criteria: 
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Discrimination, Proportionality of means, and Necessity, as well as as many as four of the five 
jus post Bellum criteria: post-war Discrimination, Rights-based respect, post-war Proportionality, 
and Compensatory Discrimination and Proportionality. Further, it could invoke any or all five of 
Elliott’s Millian principles of justice: legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise keeping, and 
impartial treatment (2007). Finally, it could include a focus on Peck’s considerations of 
balancing competing values (2006).  
Grounded in Mill’s definition of security as promoting justice, and further informed by 
recent scholarship in war and media utilitarian ethics, I operationalize this third principle for 
research purposes as suggesting at least these two Security Guiding Questions:  
6. How would this proposed response specifically promote justice for anyone’s present  
safety?  
7. How would this proposed response specifically promote justice for anyone’s enduring  
stability?  
MSP 4: Community: Security produces community. Fourth, Millian ad Bellum reporting 
should focus on his call to community to ensure security, to define justice, and to defend both – 
which, as Mill saw, speaks to a visceral “collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind, in 
such a manner that any act hurtful to them, raises his instinct of sympathy, and urges him to 
resistance” (p. 63). Indeed, for Mill, a truly useful security produces community: in seeking both 
the present safety of “our fellow-creatures” (pp. 61, 67) and in seeking a future stability of “the 
general good” (pp. 63-64) for all involved parties – including the threatening party as well, a 
moral concept congruent with just war theory. Reporting from this principle should include 
questions about the present and future well-being of all involved, especially asking how any 
proposed military response would specifically promote the present safety of all involved parties, 
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as well as how any proposed military response would specifically promote an enduring future 
stability of all involved parties – collateral damage, civilians, and enemy included. This principle 
addresses the various state, organizational, command, shared and designated responsibility, and 
group identity issues invoked in a proposed response to the threat, and seeks stable community 
for all involved.  
Therefore, Mill’s “right makes might” approach to security through justice rests upon a 
clear call to community throughout: Justice is “the claim we have on our fellow-creatures to join 
in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence” (p. 67). Citing Bentham’s 
“everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one” dictum (p. 76), Mill posits that a basic 
“unity with our fellow” (p. 33; cf. p. 38, p. 40) is what “urges [us] to resistance ... It is natural to 
resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done ... against ourselves, or against those with whom 
we sympathise” (p. 63). In fact, it is this very communal “instinct ... of self-defence” (p. 63) that 
public appeals to arms often seek to engage in their ad Bellum justifications!  
Besides considering the community aspects implied in Shaw’s UWP (2011, 2014, 2016), 
this principle also could be focused upon any one of several just war theory tenets as secondary 
moral principles, especially these five of the seven jus ad Bellum criteria: Just cause, Competent 
authority, Proportionality of ends, Probability of success, and Last resort. It could also aim to 
address any or all of the three jus in Belo criteria: Discrimination, Proportionality of means, and 
Necessity, and especially any one or all five of the jus post Bellum criteria: post-war 
Discrimination, Rights-based respect, post-war Proportionality, Compensatory Discrimination 
and Proportionality, and Rehabilitation and Re-Education. Further, it could incorporate any or all 
of Elliott’s five Millian principles of justice: legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise 
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keeping, and impartial treatment (2007). Finally, it could be focused to include Peck’s 
considerations of public service (2006).  
Grounded in Mill’s definition of security as producing community, and further informed 
by recent scholarship in war and media utilitarian ethics, I operationalize this fourth principle for 
research purposes as suggesting at least these two Security Guiding Questions:  
8. How would this proposed response specifically promote the present safety of all  
involved parties – and their larger communities?  
9. How would this proposed response specifically promote the enduring stability of  
all involved parties – and their larger communities?  
MSP 5: Utility: Security practices utility. Fifth, and finally, Millian ad Bellum reporting 
should focus on the the tradition’s core value of rational, practical, evidence-based utility in 
considering questions of security and military action – especially before such action, but also 
during and after such action, as in the just war tradition, insisting on tangible and compelling 
benefits to come only from uniquely significant harms. The burden of proof is upon those calling 
for war, not those opposing it, because of the immense harms and limited benefits most wars 
have been proven to cause. For Mill, a true and enduring security finally must satisfy strict 
utility: seeking an ideal, just, and effective deterrence; promoting the greatest quality, and not 
just quantity, of general good and least harm for all involved parties; and representing the single 
best available option in the present situation, given historical experience and contexts as well as 
all foreseeable present and future consequences. Utilitarian investigative reporting should focus 
on carefully seeking the single, best-defensible option for action that produces the greatest 
foreseeable degree of freedom and security, and affords the greatest foreseeable good, for the 
greatest foreseeable number of people, both for the present as well as for the future. This 
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principle addresses the various arguments for and against a proposed response to the threat, and 
seeks specific, logical, empirical justifications for harms in light of expected goods for all those 
involved.  
Informed by Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle (2011, 2014, 2016) and Elliott’s justice-
based Utilitarian Decision Tree (2007), several utilitarian calculus questions emerge. First, a 
reporter should ask how any proposed military response would specifically deter or “repel” this 
perceived threat with maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties, including a 
consideration of history and all foreseeable consequences. Second, a reporter should ask how any 
proposed military response would truly represent the only action available at present that would 
foreseeably promote the greatest expected well-being for all involved parties, including historical 
context and thorough evaluation of all possible alternatives. Finally, a reporter should ask how 
all involved parties would be tangibly and significantly harmed if any proposed military response 
were not undertaken – again, including thorough consideration of historical experience as well as 
all foreseeable present and future consequences.  
This final principle most closely reflects Shaw’s UWP (2011, 2014, 2016) itself, and  
also could be focused to incorporate, as he suggests, several just war theory tenets as secondary 
moral principles, especially three of the seven jus ad Bellum criteria: Just cause, Probability of 
success, and Last resort; additionally, it could address any of the last of the three jus in Belo 
criteria, Necessity, as well as any or all five jus post Bellum criteria: post-war Discrimination, 
Rights-based respect, post-war Proportionality, Compensatory Discrimination and 
Proportionality, and Rehabilitation and Re-Education. Further, it could be used to assume any or 
all of Elliott’s five Millian principles of justice: legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise 
keeping, and impartial treatment (2007). Finally, it can extend the application of any or all of 
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Peck’s three utilitarian considerations of balancing competing values, differentiating quality of 
actions, and public service (2006).  
Grounded in Mill’s definition of security as practicing utility, and further informed by 
recent scholarship in war and media utilitarian ethics, I operationalize this fifth and final 
principle for research purposes as suggesting at least these three Security Guiding Questions:  
10. Action: How would this proposed response specifically deter or “repel” this  
perceived threat with maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties –  
including historical contexts and foreseeable consequences?  
11. Inaction: How would all involved parties be harmed if the proposed response were  
not undertaken – including historical experience as well as foreseeable present and  
future consequences?  
12. Millian Security Calculus: How would this proposed response represent the only  
action available that would foreseeably promote the greatest expected well-being and  
least expected harm for all involved parties – including historical contexts and all  
possible alternatives?  
While not conclusive, these five principles – and the dozen guiding questions they imply 
– should offer a starting point for reporters to begin to interrogate, from a distinctly Millian 
“Security-&-Justice-for-All” stance, any governmental or public calls for war. And, while I 
believe this approach offers a significant contribution to addressing gaps in the military ethics 
literature, the media ethics literature, and to normative press theory, I especially believe this 
approach should address specific elements in the self-critique by the Times editors of their own 
pre-Iraq invasion coverage in 2003. What were those questions the Times failed to ask (From, 
2004a; Greenslade, 2004; Hülsen & Stark, 2015; Monbiot, 2005; Shaw, 2011, 2014, 2016)?  
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For the next part of this study, we shift from the normative question of “How should a 
Millian Security-&-Justice-for-All ad Bellum reporter operate?” to the analytical question of 
“How did the Times reporters and editors address these Millian Security Principles in their 
investigation, coverage, and self-critique – or not? by applying this Millian instrument.  
What would J. S. Mill ask? “Security-&-Justice-for-All” research questions.  
But for all the benefits served by the institution of war, modern wars are deeply tragic;  
they do waste millions of innocent lives; they tear apart societies and disburse homeless  
families across the globe. … Ultimately the greatest tragedy of modern war lies in its  
stark utility to the few at the extreme expenditure of its many.  
(Hamblet, 2005, pp. 44-45)  
Philosophers from the earliest English utilitarians to the present have questioned war’s 
utility; armed with a revisionist Millian framework, present and future war correspondents might 
more effectively ask these essential questions whenever anyone calls for war. The first part of 
this study seeks to address gaps in the war and media ethics literature by suggesting a set of five 
Millian Security Principles, drawn from my reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism and his definition of 
security as the greatest good, which seeks lasting justice by way of communal action. The second 
part of this exploratory study will apply this approach to selected examples of the 2002-2004 
coverage identified as problematic by the Times editors, testing its utility in both critiquing their 
reportage and critique, as well as informing future inquiry.  
In the public debate surrounding the justification for a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, 
public servants made numerous appeals to security, and the press repeated them (Bostdorff, 
2011; Bradford, 2004; Bumiller, 2002; Bush, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; From, 2004a; From, 
2004b; Hülsen & Stark, 2015; Kalb, 2001; Lule, 2002; Purdum, 2003; Rao, 2016; Risen, 2018; 
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Singer, 2004; Susskind, 2004). So, what did the Times staff ask about these appeals? What did 
they fail to ask about them? And what answers did they find to the questions they did ask? The 
five Millian Security Principles inform five research questions to consider here:  
RQ 1: How did the Times address security as protection against a vital, existential 
threat? In their coverage of the arguments in favor of invading Iraq in 2003, reporters dealt with 
both explicit statements as well as implicit references to a specific threat of injurious action (by 
banned WMD), a specific party threatened by such action (the United States and its allies), and a 
specific actor who threatens the existing security (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq regime, acting in 
concert with terrorists). For Mill, a legitimate threat first encompassed “any conduct which 
threatens the security” (1863, p. 63), or “a wrong done” (p. 61), including threats to rights, 
goods, and one’s existence itself. Second, Mill emphasized the importance of identifying “some 
assignable person who is [or may be] wronged” (p. 61). Finally, he also identified the “person 
who has done harm” (p. 63) or “those who infringe the rule” (p. 65) – or those who might.  
RQ 1 includes three secondary questions implied by this first principle:  
1. What is the specific nature of the perceived security threat to the U.S. from Iraq?  
2. Whose specific security is threatened by Iraq in this particular situation?  
3. Who, specifically, is threatening the nation’s security in this particular instance?  
So, how did the Times staff cover governmental and public discussion of actual and 
potential actions that would foreseeably cause undue restriction, loss, injury or death, as well as 
the careful identification of threatened victims and threatening perpetrators?  
RQ 2: How did the Times address security as preserving safety and stability? In their 
coverage of potential threats to U.S. security, as described by administration officials in support 
of a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq, Times reporters covered official pronouncements that both 
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explicitly stated and implicitly referenced elements of an impending threat to U.S. security in 
terms of both immediate, present safety as well as ongoing and enduring future stability. These 
included descriptions of primary and secondary effects of potential Iraqi action as well as of 
proposed U.S. actions, as well as considerations of several foreseeable future consequences, both 
intended and unintended. These also included consideration of the loss of tangible defenses of 
previous and present U.S. security as well as the intrusion of tangible threats to present and 
future national security. These debates included discussion of safe water sources, food supplies, 
emergency shelter, medicine, transportation, and livelihood, as well as concerns over hazardous 
conditions, materials, and persons considered to represent a threat to American citizens.  
RQ 2 includes two secondary questions implied by this second principle:  
4. How would this invasion of Iraq specifically preserve anyone’s present safety?  
5. How would this invasion of Iraq specifically preserve anyone’s enduring and future  
stability?  
So, how did the Times staff cover governmental and public discussion of actual and 
potential actions that would foreseeably preserve national security immediately, as well as in the 
future, in light of the proposed pre-emptive invasion of Iraq in 2003?  
RQ 3: How did the Times address security as promoting justice? In covering the many 
appeals to justice and international law invoked in administration arguments in favor of invasion, 
Times reporters heard statements that explicitly stated or implicitly referenced the just 
preservation of, or unjust deprivation of, individual and group rights, for both U.S. and Iraqi 
citizens, as well as the just retribution or punishment for injury – in this case, Iraq’s alleged 
refusal to desist from producing and stockpiling WMD. Millian security through justice 
addresses present and future stability. “To have a right ... is ... to have something which society 
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ought to defend me in the possession of,” Mill wrote (1863, p. 66). After Elliott (2007), Millian 
justice includes concepts of legality, morality, merit, fidelity, fairness and impartiality, proper 
authority, ethical prudence, rational defense, and justification for response. These often appeared 
in discussions of universal human rights, state-defined civil rights, morality, laws, guides, 
treaties, community traditions and expectations, agency and authority, personal and corporate 
responsibility, mutual respect, transparency, and shared decision making.  
RQ 3 includes two secondary questions implied by this third principle:  
6. How would this invasion of Iraq specifically promote justice for present safety?  
7. How would this invasion of Iraq specifically promote justice for an enduring U.S. 
stability?  
So, how did the Times staff cover governmental and public discussion of actual and 
potential actions that would foreseeably promote justice immediately, as well as sustainably into 
the future, in light of the proposed invasion?  
RQ 4: How did the Times address security as producing community? In covering the 
often-heard appeals to national identity, shared sacrifice, and democratic ideals invoked in the 
public debate over the proposed 2003 invasion, Times reporters repeated many official explicit 
statements about, and implicit references to, what Mill called the “community of interest 
between himself and the human society of which he forms a part, such that any conduct which 
threatens the security of the society generally, is threatening to his own” (p. 63). For Mill, this 
involved both “the claim we have on our fellow-creatures” for mutual defense (p. 67) as well as 
the “defence of others” (p. 75), including “those with whom we sympathise” (p. 63), “through, or 
in common with, society at large” (p. 64). His definition of communal, and not individual, moral 
“vengeance” (p. 75) is through “subordination of it to the social sympathies” (p. 64). This 
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included appeals to both national and human identity, as well as discussions of present and future 
local, state, regional, national and international alliances, the common defense, U.S. homeland 
security, law, ethics, duty, race, ethnicity, and even religion (p. 63).  
RQ 4 includes two secondary questions implied by this fourth principle:  
8. How would this invasion specifically promote the present safety of all involved – and  
their larger communities?  
9. How would this invasion specifically promote the enduring stability of all  
involved parties – and their larger communities – as well?  
So, how did the Times staff cover governmental and public discussion of actual and 
potential actions that would foreseeably promote the safety of all involved, both local and 
international communities, as well as sustainably into the future, in light of the proposed 
invasion? What about “collateral damage?” Civilians? Enemy combatants? Iraq itself?  
RQ 5: How did the Times address security as practicing utility? In its coverage of the 
2003 pre-invasion debate, the Times published numerous accounts of administration appeals to 
security that invoked utilitarian precepts, though largely unacknowledged and incomplete. While 
sometimes making reference to the cost and sacrifice of war, arguments relied on an underlying 
inference that something worse was sure to affect U.S. security if the nation did not invade Iraq, 
depose Mr. Hussein, and secure all WMD. In his consideration of the Civil War, Mill 
acknowledged that there are worse evils for a nation than war (Mill, 1862a); however, in that and 
other passages elsewhere, it is clear that he would only support war when it represented the 
single, best-defensible option for action that would foreseeably produce the greatest degree of 
freedom and security, and the greatest good, for the greatest number of people, both in the 
present situation at the time as well as in the future. Mill’s philosophy, as explained in 
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Utilitarianism (1863), is thoroughly grounded in concepts of universal equality, justice, 
community, and minimizing harm. For Mill, consideration of any action must always include 
reasoned contextual situation within “the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and 
present, and their prospects in the future” (p. 17); such consideration must therefore become 
clearly “a question of fact and experience, dependent ... upon evidence” (p. 49). This would 
include discussion of expected outcomes of suggested actions and possible alternatives, 
estimating effects on all involved parties, weighing costs and benefits, seeking precedent as well 
as appealing to principle, and acting in a transparent manner to justify its reasoning. Ultimately, 
the utilitarian calculus must rule: “Social utility alone can decide the preference” between 
individual and communal costs and benefits, he insisted (p. 72).  
RQ 5 includes three utilitarian-calculus questions implied by this fifth principle:  
10. Gain: How would this proposed invasion specifically deter or “repel” this perceived  
threat with maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties – including  
historical context and foreseeable consequences?  
11. Harm: How would all involved parties be harmed if the proposed invasion were not  
undertaken – including historical experience as well as all foreseeable present and future  
consequences?  
12. Millian Security Calculus: How would this proposed invasion represent the only  
action available that would foreseeably promote the greatest expected well-being for all  
involved parties – including historical contexts and all possible alternatives?  
Because war is unique among human activities (Walzer, 1977), journalists often lack a 
useful paradigm for comprehensive coverage of armed conflict. When societies go to war, 
whatever everyday journalistic practices may have been expected or even realized in those 
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societies are challenged by conflict’s perennial problems, including the traditional complexities 
of the military beat and its accompanying politics; the inherent dangers and logistical difficulties 
of battlefield reporting; the chaotic and unpredictable nature of armed conflict; and the 
temptations of commercial appeal, propaganda, nationalism and other biases.  
Further, newly emerging complications driven by industry downsizing, new-media-
machine news cycle demands, a shrinking world-news hole, a taste for feature over policy 
stories, a disappearing audience, and the chilling effect of nationalism further exacerbate the 
wartime journalist’s already impossible assignment and narrow the compass of actual coverage 
to what is most feasible, least expensive, and most palatable to the mass audience. My reading of 
Mill, and my subsequent proposal of five Millian Security Principles, might help journalists 
better report on the crucial ad Bellum debate for waging war. This study will apply these 
principles in considering The New York Times’ 2003 pre-invasion coverage.  
Applying the Millian Security Principles: Exploratory study methodology  
The unprecedented actions of the 2003 Times editors in critiquing their own pre-invasion 
coverage represent a similarly rare opportunity for the media ethics scholar to examine both the 
material artifacts of the journalism practice as well as the professional processes and values of 
the practitioners themselves. This exploratory study analyzes the sample of Times coverage 
provided by the editors, in light of my five Millian Security Principle categories.  
The importance of The New York Times as an object of research has long been 
established, and these particular articles provide a unique window into the particular ad Bellum 
narrative that surrounded the 2003 invasion. A century after 15 British poets reacted to the Great 
War’s awful birth in 1914, we, too, have some serious questions – at least five, for starters – for 
“who lit the fire accurst that flames to-day” (Watson, 1914, p. 11).  
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“Security-&-Justice-for-All” education seeks to establish utilitarian good  
“Doing research, in the ... social sciences, always involves bringing together three sets of 
things ... [the] Substantive ... Conceptual ... and Methodological domain[s] ... [or] content ... 
ideas ... and some techniques or procedures” (McGrath, 1994, p. 152; Baran & Davis, 2000; 
Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). In a sense, exploring the initial question of “What would J. S. Mill 
ask?” in an academic context would also invoke the concurrent questions “Who would J. S. Mill 
ask?” as well as “How would J. S. Mill ask?”  
In this exploratory study, the substantive domain consists of the 29 articles identified by 
the Times editors as a representative sample of their problematic pre-invasion coverage (From, 
2004b). The conceptual domain includes ideas developed from the literature review, grounded in 
my reading of Mill’s conception of security as the most vital interest, into the resulting five 
Millian Security Principles, and their dozen guiding questions, to be applied to the sample.  
As indicated for an exploratory study where little is known beforehand, this project 
employs an Ethnographic Content Analysis, a research method “promising for rigorous 
exploration of many important but difficult-to-study issues” (Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer, 2007, p. 
5; Altheide, 1987) – such as those evident in the fraught ad Bellum narrative in the Times.  
Substantive content for study: Times editors’ sample comprises data  
That perception [of pre-Internet influence], as well as the reality of the Times’  
dominance on the media landscape, remains intact today ... Because of this national  
influence and its reputation as the nation’s newspaper of record based on its detailed,  
thorough reportage – particularly in foreign affairs. (Hallock, 2012, p. 13)  
The data sample for this exploratory study was “already bounded by some existing public 
discourse – newspaper coverage of a controversial issue” (Pauly, 1991, pp. 11-12): in this case, 
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the 29 particular Times stories surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as provided by the editors 
in a list of sample coverage they found problematic. “Focusing on a symbolically significant ... 
event clears a space” for analysis (Pauly), and there may be no more intrinsically significant 
state-level debate than the one debating a decision to wage war, and how to conduct one (Shaw, 
2014). In this data, we find a publicly mediated discourse that often addressed issues of security, 
in a practice described in one qualitative document analysis of crime news coverage as 
combining societal “values and journalistic presentations to constitute a discourse of fear” 
(Altheide et al, 2001, p. 306).  
Further, because the “Times already was long established as the preeminent national 
newspaper” (Lule, 2002, p. 275), these specific data illuminate exemplary professional 
journalism products as well as the best practices of an industry vanguard. Just before the new 
media revolution took hold, newspapers were largely seen as “the voice ... for local and national 
news in our country” (Sturm, 1996, p. 24) – and at that time, the “front page of The New York 
Times is still the benchmark ... even in today’s media-soaked age” (Miller, 1998, p. 2). And, 
though U.S. daily newspaper circulation peaked in 1984, in 1978, at “the zenith of the press’s 
power and health” (Verducci, 2018, p. 100) a press strike in New York City may have actually 
changed the course of the final months of that year’s professional baseball season and enabled 
the eventual championship run of the New York Yankees. “With its annual haul of Pulitzer 
Prizes, The New York Times is a journalistic giant and a national treasure” wrote one industry 
analyst a quarter-century after that circulation peak (Grover, 2009, para. 6).  
By 2017, fewer than half as many people were reading newspapers” (Verducci, 2018); 
however, the Times still represents “the nation’s elite press” (Hallock, 2012, p. xiii); it “often sets 
the agenda for what’s covered and discussed by everyone else” (Braver, 2011, para. 5; Althaus & 
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Tewksbury, 2002; Marshall, 1998; Socolow, 2010) – and reflects the nature of the larger society 
as well (Hollander, 2014). The newspaper “remains No. 1 in overall reach of U.S. opinion 
leaders” (Media, 2017, para. 1), and its digital edition regularly reaches some 125 million unique 
online readers wordwide (Media, 2018, para. 1). Therefore, scholars often study the Times as 
both a source of data itself and as a reference for issues such as politics, war coverage, and media 
ethics (Anderson, 2006; Choi, Watt & Lynch, 2006; Ferrari & Tobin, 2003; Folkenflik, 2011; 
Foreman, 2016; Hakanen & Nikolaev, 2006; Hallock, 2012; Hülsen & Stark, 2015; Knightley, 
2004; Lule, 2002; Miller, 2002; Miller, 1998; Nacos, 2003; Risen, 2018; Ryan, 2004; Slone, 
2000). Finally, as “talk in, for, and about the media is itself behavior” (Pauly, p. 11), the data 
include the Times’ self-critique, and that of others.  
The stories selected to represent the newspaper’s significant Iraq war coverage at that 
time, selected from “hundreds of articles written during the prelude to war and into the early 
stages of the occupation” (From, 2004a, para. 2), began with an October 26, 2001 article 
detailing how an Iraqi agent may have met with terrorists, and ended with an April 8, 2004 
extended letter to the editor written by several of the correspondents involved in the coverage 
(From, 2004b). These 29 articles include examples of official information published with little 
corroboration as well as detailed reports that question the veracity of such claims. The original 
listing of sample articles includes links to archived copies of each one, available from the Times 
website. The listing represents a “sampling of articles published by The Times about the 
decisions that led the United States into the war in Iraq, and especially the issue of Iraq’s 
weapons” (From, 2004b, para. 1) – and thus speak directly to the heart of the ad Bellum debate, 
in public narratives invoking utility that Mill would recognize (1859a, 1859b, 1862a, 1863).  
Methodological approach: Times editors’ sample invites qualitative, ethnographic analysis  
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The ad Bellum debate strikes at the heart of individual and corporate feelings of security 
(Maslow, 1942, 1943; Mill, 1863), and invokes some of a society’s most intense and deeply held 
beliefs. Whether it’s the ancient shepherd boy summoning the village’s help when a wolf might 
threaten his flock (Aesop, 210), Bob Dylan judging government warmongers in utilitarian terms 
(1963), or the Times reporters in 2003, the issue of security strikes sure. Indeed: “Fear is one of 
the few perspectives that citizens share today; while liberals and conservatives may differ in their 
object of fear, all sides express many fears and point to ‘blameworthy’ sources-often each 
other!” (Altheide, 2002, p. 3). Further, “symbolic meanings about safety, danger, and fear can 
lead to major institutional changes and even war” (Altheide, 2017, p. x); unfortunately, in the 
end, these drive the discourse: “Much of risk communication is utility-bound and oriented to a 
control narrative to keep us safe” (Altheide, 2010, p. 147). Indeed: “Fear: she’s the mother of 
violence; You know self-defense is all you need” (Gabriel & Gabriel, 1978, Track 3). And, all 
too often, “Quick to judge, Quick to anger, Slow to understand: Ignorance and prejudice, And 
fear Walk hand in hand” (Peart, Weinrib & Zivojinovich, 1981). For the state officials who 
contemplate going to war, for the citizens who must bear the costs of waging war, for the 
journalists who attempt to cover these ongoing issues, and for the scholars who seek to make 
some sense of it all in war’s aftermath, some methodological distance becomes essential to let 
logic, and not fear, guide the analysis and understanding of the narrative and the events.  
Ethnographic Content Analysis grounds research in narrative. However, meanings in 
such fraught discourse may be coded or otherwise obscured from ready analysis (Carey, 2008; 
Pauly, 1991). Therefore, an ethnographic approach is indicated for capturing the nuances of this 
kind of narrative. Because the narrative data from these selected Times articles reflect “human 
beings engaged in meaningful behavior” as well as their “products of social interaction,” this 
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qualitative study adapts an Ethnographic Content Analysis for both “discovery” and 
“verification” of what these journalists – and the citizens of the larger community – truly valued 
(Altheide, 1987, pp. 66-67; 1985, 1996). “The most frequent type of news media–terrorism 
research uses content analysis” of newspapers (Ross, 2007, p. 219).  
As “ethnography offers a perspective for analysis of human action in the field and in 
documents” (p. 74), this approach may discover previously unidentified meanings that emerge 
from the newsroom “field” conversations as well as from the article “documents” themselves. Of 
the 29 samples selected by the Times editors (From, 2004b), 20 represent follow-up stories or 
reactions to, or revisions of, earlier reportage, providing a look at how a particular issue’s 
coverage might change over time. Another item represents a letter that the newspaper published. 
While this exploratory study does not have access to the actual newsroom and editorial board 
discussions surrounding these articles, the selections may reflect professional values in their 
evolving coverage. Further, the ethnographic approach allows us to superimpose similar 
narratives in adaptive, recursive ways: In this study, the emergent emphasis on security in 
strikingly consequentialist, just war, and even utilitarian terms evident in the national narrative 
invoked utilitarian and Millian narratives related to war, press freedom, and democracy that I in 
turn re-impose upon the Times data – as if Mill were a Times editor (cf Gade, 2000). In other 
words, as the Times editors invoked utilitarian themes in their self-critique (From, 2004a), I think 
it makes perfect sense to invite Mill into the conversation.  
Five-stage Qualitative Document Analysis guides recursive, reflexive research. In 
considering these data, this study applies Altheide’s (1987, 1996) five-stage Qualitative 
Document Analysis methodology, which “relies on the researcher’s interaction and involvement 
with documents selected for their relevance to a research topic” (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 
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39); such an approach reflects “the social, symbolic power of the words” being used (Lule, 2002, 
p. 276; Lule, 2001) and offers an effective tool for considering the pre-invasion national 
narrative as it was published in this country’s paper of record.  
Further, this method seeks nuance: “Implicit in this approach is to combine ‘how’ with 
‘what,’ as in ‘What was said?” (Altheide & Schneider, p. 40) – and, not said – as well as the 
reflexive nature of such discourse (Altheide, 2013b). As narrative in social context, news “offers 
the steady repetition of stories, the rhythmic recurrence of themes and events” (Lule, 2001, p. 
19); Altheide’s QDA provides a lens for discovering and identifying these.  
Altheide and other scholars have applied his QDA to several studies of mediated 
narrative involving fear-based appeals to security, including research on crime reporting 
(Altheide et al, 2001; Altheide, 2002), finance (Stögner & Bischof, 2018), political 
communication (Altheide, 2004), race (Nicole, 2017), school shootings (Altheide, 2009b), online 
threats of violence (Lumsden & Morgan, 2017), risk communication (Altheide, 2010), 
narrowcasting and activism (Atkinson & Leon Berg, 2012), shielding risk (Altheide, 2013a), 
terrorism (Altheide, 2017; Iqbal, 2017), and the Iraq invasion (Altheide, 2009a).  
QDA Stage 1: Times’ 2004 sample coverage selection comprises data. Altheide’s first 
stage, Document Identification and Selection, involved considering the Times initial reporting 
and subsequent self-critique. The unit of analysis is each article (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 
39). This stage includes becoming “familiar with several ... examples of relevant documents,” 
which may also suggest some initial concept or theme evident in the data (cf. Altheide, 2004). 
Initial familiarization with these data revealed significant evidence of consequentialist reasoning, 
both in the original coverage of official justification for war, as well as in the subsequent editors’ 
evaluations of the shortcomings of those justifications, the reporting, and the war’s outcomes at 
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that time (Bostdorff, 2011; Bradford, 2004; Bumiller, 2002; Bush, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; 
From, 2004a; From, 2004b; Hülsen & Stark, 2015; Kalb, 2001; Lule, 2002; Purdum, 2003; Rao, 
2016; Risen, 2018; Singer, 2004; Susskind, 2004).  
For my reading of Millian security, the data is the text of his 1863 Utilitarianism.  
QDA Step 1: Pursue a specific problem to be investigated. As directed by Altheide & 
Schneider (p. 39), I have identified the Times editors’ self-critique of problems they found in 
their 2003 pre-invasion coverage (From, 2004a). These problems involved the Times’ apparent 
lack of appropriate investigation into security-based claims by the administration as justification 
for its proposed invasion of Iraq. The prevalence of emphasis on security concerns by officials, 
and in news reports, often framed in consequentialist, just war, or utilitarian terms led me to 
revisit Mill’s Utilitarianism (1863) to consider his definition of security as the most vital interest, 
and how it might address some of the shortcomings in the Times’s coverage.  
QDA Step 2: Become familiar with the process and context of the information source. As 
directed by Altheide & Schneider (p. 39), and responding to the importance of the Times’s self-
critique, I examined several studies of the nation’s paper of record. The newspaper had, and still 
maintains, a significant presence in defense coverage, and published numerous articles about the 
plans to invade Iraq. I also used a constant comparison reading of Utilitarianism, and an 
extensive literature review of utilitarian research, to familiarize myself with Mill’s definition of 
security as the most vital interest, framed in terms of justice in community through utility.  
QDA Step 3: Become familiar with several examples of relevant documents. As directed 
by Altheide & Schneider (p. 39), I examined several Times stories about the ongoing pre-
invasion debate, in the format of the news story as published in the newspaper and on its website. 
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As directed, I selected the single article as the unit of analysis for this study. I also familiarized 
myself with a great deal of Millian literature and research.  
QDA Stage 2: Millian Security Principles comprise protocol categories. Altheide’s 
second stage, Protocol Development and Data Collection, begins with listing “several items or 
categories (variables) to guide data collection” (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 44).  
“Ethnographers approach a topic with a wealth of information and understanding about 
human behavior” (Altheide, 1987, p. 69); therefore, this scholar’s own experience and research 
in this field provides “a foundation in news procedures and perspectives which could be 
reflexively incorporated in a study.” This professional news media background enabled my 
initial look at the Times editors’ self-critique to reveal its consequentialist focus on national 
security. With this in mind, I turned to Mill’s Utilitarianism to provide categories, instead of 
deriving them from the Times coverage.  
QDA Step 4: List several items or categories (variables) to guide data collection. 
Adapting the QDA approach (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 44), this study grounded its initial 
“information and understanding” in a constant comparison reading (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
of Mill’s Utilitarianism, which surfaced several key consequentialist categories based on his 
conception of security as “the most vital of all interests” (Mill, 1863, p. 66). The study then 
refined these categories, incorporating relevant recent research on utilitarian thought in war 
philosophy (cf. Walzer, 2004; Gruzalski, 2006; Shaw, 2016) as well as in media ethics (cf. 
Christians, 2007; Elliott, 2007; Peck, 2006). Finally, the author focused these initial categories 
through his own “foundation in news procedures and perspectives” (Altheide, 1987, p. 69), 
drafting five main Millian Security Principles that in turn suggest 12 specific Millian Security 
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Questions. These formed my initial Coverage Research Protocol protocol, and were listed on a 
data collection sheet for use as a research instrument to examine the data.  
QDA Step 5: Test the protocol by collecting data from several documents. At this step, 
my study deviates somewhat from Altheide’s QDA (p. 44), in that it is my deep reading of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism (1863), and not the Times (2004) sample itself, that provides the bulk of the 
grounding for these initial categories and questions. The main product of this study is the Millian 
Security Principles model, and its pilot study of the Times sample is secondary. In order to test 
these five initial categories, I then applied them to sample Times data drawn from recent 
coverage of drone strikes in 2018 to test their relevance to security issues discussed in that 
coverage. I am now ready to move to study of the Times data set from 2003-2004.  
QDA Step 6: Revise the protocol, and select several additional cases to further refine the 
protocol. As directed by Altheide & Schneider (p. 44), I will apply this protocol to more sample 
war coverage articles to see if and where the instrument should be modified. In particular, pre-
invasion coverage from 2003 should provide opportunities for revision.  
QDA Stage 3: Reflexive coding provides organization and emergent issues. This first 
coding should also reveal an overall dominant Principle for each story, based on the number of 
paragraphs coded as bearing a primary influence from each of the 5 Principles. In a subsequent 
coding step, the protocol seeks to identify which Security Questions are addressed in each 
paragraph, and in what order of importance. This also may reveal which Security Questions are 
not being addressed, as the Times data surfaces its own suggested set of categories and themes.  
QDA Step 7: Arrive at a sampling rationale and strategy. Adapting Altheide’s third 
stage, Data Coding and Organization, these Principles will be used to initially code each 
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paragraph in the 29 items listed in the opportunistic Times sample (p. 54). This sample is relevant 
and bounded by practitioners’ valuations, and was selected by the editors.  
In reading Mill’s Utilitarianism, I searched his major writings, his collected works, and 
related literature in ethics and philosophy to surface a more complete and nuanced understanding 
of his thought. Security, justice, community, and utilitarian judgment all emerged as major 
themes in his philosophy, interconnected in ways not always appreciated in the literature or 
valuations of his contributions.  
QDA Step 8: Collect the data, using preset codes, and descriptive examples. 
Additionally, the protocol requires copying pertinent textual data to illustrate important elements 
in reporting. Finally, as Altheide’s reflexive method “is embedded in constant discovery,” the 
protocol also seeks to identify any previously unknown questions being addressed, so that initial 
categories “are allowed and expected to emerge throughout the study” (Altheide, 1987, p. 68; 
1982; 1985; 2004). This “midpoint analysis [will] permit emergence, refinement, or collapsing of 
additional categories” (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 62). My data collection for Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, and its definition of security, is complete; data collection for the Times articles for 
the exploratory section of this study remains incomplete. The revised data collection instrument 
appears at the end of this study as Appendix B.  
QDA Stage 4: Analysis includes coding, refinement, and contextualization. Altheide’s 
fourth stage, Data Analysis, conducts a qualitative content analysis that includes “conceptual 
refinement and data coding” (Altheide, 1987, p. 68). Then, the study is to “[c]ompare and 
contrast ‘extremes’ and ‘key differences’ within each category (p. 71). Notes are taken 
throughout, and combined into summaries of important findings. In this step, I expect the Times 
data to begin to reveal patterns of how its reportage addressed, or failed to address, each of the 
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Millian Security Principles and the dozen attendant questions that emerged from my deep 
reading of Utilitarianism.  
QDA Step 9: Perform data analysis, including conceptual refinement and data coding. 
During this process, the “researcher then searches through the text to find where those categories 
emerge and to examine the way the categories are depicted or constructed by the producer(s)” 
(Atkinson & Leon Berg, 2012, p. 523). For example, one QDA of the 2003 Iraq invasion 
narrative, drawing on administration as well as media discourse, found after several coding steps 
that several key pro-invasion “messages were systematically carried by major news media as a 
feature of a war programming narrative, which refers to the selective use of claims ... within a 
normative pattern, which includes occasional detractors to give the appearance of debate” 
(Altheide, 2009a, p. 21).  
Further, the researcher is to “read notes and data repeatedly and thoroughly” (Altheide & 
Schneider, 2013, p. 68). I have done this throughout the process.  
QDA Stage 5: Reporting situates each instance within the larger narrative. Finally, 
Altheide’s fifth stage, Reporting, combines these summaries with examples of each finding, 
including “the typical case as well as the extremes” (1987, p. 72). The study will also “[n]ote 
surprises and curiosities,” and will finally “[i]ntegrate the findings with your interpretation and 
key concepts” (p. 73). This process began with my initial integration of the emergent Millian 
Security Principles and the accompanying twelve questions with the original Times data.  
QDA Step 10: Compare and contrast within each category or item. As directed by 
Altheide & Schneider, I will “compare and contrast ‘extremes’ and ‘key differences’ within each 
category or item (p. 71). Further, I will “make textual notes [and] Write brief summaries or 
overviews of data for each category (variable).” 
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In this process, it is important to reflect the layered, multiple sources of meaning in the 
newspaper data itself. “The narrative structure of news reports reflects information technology, 
commercialism, and entertainment values, as well as official news sources that provide the 
majority of information” (Altheide, 2009b, p. 1355; Altheide & Snow, 1991).  
QDA Step 11: Combine the brief summaries. As directed by Altheide & Schneider, I will 
then “combine the brief summaries with an example of the typical case as well as the extremes. 
Illustrate with materials from the protocols for each case. Note surprises and curiosities about 
these cases and other materials in your data” (p. 72). These may align with the Millian Security 
Principles, or new, Times Security concepts may arise instead. The Millian principles and 
questions represent my initial combination of summaries of concepts that emerged from the 
constant comparison reading of Utilitarianism and related literature.  
QDA Step 12: Integrate the findings with interpretation and concepts. Finally, as directed 
by Altheide & Schneider (p. 73), I will summarize the findings for each article in a larger 
overview of the results, seeking patterns and points of significance within the data.  
“Grounding our assessments of the social world in qualitatively oriented research helps 
preserve the relevance and character of social life as a process of social interaction, even as we 
are able to capture it in analysis” through the Qualitative Data Analysis process (p. 73). In this 
study, I reflect the character of the Times editors’ self-critique in terms of security, as they 
interacted with the various administration officials, in light of what John Stuart Mill might have 
asked on their behalf, had he been in New York in 2003. I believe this analysis will capture 
examples of thorough work, as well as examples of incomplete work – and will also yield 
insights into how better to cover such ad Bellum discussions in the future.  
What is Mill Good For? Significance of a Millian-based analysis  
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“News is the most powerful resource for public definitions in our age” (Altheide, 2009b, 
p. 1355), so the definitions of security, justice, and community that emerge from the Times data 
may be seen as significant reflections of the larger society. How the treatment of these issues 
meet, or fail to meet, the depth of inquiry implied by Mill’s conception of those issues (1863), as 
measured by my five Millian Security Principles and the subsequent 12 questions, should 
provide insight into the quality of utilitarianism understood and invoked by the Times reporters – 
as if Mill were among the editors who critiqued the coverage in 2004.  
Further, it is expected that emergent patterns will suggest ways the Times might have 
better addressed some of its self-identified shortcomings by asking more Millian-themed 
utilitarian questions of the administration in 2003. Finally, as the model is further improved, it 
should inform future war correspondents of all stripes of ways they might seek to improve the 
utility of their coverage, independent of any such war’s participants, tactics, or venue.  
Regardless of the ongoing and emerging challenges for conscientious practitioners, I 
hope that the next time the nation’s “priests and witches all agree they should die” (Bonnet & 
Malmsteen, 1983, track 4), future war correspondents will at least have a few stronger tools for 
interrogating and investigating any government appeals to utility that such action is justified 
because it will somehow “keep them free” (Bonnet & Malmsteen).  
Findings: Millian Security and “Unfinished Business” in the Times  
When government officials argued that the United States and its allies should invade Iraq, 
because that nation had both violated international laws in the past and also represented a real, 
impending threat of harm to the region, the United States, and the world, it reflected both a 
venerable tradition of British common law predating the Constitution as well as centuries of just 
war doctrine, as it strove to justify the harm it proposed to do to Iraq and its people under the 
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principles of legal self-defense and retaliation. Much as Mill extended his definition of an 
individual’s right to self-defense and justice, the U.S. government must often do the same, under 
“its adversarial system of justice, where the assumption that a ... defendant is innocent until 
proven guilty is a part of fundamental due process” (Hagopian, 2013, para. 7). Here, this “system 
strives to protect the innocent from being wrongly convicted even at the price that some who are 
guilty will walk … [It] forces the state to justify the harm it proposes to do.”  
When the New York Times, as perhaps the most important news organization of the 
United States, covered that discussion, it also reflected a long Constitutional tradition of free 
speech, a free press, and the right to demand an accounting of the people’s government. In 
evaluating perceived shortcomings in its coverage of the 2003 Iraq invasion, the Times editors 
issued an unprecedented mea culpa: “We consider the story of Iraq’s weapons, and of the pattern 
of misinformation, to be unfinished business” – largely because “of instances of coverage that 
was not as rigorous as it should have been” (From, 2004a, paras. 14, 3).  
While statements from both U.S. officials and the Times editors invoked utilitarian 
valuations, John Stuart Mill had previously defended individual liberty from government harm, 
and defined limited governmental authority, in utilitarian terms of promoting goods and limiting 
harms through justice and security (1859a, 1859b, 1862a, 1863). This chapter assesses the Times 
discussion of its own 2001-2004 coverage in light of five Millian Security Principles.  
“A Sample of the Coverage:” The Times Editors Identify and Discuss Selected Stories   
In its May 26, 2004, letter “From The Editors,” these professional journalists offered 
examples of their pre-invasion coverage, and included a link to an online list of 28 articles and 
one lengthy op-ed letter published by the Times between October 26, 2001, and April 8, 2004 
(From, 2004a, 2004b). This purposive sample, delineated by the editors’ own actions, therefore 
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comprises 31 separate textual narrative sources: the original editorial essay, the annotated online 
list of articles, and the 29 published items included on that list.  
Because the primary focus of the Times apology was the original public narrative as 
presented in print, represented by the 28 articles and one letter the editors chose to reference, this 
study applied an ethnographic content analysis to those 29 textual sources. These sources 
represented the work of 15 different writers who created 17 single-byline, 10 double-byline, and 
one triple-byline news article, and one triple-authored composite letter to the editor. Each article 
was accessed from the Times website, then checked against PDF images of their original print 
pages, with authorship and placement data confirmed through the NEXIS database. These data 
total 891 separate paragraphs, each of which was read critically under the lenses of the five 
Millian Security Principles and their accompanying 12 guiding questions.  
However, the language of the apology itself, and some of the statements made in that 
editorial, as well as those made in the annotations of the list of representative news stories, also 
provided guidance in making sense of the narrative in terms of values the editors expressed, both 
in considering their own reporters’ professional work as well as that of the various government 
officials and newsworthy figures whose statements appeared in the coverage. So this study also 
references several of those values as they emerge in analyzing the 29 articles.  
Sample yields topical organization and editorial commentary. Immediately evident 
from the list of articles is the editors’ organization of them into six different groups, based on 
significant news items: (1) “The alleged Iraqi terrorist training camps, and Al Qaeda 
connection”; (2) “The hidden weapons facilities”; (3) “The aluminum tubes”; (4) “The Iraqi 
scientist and destruction of weapons”; (5) “The ‘biological weapons labs’”; and (6) “Raising 
doubts about intelligence” (From, 2004b). This organization provides the interested reader with 
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an easy way to compare initial reportage with subsequent follow-up stories – or, as the editors 
wrote, “where those articles included incomplete information or pointed in a wrong direction, 
they were later overtaken by more and stronger information. That is how news coverage 
normally unfolds” (From, 2004a, para. 2). In this organization, the Times reveals its pursuit of 
the core journalistic value of verification (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Society, 2016).  
Also emergent from the Times explanatory discussion are concerns over the work of 
particular reporters, an overreliance on official sources, a lack of skepticism of certain source 
agendas, failures in the editorial process, a perceived time gap in the overall coverage, and the 
then-essential consideration of news article placement within the daily print edition (From, 
2004a, 2004b; Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004). These concerns provided useful insight and 
guidance on considering the data represented by the stories themselves, and are addressed when 
pertinent as they appear in the analysis; however, because of the very small sample size, they 
could not be verified with any degree of confidence.  
Chronological order and Millian Security Principles guide analysis. However, in 
order to better explore the larger public narrative these articles represent, this study analyzed 
them in strictly chronological, not topical, order, to consider them as they originally appeared in 
their real-time context. This arrangement offered the opportunity to compare changes in the 
larger narrative over time, in addition to the topical-based comparisons offered by the Times 
subject groupings. Doing so yielded a relatively balanced, three-phase grouping of the articles: 
(1) Pre-invasion coverage, representing about 40% of the data, comprising 12 stories (seven of 
which appeared on the front page) and a total of 360 paragraphs, with contributions from nine 
different reporters; (2) Post-invasion coverage, representing about 34% of the data, comprising 
11 stories (seven of which appeared on the front page) and a total of 305 paragraphs, with 
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contributions by seven different reporters; and (3) Anniversary coverage, centered around the 
invasion’s first anniversary and a growing concern over the failure to find the WMDs described 
in the earlier coverage, representing about 25% of the data, comprising six stories (only two of 
which appeared on the front page) and a total of 226 paragraphs, with contributions by six 
different reporters. A chronological listing of the Times original directory of stories, along with 
editors’ notes and comments from that directory (From, 2004b), appears at the end of this study 
as Appendix C.  
Further, because the primary focus of this study is an initial application of the Millian 
Security Principles model, this analysis is structured in the order of those five principles and their 
accompanying dozen questions as originally developed in the theoretical review, and not in any 
other order based on their perceived importance as emerging from the Times article data.  
Moreover, this approach is especially appropriate in this study because of the limited 
sample size and its subject-selected nature. In its editorial and accompanying list of articles, the 
Times presents its own version of what it covered, what it covered well, what it failed to cover 
well, and what it failed to cover at all. Situated instead in the Millian Security model, this study 
offers an independent look at that larger narrative as played out in the pages of the Times.  
What Was It Good For? Reading the Times through a Millian ad Bellum Lens  
“The following is a sampling of articles published by The Times about the decisions that 
led the United States into the war in Iraq, and especially the issue of Iraq’s weapons” reads the 
note at the top of the Times’ list of 29 articles selected as representative of the newspaper’s work, 
both good and not-so-good (From, 2003b, para. 1). And, from the outset, the narrative appears to 
proceed in good Millian “Security-&-Justice-for-All” order, as the first three guiding questions 
of the first Millian Security Principle, Threat, are addressed in this clear, concise overview of the 
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sample: Specific weapons threatened the United States because of potential action by Iraq. 
Further, the utilitarian aspect of the situation is clearly implied, though incomplete: The 
decisions that led the U.S. to wage war on Iraq included a weighing of the potential harms to the 
United States represented by Iraq’s weapons against the known harms involved in the U.S. in 
waging such a war.  
However, in the end, the data themselves do not reflect such a balanced Millian approach 
as this opening overview statement does. Though the prominence of particular Security 
Principles emerges in ways perhaps suggested by the model, major imbalances among the 
Principles persist throughout the data, improving only in rare instances and mostly in retrospect. 
To the Millian model’s credit, a number of the problems in coverage identified by the editors or 
addressed by later reportage emerge in areas suggested in earlier coverage by imbalances 
demonstrated by the model. This means that improved coverage, though not consciously directed 
by Millian precepts, evolved in ways Mill would have suggested. A general table summarizing 
the analysis findings appears at the end of this study as Table 1.  
As might be expected of an endeavor devoted to veracity and verification (Hulteng, 1985; 
Indicators, 2018; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007; Mill, 1863; Society, 2016), working within a 
societal context where just war theory drives the military ethics discussion (Bell, 2009; Boyle, 
2003; Dubik, 2016; Fiala, 2008; May, 2015; Mellow, 2003; Ramsey, 1961; Recchia, 2009; 
Walzer, 1977, 2002, 2004, 2009), the third Millian Security Principle, Justice, maintains a clear 
dominance throughout the sample, representing the primary theme in 21 of the 29 articles, and in 
58% of the individual paragraphs. The fourth Principle, Community, emerges as second-most 
prominent theme for the total sample, and represents the primary focus in 5 articles overall and 
20% of the individual paragraphs. Threat issues almost equal Community in importance, also 
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emerging as the primary focus in 5 articles, and also in 15% of the paragraphs – but they surpass 
all other categories in secondary influence, noted in 51% of the sample. Neither the Safety & 
Stability nor Utility principles appear often enough to dominate any one story, nor do they appear 
very often as a secondary focus. Safety & Stability issues rose to primary importance in only 2%, 
and to secondary in only 5%, of the total sample. Finally, to Mill’s probable disappointment, 
Utility concerns emerged as primary in only 1%, and as secondary in only 4%, of the entire 
sample – while considering one of the most consequential of actions. 
In order of apparent salience, then, this analysis ranks the Millian Principles as Justice, 
Community, Threat, Utility, and Safety & Stability in this sample – yet with great gaps in the 
coverage among the 5 Principles and among the 12 associated Guiding Questions. Though Mill 
himself would certainly be pleased that his “Security-&-Justice-for-All” definition had been 
somewhat addressed, he would also certainly have sent these reporters back for more, as their 
“Justice-for-All & Security” stories appear mostly incomplete, and organized under a rearranged 
set of priorities, than those the Millian Security Principles model would direct.  
RQ 1: How did the Times address security as protection against a vital, existential 
threat? Ultimately, in the reportage from this sample, how did the Times cover governmental 
and public discussion of actual and potential actions, conditions, or capabilities that would 
foreseeably cause undue restriction, loss, injury or death, as well as the careful identification of 
threatened victims and threatening agents?  
As previously defined in the conceptual framework of this study, Millian Threat elements 
represent specific things that may cause harm to specific persons or property when directed to do 
so by specific actors. This principle addresses the situation at hand, or nearly at hand, and seeks 
specific identities of harms, harmed, and harmful actors. In this sample, a good deal of the 
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discussion in the Times addressed various weapons, clearly identified as a threat of harm to both 
people and property. The reporters rarely identified specific targets who might be harmed by 
these weapons; however, much of the discussion did identify Iraq, or its president, as a 
potentially threatening actor.  
From the outset, it appears that Threat issues appear frequently and consistently 
throughout the narrative, representing the second-most important element in the first, pre-
invasion coverage, and remaining influential as the third-most important element in the post-
invasion and anniversary coverage. Threat elements appeared as primary focal emphases in 15% 
of the analyzed paragraphs, and as secondary points of emphasis in 51% of them, for a total 
influence of 66%, making them the second-most addressed issue of the entire sample.  
However, attention to each of the Threat questions was not balanced. Though only one 
story failed to include any of the three questions, and only one other article included only one of 
them, this analysis revealed a marked lack of attention to the second question, that of Threat 
Target. Only about 1% of the sample carried any mention of this element, while Threat Nature 
was identified in about 36%, and Threat Agent in about 25%. As discussed below, considering 
the narrative’s context (New York, the United States) could mean that the understanding of the 
U.S. as a potential target of Iraq’s is understood. This Iraqi threat is always presented as an 
asymmetrical one, involving terrorist activity and/or WMDs, and never as a conventional 
military capability. And only once is Iraq viewed as a target of a coalition threat.  
Further, the Times narrative context may explain why only 3 paragraphs of the entire 
891-paragraph sample addressed all three of the Threat elements, and why these appeared early 
in the sample, in the first, second, and fourth articles. Perhaps reporters and editors found it 
tedious to periodically tie Threat Nature weapons to Threat Target domestic citizens to Threat 
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Agent foreign entities – yet that lack of attention to more robust coverage, and assumption of 
some details as understood, might have encouraged a lack of rigor in questioning U.S. claims.  
SGQ 1. What is the specific nature of the perceived security threat in this particular 
action? Despite the lesson of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks – that everyday objects can 
become lethal threats in the wrong hands – Threat Nature discussions emerge from this narrative 
also focused at first on the same shiny, scary objects that had distracted national security before 
(Dreyfuss, 2000; Stohl & Grillot, 2009): WMDs, or weapons whose scale lent urgency to the 
pro-invasion argument. By the third article (December 20, 2001), attention shifts from terrorists 
to tools and tactics, specifically focused on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons both held 
and further developed in secret, violating international sanctions and representing an escalating 
danger. These concerns keep Threat Nature statements among the most cited in the first six 
articles, halfway to the invasion itself.  
At no time are Iraq’s conventional military capabilities even mentioned, much less 
presented as a potential threat. Articles devoted to all WMD (entries 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10), or focused 
on the nuclear program (Entry 11), more prominent at first, begin to fade as the invasion 
approaches. Though statements about “secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons” (Miller, 2001, para. 1) issue from only a handful of sources, they seem to be accepted 
as fact by government and press alike at first. Threat Nature fades from dominance as focus 
shifts to Threat Agent issues before the invasion, Further, this passage from the tenth story 
(January 24, 2003) illustrates a growing skepticism from some reporters, as they compare WMD 
claims with what little factual evidence is available:  
Former Iraqi scientists, military officers and contractors have provided American  
intelligence agencies with a portrait of Saddam Hussein's secret programs to develop and  
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conceal chemical, biological and nuclear weapons that is starkly at odds with the  
findings so far of the United Nations weapons inspectors. (Miller, 2003a, para. 2)  
Attention to a present threat returned briefly after the invasion, with rare discoveries of a 
chemical warehouse (April 24, 2003), trailers suspected as laboratories (May 21, 2003), and a 
concern, reported after the end of major combat operations, that Iraq would use WMDs in 
defense (July 20, 2003) – but by this time, Threat Nature attention had shifted from describing 
the supposed weapons to confirming “the failure so far to find prohibited weapons in Iraq” (Jehl, 
2003b, para. 6) – leading some to propose they had been destroyed, hidden, or moved. As the 
larger discussion moved Community ahead of Threat, these questions appear less frequently.  
Mentions of weapons reappear increasingly in combination with Justice issues of 
verification, and, in the reporting surrounding the invasion’s anniversary, stories surface that 
reveal how much conflicting information that discredited these threats was known to U.S. 
intelligence agencies before the war (Jehl, 2004a, 2004c; Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004).  
Only rarely does detailed, contextual information about these threats appear, and only 
long after the fact: a year after the invasion, one U.S. official reveals that “it is now clear that an 
American bombing campaign against Iraq in 1998 destroyed much of the remaining 
infrastructure in chemical weapons programs” (Risen, 2004, para. 27); another statement that 
“the program he found was far less advanced than parallel projects in Iran, Libya and North 
Korea” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 54) represents an extremely rare comparison of the strength 
of the supposed Iraqi threat with that of other nations of concern.  
At the same time as evidence of previously reported threats failed to materialize, officials 
reported post-invasion discoveries of potential new threats, such as missiles and drones. 
Therefore, Threat Nature continued to represent the topic most likely to appear as a secondary 
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concern in the paragraphs analyzed in both the post-invasion and, increasingly, in the 
anniversary stories. Primary concerns shifted to Justice and Community – but Threat always 
followed. This analysis corresponds with the Times editorial note that the problematic coverage 
addressed “especially the issue of Iraq's weapons” (From, 2004b, para. 1).  
SGQ 2. Whose specific security is actually being threatened by this particular action? 
Perhaps because of the still-fresh memories of the 2001 terror attacks, specific references to a 
Threat Target are all but absent in this sample, appearing in only about one percent of the 
paragraphs analyzed. It may be that, writing from a U.S. perspective in the city that had suffered 
the greatest loss of life on September 11, 2001, the New York Times did not need to identify the 
United States – or other nation – as a potential target for supposed Iraqi threats. For whatever 
reason, references to Mill’s “assignable person” (1863, p. 61) appear only 13 times in the entire 
sample – in the first, second, fourth, and sixth stories before the invasion, and only one time 
after, in the 25th story of the sample, published on the anniversary of Secretary Powell’s address 
to the United Nations about a month before the invasion.  
And only once does a Threat Target concern appear as primary in any of the 891 
paragraphs analyzed; however, this rare statement may reveal something important about the 
cultural context surrounding the Times’ reportage: “The White House assertion of a terrorist link 
hits an emotional chord and plays on the American sense of vulnerability, said Daniel Benjamin, 
an expert on terrorism for the National Security Council during the Clinton administration” 
(Gordon, 2002, para. 18). This assertion of a particular “emotional chord” may indeed explain a 
“sense of vulnerability” that reporters and editors felt was so obvious as to be unremarkable. In 
fact, the first of the dozen appearances of Threat Target concerns in secondary importance 
immediately leaps out of the very first article, in reporting that an Iraqi official may have met 
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with “Mohammed Atta, one of the ringleaders of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States” (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001, para. 1). This might also explain the lack of a specific target 
identification in the oft-repeated “mushroom cloud” statement referenced in the 4th story 
(Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 13), which might imply the U.S.  
Subsequent references to potential targets of Iraq’s supposed threat include “neighboring 
countries and possibly Europe and the United States” and “installations important to the United 
States” (Hedges, 2001, paras. 2, 6), “Israel and American troops in the region” (Jehl & Sanger, 
2004, para. 65), and the United States itself (Gordon, 2002; Jehl & Sanger, 2004).  
This last reference, from the February 1, 2004, front-page story revisiting some of 
Secretary Powell’s claims from a year earlier, reveals perhaps the contextual problem in taking 
for granted a single supposed threat to the United States from one particular nation. In the 
aftermath of the occupation of Iraq, the reporters close their story in the final paragraph by 
emphasizing that U.S. intelligence agencies must “make sure that similar misjudgments are not 
made regarding other nations that could, in the long or short term, threaten American security” 
(para. 78). This statement also suggests shortcomings in addressing the third Millian threat 
concern – that of correctly identifying “those who infringe the rule” (1863, p. 65).  
SGQ 3. Who, specifically, is threatening anyone’s security in this particular instance? 
Perhaps reflecting some of the similar cultural grounding as the Threat Target, the Millian 
identification of the “person who has done harm” (p. 63) – or those accused of plotting harm – 
appears often in this sample alone, as if the names “Iraq” or “Saddam Hussein” served as a sort 
of shorthand for a known Threat Agent. This might reflect the work of a taxpayer-funded PR 
firm engaged as far back as 1991 to build public support for regime change in Iraq (Bamford, 
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2005; Bumiller, 2002), or a reflexive national anti-Arab response after September 11, 2001. It 
might also make perfect sense, in context, to assume that any news from Iraq wasn’t good.  
For whatever reason, Threat Agent concerns were fourth-most likely to appear as primary 
emphasis, and second only to Threat Nature concerns to appear as supporting arguments, in the 
Times sample. As the editorial focus shifted from justifying an invasion and verifying the 
supporting allegations, the identification of the source of those threats remained second in 
importance only to the Justice or Community issue at hand. Threat Agent references ranged from 
specific individuals, such as those involved in the September 11, 2001, attacks (Tyler & 
Tagliabue, 2001), or Saddam Hussein himself (Hedges, 2001), to nations, such as Iraq (Miller, 
2001), and non-state actors, such as terrorists (Gordon, 2002). Altogether, primary and secondary 
Threat Agent references appeared in 25 percent of the 891-paragraph sample.  
In the 12 pre-invasion articles, Threat Agent concerns dominate the first two, then remain 
very influential but never dominant thereafter. From the mention in the first story, on the 9/11 
terrorist Mohammed Atta meeting with an Iraqi agent (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001), to the second 
story, about “a secret Iraqi government camp that had trained Islamic terrorists” Hedges, 2001, 
para. 1), the Times reported early attempts by U.S. officials to connect the known Threat Agents 
of Al Qaeda to the alleged ones in Iraq – specifically, Saddam Hussein – relating fears 
summarized in Story 6 that “Iraq would give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists” (Gordon, 
2002, para. 6). These concerns appeared again prominently a year later in stories 8 (Schmitt & 
Shanker, 2002) and 11 (Gordon & Risen, 2003).  
Threat Agent concerns shift from terrorists to Iraq itself. However, as hard evidence of an 
Iraq-Al Qaeda connection failed to surface, pre-invasion references shifted to mentions of Iraq’s 
alleged WMDs and its apparent evasion of United Nations sanctions as evidence that Iraq itself – 
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and its leader, Saddam Hussein – represented a significant Threat Agent on its own. In fact, Story 
7 reported that earlier claims of a terrorist-Iraqi official meeting proved baseless – a year later 
(Risen, 2002), while Story 12 disputed alleged connections between another terror leader and the 
Iraqi government (Risen & Johnston, 2003). Instead, “Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear 
weapons,” proclaimed the first sentence in Story 4 (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 1), which went 
on to address official concerns over chemical and biological weapons as well. Further, Story 5 
related an official report that “Iraq has withheld documentation from the United Nations” (Miller 
& Gordon, 2002, para. 19).  
Indeed: “There is broad agreement within intelligence agencies that Iraq has continued its 
efforts to develop chemical, biological, and probably nuclear weapons,” the Times reported in the 
last sample story published before the invasion – and, though “there have been disagreements 
over specific pieces of intelligence” presented in the past, “the administration should instead 
stick with the indisputable evidence that Iraq has in the past stockpiled chemical weapons, tried 
to make biological weapons, and has continued to deceive United Nations inspectors” (Risen & 
Johnston, 2003, paras. 25-30). The Threat Agent was indisputable.  
After the invasion, reflecting the larger conversation’s shift in secondary emphasis from 
Threat to Community issues, Threat Agent statements decreased as dominant paragraph elements 
from 20% to 3%, yet increased in overall references from 20% to 47% - and third in frequency of 
appearance. Part of this continued importance of Threat Agent versus Threat Nature 
identification is reflected in this first sentence from Story 15, about a month after the invasion 
began, in which officials claimed that the reality they discovered on the ground in Iraq “has 
shifted the focus from finding such weapons to locating key people who worked on the 
programs” (Miller, 2003c, para. 1).  
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Threat Agent concerns decline in importance as occupation continues. However, in 
addition to the predominant discussion of Iraq – and Saddam Hussein – as Threat Agents in this 
final section of the sample, Story 13 made a rare return to the earliest allegations, reporting that a 
captured Iraqi scientist had provided new “information about Iraqi weapons cooperation with 
Syria, and with terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda” – and that the missing weapons themselves 
had either been destroyed or sent to Syria (Miller, 2003b, para. 28). Meanwhile, Story 22 noted 
that initial fears that the U.S. approach to Baghdad would “prompt Iraqi forces to launch artillery 
or missiles tipped with chemical or germ weapons” had eventually proven baseless as well 
(Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 49).  
In the final 6 stories of the sample, written around the anniversary of the invasion, Threat 
Agent issues continued to decline in importance, slipping below Threat Nature references for the 
only time in both primary and supportive paragraph topics. This may reflect a return to officials’ 
discussing particular weapons and capabilities, while the state of Iraq and its leader would be 
assumed to be known to the reader. However, their pro-invasion stance was more strongly 
questioned in this retrospective work. For example, in reflecting on the invasion’s anniversary, 
one intelligence official stated that “he believed that Iraq was a danger to the world, but not the 
same threat that the Bush administration publicly detailed” (Risen, 2004, para. 21). Further, 
another publicly “provided the first hint that the prewar intelligence on Iraq had been tainted by 
evidence previously identified as unreliable” (Jehl, 2004a, para. 9).  
Even worse, another official reported noting a definite pre-invasion bias: “It appears that 
the human intelligence wasn’t deemed interesting or useful if it was exculpatory of Iraq” (Jehl, 
2004c, para. 8). As the Times editors themselves wrote later that year, “Looking back, we wish 
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we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged – or failed to 
emerge” (From, 2004b, para. 3). More attention to Threat details might have helped.  
Emergent Synergy I: Threat and Justice principles appear together often. As 
Altheide’s reflexive ECA method “is embedded in constant discovery (Altheide, 1987, p. 68; 
1982; 1985; 2004), it will also “permit emergence, refinement, or collapsing of additional 
categories” (Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 62). During this analysis, as the relative frequency 
and strength of the individual Millian Security Principles emerged from the data, so did the 
observation that certain Principles often appeared in pairs, with one as primary and the other as 
secondary, in substantial numbers. Most prominent of these emergent pairs was the Threat-
Justice coding, which appeared in fully 27% of the sample, and was the pair most often revealed 
in the overall sample as well as in each of the three chronological coverage sections. 
For example, a later story recalled a claim from President George W. Bush from a year 
earlier, in which he had claimed: “After 11 years during which we have tried containment, 
sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still 
has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more” (Risen, 
Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 4). In this quote, Threat Nature and Threat Target elements are 
paired with Justice concerns of legality, fidelity, veracity, rational defense, and an implied 
justification for a U.S. response.  
Another example of a reporter pairing these Principles, this time emphasizing Justice 
issues of legality and veracity with a secondary focus on Threat Nature and Agent concerns, 
appeared in a June 26, 2003 follow-up story to earlier reports (Veracity) that trailers set up as 
mobile laboratories (Nature) provided proof of Agent Iraq’s illegal WMD program (Legality):  
The report on the trailers was initially prepared for the White House, and Mr. Bush has  
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cited it as proof that Iraq indeed had a biological weapons program, as the United States  
has repeatedly alleged, although it has yet to produce any other conclusive evidence.  
(Jehl, 2003a, para. 3)  
Finally, this almost prophetic statement showing the interplay between Justice and Threat 
issues appeared about five months before the invasion, in an October 24, 2002, story about how 
Pentagon officials created their own agency to review CIA intelligence related to Iraq: “Mr. 
Rumsfeld voiced his concerns this week about the difficulty of predicting the most dramatic 
threats to national security” (Schmitt & Shanker, 2002).  
In summary, the coverage in this limited sample reflects the importance of Threat issues, 
as they emerge as the third-most prominent primary category, and the second-most prominent 
secondary category. Further, Threat’s emergence as second-most prominent category in the pre-
invasion segment of the sample underscores its importance in opening the conversation. 
However, the lack of attention to the second question, Threat Target, throughout, reveals the 
incomplete nature of much of the narrative. More attention to all of these details might have 
contributed to broader, more complete coverage.  
RQ 2: How did the Times address security as preserving safety and stability? More 
attention to issues related to Safety & Stability, the second Millian Security Principle, might also 
have aided the Times journalists in their work, as issues related to specific security concerns are 
almost absent in this sample. Perhaps, again, issues of both immediate, present safety as well as 
ongoing and enduring future stability might have been assumed in the context of a post-9/11 
New York City and United States. For whatever reason, Safety & Stability topics comprise the 
least-frequent mentions of all, appearing as primary concerns in just under 2% of the entire 
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sample, and as secondary concerns in only 4% of the analyzed paragraphs. Fully 13 of the 
articles contain not a single mention of Safety & Stability issues of any level of importance.  
As defined earlier in the conceptual framework of this study, Millian Safety & Stability 
elements represent specific things that may be preserved for both present Safety and future 
Stability by a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the proposed 
response to the threat, and seeks specific mitigations of potential harms, on behalf of the 
potentially harmed, through specific immunity from potentially harmful actors. In this sample, 
very little of the Times coverage addressed clear, specific solutions to identified threats. Further, 
concrete examples of desirable outcomes or consequences are almost completely absent. Instead, 
the invasion of Iraq is presented as the ideal solution without any details.  
Overall, this Principle appears less frequently than any of the other 4 throughout the 
sample, and rises from last to next-to-last only in the section of articles published before the 
invasion. However, in combination with Justice issues, it rises to fourth most-common pairing of 
principles to emerge from the sample, evident in 3% of the paragraphs analyzed.  
Interestingly, concerns over specific safety issues for U.S. citizens are almost completely 
absent, while certain Iraqi and other non-U.S. persons are accorded Safety status just as long as 
they are on “our” side. Similar concerns arise for future Stability issues for these and similar 
allies, as the lack of planning for any “exit strategy” for post-Hussein Iraq becomes evident. Yet 
nothing in this sample ever addresses Safety & Stability concerns for Iraqi civilians. Stranger 
still, while the Times’ At War blog publishes a weekly summary of war-related civilian deaths in 
Afghanistan (Abed & Faizi, 2019), it apparently does not keep track of Iraqi deaths.  
SGQ 4. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s present 
safety? Applications of this concern as a primary concern appear in only 4 paragraphs (0.4%) 
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throughout the entire 29-article sample, in entries 1, 6, 10, and 22. Further, present ramifications 
of a proposed action appear as a secondary focus in only 15 paragraphs, representing a mere 2% 
of the sample. This made it the 10th of the 12 questions in order of primary focus, and 9th in order 
of secondary focus.  
Three of the four primary concern paragraphs appear in stories published prior to the 
invasion, resulting in the only section of coverage in which Safety & Stability moves ahead of 
Utility and out of dead last among the five Principles in frequency of appearance. The first 
instance, at the end of the first article, shows great promise in quoting a cautionary opinion from 
a former CIA official, who argued for restraint in planning any military action against Iraq (Tyler 
& Tagliabue, 2001, para. 44). A very rare connect-the-dots, balanced argument usage also 
appears in the very first article, which alleged that an Iraqi official had met with a 9/11 terrorist, 
where a specific safety concern is identified: “Mr. Ani was under surveillance because he had 
been observed near the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague, which Czech 
officials think has been selected for attack and is now heavily guarded” (para. 15).  
Almost completely missing are any concerns over Iraqi Safety: the point of gathering 
evidence against Mr. Hussein is “for planning a military campaign to topple him” (Miller & 
Gordon, 2002, para. 12). Nor any word about food, water, or medicine. On the other hand, 
officials worried that, while Hussein remained in power, “families and friends of the defectors 
would be murdered ... as a message to potential defectors” (Miller, 2003a, paras. 9, 11).  
Similar concerns appear after the invasion, in a July 20, 2003, story by the same reporter: 
one Iraqi informant “remains a cooperating source whose life would be endangered were his 
identity known” (Miller, 2003e, para. 30). Later in that same article, the only mention of Iraqi 
safety from U.S. military appears in a complaint about obtaining more sources:  
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Officials charged with cultivating Iraqis as sources remained unhappy with raids by  
Special Forces on their potential sources’ homes in the dead of night. “Knocking down a  
scientist's door at 3 a.m., putting a bag over his head, and flex-cuffing his family while  
you search for hidden weapons or documents is hardly a way to induce his cooperation,” 
one weapons expert said. (para. 36)  
However, the following quote from a U.S. official after the invasion lends weight to the 
possibility that, in the context of the recent terrorist attacks, Safety concerns for U.S. citizens 
were assumed and needed no explicit, detailed retelling: “We acted because we saw the existing 
evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on Sept. 11” (Risen, Sanger & 
Shanker, 2003, para. 13). However, no balancing safety concerns for Iraqis is evident.  
One rare example of the newspaper’s verification of a Safety concern appears later, in one 
of the anniversary stories, in which two reporters revisit some of the administration’s pre-war 
claims. One statement by President Bush that Iraqi drones could be used “for missions targeting 
the United States” was balanced a year later by an intelligence official’s observation that, while 
“you could have snuck one of those on a ship off the East Coast ... there was no evidence of any 
capability to deploy the vehicles” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, paras. 70-71).  
SGQ 5. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s enduring 
stability? Statements related to the future safety and ongoing Stability of the U.S., Iraq, or any 
other nation appeared slightly more frequently than did those of immediate Safety. A total of 12 
paragraphs displayed Stability as a primary concern, while 21 others invoked it in a secondary 
role. This placed Stability-driven paragraphs ahead of Safety and all three Utility questions near 
the bottom of the list; on the secondary concerns list, it ranked 8th of the 12 questions.  
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All but one of the primary concern appearances emerged from the first, pre-invasion, set 
of articles, and the first example, from the end of the very first article, again reveals the promise 
of this particular question almost verbatim: a former CIA official warns that any military action 
against Iraq “might destabilize one of the more moderate Arab regimes” (Tyler & Tagliabue, 
2001, para. 45). Meanwhile, a speech by President Bush “asserted that Baghdad might seek to 
strike targets on American soil ... by moving drones filled with germs or chemical weapons close 
to the United States” (Gordon, 2002, para. 7). In two rare examples of quantifying a specific 
future Stability concern, one subsequent story about the discovery of alleged mobile laboratories 
stated that the “big vessels in two of the units could be used to produce ... millions of lethal 
doses” (Miller & Broad, 2003a, para. 24), while another noted that “one truck could make 
enough raw material to fill five R-400 bombs” (Miller & Broad, 2003b, para. 28).  
Finally, in the anniversary stories, one post-invasion discovery cited as evidence of an 
ongoing Stability concern was that “Iraq had also maintained an active ballistic missile program 
that was receiving significant foreign assistance” (Risen, 2004, para. 18). Meanwhile, one 
solitary paragraph dealt with the ongoing Stability of Iraq itself after the invasion, noting that 
several Iraqi defectors who had received “taxpayers’ money ... have enjoyed powerful backing 
from civilian officials at the Pentagon and are playing a significant role in the provisional 
government in Baghdad” (Jehl, 2003b, para. 5). No mention of any “exit strategy” appeared 
anywhere yet, nor did any statements from an Iraqi citizen other than a handful of informants.  
Emergent Synergy II: Safety & Stability and Justice principles appear together often. 
As Altheide’s ECA allows for unforeseen categories to emerge, another unpredicted principle 
pairing evident in the sample involves various Safety & Stability issues paired with a Justice 
element in a paragraph. Though standalone Safety & Stability paragraphs comprised the smallest 
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group of the sample, affecting a total of 58 statements, paragraphs combining some kind of 
Safety & Stability with Justice appeared 30 times, or in 3% of the total sample.  
In one example demonstrating the strength and promise of that synergy, a pre-invasion 
story revisited several articles from the previous year detailing Iraq’s nuclear program and 
quoted administration officials directly on the issue of Stability: “Iraq was trying to rejuvenate its 
nuclear program, a development that could change the balance of power in the Persian Gulf” 
(Gordon & Risen, 2003, para. 2), reflecting Safety & Stability concerns over future security in 
terms of utilitarian Justice concepts of rights, treaties, agency and authority, and responsibility.  
In another, buried toward the end of another follow-up to the same original reportage, a 
reporter quoted an official with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had regained 
access to Iraq just a few months before the invasion, as saying that “the presence of its inspectors 
would make it hard for Iraq to resume its nuclear program” (Gordon, 2003, para. 15).  
Finally, this excerpt from two months after the invasion reveals the complex interaction 
between Safety & Stability and Justice issues, in both future Stability fears as well as Justice 
concepts of legality, veracity, and responsibility, in another extremely rare statement of concern 
for the immediate Safety of Iraqi scientists, a very special, tiny subset of the Iraqi citizenry:  
American military officers in Iraq said they believe that Iraqi scientists remain reluctant  
to speak candidly about Mr. Hussein’s weapons programs because they fear they could  
be implicated in possible war crimes or face retribution from members of the fallen  
regime who are at large. (Miller & Broad, 2003a, para. 19)  
In summary, the dearth of attention to this crucial connecting category, bridging Threat 
and Justice as the first of the response-oriented criteria, represents a real gap in the coverage. The 
category is not just last, but dead last, in apparent influence in this sample. Without more details 
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about projected costs and benefits, it becomes difficult to meaningfully weigh tangible goods and 
harms of any proposed response. Further, it becomes easier to fill these gaps with overly 
optimistic assumptions. Finally, this means that incomplete or exaggerated claims of utility – like 
some made by U.S. officials – are harder to interrogate.  
RQ 3: How did the Times address security as promoting justice? If, as the preamble to 
the SPJ Code of Ethics reads, “public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice” (Society, 2014, 
para. 1), the New York Times apparently pays a great deal of attention to the concept of Justice – 
at least as Mill described it in Utilitarianism – because this sample is dominated by themes 
related to Millian justice concepts of legality, morality, merit, fidelity, veracity, fairness and 
impartiality, proper authority, ethical prudence, and just response (Elliott, 2007).  
As previously defined in this study’s conceptual framework, Millian Justice elements 
represent a specific stance that promotes a state of justice in both present Safety and future 
Stability in a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the various legal, 
moral, and ethical rights invoked in a proposed response to the threat, and seeks equitable justice 
for all involved. In this sample, a majority of the Times’ coverage addressed various Justice 
issues, including all of the Millian justice criteria identified by Elliott. Further, a great deal of the 
coverage reflected a concern with veracity, an emergent concept not included in the original 
category definition.  
In fact, this analysis found Justice present in fully 92% of the paragraphs coded, ranking 
as primary focus in 58% of them, and as secondary focus in another 34%, making these by far 
the most-referenced concerns in the sample. Justice concerns clearly outranked all other 
categories in each of the chronological sections of the sample, and was only closely approached 
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by Threat issues in the first, pre-invasion, coverage. From a normative standpoint, this sample of 
Times coverage does address a number of Justice concerns, and it does so most often.  
While the Millian Security Principle model suggested attention to these concerns, and 
provided a distinction between immediate, present Safety and ongoing, future Stability, it became 
apparent early in the data gathering that the model did not explicitly list veracity or truthfulness 
among its defining criteria. Though Millian Justice concepts of legal rights, moral rights, “just 
deserts,” promise keeping, and impartial or equitable treatment (Elliott, 2007) certainly include 
references to truth, and Mill himself described veracity as “one of the most useful, and the 
enfeeblement of that ... one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental” 
(1863, p. 27), the coding definition did not explicitly name it.  
From the sample, then, Justice emerged particularly in concerns of (1) Just Veracity, in 
verifying the alleged Iraqi threat, (2) Just Legality, considering the legality of alleged Iraqi 
actions, and (3) Just Response, justifying a proposed U.S. response, either in immediate defense 
and deterrence, or in future penalties and deterrence. Many Just Safety concerns encountered in 
the pre-invasion coverage evolved into Just Stability issues in the post-invasion discussion. At no 
time does anything published address what might involve justice for the Iraqi citizenry.  
So, how did the Times cover the public discussion of actual and potential actions that 
would foreseeably promote justice-in-safety immediately, as well as justice-in-stability into the 
future, in light of the proposed (and actual) 2003 invasion? This analysis reveals a great deal of 
quantity, but cannot evaluate the quality of that coverage without a more finely detailed 
instrument to better distinguish among the various Justice-related concerns. However, one 
particular quality of the coverage is glaringly evident in the complete absence of Iraqi voices.  
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SGQ 6. How would this proposed response specifically promote justice for anyone’s 
present safety? A Millian “Security-&-Justice-for-All” focus would certainly suggest that 
proposing a just response to a security threat would dominate the discussion, and this question is 
second only to its partner, SGQ 7, in frequency of appearing as primary content focus in the 
overall sample, and slightly more frequent than the next most common, Community Stability.  
The concept emerges as the most-addressed concern only in the first, pre-invasion data 
segment, representing 23% of the paragraphs analyzed, and also accounts for 17% of the 
secondary attention in those first 12 articles. Following the invasion, it almost disappears.  
As might be expected, journalistic attention appears most focused upon Just Veracity, in 
verification of various pre-invasion administration claims related to supposed Iraqi threats: 
though initial allegations of an Iraqi official meeting with a 9/11 terrorist “does not amount to 
proof of Iraqi involvement in the attacks” (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001, para. 2), it was not long 
before U.S. officials began to allege proof of “terrorism training” camps (Hedges, 2001, para. 
13) that “seemed reliable and significant” – though “American intelligence officials have long 
had cause to be skeptical of such ... information” (Miller, 2001, paras. 1, 31). Therefore, because 
“there are significant gaps in what American intelligence knows about the Iraqi program ... Bush 
administration officials are hoping to use what one official called a mosaic of disturbing new 
reports” (Gordon & Miller, 2002, paras. 19-20), resulting in the news that “Secretary of State 
Colin L. Powell is poised to go before the United Nations Security Council ... to present evidence 
of Iraq’s links to terrorism and its continuing efforts to develop chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons and long-range missiles” (Risen & Johnston, 2003, para. 4).  
Pre-invasion, Just Veracity concerns shift as skepticism grows. However, further 
concerns over verification – as well as Just Response – arise early and often in the sample as 
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well, reflecting “an intense debate in Washington over whether to extend the war against ... 
Afghanistan to include Iraq” (Hedges, 2001, para. 13). “Painting an up-to-date picture of Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction is not easy” (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 19), and “some of the 
intelligence that the administration has provided about Iraq’s weapons activities is sketchy and 
out of date” (Miller & Gordon, 2002, para. 2); in fact, “the view among even some senior 
intelligence analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency is that Mr. Hussein is contained” 
(Schmitt & Shanker, 2002, para. 4). Ultimately, as “international inspectors are unlikely to find 
tangible and irrefutable evidence that Iraq is hiding weapons of mass destruction, the Bush 
administration is preparing its own assessment that will rely heavily on evidence from Iraqi 
defectors” (Miller, 2003a, para. 1). Yet a follow-up piece four days later “challenges much of 
this case” (Gordon & Risen, 2003, para. 14), as reporters appear more skeptical.  
Post-invasion, Just Veracity reveals increasing verification lapses. Following the 
invasion, attention to this question shrinks somewhat, as Iraq apparently no longer posed an 
immediate threat, though U.S. officials “expanded the hunt and ... urged patience, expressing the 
belief that some weapons may still be found” (Miller, 2003e, para. 4); officials also shifted their 
objectives, as no weapons were found: “We’ve had a conceptual jump in how we think about, 
and what we look for in Iraq’s program. We must look at the infrastructure, not just for the 
weapons” (Miller, 2003c, para. 3). Meanwhile, pre-invasion claims were increasingly 
challenged: one proved to be “based partly on forged documents” (Risen, 2003a, para. 1), and 
revelations of Secretary Powell’s behind-the-scenes challenges to CIA evidence months earlier 
meant that “the presentation he was scheduled to make at the United Nations in just five days 
was in tatters” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 33). An even worse reappraisal appeared in 
the Times about four months after the invasion: “An internal C.I.A. review of prewar intelligence 
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on Iraq, recently submitted to the agency’s director ... has found that the evidence collected by 
the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies after 1998 was mostly fragmentary and often 
inconclusive” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 24).  
In the end, as the anniversary articles almost overwhelmingly identified failures in the 
pre-invasion coverage, reporters blamed both officials and themselves One official noted that 
“there were plenty of caveats placed on intelligence reports on Iraq by analysts who recognized 
the limitations of the evidence. But often their warnings were relegated to footnotes or buried in 
lengthy reports” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 76). Later, a Times writer called a September 8, 
2002, article “one of the most serious cases of misreporting in the entire run-up ... [which] 
proved to be wrong in almost every detail” (Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004, para. 24).  
SGQ 7. How would this proposed response specifically promote justice for anyone’s 
enduring stability? While the U.S. debate over the probability of an actual threat Iraq 
represented before the invasion continues to this day, nothing in this sample indicates that 
anyone saw Iraq as an impending, “clear and present danger” to anyone in a conventional 
military sense. Therefore, a Millian Security Principle model would suggest an emphasis on Just 
Stability concerns, such as containing threats, applying penalties for legal infractions of threat-
reduction treaties, and ensuring that future threats are addressed and deterred.  
The overall predominance of this question throughout these data supports that reasoning, 
as attention to the location and disposition of supposed Iraqi WMDs and facilities, legal 
justification for the 2003 invasion, and future ramifications of failed intelligence and U.S. actions 
dominated the discussion in the Times from start to finish. By far the most-addressed of the 12 
Security Guiding Questions, Just Stability concerns appeared as primary focus in 47% - nearly 
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half – of all paragraphs analyzed, and further influenced a 26% – one quarter – of the sample as a 
secondary focus. This is a four-fold increase over the next most frequent question.  
Though dominant throughout the sample, this Category’s influence actually increases 
over time. It appears in 63% of all paragraphs in the pre-invasion stories, in 92% of all 
paragraphs in the post-invasion stories, and in 97% of all paragraphs in the anniversary stories.  
Pre-invasion concerns coalesce around legality and response. In the beginning, future 
Just Stability and present Just Safety aspects of Just Veracity appear together in a few rare 
paragraphs, where both aspects concern the consequences of being able to prove official 
assertions in both the short and long term. In debating the reliability of one informant, the first 
story balances what an Iraqi-Al Qaeda connection might mean for immediate as well as future 
issues of justice (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001). Similarly, the third story considers the testimony of 
an Iraqi defector in light of concerns that “many embellish what they actually did and what they 
know in order to try to get safe haven in the United States and other countries” (Miller, 2001, 
para. 31). Thirteen months later, the Times reported that intelligence officials said “that they have 
found no conclusive evidence of links between Iraq and the Sept. 11 attacks” (Gordon & Risen, 
2003, para. 8).  
However, in the pre-invasion stories, Just Stability issues appear most often as either Just 
Legality statements alleging illegal behavior by Iraq, or Just Response, in considering how future 
action against Iraq might improve stability. Examples of the former include a reference to 
Saddam Hussein’s “unwillingness to stop making weapons of mass destruction, despite his 
pledges to do so” (Miller, 2001, para. 4), and another to “Iraq’s efforts to hide its activities to 
develop or acquire nonconventional weapons ... a clear pattern of violating its commitments in 
all areas” (Miller & Gordon, 2002, para. 3). Examples of the latter include ongoing arguments 
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that, as Iraq continued to consort with terrorists while developing WMDs and the capability of 
delivering them, resolution by force might be justified (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001; Hedges, 2001; 
Gordon & Risen, 2003; Risen & Johnston, 2003).  
Post-invasion concerns return to questions of veracity. In the coverage that emerged after 
the invasion, Just Veracity returned to the forefront of attention, as new claims arose – and were 
quickly challenged – and old claims were increasingly doubted. Reports of suspicious materials 
discovered “as evidence of Iraq’s illicit weapons programs” (Miller, 2003b, para. 2), destruction 
of WMDs and related equipment (Miller, 2003c), a warehouse where chemical weapons may 
have been tested (Miller, 2003d), and the discovery of two mobile lab trailers (Miller & Broad, 
2003a) were investigated and found wanting: “Now, intelligence analysts stationed in the Middle 
East, as well as in the United States and Britain, are disclosing serious doubts about the 
administration's conclusions in what appears to be a bitter debate within the intelligence 
community” (Miller & Broad, 2003b, para. 4).  
Within 4 months of the invasion, even Judith Miller began to doubt the WMD stories: 
“To this day, whether Saddam Hussein possessed such weapons when the war began remains 
unknown ... The intelligence on sites was often stunningly wrong” (Miller, 2003e, paras. 4, 33). 
Meanwhile, U.S. officials announced that an internal review of the pre-invasion intelligence, 
comparing it to what was actually found in Iraq, was designed as “an intellectual exercise to find 
ways to improve the way the intelligence community works” (Risen, 2003b, para. 13). Worse, 
one general even debated the meaning of the term itself: “Intelligence doesn’t necessarily mean 
something is true ... You know, it’s your best estimate of the situation. It doesn’t mean it’s a fact. 
I mean, that’s not what intelligence is” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 52). Within 6 
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months of the invasion, attention turned to the original sources of much of the pre-invasion 
information, finding multiple Justice problems:  
An internal assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency has concluded that most of  
the information provided by Iraqi defectors who were made available by the Iraqi  
National Congress was of little or no value ... several [had] invented or exaggerated their  
credentials as people with direct knowledge of the ... suspected unconventional weapons  
program ... no more than one-third of the information was potentially useful, and efforts  
to explore those leads since have generally failed to pan out. (Jehl, 2003b, paras. 1-3).  
Anniversary coverage increasingly questions the future. As the incidence of Just Stability 
questions increased even further in the 6 anniversary stories, a Just Veracity focus addressed the 
implications of the U.S. intelligence failure for future decision making. One former C.I.A. 
official said “fundamental errors in prewar intelligence assessments were so grave that he would 
recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency and other organizations overhaul their 
intelligence collection and analytical efforts” (Risen, 2004, para. 8).  
“Maybe that’s the lesson, maybe intelligence has to be looked at with a different eye” 
(Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 75). Especially because “the prewar intelligence on Iraq had been 
tainted by evidence previously identified as unreliable ... and in other cases ... fabricated,” the 
C.I.A.’s use of such material in Secretary Powell’s U.N. presentation a year earlier was described 
“as a significant embarrassment” (Jehl, 2004a, paras. 9-11). In response, the agency’s director 
ordered officials “to put in place ‘a permanent and lasting solution’ to the problem ... the ‘single 
most important aspect of our tradecraft that needs to be examined’ was whether the intelligence 
analysts were doing enough to question old assumptions ... we need to take a hard look at what 
we assume to be true” (Jehl, 2004b, paras. 7, 10).  
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Emergent Synergy III: Justice and Community principles appear together often. As 
with the previous pairs that emerged from the analysis, various combinations of Justice along 
with Community issues appeared in 152 paragraphs, or 17% of the sample, a frequency second 
only to the Threat / Justice pair discussed earlier. This invoked Community issues of state 
alliances and politics in consideration of various Justice concerns. The importance of internal 
cooperation among various governmental agencies, coupled with the inevitability of external 
conflict among various nations, during wartime is quite predictable – and easily identified.  
Early reports described a “spirited debate in the Bush administration” (Tyler & 
Tagliabue, 2001, para. 8) and “an intense debate in Washington” (Hedges, 2001, para. 13) over 
several points in the pre-invasion discussion, eventually leading some to accuse others of 
“politicizing intelligence to fit their hawkish views on Iraq” (Schmitt & Shanker, 2002, para. 3). 
Ultimately, it was discovered that “while the analysts included caveats on their reports, those 
passages ‘tended to drop off as the reports would go up the food chain’ inside the government” 
(Risen, 2004, para. 42); further, certain “views had been dismissed because they challenged the 
widely held consensus on Iraq’s weapons” (Jehl, 2004c, para. 7).  
The complicated diplomacy involved in extending Justice concerns across national 
borders – whether among friends, foes, or usually some unwieldy combination thereof – is 
reflected in paired-Principle paragraphs throughout the sample, involving at times 
Czechoslovakia (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001); Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt 
and Morocco (Hedges, 2001); Britain (Gordon & Miller, 2002); Israel (Miller, 2003a); Al-Qaeda 
and Ansar al-Islam (Risen & Johnston, 2003); Niger (Risen, 2003a); Russia (Miller & Broad, 
2003b); the Iraqi National Congress (Jehl, 2003b); Iran and Libya (Risen, 2004); the Soviet 
Union (Jehl & Sanger, 2004); the United Nations (Gordon, 2003) – and Iraq.  
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To summarize, the overall dominance of Justice-related issues reflects the degree to 
which the administration’s effort to justify the invasion permeated the public discussion. 
However, the overwhelming attention paid to a few just war tenets, and the incomplete utilitarian 
arguments made in favor of the invasion, drew eyes away from more basic questions of legal 
justice for such a pre-emptive move, moral justice connecting the supposed goods to the 
supposed harms, merit justice balancing the uncertainty of potential harm to U.S. citizens against 
the certainty of immediate harm to Iraqi citizens, fidelity justice in abiding by several 
international treaties, and fairness in dealing with Iraq compared to dealings with other nations.  
RQ 4: How did the Times address security as producing community? In its self-critique 
of the problematic invasion-related articles, editors at the Times discovered “many shared a 
common feature. They depended at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, 
defectors and exiles bent on ‘regime change’ in Iraq” (From, 2004b, para. 4). This sentence 
reveals the complex interplay of various communities of different kinds – the intelligence 
community, the defense community, the Iraqi defector community, politicians, the media – and 
how this interaction influenced various aspects of the decision to invade Iraq.  
As defined previously in this study’s conceptual framework, Millian Community 
elements represent a specific state of being – existing or sought – that produces or invokes some 
kind of group identity that preserves both present Safety and future Stability in a proposed 
response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the various state, organizational, 
command, shared and designated responsibility, and group identity issues invoked in a proposed 
response to the threat, and seeks stable community for all involved. In this small sample, a good 
deal of the coverage in the Times addressed debates within the U.S. intelligence community, on 
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the macro level, as well as international diplomacy and policy, on the macro level. The overall 
importance of Community is reflected in that category’s emergence as second-most dominant.  
The importance of Community in Mill’s thought – the “All” for whom “Security-&-
Justice” are sought – suggests a great deal of public discussion will invoke it, and the Millian 
Security Principles approach asks two key questions about the role of Community in war. In 
analyzing this sample, Community-related concerns emerge slightly ahead of Threat, and second 
only to Justice, in importance as defined by frequency of primary focus. About 20% of the total 
sample displayed a primary focus on this Principle. In terms of secondary focus, some 39% of 
the sample referenced Community issues, registering third-most frequent among the Principles.  
Overall, Community figured in some way into nearly 59% of the paragraphs, ranking 
third in overall prominence behind Justice and Threat; like Justice, its influence increased over 
time, as the conflict became ever more complicated, and the concurrent coverage became more 
complete, robust, and skeptical of simple answers – as it probably should have been earlier. Of 
the 29 stories, Community issues dominated only one before the invasion, and three more in the 
post-invasion coverage, and was not the primary influence of any anniversary stories. It was 
completely absent from pre-invasion stories 2 and 5, and barely addressed in stories 3 and 11.  
So, how did the Times cover discussion of actions that would foreseeably promote the 
present safety of all involved, as well as the future stability of all, in light of the proposed 
invasion? Or, as Mill might ask, how is the “community of interest between himself and the 
human society of which he forms a part” addressed (1863, p. 63)? From the beginning, one 
concept not explicitly included in the original definition clearly emerged: Community Politics.  
SGQ 8. How would this proposed response specifically promote the present safety of all 
involved parties – and their larger communities? The importance of this question increased 
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from the pre-invasion coverage to the post-invasion coverage, appearing as primary focus in 
about 9% at first, then about 15% later, before disappearing in the final, anniversary coverage. 
This tracks the increasing complexity of the coverage through the main hostilities, while the 
anniversary coverage was almost completely focused on future stability and SGQ 9. Over the 
entire sample, this question was fifth-most primary, driving 9% of the paragraphs, and sixth-most 
secondary, revealed in another 6%, with a combined presence in 15% of all paragraphs.  
Several Community Diplomacy issues emerged immediately in the first article, as 
officials were “concerned about the political implications of Iraqi involvement in terror attacks” 
after a Czech report (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001, para. 10). And a nuclear Iraq “would have 
dramatically altered the strategic equation in the gulf region” (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 23). 
However, both Britain and the International Atomic Energy Agency “offered a sharply different 
assessment” on Iraq’s nuclear capability (Gordon, 2003, para. 4). Meanwhile, Community 
Politics issues arise closer to the invasion itself, as the Pentagon created its own intelligence 
agency (Schmitt & Shanker, 2002) amid “deep divisions in Washington” (Miller, 2003a, para. 
7); eventually, the “Bush administration’s efforts to build a case for war against Iraq using 
intelligence to link it to Al Qaeda and the development of prohibited weapons has created 
friction within United States intelligence agencies” (Risen & Johnston, 2003, para. 1).  
After the invasion, Community Diplomacy concerns shifted from Iraq to the United 
Nations (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003). At the same time, interest in Community Politics 
increased significantly, with reports of administrative pressure on the C.I.A. (Risen, 2003a), 
political pressure on the administration (Miller & Broad, 2003a), “disagreements within the 
intelligence community” (Risen, 2003b, para. 5), “a bitter debate within the intelligence 
community” (Miller & Broad, 2003b, para. 4), “disagreement between intelligence agencies” 
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(Jehl, 2003a, para. 2), “bureaucratic rivalries ... strife ... and arguments” (Miller, 2003e, para. 
10), yet another “dissenting view” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, para. 36), and growing reports of 
the powerful political influence of a taxpayer-funded group of Iraqi exiles whose “leads since 
have generally failed to pan out” (Jehl, 2003b, para. 3).  
Finally, only one Community Safety paragraph emerged from the anniversary coverage, 
as Secretary Powell described euphemistically the political pressure he felt while addressing the 
U.N. months earlier: “There were a lot of cigars lit ... I didn’t want any going off in my face or 
the president’s face” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 26).  
SGQ 9. How would this proposed response specifically promote the enduring stability 
of all involved parties – and their larger communities? It would be tempting to predict that, 
given the immediate nature of more pressing concerns during conflict, this question, addressing 
the long-term health and stability of the interconnected groups involved, would carry less 
importance than the previous one. However, as Mill insisted, a key element of security is “the 
whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment ... the claim we have on our 
fellow-creatures to join in making safe for us the very groundwork of our existence” (1863, p. 
67). In this sample, the Times obliged, paying more attention to ongoing Community Stability 
issues than present Safety ones, focusing on statements related to this question in 11% of the total 
paragraphs, and referencing it in another 14%, for a total presence in nearly one quarter. Further, 
unlike the previous question, this one continually increases in importance as the conflict, and its 
aftermath, plays out – and, as concerns surrounding Politics, Diplomacy, and, increasingly, 
internal Identity, appear with greater frequency and wider application.  
In the dozen pre-invasion stories, Community Stability ranks sixth (3%) in primary 
importance, and fourth (8%) in secondary importance, in the analysis –slightly below the 
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previous question in both categories. And, from the very first story involving Czechoslovakia 
(Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001; Risen, 2002), international Diplomacy concerns attract this question 
the most. Some 9 nations – as well as the United Nations – are mentioned; however, two trends 
seem remarkable. First, it would seem that a nation preparing for war would engage its fellow 
nations much more than what this sample suggests. More importantly, there is a distinct and 
significant lack of respect – and even acknowledgment – for Iraq reflected in these articles, as it 
is always portrayed in a negative light, unlike the treatment accorded the other nations.  
In the post-invasion segment, the relative importance of this question increased, moving 
from sixth to third-most addressed as primary focus, guiding 10% of the paragraphs, and 
remaining as fourth-most invoked in secondary focus in 7%, representing a total influence of 
17%, and growing in frequency. In this phase of the coverage, as with the previous question, 
focus shifts from international Diplomacy issues to internal Politics ones, especially involving 
inter-agency conflicts over intelligence (Risen, 2003b; Jehl, 2003a; Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 
2003) and the influence of the Iraqi National Congress (Miller, 2003c; Jehl, 2003b).  
Interestingly, more inward-focused Community Identity issues arise in the anniversary 
coverage, where this question becomes even more important than before, rising to second most 
invoked in both primary focus (23%) and secondary interest (33%) in the final 6 stories. This 
increasingly greater attention parallels the shift in focus to concerns of process, policy, quality 
control, and the pitfalls of groupthink. Information quality and inherent systemic weaknesses 
(Risen, 2004), disinformation (Jehl & Sanger, 2004), “barriers to sharing information” (Jehl, 
2004b), and consensus views “treated like a religion ... with alternative views never given serious 
attention” (Jehl, 2004c), emerged as internal intelligence Community concerns.  
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Finally, in the composite op-ed letter published April 8, 2004, the Community Stability 
question returned full circle to the Times coverage itself, with allegations that Knight Ridder 
newspapers provided more complete coverage of the dissenting views from within the 
intelligence community than did the Times – “The contrast between the two accounts is striking” 
– and that investigative pre-invasion coverage in the Times became a “sudden silence that set in 
in late October and that lasted until the start of the war” – a gap that the Times’ foreign affairs 
writer “found so troubling” (Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004, paras. 30-33).  
Emergent Synergy IV: Threat, Justice and Community principles appear together 
often. The third-most likely combination of Principles to emerge from these data is this triplet, 
representing at least 96 paragraphs, or about 11% of the total sample, where all three appeared as 
marked issues of focus within the same statement. Further, this combination appears with 
significantly greater frequency over the time span of the sample, perhaps as the Times coverage 
becomes more robust, increasing from 7 (2%) pre-invasion examples to 26 (9%) post-invasion 
examples to eventually 63 (28%) examples in the 6 anniversary-timed articles.  
In the pre-invasion articles, this combination appears immediately in the complex 
coverage of Czechoslovakian agents telling U.S. officials of an alleged meeting between an Iraqi 
officer and a 9/11 terrorist (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001; Risen, 2002), of “a flood of all-too-eager 
informants who have left Iraq as war seems more likely” (Miller, 2003a, para. 15), and of claims 
from Iraqi, Israeli, and U.S. sources that Iraq had moved its WMDs to Syria (para. 18).  
Post-invasion coverage invoked all three Principles in paragraphs addressing a shift in 
U.S. fact-finding focus (Miller, 2003c), “disagreements within the intelligence community” 
(Risen, 2003b, para. 5; Miller & Broad, 2003b; Jehl, 2003a), the “ground truth” that fact-finding 
teams encountered once in Iraq (Miller, 2003e, para. 3), disagreements over the value of the 
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United Nations weapons inspectors (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003), and the credibility of 
informants associated with the Iraqi National Congress (Jehl, 2003b).  
The post-combat introspection reflected earlier in this analysis also influenced a three-
fold increase in Threat-Justice-Community combinations in the final sample section, present in 5 
of the 6 stories, driven by greater and deeper attention to the inner workings of the intelligence 
community. This explanation from one of the Times reporters describes one unseen challenge to 
doing Justice in covering the WMD Threat, caused by the source Community:  
Sometimes the media is confronted by officials who seek to deceive the press. But the  
WMD issue was more complicated. In this instance, key officials appear to have  
deceived themselves. That poses special challenges ... but one which journalists should  
be prepared to meet. There is a lesson for the media in this episode. It is possible to be  
too accepting of the paradigm that guides the intelligence community, nongovernmental  
experts, and policy officials. (Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004, para. 21)  
Overall, the emergent prominence of this category, second only to Justice in influence in 
this sample, resonates with Mill’s frequent references to community throughout his defense of 
Utilitarianism. Further, subcategories related to Politics, Stability, and Identity revealed depths of 
meanings not originally considered in the category definition. Finally, however, the almost 
complete absence of attention to any Iraqi or Middle East community in any meaningful way 
pointed to gaps in the coverage that might have been better addressed from a Millian stance.  
RQ 5: How did the Times address security as practicing utility? However completely 
the Times may have engaged the previous 4 Millian Security Principles, through their 9 Guiding 
Questions, in their invasion-related coverage, a truly utilitarian approach requires that all of these 
various goods must be weighed in light of expected costs and benefits to everyone concerned. As 
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Mill insisted: “if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for weighing these 
conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region within which one or the other 
preponderates” (1863, p. 28).  
As previously defined in the conceptual framework of this study, Millian Utility elements 
represent specific statements that practice some degree of utilitarian calculus, seeking to balance 
goods and harms for the greater good, to ensure both present Safety and future Stability by a 
proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the various arguments for and 
against a proposed response to the threat, and seeks specific, logical, empirical justifications for 
harms in light of expected goods for all those involved. Informed by recent scholarship in war 
ethics (Shaw, 2011,2014, 2016) and media ethics (Elliott, 2007; Peck, 2006), this principle 
considers three basic types of utilitarian statements: those balancing goods and harms in light of 
a proposed action, those doing the same calculation in light of refraining from a proposed action, 
and a comprehensive Security Calculus that involves as many different aspects as possible, 
considers all available options, and seeks the single best course of action.  
So, how did the Times do in considering Utility? Not too well, at least in this limited 
sample, according to this analysis. Where the model might direct significant attention to Utility 
in proportion to that afforded the others, these data show otherwise: Utility ranks dead last in the 
overall sample, and in the pre-invasion segment of coverage – the very place we might expect to 
encounter it the most – where it is completely absent from 5 of the 12 early stories, and virtually 
absent, save for a few mentions, in two more. Similarly counterintuitively, it moves up in both 
sample segments after the invasion.  
Utility appears as a primary concern in only 11 of the 891 paragraphs analyzed, or 1%, 
and represents a secondary concern in only 34 statements, or 4%, for a total focus influence of 45 
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paragraphs, or 5%. Its overall influence appears in 6% of the pre-invasion coverage, increases to 
about 7% in the post-invasion coverage, and then drops again to 6% in the anniversary coverage. 
As might be expected, all three Utility questions appear at least once only before the invasion; 
the Millian War Principle, Guiding Question 12, is absent from the rest of the coverage, and the 
non-act Question 11 disappears in the final, anniversary sample segment.  
As with the Safety & Stability Principle discussed earlier, the historical context of a post-
9/11 New York City and United States that emerged from the narrative might explain this 
apparent lack of attention; that government officials were weighing the pros and cons of military 
action could perhaps be assumed as a given. However, more attention to Utility would certainly 
have helped: “If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to 
decide between them when their demands are incompatible” (Mill, 1863, p. 31).  
SGQ 10. How would this proposed response specifically deter or “repel” this perceived 
threat with maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties – including historical 
contexts and foreseeable consequences? In these data, this first step in considering Utility is 
about as far as most reporters got, representing the most frequently addressed of the three 
associated questions. Even as the most-referenced question, though, it still represents only about 
4% of the paragraphs analyzed, noted as primary focus in less than 1%, and appearing as 
secondary focus in about 3% of the sample. It is 8th of 12 in frequency of primary focus.  
In the pre-invasion coverage – where one might expect to see it the most – this question 
represents a primary focus in only about 1% of the paragraphs, and appears as a secondary 
concern in about 2% of them. It does appear at the end of the first story, in a cautionary quote: 
Any action “must be carefully weighed on the basis of sound intelligence and political 
information” (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001, para. 45). A similar quote appears a month later, 
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weighing how Iraq poses “a national security threat” (Miller, 2001, para. 32). Yet the “Bush 
Doctrine” of pre-emptive action is never itself challenged: “The question is not, why now?” 
(Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 12). Instead, only one rare counter in the last pre-invasion story 
claims Iraq wouldn’t use WMDs unless it was first attacked (Risen & Johnston, 2003)  
In the 11 post-invasion articles, evidence of this question increases slightly (though it is 
absent in 3), usually in tie-back statements where the ongoing failure to find WMDs are said to 
weaken “a major justification for the war” (Miller, 2003b, para. 6; Miller & Broad, 2003a; Risen, 
2003b; Miller, 2003e; Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003; Jehl, 2003b). Meanwhile, one story finds 
utility in the war by being able to “study the intelligence reports it produced before the war and 
see how they compared with the reality discovered on the ground” (Risen, 2003b, 9). And the 
National Security Adviser repeats an apocalyptic valuation often heard before the invasion: “You 
have to look at that body of evidence and say what does this require the United States to do? 
Then you are compelled to act” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 8).  
Finally, while this key Utility application manifests itself in fewer examples in the 
anniversary appraisals, it now appears fully stated, in the form of a question: “how can a nation 
threaten to act pre-emptively against another government if the evidence of what kind of a threat 
it poses – and how imminent the threat may be – is so far off the mark?” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, 
para. 73). “But many nations, experts say, pose that potential threat ... [So] make sure that similar 
misjudgments are not made regarding other nations that could, in the long or short term, threaten 
American security” (para. 78). Yet not once is pre-emption itself challenged.  
SGQ 11. How would all involved parties be harmed if the proposed response were not 
undertaken – including historical experience as well as foreseeable present and future 
consequences? Part of the utilitarian calculus, especially when considering justice, is to consider 
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the ramifications of not acting, if the balance offers a better outcome than acting (Elliott, 2007). 
This question is addressed even less frequently than the previous Utility concept, appearing as a 
primary concern only twice, and as a supporting concern only 5 times, in all, making it the 
second-to-least influence of the 12 Guiding Questions.  
Nearly all of these 7 appearances emerge in the pre-invasion coverage, with only one 
supporting statement in the post-invasion coverage, and none after that. The extremely rare 
statement included with the previously noted caveat at the end of the first story is clear: “such 
action must be successful, or it should be avoided for the time being” (Tyler & Tagliabue, 2001, 
para. 45). An even more clear – and rare – statement appears 6 months before the invasion: 
Washington, the critics say, has time to try its hand at diplomacy and should enlist  
United Nations backing to force Mr. Hussein to accept inspectors back. Taken in its  
totality, the critics insist that the intelligence suggests there is no rush to take military  
action. (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 15) 
However, the only other invocation of this question in any of the 531 paragraphs 
published after the invasion return to repeat that apocalyptic, all-or-nothing valuation:  
The president of the United States could not afford to trust Saddam’s motives or give  
him the benefit of the doubt ... Analysts say the cost of overestimating the threat posed  
by Mr. Hussein was minimal, while the cost of underestimating it could have been  
incalculable. (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, paras. 9, 27)  
SGQ 12. How would this proposed response represent the only action available that 
would foreseeably promote the greatest expected well-being and least expected harm for all 
involved parties – including historical contexts and all possible alternatives? Ultimately, to 
Mill’s certain consternation, the final utilitarian calculus, based on his thought as adapted by 
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Elliott (2007) and Shaw (2011, 2014, 2016), appears in exactly one of the 891 total paragraphs 
comprising this sample – and it appears earlier in the same paragraph previously quoted in 
support of the previous question, published about 6 months before the invasion:  
The administration’s critics assert that the last decade has shown that Mr. Hussein can  
be contained through a combination of United Nations sanctions, carefully designed  
inspections and, if Iraq refused to admit the monitors, targeted air strikes. Iraq, the  
critics say, remains heavily dependent on external assistance to advance its nuclear  
program. (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 15)  
For whatever reason, this kind of careful calculus is absent in the rest of the sample, and 
the key empirical only appear in two very rare Threat Nature reports: first, the 1998 U.S. 
bombing campaign “destroyed much of the remaining infrastructure” for WMD (Risen, 2004, 
para. 27); second, “the program ... was far less advanced than ... Iran, Libya and North Korea” 
(Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 54). More attention to any pre-war assertion would be welcome.  
Emergent Synergy V: Justice and Utility principles appear together. As rarely as any 
application of Utility concepts appeared in this sample, when they did, they emerged most often 
paired with Justice issues than with any other Principle – and often enough to rank fifth on the 
Emergent Synergy list, present in 19 (2%) of the paragraphs analyzed. None of these pairs 
appear in any of the dozen pre-invasion stories, but 12 appear in the post-invasion stories, and 
the remaining 7 appear in the half-dozen anniversary-timed articles.  
A statement made about 6 months before the invasion, but referenced afterward, invoked 
both Utility and Justice issues when the Vice President said that “incomplete information ... 
should not deter the country from taking action” (Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 20). A 
rare triple-Principle paragraph united Justice Legality with Utility and Community Diplomacy 
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two months before the invasion: “the White House ... hopes [to] convince skeptical allies and the 
American public that Iraq’s behavior warrants military action” (Miller, 2003a, para. 8).  
The unusual utilitarian rationale for the post-invasion intelligence review mentioned 
earlier appeared paired with the Just Veracity concept of verification: “If we go to war with Iraq, 
what are the things we should look at?” the Secretary of Defense had asked some 6 months 
before the invasion (Risen, 2003b, para. 10). It is possible that U.S. intelligence officials 
conducted other empirical studies to gauge the utility of the invasion, but this is the only one 
discovered in this analysis. Here, Safety & Stability issues could enhance review, as it did in an 
extremely rare quadruple-Principle paragraph guided by Utility (taxpayers’ financial 
consequences) but also addressing elements of Safety & Stability (provisional infrastructure), 
Justice (U.S. credibility), and Community (U.S. politics) in its post-invasion evaluation:  
[O]fficials said the arrangement had wasted more than $1 million in taxpayers’ money  
and had prompted them to question the credibility of Mr. Chalabi and the Iraqi National  
Congress. Both have enjoyed powerful backing ... at the Pentagon and are playing a  
significant role in the provisional government in Baghdad. (Jehl, 2003b, para. 5)  
Meanwhile, one anniversary story lamented over Justice and implied Utility, because of 
“severe looting ... [of] crucial documents and other materials ... it will be virtually impossible to 
ever get a complete picture of what Iraq was up to before the war” (Risen, 2004, para. 19).  
Summarizing this most Millian category, this study found very little attention to utility in 
this limited sample – and, when it appeared, it was usually either incomplete or exaggerated, 
nearly always missing key elements in the discussion. The scarcity of Safety & Stability items 
meant that officials – and reporters – made intuitive leaps from Threat to Justice and beyond, 
leaving gaps in the narrative that became painfully evident when the questions turned to Utility.   
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What Were They Good For? Reading the Times Editors through a Millian Lens  
Finally, regardless of how John Stuart Mill might have critiqued these 29 articles, the 
Times editors certainly had some things to say about them – and careful reading of the May 26, 
2004, editorial reveals several concerns they mentioned. Among them were the reliability of 
Iraqi sources; the work of individual reporters; journalistic conventions of placement, editing, 
and verification; a perceived 5-month gap in coverage right before the invasion; and comparable 
news outlets’ coverage (From, 2004a; From, 2004b; Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004).  
First, the editors noted in reviewing the problematic stories, “many shared a common 
feature. They depended at least in part on information from a circle of Iraqi informants, defectors 
and exiles bent on ‘regime change’ in Iraq ... whose credibility has come under increasing public 
debate in recent weeks” (From, 2004a, para. 4). “The most prominent of the anti-Saddam 
campaigners, Ahmad Chalabi, has been named as an occasional source in Times articles since at 
least 1991, and has introduced reporters to other exiles.” However, this Millian analysis did not 
reveal any noticeable differences between the 4 stories citing those sources identified with the 
Iraqi National Congress and the remainder of the sample. Because this model did not account for 
source identity, the editors’ perceived lack of verification did not register.  
In the Times sample, organized as it was published, a comparison of the dozen “stories 
that cast doubt on key claims about Iraq’s weapons programs” (From, 2004b, para. 9) with the 
various original weapons stories reveals that all reporters’ attention to Threat Nature concerns 
remained important throughout the sample – and just over half of them made the front page. 
Further, the one opportunity identified for direct comparison, as “one example of a claim that 
was quickly and prominently challenged by additional reporting” (para. 7), reveals a similarly 
consistent level of significant attention in the two follow-ups, and both appeared on page A1.  
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When compared under the Millian Security Principles, the work of the 15 different 
writers demonstrated no remarkable, consistent differences. Slight differences between any two 
reporters are probably related to time or topic, rather than to either reporter’s work.  
In particular, Judith Miller’s “now-discredited coverage” (Hallock, 2012, p. 273; 
Anderson, 2006; Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004) in her earlier stories relied heavily on 
information from Iraqi dissidents considered unreliable (Jehl, 2003b) – but she wasn’t alone in 
doing so (Layton, 2003). A comparison of Miller-authored stories with those written by others 
failed to reveal a great deal of Security Principle differences in this limited sample.  
Similarly, no meaningful, consistent patterns could be found among any of the Principles, 
the related Guiding Questions, and any story’s placement on the front page.  
Further, in the op-ed / letter discussion involving three different reporters, Times foreign 
affairs writer Michael Massing identified a “sudden silence that set in in late October and that 
lasted until the start of the war that [he] found so troubling” (Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 
2004, para. 33). While this Millian analysis found an overall shift in dominant coverage focus 
from Threat in 5 of the 8 articles published before this “Massing Gap” to Justice in all 4 of those 
published after late October and the invasion, this appears to represent the overall shift in focus 
from Threat to Justice already underway in the sample – and 3 of those 4 involve news of 
information that undercut the administration’s pro-invasion stance.  
Finally, both the editorial and the op-ed letter favorably mentioned what they judged was 
more comprehensive work by various Knight Ridder Newspapers reporters on comparable 
stories. Analyzing those is beyond the scope of this study, but an exploratory review of 
contemporary coverage in some of the other outlets reveals some instances of wider sourcing, 
deeper questions, and more comprehensive coverage.  
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Discussion: What Was it Good For? “Setting the Record Straight” 
This pilot study reveals that this particular application Mill’s conception of security 
proves a very useful tool for considering the coverage the Times editors selected. Further, the 
Millian Security Principles might have helped the Times cover the war better, had reporters 
pursued lines of inquiry suggested by its guidelines. Finally, the model shows promise in future 
applications to both traditional and emergent conflicts, as well as to other security concerns.  
“I read the news today” goes the first line of this famous Beatles song (Lennon & 
McCartney, 1967, track 13) – “The English army had just won the war; A crowd of people 
turned away: But I just had to look, having read the book.” Thirty-six years later, in a dramatic 
statement broadcast from the deck of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, then-President George W. 
Bush told the world’s news organizations that “the United States and our allies have prevailed” 
(Bush, 2003b, para. 1) – and a crowd of people turned away. However, barely a year later, the 
editors of the Times just had to look – as, more recently, did I, having read Mill’s book.  
Under the Millian Security Principles lens, this study found successes and failures that 
somewhat corresponded with those the Times editors identified – but in greater detail.  
Getting “the Record Straight:” Analyzing the Times Reveals Millian Values  
So, what would John Stuart Mill say about the articles that the Times editors identified as 
either problematic or exemplary in this sample? Quite a bit, if the initial results of this pilot study 
are any indication. The 5 Millian Security Principles – and their accompanying 12 Guiding 
Questions – easily identified corresponding manifestations in the Times reportage. It appears 
from this study that this model yields useful organization and analysis of the kind of conflict 
coverage reflected in this sample. And, where evidence for particular Principles or Questions 
was scant or absent, that absence pointed to significant gaps in the coverage.  
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The “Security-&-Justice-for-All” lens discovers successes and failures. In practice, 
the 5 Millian Security Principles proved useful in identifying and organizing emergent issues of 
importance in the analysis of this small sample of coverage from the Times. Shifts in emphasis 
also emerged, consistent with the sample’s three different phases, between Threat and 
Community issues. Though an unforeseen focus on veracity and verification led to an unbalanced 
preponderance of Justice-coded paragraphs, nothing emerged that could not be quickly coded 
within the existing model. The size of this imbalance, though, suggests that issues related to 
truth-telling might better be moved to a new category for that value.  
Security addresses a vital, existential Threat (sometimes). The only category focused on 
the actual situation at hand, Threat elements did emerge as the second-strongest focus in the pre-
invasion coverage before fading, as we might expect, afterward. The model also suggested that 
later coverage might return to these issues, as the Times eventually did, by “re-examining the 
claims as new evidence emerged” (From, 2004b, para. 3). However, this Principle and its 
Guiding Questions revealed gaps throughout the coverage and the need for more detail. Yet this 
Millian focus on Threat offers both a valuable coverage guide as well as a metric.  
As observed, Threat Nature discussions tended to focus on “shiny” WMDs, often without 
meaningful detail or context. This reflected the journalistic convention of “nuggets,” or “money 
quotes” of important people saying important things, which led to an over-reliance upon official 
sound-bite “information that was ... insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged” 
(para. 3) – such as the ubiquitous, terrifying “mushroom cloud” (para. 8).  
The analysis also revealed a near-complete absence of specific Threat Target 
identification, which meant most stories failed to fully connect the three Threat dots. By the 
apparent assumption of the United States, or its allies, as potential victims, the Times failed to 
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walk its readers through the actual probability of harm from these particular Natures and Agents. 
As redundant as it may seem, more attention to this would have filled some gaps.   
Finally, this study revealed an almost reflexive assumed invocation of terrorists, Iraq, and 
Saddam Hussein as symbolic Threat Agents who required no further investigation or explanation 
as such. This meant that no other nation’s comparable potential threat appeared in comparison 
until very late in the sample. Further, a very rare few quotes portrayed Mr. Hussein as a rational 
actor manageable by actions short of war and regime change – and those were late. Instead, for 
many of the “dire claims about Iraq ... there was no follow-up at all” (para. 5).  
Security preserves Safety & Stability (rare). As these response-related concerns 
emerged as the least-addressed of all, the model’s potential for both assessing past coverage as 
well as guiding future reporting became conspicuous by its absence. Completely missing from 
nearly half of these articles, Safety & Stability issues require investigation and analysis beyond 
Threat sound bites into nuts-and-bolts realities of water, food, medicine, utilities, law 
enforcement, and other day-to-day elements of security. And it got progressively worse: overall 
evidence of these items decreased as time passed, missing in one third of the pre-invasion stories, 
nearly one-half of the post-invasion stories, and two-thirds of the anniversary pieces. The lack of 
any Marshall Plan-style exit strategy emerged from reading between the lines.  
Among the least-addressed Guiding Questions, Safety could have better informed the 
Times reporting in two main areas. First, in considering how specific Threats might affect the 
lives of U.S. citizens, important context and nuance might have emerged – not only in terms of 
internal concerns for its civilians, but also in long-term concerns for its military personnel.  
Further, any consideration at all for the immediate well-being for the people of Iraq – and 
for the larger region – would have invoked better utilitarian considerations of this proposed 
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response. Though the Times did publish remarkable work on this later – most notably in the 
reporting of the late Oklahoma native Anthony Shadid (2012) – it is virtually absent here. 
The same is true for future concerns of Stability – where attention decreased, instead of 
increasing as the model might suggest. Any news of the growing unrest and insurgency in Iraq 
appears only in terms of shifting U.S. resources away from the search for WMDs, and the only 
Iraqis whose future seems worthy of concern are those who provide useful intelligence.  
Though the Times did report later on Stability issues like schools (Tavernise, 2006), “Mill 
requires calculating what is truly good for the whole community” (Elliott, 2007, p. 100) 
throughout the discussion of perceived threats and proposed responses, not just afterwards.  
Security promotes Justice: Plenty for me, but not much for thee. The importance of 
justice in Mill’s thought – occupying the final third of Utilitarianism (1863; Elliott) – finds 
plenty of interest in this sample, as Justice dominates the narrative’s attention throughout the 
sample, appearing in 92% of the paragraphs; further, as the model suggests, the reporting’s main 
focus shifts from immediate concerns before the invasion to long-term issues afterwards.  
However, this analysis surfaced a significant degree of attention to issues of veracity, or 
truth-telling, in such proportion as to suggest adding a separate category for it in future studies. 
As initially defined, the Justice Principle included the Millian secondary principles of legal 
rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise-keeping, and impartial or equitable treatment (Mill, 
1863; Elliott, 2007), and veracity may be seen as an element of each and every one of these 
criteria. Yet the reflexive nature of an Ethnographic Content Analysis – “looking at one feature 
in the context of what is understood about other features” (Altheide, 1987, p. 66) – allowed this 
emphasis to surface as an emergent subcategory that drew from the existing ones.  
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Finding that statements related to Just Veracity permeate the narrative – in which a news 
organization whose professional tradition claims its “essence ... is a discipline of verification” 
(Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007, p. 12) covered its government’s claims – could hardly count as a 
novel discovery. However, because the model suggested interest in the various Millian aspects of 
Justice, this analysis successfully identified the significant attention to the various claims the 
government made to justify the invasion.  
Further, although the model did not differentiate among information sources or balance – 
and therefore could not corroborate the Times’ own critique of “coverage that was not as 
rigorous as it should have been” (From, 2004a, para. 3) – it did cast in sharp relief the complete 
lack of Iraqi voices throughout the sample. Though Mill insisted that “the happiness which forms 
the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of 
all concerned” (1863, p. 21), the Times reporters and editors did not see fit to seek comment from 
Iraqi officials or citizens in any of these articles. This was not unique to the Times – “where were 
the Iraqi imbeds?” asked one CBS correspondent (Newton, 2003) – but a Millian concern for 
impartial and equitable treatment would suggest a wider range of voices. 
More closely aligned to the original model’s conception of Justice, discussion related to 
Just Legality emerged in consideration of Iraq’s alleged infractions of international law, United 
Nations sanctions, and agreements to restrict its weapons development. Further, as the model 
suggested, attention to these items increased as time went on – not only in terms of seeking to 
establish evidence of past Iraqi wrongdoing, but also increasingly in considering future Bush 
Doctrine pre-emptive action and the need for better intelligence.  
Finally, whether considering Just Legality or Just Response issues – and in the various 
combinations of statements invoking Just Stability concerns – the complete lack of awareness of 
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potential injustice by the United States is significant in this sample. Despite the agreement 
among the early Utilitarians that all war was largely unjust, and Mill’s concern with “the various 
modes of action, and arrangements of human affairs, which are classed, by universal or widely 
spread opinion, as Just or as Unjust” (1863, p. 53), nothing in this sample appears to address 
issues of civilian “collateral damage” deaths, war crimes, and all the various harms war 
encompasses – much less any discussion of international laws prohibiting aggression.  
Security produces (some) Community. As with Threat and Justice, the Millian 
Community category suggested a significant amount of attention would emerge in an ad Bellum 
narrative – and it did, affecting 53% of all analyzed paragraphs and representing the third-most 
referenced Principle, only slightly eclipsed by Threat-related statements. Further, not only did 
the model demonstrate a growing degree of consideration over time, it also revealed a deficiency 
in the pre-invasion coverage, where these concerns were completely absent from a third of the 12 
stories in that part of the sample.  
Finally, application of the model surfaced several significant secondary principles in the 
sample, beginning with Community Diplomacy issues related to cooperation with other nations in 
response to the supposed Iraqi threat, continuing through an unforeseen emergence of 
Community Politics within the government, and ending with an increasing focus upon issues 
related to internal Community Identity and concerns with interagency cooperation. Of greatest 
impact was the Politics-related statements, and that term was added to the original definition.  
The relative lack of attention to Community Safety concerns may indicate an assumption 
that any action that would disarm Iraq would improve the immediate safety of the U.S. and its 
allies; however, the sample reveals no interest whatsoever in the safety of the Iraqi people – 
another indication of the lack of Millian inclusion in the discussion. At no time does any 
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discussion emerge around issues of immediate safety for Iraq or its neighbors. Attention to those 
issues – especially combined with other categories – would have enhanced the coverage.  
Finally, the model’s question of Community Stability, reflecting Mill’s concern with the 
ongoing well-being of the larger community, suggests that more attention should have been paid 
to these issues in the pre-invasion coverage. Emergent discussion of inter-agency conflict should 
have led to wider sourcing, and the few statements regarding the ongoing stability of the region 
should also have meant a more robust interrogation of post-Hussein plans for Iraq.  
Security practices (myopic) Utility. Ultimately, the model’s greatest utility in this 
analysis is its revelation of a nearly complete lack of attention to a fully utilitarian defense of the 
invasion. Though the ad Bellum decision that “it is allowable to go to war” (Mill, 1859b, p. 118) 
represents for Mill one of the most important ethical questions, it is rarely invoked in this sample 
– and, when it is, it appears incompletely or illogically applied. The three Guiding Questions 
influence so few paragraphs that this essential Principle is barely more evident than the similarly 
absent Safety & Stability category. The model suggests that this essential concept be thoroughly 
explored before a nation decides to wage war; instead, it influences barely 8% of the entire 
sample, and is completely absent from nearly half the 12 pre-invasion stories, from a third of the 
11 post-invasion articles, and from one sixth of the 6 anniversary stories.  
This echoes one of the main critiques from the Times editors: “Administration officials 
were allowed to hold forth at length on why this evidence of Iraq’s nuclear intentions demanded 
that Saddam Hussein be dislodged from power” (From, 2004a, para. 8) – and the same was true 
for allegations of other WMDs and the nation’s alleged alliance with terrorists.  
Worse, what emerged from the narrative, instead of reasoned cost-benefit arguments 
based on Safety & Stability or Justice issues in response to specific Threats, were more of the 
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kind of apocalyptic, all-or-nothing statements like this one. The mere possibility that Iraq held 
any hint of WMD, coupled with the suggestion of collaborations with terrorists, meant that any 
response would be worth the cost because of these utterly horrifying possibilities of harm. As 
one of the anniversary stories put it: “Analysts say the cost of overestimating the threat posed by 
Mr. Hussein was minimal, while the cost of underestimating it could have been incalculable” 
(Risen, Sanger & Shanker, 2003, para. 27) – a claim that is repeated without any attempt of 
qualifying or quantifying these particular costs and balancing them for maximum good.  
Apocalypse Now. Examples of this absolutist language emerge from several paragraphs 
coded as Utility statements – reminiscent of the arguments reporters once heard about a popular 
anti-drug education program: “that ‘if D.A.R.E. detoured just one child ...’ communities should 
support it,” noted one critical metastudy (Hanson, 2019, para. 40). “Yet if a drug worked one 
percent of the time, the Food and Drug Administration would pull it off the market.” This study 
concluded that “The estimated cost of DARE annually is already $1 to 1.3 billion. That’s a lot 
for a completely ineffective, often counterproductive, program.” Yet, like with the promotional 
D.A.R.E. slogan, no cost-benefit analysis is offered to support such statements as officials “are 
not willing to risk leaving [Mr. Hussein] in power” (Schmitt & Shanker, 2002, para. 5), or “no 
president has the luxury to tolerate a growing threat” (Jehl & Sanger, 2004, para. 77).  
Adolescent utility. While not quite so apocalyptic, a significant number of Utility-coded 
paragraphs reflect a sort of incomplete, or adolescent, utilitarian appeal, one that invokes the 
power of a “greater good” appeal absent its corresponding responsibility of complete reasoning 
(Didgah, Shariati, Behashti, & Naiini, 2018; Farrell, 1993). For example: “It was the prospect of 
... an atomic bomb ... that the Bush administration most sought to fan as it pushed the case for 
war. Yet it had little concrete evidence” (Gordon, Milbank, & Massing, 2004, para. 25).  
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That the most-seen combination of Utility with any other Principle is with Justice reveals 
significant discussion of connecting the ad Bellum argument with various justifications; that this 
combination is fifth on the synergy list, evident in only 2% of the sample, speaks to its overall 
absence from the narrative. Easy appeals to the greater good emerge with little or no support. 
Perhaps the most damning discovery of this analysis is that the solitary story bearing evidence of 
all three Utility questions – Action, Inaction, and the Utilitarian Security Calculus – and the only 
paragraph of the entire sample coded for that last question – quotes officials who argue against 
the proposed invasion: “Taken in its totality, the critics insist that the intelligence suggests there 
is no rush to take military action” (Gordon & Miller, 2002, para. 15).  
The “Security-&-Justice-for-All” lens underestimated Justice. For all the many points 
of interest the Millian Security Principles model suggested might emerge from this analysis – as 
well as those made conspicuous by their absence – the additional, unforeseen issues that also 
emerged beyond the model’s criteria demand attention and explanation.  
Fortunately, instead of reflecting “my fear of the dark – of things not seen” (Lindsay & 
Wilhelm, 1984, track 2), Mill and Altheide agree on the essential value of discovery and 
adaptation: “The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, 
admit of indefinite improvement, and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their 
improvement is perpetually going on,” Mill observed (1863, p. 29); meanwhile, the ECA 
methodology will “permit emergence, refinement, or collapsing of additional categories” 
(Altheide & Schneider, 2013, p. 68). The model suggested Justice – but was not able to account 
for its different guises, its emergent emphasis upon veracity, and its overall dominance.  
Justice, Justice über alles. That this model surfaced such an overwhelming quantity of 
Justice-related statements in analyzing the work of a reputable news organization covering its 
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government’s attempts to prove multiple Threat elements to Safety & Stability involving multiple 
Community aspects marks a success. However, in many ways a victim of its own success, the 
model failed to account enough for the varying qualities of Millian Justice itself. The research 
instrument divided all Justice concerns into two temporal categories, immediate Safety and 
ongoing Stability, which proved too blunt a distinction for such varied volume.  
Further, as significant meaning emerged from the data in coupled synergies among the 
various Principles, Justice was the recurrent element in each of the top-5 pairs: Threat-Justice, 
Justice-Community, Threat-Justice-Community, Safety & Stability-Justice, and Justice-Utility. 
That the model would suggest several other proximate pairs, such as Threat-Safety & Stability 
and Community-Utility, which did not emerge, reveals further gaps in the coverage.  
Future application of this model should allow for some accounting of these pairs.  
Justice is a many-splendored thing. As the various instances of Justice emerged around 
issues such as Veracity, Legality, and Response, the model might be improved by adding a 
second layer of categories, perhaps adapting Elliott’s 5 specific principles (2007) from Mill’s 
utilitarian justice definitions (1863): legal rights, moral rights, just deserts, promise-keeping, and 
impartial or equitable treatment. This would also help address potential confusion surrounding 
the use of the term “justice,” which for some scholars might invoke only legal or moral 
connotations. It would also provide more detailed reporting of Justice-related findings.  
And it might direct reporters and scholars alike to more substantive and robust 
examination of these various elements of Justice as they currently exist in a given situation, and 
as they may be threatened by a particular Threat, a proposed response, or both. For example, 
more consideration to various aspects of Justice in Iraq would have provided insight into the 
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larger reality of life under Saddam Hussein for most of his citizens before the invasion – and 
how various elements of Justice would be affected in the war’s aftermath.  
Truth, Justice & The Millian Way. However, even adding these secondary categories 
still won’t account for the significant emergence of Veracity-related issues of Justice, much less 
for the overall dominance of this Principle. Faced with similar changes to its venerable “Food 
Pyramid” dietary guidelines, the U.S. Department of Agriculture devised a simpler, 4-color “My 
Plate” to suggest a more healthful balance (DeNoon, 2011). Although the former First Lady 
insisted that “families will find this useful” (para. 5), no such useful distribution of utilitarian 
Principles emerged from the utilitarian literature; on the contrary, Mill’s ideal “weighing these 
conflicting utilities against one another” (1863, p. 28) suggests that utility will determine a 
uniquely appropriate proportional distribution in each individual case.  
Nevertheless, a Millian Security “food plate” where one single Principle alone accounts 
for well over 50% of the 5-section dish indicates an imbalance in the model, and one that 
probably made a significant difference in the analysis. In this study, Veracity was coded under 
several of the Millian Justice secondary principles: truth-telling in any given action may be seen 
as a legal right, a moral right, a deserved right, a promise to keep, or a result of impartial or 
equitable treatment – or any combination of these just ideals. For future application in journalism 
ethics and ad Bellum war ethics alike, it makes sense to add a separate category for Veracity 
itself, rather than task the researcher to shoehorn data into the various Justice codes.  
Finally, this is consistent with Mill’s own emphasis in Utilitarianism on the primacy of 
“veracity ... the insufficiency of which does more than any one thing that can be named to keep 
back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the largest scale depends” 
(1863, p. 27). In fact, his unequivocal insistence that “any, even unintentional, deviation from 
 303 
truth, does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion” certainly 
carries significant weight in considering a government’s ad Bellum arguments and a free press’ 
attempts to accurately and completely report them to an ever-less trustful public.  
That this defense of veracity appears in Mill’s rebuttal of the various criticisms of utility, 
some 40 pages before he defines security as “the most vital of interests” (p. 67), may explain 
why this researcher considered it assumed in examining the various Millian elements of security; 
however, Mill’s insistence on its essential requirement for any community endeavor – and its 
emergence as a significant issue of attention from the data – suggest it be added to the Millian 
Security Principle model as a precursor of some sort to the other categories. At least in this 
study, such a revised coding would more accurately describe the data – and better balance the 
categories on the Millian ethics plate as well.  
The “Security-&-Justice-for-All” lens needs sharper focus in places. Similar to the 
discovered need for better clarity in defining Justice more carefully, several emergent issues 
suggest that other aspects of the model might offer better utility with a little Millian 
“improvement” (p. 29), especially in considering an analysis that yielded a great deal of quantity, 
but struggled with distinguishing among different aspects of quality.  
First, a more clear distinction between Threat as considering the situation at hand, and all 
other Principles as focused on the proposed responses to that situation, might better assist the 
researcher in differentiating among the various codes. For example, some confusion between 
Threat identification issues and Safety & Stability considerations might clear if one remembers 
that the former focuses on sources, while the latter focuses on methods and outcomes.  
Second, some method for accounting for different identities would add clarity and focus 
to the data, and more utility to the analysis. For example, in Threat issues, the danger to U.S. 
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citizens from potential Iraqi action was prominent; the danger to Iraqi citizens from potential 
U.S. action was absent. In Safety & Stability issues, for example, no attention was paid to the 
enormous human cost of war – whether to citizens or to military personnel on both sides. In 
considering Justice, identifying various sources of information would yield deeper data. And in 
Community-related issues, the various communities should be identified and examined. This 
added level of attention would also direct reporters and scholars alike to seek absent voices – and 
to more critically examine agenda-driven sources like the Iraqi National Congress. Mill’s 
defense in On Liberty of the value of all opinions would suggest casting a much wider net.  
Third, some tracking of placement – both in terms of stories within the publication, as 
well as statements within each story – might shed more light on the importance of various 
Principles and their influence in the data. One emergent element of interest in considering Utility 
was that statements invoking some form of the last three questions tended to appear at the end of 
a story, as a sort of counter-balancing thought to the dominant discussion. There is a significant 
difference in influence among front-page stories, headlines, lead sentences, and closing material. 
This instrument needs some way to account for these subtleties.  
Finally, to answer a perennial critique of utilitarianism, future research applications of 
this approach might benefit from some category for the non-rational or purely emotional. War 
follows “a logic all its own” (Hamblet, 2005, p. 39), whenever anyone dares “Cry ‘Havoc!’ and 
let slip the dogs of war” (Shakespeare, 1601, lines 270-275). Though nothing explicitly of this 
nature emerged from these data, the few statements about the undercurrent of fear pervading the 
U.S. after the 2001 terror attacks point to the strength of strong popular beliefs that may have no 
basis in reality – and may be beyond the reach of the kind of rational appeal so central to Millian 
utilitarianism. Where this study assigned statements of this nature to the appropriate Threat or 
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Safety & Stability categories, it did not have a method for considering the validity or rationality 
of such statements – or any for dealing with irrational ones.  
The “Security-&-Justice-for-All” Model extends Utilitarian Ethics Literature and Theory  
This pilot study applied the Millian Security Principles model to a sample of coverage 
from the New York Times, and demonstrated that much of the narrative did, in fact, make appeals 
to utilitarian greater good or security, but in an incomplete manner. Numerous officials sounded 
like the scientists in Jurassic Park, who “were so preoccupied with whether they could ... they 
didn’t stop to think if they should” (Kennedy, Molen, & Spielberg, 1993). Further, while the 
model illuminated some correlations between the Millian Principles and some of the issues 
raised by the Times editors, it demonstrated its true utility in focusing and shaping a coherent 
analysis of emergent concerns it revealed in the invasion coverage sample. Finally, though 
challenges and limitations in the model emerged as well, it still demonstrated real promise in 
providing valuable insight into, and guidance for, further narrative analysis.  
The Millian Security Principles complement recent Utilitarian theory. This study’s 
extensive review of the Millian literature to date found nothing related to his definition in 
Utilitarianism of security and its vital importance. In addition to the renewed attention to Mill’s 
thought in recent years – related to his bicentennial and his book’s sesquicentennial – his 
writings and ideas continue to exert significant influence in philosophy and ethics. The Millian 
Security Principles complement this ongoing presence by offering a new application of Mill’s 
thought, potentially useful in considering various philosophical or ethical questions.  
The Millian Security Principles extend recent war ethics scholarship. Building on 
recent war ethics scholarship by Walzer (2009), Whitman (2006), Singer (2004), and especially 
Shaw (2011, 2014, 2016), this model extends Shaw’s Utilitarian War Principle by situating it in 
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a larger construct based on Mill’s definition of security and its vital importance. Though also 
focused on the crucial ad Bellum question, this model goes beyond current utilitarian war and 
just war ethics by providing a new, independent framework for organizing issues that arise 
around conflict narratives. Further, it offers a new set of criteria for opening, focusing, or 
otherwise engaging such narratives.  
The Millian Security Principles contribute a new media ethics model. While media 
ethics scholarship increasingly moves away from utilitarianism, the traditions still exercises 
significant influence on both scholarly theory as well as professional ethics codes and practice. 
Notable work by Peck (2006) and especially Elliott (2007) further enhanced the understanding of 
utilitarian media ethics, and surfaced nuances in Mill’s thought on community and especially 
justice. This model situates those values of community and justice within a broader security 
structure that adds the concepts of threat, safety, and stability to the utilitarian media ethics 
toolkit. Further, its “Security-&-Justice-for-All” checklist provides powerful new guidelines for 
comprehensive, inclusive consideration of ethical issues in media product and practice.  
The Millian Security Principles enhance the larger public conversation. Moreover, in 
a civilian-command democracy, informed citizen participation and debate remains central to the 
ad Bellum narrative – requiring a “link between the military ... and the wider civilian society” 
(Offley, 2001, p. 15). Public servants, citizen-soldiers, citizen-journalists, and all other members 
of a democracy need a useful framework for considering the essential ad Bellum question – as 
well as other questions involving community-sanctioned violence. By focusing on specific, 
defined threats to safety and stability, and insisting on justice for all those involved, this 
approach adds a new framework for useful inquiry to the ongoing public discussion.  
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The Millian Security Principles provide a normative coverage prescription. Finally, 
by outlining a normative rubric for engaging the ad Bellum question with its 5 Principles and 12 
Guiding Questions, the “Security-&-Justice-for-All” structure moves beyond guiding useful 
examinations of past coverage under a utilitarian ethic towards directing future coverage in 
specific, measurable steps. This promises many useful applications for enterprise, investigative 
reporting – whether by experienced war correspondents, general assignment staffers, 
professional-amateur hybrids, defense-industry writers and bloggers, or interested citizens – to 
engage with any number of conflict-related subjects along Millian Security lines of inquiry.  
The Millian Security Principles provide a model for media education. Beyond its 
ethics applications, this model’s 5 Principles and 12 Guiding Questions provide a structure for 
teaching several imaginative thinking skills for media students, who can choose one or more 
items from the normative rubric to guide story topic identification, source identification, data 
collection, and reporting goals. As a whole, the “Security-&-Justice-for-All” structure offers a 
guide to more balanced consideration of threat, security, stability, justice, and community.  
Limitations of the Times Study: What Wasn’t this Good For? 
Though this pilot study of a limited Times sample viewed under a Millian Security 
Principles lens revealed a great deal about the 29 articles selected by the editors – as well as 
significant items of interest for future inquiry – limitations in this study linked to the instrument 
itself, the methodology, and the sample emerged alongside the useful findings.  
Several emergent difficulties in data analysis among the various categories were 
discussed earlier; in addition, clearer category definitions and examples of each code type would 
make future study more efficient and effective. Further, when many paragraphs displayed the 
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influence of more than two categories, the instrument did not have any way to rank them in order 
of strength or importance. Nor did it allow for coding any items with equal influences.  
Further, as Altheide’s Ethnographic Content Analysis also involves the researcher’s 
insights as part of the instrument, inherent limitations on reliability restrict any generalization of 
these findings. No feasible large-scale study could, for example, require each coder to undertake 
a significant literature review of Mill and utilitarianism before beginning the analysis; therefore, 
more work is needed to refine the model’s categories and definitions for use in future studies.  
Finally, the highly limited nature of this purposive sample – chosen by the Times editors 
to represent the good, the bad, and the ugly of its coverage – reflects what those editors wanted 
the readers to see. As the nation’s unofficial paper of record, surely the Times coverage of the 
2003 Iraq invasion easily encompassed many multiples of the 29 articles included here. This 
means that the study cannot be considered in any way indicative of the larger coverage: It is 
entirely possible that better, more comprehensive articles appeared in the very same issues. And 
ultimately, the very small number of stories sampled made any kind of meaningful longitudinal 
or comparative analysis nearly impossible, other than at a very basic and general level.  
Suggestions for Future Research: “We Fully Intend to Continue”  
As the Times editors resolved in 2004 to double down on their coverage of the decisions 
that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this study – despite its limitations, and some 15 years later – 
offers promising potential for further application of the Millian Security Principles model to the 
invasion coverage, as well as other conflict-related narratives, to see how a Mill’s-eye view 
might better inform the conversation and its conclusions.  
Iraq revisited. First, with a “Security-&-Justice-for-All” model – improved in ways 
suggested earlier, and subject to continual refinement (Altheide, 2103; Mill, 1863) – a more 
 309 
comprehensive study of Times coverage of the Iraq invasion would shed light on the narrative. 
The three time frames that emerged from this sample – pre-invasion, post-invasion, and 
anniversary – provide useful sampling targets, and could be augmented with further 
anniversaries aimed at collecting a much larger, more representative data sample.  
Second, the model could be applied to a wider range of news outlets from the same 
period, to better understand the larger context and quality of coverage – especially involving 
Knight Ridder and other exemplar news organizations and media types as well.  
Third, the model could be applied to other sources of data – interviews with reporters and 
editors, surveys of writers as well as readers, reporters’ source notes and recordings, archival 
materials, conference proceedings, and other conflict-related security narratives. An analysis of 
any of these using the Millian Security Principles might reveal much of interest.  
Beyond Iraq. Fourth, the model could be applied to other conflicts besides the 2003 
invasion. As we never seem to escape “wars and rumors of wars,” there is no shortage of 
conflicts to cover – especially as many military actions fall short of a full-scale war. Regardless 
of a given conflict’s scope, the model provides structure and guidance for study.  
Fifth, in addition to considering coverage of traditional warfare such as the 2003 Iraq 
invasion, this “Security-&-Justice-for-All” model shows promise for the effective study of new, 
transitional kinds of asymmetrical warfare – such as that involving non-state actors or terror – as 
well as emerging conflict arenas of unmanned, automated weaponry, such as drones, and the 
virtual battlefield of cyberwarfare – which already rages worldwide, though mostly unseen.  
Sixth, this model may prove useful in considering several other, non-martial areas of 
community-sanctioned conflict or violence, in offering a structured utilitarian reasoning 
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procedure for analyzing discussions of capital punishment, the use of lethal force by police, 
lethal self-defense by citizens, militias, the Second Amendment, euthanasia, and abortion.  
Seventh, the model may also prove worthy of guiding inquiry into non-conflict areas of 
security and justice, in addressing other threats to community stability and well-being such as 
critical infrastructure, the economy, industry, demographic changes, and the environment.  
Finally, a revised version of this model, with carefully operationalized variables chosen 
to investigate the Millian criteria, should yield significant and useful consideration of any of 
these data sources in a quantitative content analysis or similar study.  
“Unfinished Business” and “Aggressive Reporting:” Contributions and Conclusions  
“We consider the story ... to be unfinished business,” concluded the Times editors in their 
mea culpa (From, 2004a, para. 14). “And we fully intend to continue aggressive reporting aimed 
at setting the record straight.” Fifteen years later, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we can 
identify some of the long-term consequences of concerns raised in the Times coverage: no 
evidence of WMDs ever came to light, the regional destabilization that some experts warned 
might come of invading Iraq did come to pass, and costs and casualties continue to mount.  
Perennially, it seems, “War! Children, it’s just a shot away” (Jagger & Richards, 1969, 
Track 1); however, today’s conflict correspondents work in a radically different reality, 
repeatedly decimated by deep cuts to personnel and resources while increasingly challenged by 
an ever-impatient electronic media. The 2003 media legion that invaded Iraq alongside the troops 
no longer exists – and may never be seen at such scale again. In their former glory days, outlets 
like the “AP had never hesitated,” reminisced one regional editor: “The attitude was always, 
‘Forget the budget. We’ll find some way to pay for this.’ You didn’t get fired for going over-
budget, but for missing the story” (Frazier, 2019, para. 3).  
 311 
But who has those kinds of resources anymore? “The pieces that I always lament [not 
publishing] are the long-haul reportorial pieces that require commitment,” lamented one major 
magazine publisher recently (Green, 2018, para. 11). Indeed: “It’s expensive to cover war and 
the hidden costs are exponential,” noted one former reporter. “The AP can’t be at every coup and 
every conflict and every war anymore, we are seeing that now” (Frazier, para. 13).  
These shifting priorities carry real consequences: As a skeleton crew of one, manning 
ABC’s Afghanistan bureau in April, 2011, veteran war correspondent Mike Boettcher found 
himself hugging the ground for dear life as U.S. Marines encountered a fierce Taliban spring 
offensive (Boettcher & Patrick, 2011; Boettcher, 2011). As he recounted several years later, after 
feeling in those moments the closest to death he had ever come in over 30 years of covering 
conflicts, he then had to fight to upload his report to New York – because over 100 ABC 
reporters and staff covering preparations for a royal wedding in London were consuming all the 
available satellite bandwidth (M. Boettcher, personal communication, June, 2014).  
Today’s would-be war reporter faces unprecedented challenges in attempting to cover an 
ever-shifting battlefield in an ever-evolving media environment. Though nothing can completely 
address all of these challenges, the Millian Security Principles, as validated by this pilot study, 
offer a sort of 5-bladed Swiss Army Knife that reporters can apply to the crucial ad Bellum 
question as well as to the conflict that follows: First, the criteria of Threat, Safety & Stability, 
Justice, Community, and Utility provide a useful ethical framework for reporting and challenging 
any statements made by government and other sources, to avoid falling “for misinformation ... 
[as] did many news organizations – in particular, this one” (From, para. 4).  
More importantly, however, the Principles delineate a deliberate, reasoned, normative 
process through which reporters can more effectively plan and pursue increasingly robust, 
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comprehensive coverage that independently seeks “more and stronger information” (para. 2), 
“new evidence” (para. 3), “follow-up” reportage (para. 5), and “independently verified” 
information (para. 6) beyond what official sources provide – informing the kind of “aggressive 
reporting” (para. 14) that the Times described as its past failure and its future standard. This 



































Appendix A  
 
Five Millian Security Principles Categories 
 
[MSP 1] Threat: Security protects against a vital, existential Threat.  
 
First Principle: Security, “the most vital of all interests,” protects against “a violation of a 
right,” a definite Threat to “the very groundwork of our existence” (pp. 66-67).  
 
Millian Threat elements represent specific things that may cause harm to specific persons or 
property when directed to do so by specific actors. This principle addresses the situation at hand, 
or nearly at hand, and seeks specific identities of harms, harmed, and harmful actors.  
 
Key identifiers include words, phrases or sentences, including questions, that explicitly state or 
implicitly reference a specific threat of injurious action, a specific party or thing threatened by 
such action, and / or a specific actor whose plan or potential threatens the existing security.  
For Mill, this first encompassed “any conduct which threatens the security” (p. 63), or “a wrong 
done” (p. 61), including threats to rights, goods, and one’s existence itself.  
Second, he seeks to identify “some assignable person who is wronged” (p. 61).  
Finally, he identifies the “person who has done harm” (p. 63) or “those who infringe the rule” (p. 
65).  
 
Examples include discussion of actions that would foreseeably cause undue restriction, loss, 
injury or death, as well as identification of threatened victims and threatening perpetrators.  
 
Consider how these specific Threat Principle Questions are addressed in this selection:  
 
1. What is the specific nature of the perceived security Threat in this particular action? (Threat 
Nature). For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed nuclear weapons, which 
represent a clearly identified threat to both people and property.  
 
2. Whose specific security is actually being Threatened by this particular action? (Threat 
Target). For example, some of the discussion in the Times identified coastal residents of the 
United States as being vulnerable to drone weapons launched from terrorist-manned boats.  
 
3. Who, specifically, is Threatening anyone’s security in this particular instance? (Threat 
Agent). For example, some of the discussion in the Times identified former Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein as being prepared to use various weapons to harm U.S. citizens.  
 
Differentiating focus: MSP 1 addresses potential threat elements evident in the situation at 
hand. All four subsequent MSPs address the potential outcomes of the proposed response(s) to 
those threat elements.  
 
 
[MSP 2] Safety & Stability: Security preserves Safety and Stability in response to Threat.  
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Second Principle: Security preserves both the present Safety, “all our immunity from evil,” as 
well as an ongoing and enduring Stability, “the whole value of every good ... beyond the passing 
moment” (p. 67).  
 
Millian Safety & Stability elements represent specific things that may be preserved for both 
present Safety and future Stability by a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle 
addresses the proposed response to the threat, and seeks specific mitigations of potential harms, 
on behalf of the potentially harmed, through specific immunity from potentially harmful actors.  
 
Key identifiers include words, phrases or sentences, including questions, that explicitly state or 
implicitly reference elements of security in both immediate, present Safety as well as ongoing, 
enduring future Stability.  
This includes primary and secondary effects of threatened action, as well as foreseeable future 
consequences, both intended and unintended.  
This also includes considering the loss of tangible defenses of previous and present security as 
well as the tangible manifestation or intrusion of tangible threats into present and future security.  
 
Examples would include discussion of proposed actions (or failures) to preserve safe water, food, 
shelter, medicine, transportation, livelihood, health, well-being, and life, as well as concerns over 
hazardous conditions, materials, methods, or persons whose particular function in the community 
could create a threatening situation when faced with a specific threat.  
 
Consider how these specific Safety & Stability Principle Questions are addressed in this 
selection:  
 
4. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s immediate, present Safety? 
For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed U.S. actions taken to protect certain 
Iraqi informants against retaliation from loyalists.  
 
5. How would this proposed response specifically preserve anyone’s ongoing, enduring 
Stability? For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed U.S. concerns that Iraq 
was developing ballistic missiles that threatened the ongoing stability of nearby nations.  
 
 
[MSP 3] Justice: Security promotes Justice in response to Threat.  
 
Third Principle: Security promotes Justice: in seeking a just present Safety to deter or “repel” 
unjust harm, as well as in seeking a just enduring Stability to prevent, or “retaliate / punish” for 
“a violation of a right” (pp. 62-63; p. 66).  
 
Millian Justice elements represent a specific stance that promotes a state of justice in both 
present Safety and future Stability in a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle 
addresses the various legal, moral, and ethical rights invoked in a proposed response to the 
threat, and seeks equitable justice for all involved.  
 
Key identifiers include words, phrases or sentences, including questions, that explicitly state or 
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implicitly reference a just response seeking present preservation of, or unjust deprivation of, 
individual and group rights, as well as a just response seeking future preservation of, or unjust 
deprivation of, individual and group rights, as well as just retribution for damages and just 
punishment for injury.  
Millian justice addresses present and future stability through rights. “To have a right ... is ... to 
have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of,” Mill writes (p. 66).  
After Elliott (2007), Mill’s definition of justice includes concepts of legality, morality, merit (just 
deserts), fidelity (promise keeping), veracity, fairness and impartiality, proper authority, ethical 
prudence, rational defense, and justification for any proposed response.  
 
Examples would include discussion of universal human rights, state-defined civil rights, 
morality, laws, guides, treaties, community traditions and expectations, verification, truthfulness, 
agency and authority, personal and corporate responsibility, mutual respect, transparency, and 
shared decision making.  
 
Consider how these specific Justice Principle Questions are addressed in this selection:  
 
6. How would this proposed response specifically promote Justice in defining anyone’s present 
Safety? For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed attempts to verify evidence 
that Iraq possessed WMDs in sufficient quantity and quality to immediately threaten others.  
 
7. How would this proposed response specifically promote Justice for anyone’s enduring 
Stability? For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed various justifications for 
sanctions, or other punishments, for Iraq’s alleged development of treaty-banned weapons.  
 
 
[MSP 4] Community: Security produces Community in Just response to Threat.  
 
Fourth Principle: Security produces Community: in Safety of “our fellow-creatures” (pp. 61, 
67) and in Stability of “the general good” (pp. 63-64) for all involved parties – including the 
threatening party.  
 
Millian Community elements represent a specific state of being – existing or sought – that 
produces or invokes some kind of group identity that preserves both present Safety and future 
Stability in a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the various state, 
organizational, command, shared and designated responsibility, and group identity issues 
invoked in a proposed response to the threat, and seeks stable community for all involved.  
 
Key identifiers include words, phrases or sentences, including questions, that explicitly state or 
implicitly reference the “community of interest between himself and the human society of which 
he forms a part, such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally, is 
threatening to his own” (p. 63).  
For Mill, this involved both “the claim we have on our fellow-creatures” for mutual defense (p. 
67) as well as the “defence of others” (p. 75), including “those with whom we sympathise” (p. 
63), “through, or in common with, society at large” (p. 64).  
His definition of communal, not individual, moral “vengeance” (p. 75) is through “subordination 
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of it to the social sympathies” (p. 64). Throughout, his positions on individual rights and 
responsibilities are extended to the larger group, society, state, and humanity at large.  
 
Examples would include discussion of present and future local, state, regional, national and 
international alliances, politics at any level, the common defense, homeland security, duty, race, 
ethnicity, or religion (p. 63).  
 
Consider how these specific Community Principle Questions are addressed in this selection:  
 
8. How would this proposed response specifically promote the present Safety of all involved 
parties – and their larger communities? For example, some of the discussion in the Times 
addressed debates within the U.S. intelligence community among various government agencies 
over the exact nature and strength of the alleged Iraqi threat to immediate U.S. safety.  
 
9. How would this proposed response specifically promote the enduring Stability of all involved 
parties – and their larger communities? For example, some of the discussion in the Times 
addressed the United Nations weapons inspectors, whose multilateral mission in Iraq was 
designed to assure the community of nations that Iraq did not pose a threat to them.  
 
 
[MSP 5] Utility: Security practices Utility in Just, Community response to Threat.  
 
Fifth Principle: Security practices Utility: seeking an ideal deterrence in both Safety and 
Stability, promoting the greatest general good and least harm for all involved parties, and 
representing the single best available option, given historical experience as well as foreseeable 
present and future consequences, based on empirical evidence.  
 
Millian Utility elements represent specific statements that practice some degree of utilitarian 
calculus, seeking to balance goods and harms for the greater good, to ensure both present Safety 
and future Stability by a proposed response to a specific Threat. This principle addresses the 
various arguments for and against a proposed response to the threat, and seeks specific, logical, 
empirical justifications for harms in light of expected goods for all those involved.  
 
Key identifiers include words, phrases or sentences, including questions, that explicitly state or 
implicitly reference the utilitarian ethics calculus of seeking the single, best-defensible option for 
action that produces the greatest foreseeable degree of freedom and security, and affords the 
greatest foreseeable good, for the greatest foreseeable number of people, both now and in the 
future.  
Mill’s utilitarianism is thoroughly grounded in concepts of universal equality, justice, 
community, and minimizing harm.  
Utilitarian consideration of any action includes “the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, 
past and present, and their prospects in the future” (p. 17) and becomes “a question of fact and 
experience, dependent ... upon evidence” (p. 49).  
 
Examples would include discussion of expected outcomes of suggested actions and possible 
alternatives, estimating effects on all involved parties, weighing costs and benefits, seeking 
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precedent as well as appealing to principle, arguing from evidence, and acting in a transparent 
manner to justify its reasoning. “Social utility alone can decide the preference” between 
competing individual and communal costs and benefits (p. 72).  
 
Consider how these specific Utility Principle Questions are addressed in this selection:  
 
10. Action: How would this proposed response specifically deter or “repel” this perceived threat 
with just, maximal gain and minimal harm for all involved parties – including historical contexts 
and foreseeable consequences? For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed U.S. 
government claims that the situation in Iraq compelled the U.S. to act as soon as possible, 
regardless of international support, legal standing, or conflicting intelligence reports.  
 
11. Inaction: How would all involved parties be unjustly harmed if the proposed response were 
not undertaken – including historical experience as well as all foreseeable present and future 
consequences? For example, some of the discussion in the Times addressed concerns raised by 
some intelligence officials that, lacking any evidence of an immediate threat, the consequences 
of action against Iraq were so significant – especially regarding regional stability – that the best 
course of action was to refrain from war.  
 
12. Millian Security Calculus: How would this proposed response represent the only action 
available that would foreseeably promote the greatest expected security and least expected harm 
for all involved parties – including historical contexts and all possible alternatives? For example 
(very rarely), some of the discussion in the Times addressed a complete, balanced consideration 
by officials of all (or most) of the various competing elements involved in deciding whether an 
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/// [7] 00 (0) ///  
  [8] 00 (0) /// [9] 00 (0) /// [10] 00 (0) /// [11] 00 (0) /// [12] 00 (0).  
 TOTALS: Main Q: X-X /// Other Qs: X-X /// Unaddressed Qs: X-X  
 
 
STEP 3: Write a short summary of the most pertinent observations about this article. 
Include information  






























[A] Pre-invasion coverage (n = 12 articles, ~ 40% of paragraphs)  
 
The alleged Iraqi terrorist training camps, and Al Qaeda connection: [AI 1]  
[01] • October 26, 2001: Czechs Confirm Iraqi Agent Met With Terror Ringleader  
 
[02] • November 8, 2001: Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism [AI 2]  
The accounts of the terrorist training camp have not subsequently been verified. 
 
The hidden weapons facilities: 
[03] • December 20, 2001: Iraqi Tells of Renovations at Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms 
[HW 1]  
According to Knight Ridder News, this scientist was taken back to Iraq earlier this year for a tour 
of sites where he worked. None of the sites showed evidence of illegal weapons activity. 
 
The aluminum tubes: 
[04] • September 8, 2002: U.S. Says Hussein Intensified Quest For A-Bomb Parts [AT 1]  
 
[05] • September 13, 2002: White House Lists Iraq Steps To Build Banned Weapons [AT 2]  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: first  
Following are examples of stories that cast doubt on key claims about Iraq's weapons programs, 
and on the reliability of some defectors. [RD 1]  
[06] • October 10, 2002: Aides Split on Assessment of Iraq's Plans  
 
On the subject of the meeting in Prague, a Times follow-up cast serious doubt: 
[07] • October 21, 2002: Prague Discounts An Iraqi Meeting [AI 3]  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: second = “The Massing Gap” – nearly three months of 
silence pre-invasion  
[08] • October 24, 2002: A C.I.A. Rival; Pentagon Sets up Intelligence Unit [RD 2]  
 
The aluminum tubes: - second round = “The Massing Gap” – nearly three months of silence 
pre-invasion  
[09] • January 10, 2003: Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited By Bush [AT 3]  
 
• Follow-up to hidden weapons facilities:  
[10] January 24, 2003: Defectors Bolster U.S. Case Against Iraq [HW 2]  
 
The aluminum tubes: - third round  
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[11] • January 28, 2003: Report's Findings Undercut U.S. Argument [AT 4]  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: third  
[12] • Feb. 2, 2003: Split at C.I.A. and F.B.I. on Iraqi Ties to Al Qaeda [RD 3]  
 
 
[B] Post-invasion coverage (n = 11 articles, ~ 34% of articles)  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: fourth = 1st post-invasion (3/19) story / nothing on UN 
observers (2/12)  
[13] • March 23, 2003: C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports [RD 4 / Post-
invasion]  
 
The Iraqi scientist and destruction of weapons: 
[14] • April 21, 2003: Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert [IS 1]  
 
Follow-ups: 
[15] • April 23, 2003: Focus Shifts From Weapons To the People Behind Them [IS 2]  
 
[16] • April 24, 2003: U.S.-Led Forces Occupy Baghdad Complex Filled with Chemical Agents 
[IS 3]  
 
The "biological weapons labs": 
This is one example of a claim that was quickly and prominently challenged by additional 
reporting 
[17] • May 21, 2003: U.S. Analysts Link Iraq Labs to Germ Arms [BW 1] = 1st post-combat ops 
(5/1) story  
The story left the impression that the Administration claims represented a consensus, because we 
did not know otherwise. By June 7, however, the same reporters, having dug deeper, published a 
front-page story describing the strong views of dissenting intelligence analysts that the trailers 
were not bio-weapons labs, and suggesting that the Administration may have strained to make 
the evidence fit its case for war. (Last Sunday, Mr. Powell conceded that the C.I.A. was misled 
about the trailers, apparently by an Iraqi defector.)  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: fifth   
[18] • May 22, 2003: Prewar Views of Iraq Threat Are Under Review by C.I.A. [RD 5]  
 
The "biological weapons labs": - folos  
[19] • June 7, 2003: Some Analysts of Iraq Trailers Reject Germ Use [BW 2]  
 
[20] • June 26, 2003: Agency Disputes C.I.A. View on Trailers as Weapons Labs [BW 3]  
 
The Iraqi scientist and destruction of weapons: second round  
[21] • July 20, 2003: A Chronicle of Confusion in the Hunt for Hussein's Weapons [IS 4]  
 
Raising doubts about intelligence: sixth   
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[22] • July 20, 2003: In Sketchy Data, Trying to Gauge Iraq Threat [RD 6]  
 
[23] • September 28, 2003: Agency Belittles Information Given By Iraqi Defectors [RD 7]  
 
 
[C] Anniversary coverage (n = 6 articles, ~ 25% of paragraphs) – after 4-month gap in 
chosen coverage  
 
[24] • January 26, 2004: Ex-Inspector Says C.I.A. Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program [RD 
8] = Anniversary 
 
[25] • February 1, 2004: Powell's Case a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms [RD 9]  
 
[26] • February 7, 2004: Agency Alert About Iraqi Not Heeded, Officials Say [RD 10]  
 
[27] • February 13, 2004: Stung by Exiles's Role, C.I.A. Orders a Shift in Procedures [RD 11]  
 
[28] • March 6, 2004: U.S., Certain That Iraq Had Illicit Arms, Reportedly Ignored Contrary 
Reports [RD 12]  
 
The aluminum tubes et al: - final round  
[29] For a discussion of this (aluminum tubes) coverage by Michael R. Gordon, chief military 
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